AN INVESTIGATION
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND OF THE PROGRESS OF REASON,
FROM SENSE TO SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

IN THREE PARTS.

BY JAMES HUTTON, M.D. & F.R.S.E.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL III.

EDINBURGH:
PRINTED FOR A. STRAHAN, AND T. CADELL,
LONDON.

1794.
ERRATA.

Page 102. line 20. for respectfully, read respectively

195.  5. for efficient, read efficient

216.  16. for the proposition, read one of the propositions

302.  3. for But, read Or

336.  20. for mind, read kind

398.  20. for vigour, read vigour

408.  18. for again, read against

624.  23. for affecting, read effecting
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PART III.

OF

WISDOM OR PHILOSOPHY,

AS THE

PROPER END OF SCIENCE, AND THE MEANS OF

HAPPINESS.

IN EIGHT SECTIONS.

VOL. III.
PART III.

Of Wisdom or Philosophy, as the proper end of Science, and the means of Happiness.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING treated of knowledge, both as the instinctive cause of action in animals and the conscious faculty of thought in man; and having considered wisdom as the effect of human knowledge, we are now to inquire concerning the effect of wisdom.

The subject knowledge will thus be examined in all its parts; for, having first inquired into the efficient cause of knowledge, or the means by which that end is naturally attained, and then consider the final cause, or end and intention of the human intellect, we shall have examined the subject in every view. Now, so far as all the parts of this subject, human knowledge, shall be found properly connected in a necessary order, we shall be led to perceive a system of mind, as we conceive a system of matter. This system of mind will then comprehend both the sensual and intellectual systems.

That the sensual system is contrived in supreme wisdom, for the purpose of life, is a proposition which will not be disputed. But, the purposes of life are not those of intellect, although intellect is occasionally employed for the purposes of life, in like manner as life is employed as the means of intellect.
INTRODUCTION.

The system of life has been contrived in wisdom. In that system, sense, memory, and discernment, are employed, as the means to attain the end which is effected; but then, the design, by which that system was created or contrived, is not in the mind by which the vital functions of the animal are conducted. For, the wisdom, which may be perceived in that sensual system, belongs not to the brute animal, who has no science or intellectual knowledge, by which he should be led to acquire wisdom proper to himself. But, man has science; and, he arrives at wisdom, in the progress of his intellect. He then perceives a proper subject for his inquiry; this is, to understand the proper end or intention of that wisdom which he is made to acquire, as well as to see the means by which that intellectual state of his existence had been attained. Now, this is the present object of our science.

In the first Part of this work, the instinctive faculties of man have been examined; those faculties by which he knows, not only for the purposes of life, but also for that of leading his reasoning mind to know his knowledge, and thus become a conscious being, which is perhaps infinitely more than reasoning simply in consequence of knowledge.

In the second Part, again, those conscious operations of reason have been examined, operations by which man becomes a scientific being, in seeing the order of his own thoughts and that of natural events. In this capacity, man is no more an animal, but has become a pure intellectual existence, knowing for the purpose of acting wisely in seeing ends and means.

In this third Part, Philosophy is now to be examined, in order to understand its nature, and to see its purpose. Here then will terminate this subject; for, having considered the faculties of man, from their beginning to the end or purpose of their existence, we can
can find no more data in our knowledge, consequently can proceed no farther in reasoning scientifically, that is, in seeing truth, and estimating the degrees of probability.

In treating of this subject, I shall, first, examine the intellectual faculties of man as applied to natural philosophy, by which means his science is promoted, and his power in the material system is enlarged. I shall then pursue the system of intellect, in proceeding to the proper end of its intention, through moral philosophy, in which man learns his social duties, and enjoys his social affections. Lastly, I shall examine philosophy in general, as the means, intended by the Author of our being, for the independent happiness of our intellectual existence, and for the rational or well grounded hope of future felicity.
SECTION I.

General view of the progress of Intellect, from Science to Philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

Of Philosophy, as the ultimate progress of the human understanding.

1. PHILOSOPHY, like science, is a progress of the human intellect; it will therefore be proper to begin with distinguishing those two things in relation to each other.

Science is an operation of a conscious being, distinguishing and generalizing one subject of knowledge, in order to understand that subject; whereas, philosophy distinguishes and generalizes the subjects of science, in order to form design, and understand the proper adapting of ends and means. If we shall thus discriminate science and philosophy, in the progress of intellect to design and wisdom, we shall find reason for making another distinction, in the further progress of intellect, judging in relation to its own designs, and knowing the nature of its proper wisdom. Therefore, however we shall please to term those several things, it will be evident, that there is a progress of the human intellect advancing more and more towards perfection by certain steps. It is in the seeing of these steps that we learn, at the same time, the wisdom of that supreme design in
in which we have been made to exist, and the nature of our proper wisdom by which our voluntary action must be conducted.

2. Animal action proceeds on knowledge which is unerring, as being absolute and immediate, consequently necessary, or the work of nature. Human knowledge is a different thing; it consists of that which, on the one hand, may be termed proper knowledge, as comprehending both matter of fact and truth; and, on the other, of knowledge which may be considered as improper or false, consisting of imagination, supposition, error, and absurdity. Therefore, if we would avoid imposing upon ourselves, and acting thus improperly, it behooves us to examine well our knowledge, how far it is of the one or other of these two kinds, true or false, real or imaginary, certain or assumed. But, as our knowledge in general is extremely complex, and as some of the parts of which it consists may be true, while others are false, it becomes necessary for us to separate and abstract our natural knowledge, that thus each part may be examined, both in relation to truth, or that which is believed upon evidence, and to that which is always considered as matter of fact, and cannot be doubted; for, unless we find a consistency among all those things thus compared in our reason, we must be assured that there is error in our opinion.

All our acquired knowledge being in this manner to be compared with that which is absolute, evident, or certain, it is necessary that there should be some principles which are true in themselves, or a certain species of knowledge which is ultimate, and therefore cannot be either farther analysed, or compared with any other, in order to try its consistency or truth. Having discovered what are those principles of absolute certainty, then, by referring and relating to those every other thing, we would have it in our power to examine our knowledge, in order to know it better; and, we would be able to form an opinion concerning its truth, its falsity, or its uncertainty.

3. It
3. It is this examination of our natural knowledge, in order to know its truth, which is properly science, as being a superior species of knowledge. Science proceeds all by conscious comparison, as judging one thing from another, which is then better known. But, there may be, in science, indefinite degrees; for, if I judge one thing in comparing it with another, and this with a third, unless I knew what is first in knowledge, or what is perfect, in being absolutely true; and also, unless I knew every step in the production of the examined knowledge, I cannot be said to have perfected my science, or to have arrived at the end of knowledge, however I may have advanced far beyond that which is natural to me, either as an animal or a man.

Now, this study, of first principles, is properly the science of our knowledge. It is infinitely removed from the natural knowledge which we have as animals; for, it is perfectly abstract, in having no immediate relation to any natural thing, or to the object and intention of our animal knowledge. The object of this study is to know absolutely; and this is infinitely removed from the having knowledge absolute, which is the first knowing, the knowing in necessity, or the beginning of a mind. These two things, therefore, are placed at the opposite extremes of being or existence; the one is the beginning of a mind emerging from nothing, or a state of absolute ignorance, and knowing simply, without either thought or judgment; the other is the perfection of a mind, not only knowing things, the relations and the order of those things, but knowing itself, as knowing that upon which its knowledge ultimately rests. This is the perfection of science, which has truth for its object; and it leads to the perfection of intellect or human knowledge, which has happiness for its end.

4. Happiness may thus be considered as the proper end of science. But, must a person, it may be asked, arrive at the perfection of science
science before he is completely happy? This question must be answered in the affirmative, if by completely happy, shall be meant, as happy as it is possible for him to be. But, in happiness, there is genus, species, and degree. A being may be happy as an animal, which is one kind of happiness; he may also be happy as a man, which is another kind; and, in those different kinds of happiness there are several species, as well as in each species there are variable degrees. Therefore, accurately speaking, a being cannot have happiness complete, without having happiness of every kind of which his nature is capable; happiness in every species of which the kinds admit, and happiness through all those cases in its ultimate degrees.

An animal may be said to be happy who is in the perfect case of health, and pleased in the proper enjoyment of his nature; a person may be said to be happy, who, to his animal enjoyment, has superadded that of intellect, in the knowledge of order, beauty, truth; and, in this manner, he may enjoy through every species of those means of happiness. But, is there not still happiness and knowledge of another kind, when, besides having every other species of science and enjoyment, a person should know the nature of his science and his happiness, its causes and its limits, its proper ends and means? Here is certainly something more than science; for, man may be happy through every enjoyment or species of science, without knowing how to make himself most happy. This last progress requires just estimates of happiness; and this is the application of science to happiness, the proper end or effect of science. Here, therefore, would be a scientific progress of intellect, beyond the proper limit of science; and here, man might make himself again more happy, in knowing his own nature, that of happiness, and all the means conducive to that end.

Thus, besides the happiness of mere animal enjoyment, and the rational enjoyment of his intellect, or the happiness of science, there
is still an important object of pursuit for man. This progress of intellect will then constitute knowledge of a superior order in the estimate of human wisdom, and procure a happiness which may be truly termed supreme; a happiness which cannot be attained except in studying science, knowing himself, and arriving at philosophy.

6. We may therefore define philosophy, as being not only the perfection of science, but the proper end or final cause of human knowledge, and as being, in like manner, not only the completion of happiness, but the way in which happiness may be best attained. Thus philosophy, which necessarily requires science, and which naturally leads to happiness, may be distinguished in relation both to science and to happiness; the one of these is in relation to philosophy, the proper means, the other is the proper end. Philosophy will thus appear to be an acquired state of mind, proper for happiness, and brought about in the pursuit of knowledge.

7. The happiness felt by the animal, who has not science, is merely pleasure; the pleasure, again, which is felt by man in having science, is a rational enjoyment. The nature, however, of this rational enjoyment is not then understood; for, man, who has pleasure in science, knows no more the nature of his enjoyment in that pleasure, than the brute does in feeling the pleasure which attends the gratification of sensual desires. The man of science, in seeing truth, enjoys that species of happiness which is then comprehended in the progress of his intellect. He also knows that he thus enjoys; but, this man may be as yet ignorant why, or for what purpose, it is that he thus enjoys. In like manner, the moral man has pleasure in the approbation of his species; but, he knows not why, or to what purpose, he has pleasure in that speculation. It is otherwise in philosophy. There, a man is not satisfied with the instinctive pleasure of the animal, nor with the conscious enjoyment of his science and his morals; for, he then inquires if he has truly reason to
to be happy; he demands the reason of his satisfaction, and he seeks the approbation of his own mind to the enjoyment of his happiness, through whatever channel this has come.

Here, therefore, in philosophy, may be observed a progress, which will necessarily be considered as in its nature ultimate, although it is not absolutely so. For when, after being pleased in my person, and satisfied in my knowledge, I shall next enjoy the happiness, the love and admiration of my species, and obtain the approbation of my conscience, What have I left to do, in order to be happy?—Nothing, but to know that this truly is, and that it will be. Now, in order to know that which in sentiment is just or true, we must know what is general or always in such a thinking being as ourselves; and, we can only know what will be, in understanding that which has been, and that which truly is. But here is a great field for speculation to the human intellect, even after we have arrived at supreme happiness.

8. If happiness be the proper object for man to pursue, philosophy must be the science in which he may expect the accomplishment of this intention. Philosophy is the science of causes and effects, of agents and of sentient beings; it is the science of attaining ends, in knowing means; and it is that science in which man may examine the ends or purposes which he has in view, in order to understand how far, when attained, these ends may answer his expectation or desire. Is it animal pleasure which gives man delight? Or is he pleased with the instinctive enjoyment of his passions and affections? Philosophy will ensure him this satisfaction, in showing how to obtain always the greatest quantity of pleasure. Is it the pleasure of knowledge and contemplation of truth that is the object of his desire? He will find this in philosophy; for, here the truths of science are employed in order to reason, and are generalised in a proper comparison of his ideas. Or, is it the enjoyment of himself in every
pleasure, and the conscious satisfaction of a pleased mind, that is the object of his pursuit? Then, he must study the general of enjoyment; and he must make his own nature the object of his science. But, how is this to be done, unless by the highest generalisation of his science? Now, if the reasoning faculty proceeds beyond what may be strictly termed science, here will be a superior science, in which man, making every action, passion, thought, and fancy of his mind, the object of his knowledge and reflection, judges on the whole; and, this is philosophy.

Without any degree of science, an animal may enjoy the pleasures of life; without philosophy, a man proceeds to enjoy in knowledge, or in satisfying that curiosity which is natural to him as a man; but it is only in philosophy that a man may proceed to enjoy himself, which is undoubtedly the last enjoyment in the order of attainment, and is perhaps the highest in the order of human climate. A man sets out to measure the distance or the magnitude of the sun and moon; this demonstrates science in the mind of such a person; for, without science he could not conceive the intention. But suppose this person has not science sufficient to fulfil the intention, then, it is in vain that he attempts to estimate these objects. In like manner, a man, without philosophy or the science of agents and of sentient beings, of motives and enjoyments, seeks after happiness the natural pursuit of man; Will he then find that which he blindly thus pursues? No; he must first learn to know that for which he seeks. But, this can only be known, in studying the knowledge of himself, and the nature of his knowledge or enjoyment. Now, this is what every man of understanding comes to do, more or less, although he may not be able to see how he comes to do it; in like manner as every man proceeds more or less in geometry, but without knowing that science in which he has proceeded.

9. Whether
9. Whether we consider philosophy as the knowledge of causes which have been, or as the cause of our knowing effects which are to happen, science, which is the knowledge of relations and the understanding of thoughts and things, is necessarily required for that generalization of our knowledge, or that reasoning upon principle, which is employed when man designs in wisdom after contemplating his happiness. But, if man be wise, he will love knowledge; for, knowledge is the means of being wise. If man again be knowing or intelligent, he will love wisdom; for, wisdom is the means of being happy. Now, there is no question in relation to the love of happiness; every man pursues happiness, although it is not every man who knows that which he pursues. This, however, is learned in studying wisdom; and, wisdom is the subject of philosophy as a science.

10. Thus we have reasoned upon the supposition of happiness being the proper end of human intellect; but, the mind of man may be employed in inquiring how far happiness, instead of being the end of our intellectual existence, is only the means employed to bring about some farther end. Here then it might import man much to know this end, to which his present happiness were leading him; in like manner as it is of great consequence for him to inquire, concerning the end to which the indulgence of every sensual gratification may conduct.

If happiness, arising from the enjoyment of our nature and from the approbation of our own mind, shall be supposed as leading to some further end, it must be evident, that this design cannot be known immediately in the study of our own mind, but in studying the intention of that Mind from whence man as an existence has proceeded. And if, in the generalization of our scientific views, data should be obtained, from whence to conclude any thing concerning the nature of those intentions by which the constitution of human
human intellect has been formed, here would be the most sublime subject for a philosophical discussion.

But, whatever may be the result of such an inquiry, the study of nature must appear to be the proper means for succeeding in this undertaking. And now, this study may be made the subject of our examination.

C H A P. II.

Of Studying the Wisdom of Nature as an Efficient Cause.

1. We have now examined science upon metaphysical principles, that is, we have studied the nature of our knowledge; and it is in this examination that we have found the common sense of mankind, or what may be called the science of the vulgar, erroneous in some speculative points. How should it otherwise be! For, if it were not so, what would be the use of science, that is to say, the perfecting of science in reasoning with all the light of order and reflection? Nothing is more certain than the existence of vulgar prejudices: The examination now made of human knowledge, has been with a view to correct in science the prejudices of the vulgar; prejudices too often retained in the reasoning of philosophical men upon speculative subjects, where the animal interest is not immediately concerned, and where the common sense of mankind is not the only rule to be consulted.

We have thus proceeded in science, either to demonstrate things contrary to the commonly received opinion, or to explain things, which, though received as true, had not been seen in science, by being traced to their first principles.

2. In
2. In this manner it has been shown, that magnitude and figure
are not the properties of any extrinsic substance independent of our
thought, imagination, or conception. Length is extension; extension
is the conscious action of mind, conceiving things in succession;
and volume, to that extension, has superadded direction;
from this necessarily arises figure, which, when conceived in the
abstract, is erroneously supposed also to subsist externally. In this
manner we have been made to find, that space is not any thing exis-
ting independent of our thought; nor is it a thing perceived, as
may be volume, when sense conducts imagination; but it is an
abstract idea of volume, in which there is nothing retained, or at-
tended to, besides general, undirected, or every way directed, and
unlimited extension.

Motion in the abstract, or separated from force, is properly the
directing act of mind, conceiving successively the ideas of magnitude
and figure, or changing the several parts of space in time. Rest,
again, is a power of the mind, to conceive the parts of space un-
changed, or to consider figure and extension as preserved.

3. It has been shown, that matter, so generally confounded with
actual or physical body which we perceive, is truly no such thing;
it is however the cause of such a body, or of our knowledge in re-
lation to this idea, which to us is all the same. Therefore, matter
must have power or activity; for, we must know by means of pas-
sion; and, physical body has no other absolute independent prop-
erty, besides that of exciting in us sensation.

4. In matter, then, we have a substance, which, though defi-
lute of those attributes magnitude and figure (imagined and conceived by
our mind), is the appointed means between our thinking, knowing,
active substance, and a separate being which exists with power and
energy, or it is that being. This then is the extrinsic independent
being,
being, whose nature may be further investigated, after we have thrown off the prejudice or error, of attributing to this extrinsic being magnitude and figure, the creatures of our mind; and after, in strict reasoning, we have considered this active substance, as, in the case of our sensation, being the cause of passion, and, in that of our changed or varied passion, the cause of our growing knowledge.

5. There are two ways, it has been shown, in which we are taught to understand that there is an external substance, that is, a being existing independent of our mind, or us. The first of these is passion, in which we know, either in suffering or enjoying; the second is conscious action, in which we find our will opposed, and our moving or changing power resiled in effect. To one or other of these may be ultimately referred, as first principles, all our knowledge of external power and energy. But, besides external power and energy, what is there? Surely there is nothing passive and inert; nothing that may be said to exist without power and energy. The inactivity of matter, on which commonly so much is built, is nothing more than mere supposition; and this is founded on a vulgar prejudice, with regard to the apparent state or permanency of bodies, which is not then properly examined in science, and is certainly a conclusion that is erroneous.

Resistance, in opposition to a moving power, is force; and, motion, in opposition to resistance, is also force. The force of resistance, is measured by the moving power which it is able in changing to compensate; and the force of a moving power, is measured by the power of resistance which it is able to overcome, or to compensate in its change. Therefore, as our mind may ultimately be active both in moving and resisting motion, so, in a proper chain of observation, we, who are conscious, reasoning, and reflecting beings, have the means of judging with regard to active power and resisting force, which are external.

6. Therefore,
6. Therefore, though we learn to know that there is not truly magnitude and figure subsisting externally or independent of our mind, as is commonly believed, yet, in the course of science, we are thus assured, that there is actually something external, independent of our mind; and, that this existence has power, energy, and force.

So far, the more simple exercise of science carries us. But, we may also inquire if it can be made to appear, that there is wisdom and design, as well as power and energy, independent of our mind, or extrinsically in relation to us.

7. Here then is a state of knowledge, to be arrived at, beyond that simple progress of scientific reasoning which is founded immediately on our knowledge. This further progress of reason requires, first, the physical science of effects, and secondly, the science of physical causes, which forms the subject in that branch of philosophy.

8. In order to discover design in that active being which exists without us, we are to compare the various things which we perceive. If there, instead of the infinity of different ways in which these may be conceived to be acting in perpetual disorder, nothing is perceived but what must be ultimately resolved into order and regularity, then, to the power, energy, and force, which exists without us, we necessarily adjudge design and wisdom, in adapting ends and means; and this is natural philosophy.

9. We ought however to be cautious, in thus investigating the laws of nature, not to fall into the error so common among philosophers, of setting out with a principle which is truly nothing but a supposition of the thing in question. The object of science is to discover truth, or see the evidence of what is known; and that of physics is to know the wisdom by which things are ruled. Upon no occasion, therefore, is the supposition of wisdom to be admitted
as a principle in that science, or in natural philosophy. It is true, that, having found wisdom in one thing, or one part, we naturally, or in reasoning, presume it in another; but in science presumption is no proof; and, though a truth may be presumed, this is only in order to find means in reasoning for the proof or confirmation of that which was supposed.

10. It may be alleged, that the wisdom of nature is to be concluded a priori, because, physical causes being only known to us in their effects, the ends do not exist without the means; therefore, wisdom being properly the adapting of these ends and means, every thing which is must be in wisdom; consequently, nature must be wise *. But, this is either begging the question, or resolving it; if the first, it is improper to take for granted what requires a demonstration; if the last, then, however true the proposition, we should see the evidence of its principles. Without scientific knowledge, we

* Some have formed an argument of scepticism upon the following grounds, That in the infinity of modes in which things may exist, there are but a certain number which can subsist by reason of their aptitude for the purpose of that subsistence. Consequently, that it is not the wisdom of the actual system which is to be acknowledged as the cause of what appears and is admired in the world; but that it is the necessity of nature which makes such things subsist as had remained; while an infinity of things had perished, from their inaptitude to subsist.

The sophistry of that reasoning will appear to consist, in not distinguishing this abstract truth, that only things wisely contrived can subsist, and this actual truth, that there is wisdom to be perceived in the system of subsisting things. For, the necessity of actual things, here opposed to the provident wisdom of contrivance, supposes the folly of a production which would disgrace even the wisdom of man as its author. Now, that unwise creation, which should employ almighty or unlimited power, in causing an infinity of useles or ineffectual beings, cannot be supposed consistently with what appears, however conceivable in the imagination of an intellectual being; and, the folly of creating an infinite diversity of systems, out of which only one should remain, could originate in no other mind, than in one who abused intellect in order to reason with absurdity.
we cannot doubt the proposition, no more than we can believe it; but, in resolving this question, it is not the science of speculation or opinion that we are to employ, it is the science of action or of matter of fact.

11. In putting the question now considered, we do not deny the wisdom of nature; we only express our desire to see the evidence of the proposition: We do not demand to be instructed immediately with regard to the general proposition, which is absolute and unintelligible of itself; we want to see the steps by which we may arrive, in reasoning, at this perfect knowledge. It is less important, perhaps, for a man to know that nature is wise, than it is for him to learn or see the wisdom of nature. It is impossible to know or learn that nature is wise, except by learning the wisdom of nature. Tell a child that nature is wise, you do nothing but teach him words; and who is to tell a philosopher that nature is wise?—Nothing but the works of nature. The works of nature, by which animals are made to act wisely, do not teach those animals wisdom, that is, do not teach them first to think or understand, and then to act from principle or conscious knowledge. But, the works of nature, which are particular, teach man to think; and, in thinking, he arrives at the knowledge of generals. It is only then that he can think of wisdom, which is unintelligible to a child.

12. A man may be extremely wise in having learned the wisdom which is in nature, without having learned to know what nature is; and far less to know that nature is wise: This last is a progress of mind beyond the course of simple wisdom, which, in the order of things, is first. Thus, it is not ordinary wisdom, that which makes a man discover nature to be wise. This general proposition with regard to nature, can only be known by us in the particulars. But having in those particulars, which are physical truths and the subjects of our observation, discovered wisdom, in seeing the just order
of those things which happen, and having in the generalisation of philosophy seen the just relation of all the different events, we then conclude, with all the satisfaction of science, that the general proposition, affirming wisdom in the works of nature, is a truth; and that there is thus system or design in what appears. For, having found system in all or every thing which we have been able to examine, it is impossible to believe, that there is not system in those parts of nature, which, though they have not been as yet investigated, resemble those that have.

13. It is not sufficient to find in nature wisdom; the wisdom of nature, in order to be the most worthy object of our contemplation, should be perfect; for, one instance of folly or defect of wisdom in the works of nature, would destroy the idea of absolute wisdom, as proper to that Being which, in acting, causes what is known or appears. But, if the wisdom of nature is not absolute, it must be relative; and then it would be considered as relating to the human intellect, in being either superior, equal, or inferior. Now if the wisdom of man be inferior to that of nature, How can he discover a defect, in that which he may not comprehend? If it be equal or superior, then, How could the mind of man be taught in studying nature? Instead of supposing folly or defect of wisdom in the course of nature, we may consider this as in the mind of man. Thus would be explained the perverted judgment in the mind of man, of imperfect wisdom in the works of nature. At the same time, we are to avoid the relishing satisfied with a mere supposition of wisdom being in nature, when it is the proper object of human intellect to discover it, and when this discovery is the proper means of human wisdom.

14. Perfect wisdom, in choosing ends, must be determined by what is best; and this wisdom will avoid all superfluity in the use of
of means. Now it is only in seeing the whole of things, that just conclusions may be formed with regard to the wisdom of particulars; and, it is only in a general knowledge, that nature may be underflood, in having particular appearances explained from her general laws. But this is only to be done, in having science brought to a certain degree of perfection; and, the perfection of human knowledge is an end not to be fully accomplished.

This imperfect or subordinate nature of human intellect, is the occasion, in natural philosophy, where our inquiry regards the means of ends which are observed; and in more general philosophy, where the question is not with regard to means but ends, that philosophers are apt to reason beyond the principles of evidence, either in employing principles which do not properly apply, or in asuming principles which, not being suspected as false, are not examined in order to see their truth.

Hence often, in defect of science, various arguments are employed to support imagined theories; and thus, sometimes principles of vulgar prejudice, sometimes arguments of misapprehended wisdom, are employed in subjects of physical and metaphysical discussion, to the corruption of philosophy. But, to a mind reasoning from false principles, while also philosophizing from those that are just, there must arise some inconsistency in his conclusions; and, this sense of inconsistency, to a mind understanding what is required to constitute a truth, and not fettered with the prejudice of education or the superstition of authority, will naturally lead to the examination of its principles, and bring about the reformation of philosophy.

15. The wisdom of nature, thus pursued in the progress of true science and philosophy, will afford an endless subject of investigation for the inquiring mind; without, for that reason, giving any room to doubt with regard to the proposition, of nature being perfectly
wise in all her works. Hence, on the one hand, to conclude that nature is wise, without having seen the evidence of this truth, would be prejudice; or mere superstition. On the other, to deny that nature is perfectly wise, because we have not been able to understand the wisdom of all things which appear, would be no other than unreasonable scepticism, arising from a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific evidence.

Such a scepticism as this, if applied to the affairs of life, or morals of mankind, would necessarily be held in the utmost derision or contempt. But so far as, in those two cases here compared, it is observation which forms the basis of our judgment, there cannot be a rule of judging in the one case, which does not in the other equally hold good. A man who has acted with perfect wisdom in every case which we have had occasion to observe, must he not be concluded to act wisely in other cases which are either not examined, or not sufficiently understood? And, is not this species of reasoning equally applicable to nature? Had we found nature foolish in one thing, we should then justly conclude that she might be foolish also in another; but, when we find nature perfectly wise in everything that we are qualified to judge of, must we not presume equal wisdom in those works of design which have not been explained, and of which we are not competent to judge?

16. The wisdom of one man may be compared with that of another, or in the same man with itself at different times. It is thus that there appear different degrees of wisdom in finite knowledge devising means for a proposed end. But, how shall we, in our limited knowledge, judge the wisdom of nature, if it is absolute? Or, how pretend to limit with ignorance or error the fountain of our science? We only know the end of natural things in seeing it accomplished. There is no question, then, if means have been devised in order to produce an end; the object of our investigation is to
to know those means, in order to be instructed from the system of wisdom then perceived. Having thus learned the wisdom of nature in relation to certain things, this properly suggests to us other subjects of inquiry, whether in the generalisation of ends thus understood, or in the understanding of means, thus employed in wisdom, and explaining what appears. It is in this manner that the wisdom of nature, which perhaps admits of no degree, may be compared with itself, in order to know the perfect nature of that wisdom.

CHAP. III.

Of studying the Wisdom of Nature as a Final Cause.

1. THE study of natural philosophy is not limited to the knowledge of means, in order to acquire wisdom; for, after we are wise in knowing means, it may be inquired, What ends are to be attained, in wisdom, through those means? This is to inquire after the final cause of those things which we observe; for, in our systematical idea, every thing stands in the double relation of ends and means; and, one or other of these may be occasionally made the subject of inquiry.

2. But, our knowledge of final causes, in order to understand nature, can only take its rise from our knowledge of those which are efficient. For if, in the progress of our knowledge, causes which are efficient may appear, or be concluded in reason, then, in the wisdom of intelligent beings, we may seek the final cause, by inquiring after that which, in the wisdom of nature, is the end of all that efficiency which thus we know. Here is therefore a generalisation of effects, instead of causes. Now, to inquire after an effect which is a gene-
ral end, without that knowledge which comprehends particulars, is impossible; and, for this purpose, the knowledge of cause is no less necessary than that of effect. Mankind, as well as brutes, may know particular effects without knowing cause; but then, they know not these things as effects; and, these events must first be known thus scientifically, before a general effect, a wise end, or a final cause, may be made the object of our inquiry.

3. But, as the study of particulars in science, without generalisation or philosophy, leads only to present pleasure or amusement, in like manner the philosophising improperly, or generalising without the accurate science of particulars, leads to an end which, in relation to good and evil, is precarious. True philosophy, it will be shown, is the greatest blessing to mankind; but, false philosophy, or an erroneous principle of conduct derived from that source, may be evil and indefinite, as the nature of error is indeterminate; and, the misery entailed upon mankind by the introduction of false principles, may be as pernicious as the establishing of rules, such as are wise and just, may be highly beneficial to man, who is to be actuated by general principles.

In order to see this, we have but to consider, that just principles are only to be acquired in the most perfect generalisation of particulars, in whatever branch of science this species of reasoning is employed; and that the employing of principles which are erroneous, as this leads in reasoning to inconstancy, so, in practice, it will necessarily conduct to folly. Now, in the science of morals, it may be shown, that folly leads to evil; and, the evil that may ensue from reasoning from falsehood in principles, which are but few, may be great, where science is not cultivated, and erroneous principles corrected. But, so far as the evil of practice leads the mind to reason or think upon the cause of things, and the absurdity of false reasoning to see the path where truth had been forsaken, there is a tendency
dency in nature to make evil less, and in human nature to improve itself by promoting knowledge.

4. Hence the field of our inquiry appears to open as we proceed. We first inquire after that which is, and thus learn the wisdom of nature, without knowing that nature is wise. But, having advanced in the wisdom of nature, we next inquire after the nature of that wisdom which we have learned to observe; and, not contented with this truth, that all things are conducted in perfect wisdom, we are led next to inquire, how far there may appear to be a purpose, in wisdom; for all those things which we observe, it is plain the solution of such a question as this, would place the intellect of man in a conspicuous light, and furnish the fairest means for the increase of his wisdom.

5. The learning to know ends and means, is truly acquiring the faculty of wisdom; therefore, in becoming wise or intelligent, we are capable of devising ends and means, as well as of observing those which truly are. But if, in the investigation of phenomena, we substitute our own imperfect wisdom in place of nature's laws, which it is our business to discover, we then deceive ourselves, and thus introduce error into our philosophy.

It is not therefore to the imaginations of our mind, that must be referred the evidence of physical truths; and, the metaphysical solution of natural phenomena are as inadmissible, as is the bare testimony of our senses, with regard to the nature of that existence by which we are affected, and by means of which we proceed to know. But, as the science of metaphysics is not to be employed or misapplied in the solution of natural phenomena, neither is the science of physics to be admitted in the explanation of that which holds of mind; for, in thus confounding things which are naturally distinct,
we only obscure our understanding, and retard the progress of our intellect.

6. Human knowledge naturally proceeds by means of sensation, perception, judgment, and conscious reflection. Science, therefore, which is the analysis of our natural knowledge, and philosophy, which is the generalization of our science, must proceed in a similar manner, not in considering one branch of knowledge alone, but in comparing every thought; and in employing every principle. What, for example, would be the use of mathematical knowledge without physics? and, How could natural philosophy proceed without mathematics, or the science of figure and proportion? But, How improper or inadequate is all the progress of mind in physics and mathematics, to make us understand our knowledge, or to know our mind? It must also be evident, that all the wisdom which man can arrive at by the knowledge both of natural and metaphysical truths, could not serve to found a principle of moral conduct, or direct his opinion in regard to right and wrong.

7. The principles of natural philosophy are placed in observation; and, by natural philosophy, we acquire a species of wisdom that may be termed actual; it is the knowledge of action, and the way to effect the conceived change of perceived things, in knowing the laws by which those things are changed. But, there is another species of philosophy that may be termed moral; it does not relate to the changes of external or perceived things, but to those of our mind or sentiment, in the enjoying of pleasure and happiness, and in the suffering of distress and misery. In this science of moral truth, there are to be learned ends and means different from those of nature, though necessarily connected with them. Hence, in the progress of our science, we may learn wisdom in relation to passion, as well as action; and thus learn to act wisely, in relation to moral as well as natural subjects.

8. The
8. The subjects of natural philosophy are beings which have action, and are capable of change; but, sensibility is not proper to those acting powers. This is not the case in moral philosophy, the subjects of which have power to know as well as to act, and to act in consequence of their knowledge. Here, therefore, in our philosophy, we unite the knowledge of external and internal causes, or the subjects of nature and of intellect. Now, if, in this progress of our understanding, we may find principles of equal evidence with those of physics and mathematics, which never admit of doubt, we shall then be led into the knowledge of more general ends, and thus extend philosophy to final causes. Instead, then, of learning from nature the wisdom of accomplishing an end conceived, we shall acquire the wisdom of conceiving an end, in the accomplishing of which our happiness may be concerned.

9. But, though we thus arrive at the knowledge of ends and means beyond the immediate subject of natural philosophy, we are not to imagine that we attain this state of intellect without the cooperation of external causes; or, that we ever arrive at any superior kind or degree of wisdom, without passing through those that are inferior. It is not necessary, in order to be an honest man, that this man should be a Newton; but no man can be honest, who is absolutely ignorant of the principles of that philosophy, in the prosecution of which Newton was illustrious. It is not that the principles of natural philosophy preserve a man from being a rogue; for, the same conditions that are required to produce in a man what is called honesty, are also necessary before he can become dishonest. Natural philosophy is distinctly different from the philosophy of morals, with which it therefore does not interfere; but it is necessary that a man shall first know natural things, before he can know the rules of morality. It is not necessary that a man shall be a philosopher, in order to be a moral man; but a philosopher is much more than a moral man, although no man can have morals in any degree with-
out wisdom. And, how could wisdom in any degree be attained, without the means of natural knowledge? We might as well look for the flower to follow the fruit, or the animal to be produced without a parent.

10. Now, after having in natural philosophy learned, as may be here supposed, the wisdom of all that exists without us, or that of nature which is perfect, we turn our examination towards ourselves, in considering the ends and means of our intellectual existence, the motives of our conduct, and the causes of our happiness and misery, we then find a most interesting subject of inquiry, namely, how far the means are also here in wisdom, and how far the end is to be judged good. Thus, moral philosophy is also founded upon science; but, besides the science of action, of motion, and of powers, this study requires the science of passion, of volition, and of motives.

11. Thus it will appear, that there is a branch of science distinctly different from that in which natural philosophy is attained. By pursuing the one of these, we acquire wisdom and power over nature, that is, we have the power to dispose of nature according to those rules of wisdom which we have learned in studying her works. By pursuing the other, we acquire wisdom and power over intellectual agents, that is, we have power to dispose of events in the sentiments and opinions of men, according to those rules of wisdom which we have learned in studying that system of intellect wherein sentiments and scientific opinions are the motives of man’s actions.

12. If, after studying moral philosophy, we shall find all things conducted, not only in the order of wisdom, but also either, on the one hand, in the design of good, as leading to happiness and enjoyment, or, on the other, in the design of evil, as leading to unhappiness and misery, then we may form a judgment with regard to the nature of that existence which acts perpetually independent of our
our volition, and on which Being our mind has its dependence, in acting, suffering, and enjoying. Hence, knowing the relation in which we stand to every other being, and the conditions in which we are to act in order either to suffer or enjoy, we may resolve, like men, by wisdom, and not believe, like children, by prejudice; nor act like brutes, in pursuing the instinctive appetites of the animal, without either knowing in science, or believing in superstition.

13. If we should thus arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, in which there is an evidence that leaves no room to doubt, then here would be philosophy properly so called; it would be true philosophy, as distinguished in relation to sophistry, which leads only into scepticism and discontentment; it would be general philosophy, as distinguished in relation to that which, being confined to the subject either of nature or of morals, is particular; and it would be perfect philosophy, as being founded upon general science, or every kind of information of which the human intellect is susceptible. So far, therefore, as the principles shall be perfect, and the reasoning found just, true philosophy may procure us that satisfaction which arises from a steady determination of our conduct, flowing from motives which are known and approved.

14. Thus it imports us much to know the effect that this metaphysical investigation, which has now been made with regard to the principles of our knowledge, may have upon our philosophy, whether natural or moral. Therefore, besides that natural motive of immediate pleasure which in the pursuit of truth affects the mind of man, we have one still more interesting, as bringing the truths investigated home to our proper use, in every case of voluntary action. Hence it will appear that there is every inducement for us to inquire, how far we may thus arrive at forming satisfactory conclusions in a philosophy, which, as it is most general in its means, will be most interesting in its end or purpose.

15. With
15. With this view, we shall first consider the effect which may be expected from the investigated principles applied to nature, or that system of wisdom which, by means of things seen or perceived, we contemplate in order to be knowing, wise, and powerful. We shall then proceed to subjects of morality, which are the principles of moral sentiment and rational determination, and which form the proper science of suffering and enjoyment.
SECTION II.

Application of the investigated Principles to the Study of Natural Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION.

SCIENCE is the study of our knowledge. But, in studying knowledge, What is the end or intention?—Is it not to be wise?—If wisdom be attained by means of science, and if there is no other way by which human wisdom may be attained, then, beyond science, there must be a certain state of intellect, in which man, from a simple observer and scientific speculator, becomes a proper and effectual agent; in this state, he must be a person knowing means, and acting from design which is proper to himself; and here he must be one who is conscious of his will, and who operates for his future happiness. But, is not this philosophy?

As science is the study of knowledge, philosophy may be considered as the study of wisdom. But, in this study there may be distinguished two different routes in which we may proceed; so far as, on the one hand, we may pursue that wisdom which is perceived in nature, and by knowing which man becomes powerful in the operations of this world; and, on the other hand, so far as we shall have for object that wisdom by which, in pleasing others, we promote our own happiness. It is the first of these that is the subject of this section.
C H A P. I.

End or Purpose of Natural Philosophy.

1. SENSATION is for us a source of knowledge or proper information; and, imagination or conception is then produced, by the proper action of the mind exerted on that occasion. But, all that knowledge, whether of sensation or perception, would be useless, with regard to the system of animal life, without the faculty of reason or discernment. It is by this faculty that the mere animal acts, in pursuing what is pleasant and avoiding what is disagreeable. In the proper order of succession, therefore, discernment necessarily follows the knowing in sense, and the conceiving in perception.

Here is a system of operations which may be now inquired into, in order to see the final cause, i.e. the proper end or purpose of that system of discernment and intelligence, which we find in ourselves.

Sensation and perception are first necessary in order to procure that knowledge which is absolute and instinctive. On this, again, the discerning or judging power is employed in order to serve the purposes of life; it is thus that the animal mind proceeds in distinguishing what is pleasant and what is painful, that is to say, what is proper for the animal to do, what he is to avoid, and what to pursue; but all this instinctively, that is, without knowing how the thing is done, or why he does it.

This however is not the only purpose of the discerning faculty; for, in the operation of mind, when not acting in relation to external...
nal things, but reflecting upon perceptions and judgments which have been already made, there is a discerning faculty exerted in relation to the operations of the mind itself, in order to know knowledge, and thus to increase the power of that understanding being.

When a person thus proceeds in the understanding of his knowledge, he first distinguishes differences in things with which he is concerned, and then he assimilates those distinguished things in finding relations of agreement among those distinctions which he had formed *. Now the first end to which this scientific process is employed by man, is to serve the animal purposes of his life or pleasure; for, knowing the most distant relations of connected things, and the near or intimate relations of things most distant, there is thus procured a greater field for judging, in what concerns the animal to do, in order to avoid the disagreeable and obtain the proper or the pleasant.

It is only occasionally, however, that the mere animal purposes are thus served by the intellectual progress of the human mind; no animal employs such means in the oeconomy of the species, however wisely contrived that oeconomy; and, it is more properly to another end that those scientific operations of man are intended in the wisdom of a general cause. It has been shown, in the preceding part of this work, that, in the pursuit of science, of truth, or the knowledge of relations, there is felt pleasure which may be termed spiritual, by which the conscious agent is excited to leave the route of animal or sensual pleasure, and to proceed in that of intellect, to understand himself and every thing with which he is concerned. Here, therefore, begins to appear a new purpose for life itself; this is, to procure pleasure in thought, and thus learn the animal man a new manner of enjoyment,—an enjoyment distinctly different from the pain and pleasure by which the mere animal part

* Part I. Sec. IX. Chap. III.
OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Part III.

is actuated, and an enjoyment which leads to a very different end, as will be shown in the prosecution of this part of the work.

2. Here we find man appearing in his own nature; not as a being who is simply instructed, so as to act for the purpose of that animal system alone of which he forms a part; but as a thinking being, one who thus becomes capable of acquiring superior degrees of understanding, in distinguishing knowledge and in generalising truths. It is by proceeding in that course of mind, and in contemplating that intelligence and power which is displayed in the universe, that man becomes so far acquainted with the supreme Mind, from whence human nature had its origin, and to which man looks up for the expectation of his future existence.

3. It will thus appear, that the reasoning employed in the contemplation of the universe, or in that of the several parts of nature, which must in our limited capacities be successively conceived, is of that abstracted kind, which, although founded on the first conclusions that are common also to the brute, rises by successive steps, according to the capacity with which the rational person, thus proceeding, may be able to produce new principles of information, all of which are properly descended from, as they necessarily depend upon, the first sensation and perception, where the man is not discriminated from the animal, and where the philosopher is on a level with the creature man.

4. In treating of science, cause and effect have been investigated as conceptions in the human mind reasoning with regard to events, things which are perceived. We are now to observe, that ends and means are also conceptions of the mind, and are equally connected with events, of which we either are conscious from within, or which we perceive by means of sense. Now as, in the operation of reasoning, there is to be distinguished a less and more abstracted species,
species, so the conceptions of cause and effect, considered in relation to those of ends and means, will be found to be in their nature more simple, and less removed from the first information sense; while the conception of ends and means have a more immediate relation to mind, that is, to our thinking principle, in which we conceive wisdom and design. For, though in both cases there is necessarily conceived action or change, it is only in the conception of ends and means that will is necessarily perceived; and, it is only by considering cause and effect in the light of ends and means, that design can appear as being connected with them.

Hence, the most extensive conception of ends and means is the highest attainment of science; and, in natural philosophy, this is acquired by the consideration of cause and effect.

5. Philosophy is thus the science of acting things, which have effect, and which may be related to design, wherein ends and means will be the object of inquiry. Means and ends being thus the subject of philosophy, it will appear that there are two distinct branches in this science. For, means ultimately all relate to external things; and ends necessarily relate to mind, in which design is formed.

Natural philosophy will thus appear to be the science of causes and effects, abstracting from mind, in which cause and effect may be also properly conceived. But when, to the science of cause and effect, we join the study of mind or knowledge, which is the science of metaphysics, we then are made to know ourself, in understanding the causes of our knowledge: And when, to this knowledge of ourself, we join the understanding, which we may acquire, of similar, thinking, voluntary agents, we then arrive at a more extensive knowledge of cause and effect in relation to a system of intellectual agents, which is the science of morals, and the philosophy of mind.
6. In the display of nature, and the general laws of action, rational and contemplative beings must almost every where perceive certain ends to be attained in those changes of things considered as events; consequently, those events, thus conducted with the utmost regularity in their natural order of succession, and leading with infallibility to the conceived end which is perceived, will be acknowledged as arising from action which is not fortuitous, but which is necessarily connected with design. But, besides ends, there are also to be perceived means, which are employed in order to effect the end or intention of design. Thus, for example, bodies must remain upon the surface of this earth; and, weight is the means employed in order to attain that end; in like manner as, by gravitation, the globe itself is preserved in the system, being by it retained in her orbit.

7. As wisdom is the attribute of mind, a being of design, where means are properly adjusted to an end in view, so, the operations of nature will necessarily appear to be conducted in wisdom; for, it is only in events properly adapted to each other, as ends and means, that we conceive design connected with those things. Therefore, though our ignorance in the operations of nature so often conceals or obscures our conceptions of wisdom in those designs which are not seen, the progress of our knowledge in natural things, necessarily leads our mind to the contemplation of wisdom, by opening to our view design which has taken effect, being only perceived by the eye of reason in the end which is accomplished.

8. It is in the natural course of things that we learn to form design; and it is in observing the natural order of events, that we necessarily conceive wisdom as connected with things which actually appear. Hence, as active beings, we are improved in our powers, by learning more and more the proper adjustment of ends and means;
means; and, as contemplative beings, our intellectual faculties are enlarged with every instance of wisdom which is observed.

Chapter II.

Proper manner of pursuing Natural Philosophy.

1. Natural Philosophy is a science in which progress may be observed from small beginnings to an acquisition that may be great; and in this science there are to be distinguished both means and ends. The first of these, the means of philosophy, comprehend both the history of the past, or events that have actually happened, and the consideration of the present apparently unchangeable nature and constitution of things, that is, of our ideas respecting similitude, magnitude, order of situation, and succession. These are the data or principles in relation to which our reason is employed in natural philosophy; and of this the proper end or intention is, first, new conceptions or judgments with regard to the proper relations of things, the order of events, or the causes of what has happened; and, secondly, knowledge of nature, or that supreme design whereby future events are to be conducted.

2. Our ideas of things being attained by an operation of the mind in relation to perceived events; and philosophy being considered as the just arrangement in our mind of those ideas in order to find a proper relation or chain of connection among those that are even the most distant, natural history, as a branch of philosophy, will appear to have for object the assemblage together and recording matters of fact, or perceived events, with their more immediate connections; and therefore it will appear that natural history, in the order of
of science, must precede that generalisation of our knowledge, in relation to things, which is natural philosophy.

3. Having, from the proper subject of natural history, formed a principle or general maxim of natural philosophy, this principle will serve a double purpose in science; first, in forming a certain theory and probable conjecture, which is to be confirmed by experiment; and, secondly, in thus directing the study of natural history or observation, where to apply for new facts, in augmentation of those already known or recorded. Hence it will appear, that natural history and natural philosophy should proceed together with mutual advantage; and that thus new principles will be attained with greater facility by an enlightened philosopher, and natural history better directed in experiments conducted with all the skill of advancing science, than by the accidental exertion of curious minds, and the undistinguishing record of every fact that may be occasionally observed.

4. Hence, as reasoning upon things only fancied by the mind, and not really found in nature, whilst these are considered as matters of fact, tends to lead the mind into a maze of error, so, without proper reasoning on observations truly made, the volume of natural history, which includes experiment, might be filled, without useful knowledge following as the fruit of such industrious labour.

5. Philosophy, which investigates the laws of nature from those appearances that necessarily imply something as the cause of the perceived effect, must, for this purpose, employ the reasoning faculty; and this operation of the mind, as an intellectual being, proceeds upon principles, without which no conclusion could be formed. But the first principles of natural reasoning arise from the thing known in the sense, and the action of the mind which we are conscious of exerting
exercising on such occasion. Ideas are thus formed of things seen in reason, and not in sense alone.

6. Natural philosophy being the knowledge by which man attains the power of accomplishing conceived ends, in external things, by natural means, the science of physics is first employed, in order to perceive the connection and various relations of things, the agreement and disagreement of ideas; and hence to conclude similarities and dissimilarities in things that are not immediately perceived. For example, it is found to be the same power that retains the planets in their orbicular motions, and directs a heavy body to move in a right line; because, in both, there may be perceived effects sufficiently similar to infer that truth. In like manner, it must be concluded, that heat and gravitation are two different powers, seeing that the effects perceived, as respectively belonging to those powers, are so dissimilar.

7. Now, it is in proportion to the number of those similarities and dissimilarities, agreements and disagreements, seen in reason, that our knowledge in natural things, or our understanding of things that are perceived, must increase. Hence it will appear, that it is not in proportion to the multitude of things known, but to the order in which these are disposed, with regard to the understanding, that natural philosophy must advance; and that by neglect, either in the making of observations, or in the proper disposal of these by reason, in order to form conclusions, the progress of science may be equally retarded.

8. In order that certainty should attend physical investigation, two things are required; first, accuracy in observation; and, secondly, justness in reasoning, or in forming of judgments on what may be perceived; and as, in both these operations, various degrees of inattention will naturally take place, so, by proceeding in that erroneous
erroneous path into which investigating philosophers may have stumbled, the mind must be farther and farther removed from the true or only course which it ought to pursue for attaining the required knowledge. It will therefore appear, that it is the nature of knowledge, considered as a growing thing, to proceed by fits, and to be attended with alternate periods of quicker advancement, and of retardations. Hence, when the vigorous progress of the mind, in natural knowledge, happens to decline, it may be most properly restored by returning, from time to time, in those directions where the true progress may have been lost, and in correcting those errors and false steps by which the investigation of truth has been misled.

9. Sensation and perception being the first principles of knowledge, proper observation is the principle whereon is founded natural philosophy; and here, to avoid error, the greatest attention is required, never to draw any conclusion that is not necessarily inferred from the observation, as one false step pursued will lead to endless deviation; whereas, in a rational deduction from appearances as first principles, nature is properly pursued. Thus the mind is led farther and farther into knowledge, with a certainty that is only to be found in a rigorous adherence to the truth of observation.

In drawing conclusions from observations that may be made, it is necessary always to distinguish the positive and negative that may occur on that occasion; and, to make the proper use of this distinction, which is, that when a positive conclusion does appear, in that case, the opposite may be inferred as a negative; but, when a negative conclusion only appears, the opposite must never be inferred as a positive. This will be illustrated in an example.

10. Suppose that a body of water shall be included in a hollow ball of gold; and that this ball, closed, shall be strongly pressed with an external force; in this operation, let water be supposed to make
its appearance in small drops upon the surface of the ball, in proportion as compression shall be perceived to take place; in this case, there are positive and negative appearances, that must be distinguished, in order to make proper conclusions from the real observation.

The positive appearance is, that water has pervaded the body in which it was inclosed, therefore the opposite as a negative conclusion is properly inferred; which is, that water is not retained in such a body as this in which it had been contained, and pressed with that power which had been employed.

The negative appearances are, that the water was not compressed, nor the substance gold impervious to water; but from these appearances, in order to form any positive conclusion either with regard to the resisting power of water in relation to compression, or pervious nature of the substance or solid body of gold in relation to water, it ought to appear, that a small degree of compression in the water had been a proper subject of observation, in the present case, and that the body of gold had been continuous in its substance, in those places where the water had appeared.

It must be evident, that as, in the supposed case, the only positive appearances are not inconsistent, on the one hand, with the compressibility of water, or, on the other, with the impervious nature of gold to water, so, from the observations in this experiment, no conclusion, with regard to those two facts in question, can properly be formed; but, for this purpose, other observations, to reason upon, are necessarily required.

11. Hence it will appear that nothing is more dangerous in the pursuit of natural philosophy, or attended with consequences so fatal to this science, as the forming positive conclusions, in judging of things which are only apparent in their nature; and which, though
they truly give an evidence, are not to be considered as a testimony of any real existence, but only a negative testimony of something conceived which does not then exist. Nothing, on the contrary, can promote the advancement of this science more than the most extensive reasoning from facts or observations which are in their nature positive, and not simply apparent; and in which the judgments thus formed constitute principles, the foundation of further reasoning, and proper steps, on which the mind may proceed with the utmost security, for attaining higher degrees in science.

CHAP. III.

No necessary Impediment in the pursuit of this Science.

1. ACCURACY in observation being considered as requisite to the certainty of physical investigation, it may be hence imagined, that, in the progress of this science, no certainty can be attained, like that which is found in mathematics; and that there is little more than a probable conjecture here obtainable, where perfect accuracy in observation may be considered as a thing impossible. This subject has been already considered, in treating of physical principles; but now, in the application of this theory of human understanding to the science of natural philosophy, it may not be improper to examine the grounds on which an argument of this kind may proceed, in order to show its fallacy, and thus establish natural philosophy upon the most ascertained basis.

2. In natural philosophy, reasoning proceeds upon certain facts, which are the proper subjects of our observation. But, on this occasion, the evidence and certainty of our judgments are not affected by
by our ignorance of cases where no observation has been made, nor by the uncertainty of observation in cases where, from the nature of things, we are not qualified to form a judgment that is positive. For example, it would be unjust to judge of motion, either from observations with regard to the situations of bodies at the greatest distance, such as the fixed stars, or from the perceived dimensions of those bodies which change in the least degree; such judgments would be formed contrary to the strict rule of science, which it is necessary to observe in natural philosophy. Here we must take our judgment from cases properly calculated to inform us with regard to the fact in question; and thence, by reasoning, we may be enabled to judge of similar questions, with regard to other cases, where, from inaccurate observation, or the opinion of the vulgar, motion, when unobserved, is held as rest.

3. Our incapacity for measuring every quantity is no argument against our being able to ascertain certain proportions of things. It is no less certain, for example, that a microscopic animal may be found by observation to be at least ten thousand times smaller than another known animal, although the thousandth part of that smallest thing be not a quantity perceivable. In like manner, there is no uncertainty with regard to this earth being distant from the sun ninety millions of miles, although it may be several millions more.

A reasoning person may be convinced, that heavy bodies, in the same situation or in equal conditions, fall equal spaces in equal times, although every portion of space and time be not to us a subject of accurate mensuration. We never saw two bodies fall in equal conditions, no more than we ever measured equal spaces or equal times; but, the more accurately we perform those operations, the more we find the proposition verified in the experiment. Here we find no principle upon which may be founded disbelief or scepticism in science; and here, we know all that we have properly any occasion.
to know, for the purpose of investigating the laws of falling bodies. Consequently, whatever truths shall be found to follow from those principles, may be admitted in our philosophy, without any apprehension of error by reason of the imperfection of human measurement.

4. The science of physics proceeds upon actual observation of differences; every observed difference, therefore, is real, although every observed equality is not so, being only apparent. But, in comparing the real differences and apparent equalities, we come to form certain conclusions, which, though not absolutely unconditional, are true under the known conditions. This is philosophy, or the perfection of human knowledge; not as meaning that human knowledge is perfect and absolutely unconditional, but that it is perfect for our purpose if properly pursued; and, it has not in it any uncertainty, although it be limited in the imperfection of our senses.

5. This, however, does not affect our science; things are not less visible or perceptible upon the surface of this earth, because similar things on that of Jupiter or Saturn would make no sensible impression; luminous and dark objects are perfectly distinguished, although every possible quantity of light proceeding from bodies may not be a proper subject of observation; and the colour of redness is as perfectly distinguished from green as is a circle from a square; or the order of the prismatic colours is a thing perfectly conceived, although every intermediate shade in that indefinite series is not sensible distinguishable, in like manner as the proportion of the square to the circle is not as number a thing to be expressed.

The qualities of things in relation to hardness, taste, smell, heat, and cold, are all likewise perfectly distinguishable, or distinctly known, although all the various degrees of these which, like quantity, are indefinite, do not in the actual constitution of things form
a subject intended for human observation, which necessarily is finite or limited in its nature.

6. Hence it will appear, that for the truth of physical investigation, in the measurement of things, it is not necessary to have known the precise quantity, which is not possible, but only to be sensible of differences that are real in qualities and quantities, and of similarities and equalities which are not real but apparent. From whence by reasoning, although we cannot know the precise quantity, we may learn certain limits within which the precise quantity is found; and this is all that either as living animals, or intelligent beings, we require. In this manner we may arrive at truths which are far beyond the limits of our senses. For example, every body sees an apple fall from a tree; but it is no less true, that the moon falls towards this earth; every body observes the motion of the tides; but it is no less certain that the water of a lake or pond is thus affected, although it may not be in the power of human observation to make sensible the effect.

7. It is the consideration of mathematical speculations that gives occasion to regret an imagined imperfection, or reproach physical measurement with a supposed defect; for, upon the supposition that physical measurement or observation in this respect were perfect, and that mathematical speculations were applicable to natural things, then things with regard to quantity might be known with absolute accuracy, and the results of mathematical investigation tried therewith; but this may be considered as an unjust view of things, those equalities and multiples of things, which are the subject of mathematical speculation, are things assumed for the purpose of the investigation proper to this science; they are however nowhere applicable to physical things, in the sense here considered. Consequently, it may not arise from any imperfection or defect of physical investigation, that mathematical truths cannot thus be tried, or, conversely, that
that those speculations are not to be found with accuracy in natural things, by means directly of observation.

8. Human observation with regard to quantity would with reason be concluded as having naturally no im perfection or defect, but that on the contrary it is contrived in wisdom, as being perfectly adapted to the purpose of its intention, if it could be made to appear, that, upon the supposition of observation being capable of distinguishing the smallest possible inequalities, and perceiving the equalities of the smallest things, yet the present conclusions of mathematical inquiry could not be more applicable to natural things than they are in the present state of human observation. But this will be evident by considering the nature and constitution of things; for, mathematicians are employed in contemplating things which, strictly speaking, never did, nor ever will take place. It must also be considered, that though the smallest quantity were a proper subject of observation, whilst quantity belongs to every perceived thing, yet nothing perceivable is permanent in its nature; and it may be made to appear, that, in this system of changing things, the precise quantity of any thing cannot be conceived to continue the same for any portion of time that may be assigned.

9. Hence it may with reason be concluded, that greater accuracy in human observation with regard to quantity, would, instead of being an advantage, be really a defect, seeing that thereby our judgments, with regard to things perceived, would be confounded by containing nothing but inequalities, and by being necessarily involved in perpetual change, without those apparent equalities and that apparent steadiness which are so necessary to the formation of our ideas: Hence also will appear the necessity that there is, in judging of things, to distinguish, on the one hand, betwixt the fixed ideas of things formed in our mind, which ideas are founded only on apparent equalities, and, on the other, the real existence or natural constitutio
tion of things, which though never equal, strictly speaking, may be so in relation to our observation, and which, though never fixed, yet may be in reason, and with the utmost certainty investigated, so far as they are actual changing things.

10. Physical investigation does not consist in measuring things that truly are; nor in ascertaining the degrees of qualities that do not change. So far as the nature of things consists in action, the conditions of these actions are the proper subject of physical investigation; so far as external things consist in power to change, the proper object of philosophy is to know the relative intensity of those powers, and the general direction by which the effect is regulated. To suppose that there is any thing in nature which preserves the measure of its dimension, or that there is any invariable quality in physical body, is not to know the nature of the subject concerning which we are to inquire.

11. If, indeed, things really were what they are vulgarly thought to be, and if our accurate or scientific knowledge of them depended upon the measure of those qualities by which they are known, and in which they are then supposed to subsist, in that case, human observation would truly be an insufficient basis on which to build a just philosophy; and natural philosophy would be that precarious thing which it is commonly esteemed, by those who examine what they are to believe, and who receive no system but what is founded upon evidence. This, however, is not the case; natural philosophy has its scientific principles, which, though distinctly different from those that are learned in the branch of mathematics, are no less evident to the understanding, though not founded in the operation of the mind itself, as is the science of figure and proportion; and these principles are absolutely certain, as coming from sensation which cannot be disturbed.
Man cannot make an observation of quantity without error; but he does infinitely more, when he appreciates the error of his observation. Had external things existed in magnitude and figure, as we vulgarly believe, nature might have given to man the capacity of making observations without error and deception. But in so doing he would not be removed a step above the brute, as he is at present, when he says, *humanum est errare*. For, it is not in the capacity of knowing absolutely or instinctively, which we have immediately from nature, that human understanding grows; but it is in the knowledge of our error, that is to say, it is in the examination of our knowledge.

12. Upon the whole, therefore, it must be concluded, that there is not any natural inaccuracy attending human observation, whereby it should be necessarily disqualified from investigating things with certainty; but that the inaccuracy of man proceeds in general from prejudice, from inattention, and from the rash belief of things which do not really appear; and that, to make proper observations for the purpose of philosophy, it requires much application of reason, and great attention of the mind, otherwise inconsistencies will gradually insinuate themselves into the result of such investigation.

**C H A P. IV.**

*Of the Defect of the Physical Systems already received.*

1. We have endeavoured to show, that external things are not truly or absolutely extended and impenetrable; but that they are only virtually so, in having the power to excite in us sensation.
fenation as the cause of our perception, and in thus leading our imagining faculty to the conception of things with magnitude and figure. Thus I have endeavoured to prove, that material things exist not in the form which we ourselves imagine; but that they exist in power and energy; and that the effect of that external power and action is passion and knowledge in our mind.

The received systems of philosophy have, on the contrary, supposed that perceived things consist of matter, and that the property of this thing, called matter, is to be really extended and impenetrable, and not to be only virtually so, in having the power to affect our mind in such a manner as to give occasion to that conclusion which we form of resistance and solidity in the external thing, which is then considered as thus subsisting. Hence, those systems of philosophy have supposed the perceptible qualities, magnitude and figure, as being things truly subsisting; and that externally, or independent of the conceptions formed in our mind.

But, as those perceptible qualities of bodies are manifestly lost upon certain occasions, and not inviolably preserved, philosophers have had recourse to matter as the thing which alone is unalterably extended and impenetrable; and which, in that state, has also figure as an unchangeable property. Hence it is evident, that, according to this sense of things, matter means no other than bodies, and cannot explain those appearances in which perceived bodies do not retain their magnitudes and figures, considered as essential qualities or their property which they cannot lose.

2. It must also appear, that, although this supposition of matter, when considered as a thing with absolute unalterable volume and figure, might be employed in order to explain the apparent impenetrability and hardness of bodies, yet it cannot, without a manifest absurdity, be employed for the explanation of those appearances in which bodies
dies are known not to retain their magnitudes nor figures. Thus it
will appear, that this notion of matter, in the sense now considered,
is not founded in truth; and that it has taken its origin only from
that knowledge which has been distinguished as common sense, and
not perfect or accurate science; for, there is not an appearance in
nature from whence it may be positively concluded, that bodies can-
not be made to penetrate each other, or that they cannot lose their
volume and figure; and the negative conclusion, that bodies are not
diminished in their volume, or changed in their figure, when the
quantity to be perceived is far from being a proper object of our
observation, is evidently a vulgar error, which science must correct.
This may be illustrated in an example.

3. The hardness of a cannon-ball, or the power of this body to
resist the change of its figure which we endeavour to destroy, must
either depend upon the essential hardness of its matter, or upon some
other cause. But if it is upon another cause besides the quality
of its matter, then, Why suppose hardness in that matter, which is
not known? If, on the other hand, the hardness of the cannon-
ball is founded in the hardness of its matter, which is absolute, then,
How comes the hard body to lose its hardness altogether, as it does
in being fluid? or the ball to change its figure, as it actually does on
being pressed?

4. It must be here observed, that the resorting to absolute hard-
ness as only placed in the unperceived parts, is nothing but a feeble
effort to flave off this question, how comes the figure of the per-
ceived thing to be changed. For, if it be only those parts that are
altogether imperceptible which are hard, and do not change their
figure, this is to involve philosophy in an opposite difficulty, which
it is impossible upon those principles to resolve, namely, how come
perceptible bodies ever to be hard? The bestowing a power to
produce hardness, in a thing where hardness naturally is not, will be
found,
found, on due consideration, to be departing from that system of philosophy which is founded upon this principle. That hardness, or absolute figure, is truly a quality in external things.

5. Perceived bodies, besides being soft, are also compressible. Here is a fact that must be inconsistent with the supposition of such bodies consisting of matter, which is extended and impenetrable. Here elasticity is brought in to support hypothesis, or explain appearances. Elasticity will therefore require to be here examined.

6. Elasticity is a term that has two different applications, first to hard bodies, which, in having their figure changed by external force, recover again their figure, when the external power is removed. Secondly, elasticity is applied to soft bodies or fluids, when, after losing their volume, by the compression of external power, this is again recovered, upon the removal of compression.

7. If, on the one hand, we shall ascribe to an external thing extension and volume, as an absolute and indelible property, then it is altogether inconsistent with this principle to allow this volume or property to be lost. On the other hand, if there is allowed to be in external things a power, by which volume, where not existing, may be gained, or produced, then it is no less superfluous to suppose volume an absolute property of those things, than it is truly inconsistent with appearances, seeing it is only a quality conditionally retained, and in like manner lost.

8. Hence it will appear, that it is impossible by elasticity, which is a proper description of appearances, to support the supposition of matter as a thing having extension and figure as absolute unalterable properties. Therefore, magnitude and figure, although things perceived in the mind, yet, when these conceptions are attributed to external things as their property or absolute qualities, this is nothing but
but mere supposition, and is inconsistent with experience, by which those things or judgments may be further tried.

9. Real appearances may be explained by supposition, when this supposition is, upon due examination, found to be in all respects consistent with the appearances; but, hence it necessarily follows, that those suppositions, when any way inconsistent with the thing for which they are intended as an explanation, must be rejected as chimerical or without foundation. It will also be allowed, that one supposition cannot be supported by another; consequently, when we have supposed matter as consisting of particles endued with hardness and incompressibility, or absolute figure and volume, then, either natural appearances must be explained by this supposition in order to its being admitted as a truth, or, some other theory must be adopted, if that supposition does not find its support in actual appearances. But here, we are not to call in another supposition in order to explain that which is inconsistent with appearances. Thus attractive and repulsive powers, which may be truly inferred from appearances, are not to be employed in order to reconcile those appearances with a certain supposition, viz. of matter, which is plainly inconsistent with them. Therefore, though a theory of material things may be founded on those powers of matter as the principles of phyalical body*, yet, the supposition of those powers is not to be employed, in order to support another supposition which is certainly contradicted by natural appearances.

Hence, in order to explain the elasticity of a body recovering volume or figure, a repulsive power among the particles of matter is not to be admitted as an explanation of this appearance, or a confirmation of that theory respecting matter as consisting of hard and incompressible bodies: For, though the action of a moving thing were to be explained in the general laws of motion, and though the solidity

* Part II. Section XII.
solidity of a body were to be explained in those of resistance. To what purpose employ those investigated laws of action and resistance to support a theory of hard and figured particles of matter?—a theory which holds material things as absolutely inert,—and a theory which cannot allow of elasticity as belonging to a body, without plainly contradicting itself.

10. Thus it will appear, that the supposition of magnitude and figure, as absolute qualities residing in the thing which is conceived as external, cannot be admitted in science without some rational principle on which it may be founded. For, though an understanding being, reasoning more immediately from appearances, will naturally conclude that such is the case, in ascribing magnitude and figure, the perceptible, as well as colour the sensible qualities, to external things; and will thus consider all these qualities as truly subsisting in those things, yet, men of science and accurate examination must discover the fallacy of those conclusions with regard to magnitude and figure, as well as in relation to colour, so far as those conclusions are founded on the mere appearance of things; for, this is an evidence no better than that by which the vulgar determine one grain of sand to be equal to another, viz. because they have not observed their inequality, and do not reason any farther upon the subject.

11. But, though attractive and repulsive powers are not to be thus assumed in an arbitrary manner, in order to explain a mere supposition, yet, powers of this kind, such as that of gravitation, a thing investigated as existing externally and continually exerted, may with reason be employed, in support of a supposition by means of which the real appearances of things are to be explained. Therefore, it will now be proper to examine how far the material system, of those philosophers who suppose magnitude and figure as absolute qualities in external things, may be considered as finding any support
port in the law of gravitation, the only power of this kind that has been properly investigated, and therefore a thing not merely supposed.

12. It is by means of perceived bodies, that the law of gravitation, in which there is evident design, has been discovered. Without having had the knowledge of this law, the investigation now made with regard to the nature of our understanding, might perhaps be considered, in relation to natural philosophy, as an useless speculation. But when, in reasoning with regard to gravitation, bodies are considered according to the obvious opinion of mankind, or system of philosophy which is now considered, and a question is made concerning gravitation, what it is, and how it is related to bodies, which only are the things from whence the law is found, then here begins to appear an absurdity in reasoning, or a thing in idea inconsistent. For,

A material body, considered as a thing in its nature inert, cannot in reason be allowed to move itself; this is evident. If gravitation, which, in this case, is to be employed for moving bodies, is to be considered as a material thing, then, this is inconsistent with appearances; and, if it is supposed, in order to explain appearances that do not imply this supposition, it will be ineffectual; for, there is equally required a moving cause to make it produce the effect perceived. If, on the other hand, we shall consider gravitation as an immaterial thing, this is only an expression of ignorance with regard to that which is required to be known; for, this expression means no more than that bodies are not moved by their magnitude and figure, which, according to the notion here considered, is all that bodies have as matter. Consequently, in having recourse to gravitation as a cause for moving bodies which are considered as inert, we form a hypothesis which is either useless for the intended purpose, inconceivable in itself, or inconsistent with appearances.

13. In
13. In this case, where philosophy is considered as being involved with certain inconsistencies, if it should be made to appear, that gravitating bodies do not really exist as they seem to us, but that they truly represent a mode of action in our mind, and a mode of action with regard to an external cause, betwixt which two actions there is interposed a passion of the mind, which is sensation; then, inconsistency may be removed from the consideration of perceived things, and a new field be laid open for the progress of philosophy. In this case, the object proposed in science should be, to investigate the purposes of this external power or cause, and the mode in which it actually proceeds for the production of external bodies, or the conception of them in our mind, which is the same thing, or comes to the same end.

14. It is of such importance, that this question, concerning the nature of body, or material things, and gravitation, which form the chief part of the subject of natural philosophy, should here be understood, that it may be repeated, in an argument conceived in other words, that so in this review the subject may be seen in a fuller light.

The doctrine presently received, concerning bodies having gravitation, supposes two things; first, that a material thing, or natural body, is in all respects inert, but preserves itself in its present state, whether that be of motion or of rest; secondly, that there is a power of gravitation, whereby this inert body tends to every other, with a force in proportion to its quantity of matter, and according to a certain law or rule of intensity, variable with the distance.

It is not here proposed to examine particularly how far this representation of things, according to the present established system of philosophy, is consistent with itself in all respects or not, but only to observe what may be the natural consequence of finding this maxim
of philosophy, not to be strictly true, or not a just representation of things which may be otherwise consistently with all appearances. Therefore,

Upon the supposition that a body, according to this notion of things, exists, a question necessarily arises, What is gravitation? Is it material, that is to say, of the nature of a body, or is it not? If it is not, then, the admitting of that thing, gravitation, for the explanation of appearances, must be really doing nothing; as, this explaining thing not being known, we have nothing but the appearances themselves, under the name of gravitation. This, then, would only be a part of natural history; which might, indeed, serve as the proper means, in reasoning, for the establishment of philosophy, but could not be considered as any part of philosophy itself, which must treat of causes as well as events, and in which our understanding should be enlarged by the generalisation of those causes.

On the other hand, if we shall admit gravitation as a known power, or existing thing, which really cannot be doubted, seeing the direction and law of variation in the action of this power is known, then, the question that was now put with regard to gravitation, necessarily recurs to body, What is that thing, body, to which gravitation as a power belongs? Particularly, Is this external thing of the nature of gravitation, that is to say, has it power and efficacy, or has it no such thing? If it has none, then, How do we come to know it? For, unless there be some means by which we may acquire the knowledge of this thing which is external in relation to our thinking principle, then, according to reason, it must only be a fiction of the mind.

Hence, if human knowledge is allowed to be a positive thing, we are under the necessity of giving to body the attribute of power and action, in order to avoid a manifest absurdity in reasoning; and body,
body, having power, is of the same nature with gravitation, a thing
known actually and positively, and no fiction. Consequently, in
order to understand more fully the nature of this thing called phy-
sical body, the direction and law of variation in the several actions
of this thing, so far as they may appear and be found different from
those of gravitation, may be inquired after. Therefore, when these
are investigated, as has been done so happily with regard to gravita-
tion, then more of the nature of physical body will be understood,
or science in natural things will be thus advanced.

C H A P. V.

Different Views in Science, and different Principles employed in Phi-
losophy.

1. T H E R E are two different lights in which external things
may be considered, that is to say, they may be considered
either physically or metaphysically; and, the nature of those things
will appear to us very different, according as they are considered in
one or other of those particular views.

2. We have now considered them metaphysically, and shown why
they should not be supposed as possessing the qualities of magnitude
and figure, which are only conceptions in our mind, although attri-
buted to things that are external. External things, considered met-
aphysically, have power to act and to be affected, that is, to pro-
duce change in our mind, and to be apparently changed, in confe-
quence of the action of our mind. But, the various modes in which
those changes may take place or happen, that is to say, the order of
those eventual things, these are in the mind, or properly belong to
that intellectual being which then conceives those things.
3. On the other hand, when external things are considered physically, the action of those things is to be confined to the effects upon each other; and, these things are all distinguished by qualities, which, though truly existing only in our mind, must be considered as proper to those things that are in this manner distinguished in relation to each other. Thus, for example, things are of different colours. Colour, therefore, although properly or metaphysically only in our mind, is in physical things to be considered as a quality of those things, as it is that by which they are occasionally distinguished; thus light is considered as variously coloured. In like manner, although, metaphysically, volume and figure are only things existing in the mind which thus conceives, nevertheless, it is by this conception, which is in its nature various, that things are also occasionally distinguished.

4. But although external things, considered physically, have the perceptible qualities of volume and figure, upon the same condition with the sensible qualities of colour, heat, &c. yet there is something very different that may be now observed, as taking place with regard to those sensible and perceptible qualities.

Physically considered, external things are believed to subsist, or to exist always with volume and figure, the perceptible qualities; but, with regard to the other qualities of external things, these are considered as not subsisting, or not always existing in the things that are perceived with them. Hence it is that volume and figure, the perceptible qualities of external things, are considered as being things existing externally, which the sensible qualities, colour, taste, heat, &c. are not.

5. As, by a metaphysical investigation, it has been shown, that volume and figure, as qualities of external things, exist no more externally than do the qualities which are properly sensible, it may
be thought that here is an absurdity in our physical views of things, if the metaphysical inquiry is found just; or else that there is an absurdity in the metaphysical conclusion, if the physical view of things is to be believed. This, however, would be a very improper way of judging in relation to this subject; and it may be made to appear, that both those different ways of viewing the qualities of external things are proper, and founded in the nature of things. For, things may be either considered physically or metaphysically, without any inconsistency. The inconsistency arises from our considering things physically with our metaphysical notions, and metaphysically with our physical ideas. In this case, no doubt, our reasoning will necessarily lead us to absurdity; not from the nature of things, nor the defect of reason, but from the misapplication of principles, in not sufficiently distinguishing the nature of the subject, and the arguments that are then employed.

6. That there are distinct sciences, where the mind is to judge of truth, according to the rules established in the nature of things, or system of human understanding, and proper to each of those different sciences respectively *, may now be illustrated, in considering the case of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. First, then, in the science of mathematics, to judge according to the rules of physics, would be extremely improper; a circle and a right line are imagined, and are therefore actual things in the mind where they are thus conceived; but they do not subsist; they never have been in any other way, and never will happen. Nevertheless, the evidence of mathematical truths, considered according to the rules of that science, where the things demonstrated are not supposed as taking place, is not diminished from there being no such thing existing externally as a circle or a right line.

Secondly,

* Part I. Sect. I. Chap. III.
Secondly, In the science of physics, on the contrary, there is something existing externally; and, the truths of phsyical things are not merely conceived and hypothetical, but actually happen, or have truly been. But, to judge of phsyical things from mathematical notions of equality and permanency, is just as absurd as to ask where is the circle or the right line that are employed by the mathematician in the production of his truths. In phsyical things, there is nothing but inequality and change; but this does not hinder that, in common sense, or the useful arts of life, minute inequalities and changes are justly overlooked, and things are considered as then equal and permanent. The absurdity lies in considering these notions of common sense, which are composed of mathematical and phsyical ideas, as composing science, which they do not reach.

Lastly, In metaphysics, where our proper knowledge, as well as the nature of other such existences, are the subjects of the science, the considering of magnitude and figure as things which, according to mathematical ideas, are permanent, or, according to phsyical ideas, changing, is a manner of reasoning which, instead of enlightening the scientific mind of man, leads him into continual inconsistency, disputation, and contradiction. But this may be avoided, by confining each subject to its proper science, or, by pursuing each science by the rules established in those particular modes of thinking.

7. In this science of metaphysics, therefore, where our knowledge and its causes is the subject of contemplation or investigation, bodies having magnitude and figure are considered as ideas in our mind; and, there, they may either remain the same, or change according to a certain rule. Now, it is the rules or known order of those actions and proportions, of those motions and resistances, that are to be considered as giving scientific knowledge, which is the road to wisdom, as wisdom is the way to know our proper happiness.

8. When
8. When things are considered physically, then all their qualities appear changeable, except their perceptible qualities; at least, all the sensible qualities of those things are changeable for other qualities which necessarily exclude the subsistence of each other. Thus a body may be either black or white, red or green, but it cannot be considered as being at the same time black and white, hot and cold, &c. But this conclusion of commutability cannot be formed with regard to the perceptible qualities of things; not that those things are naturally unchangeable in relation to their perceptible qualities; this is far from being the case; but, when the volume or the figure of a thing is changed, it has nevertheless volume and figure. Therefore, although bodies are changeable in their volume and figure, or external things in relation to their perceptible qualities, yet, the perceptible qualities of external things are never apparently commutable with other qualities, as are the sensible qualities; these qualities are only alterable in degree, but not in kind. Hence, according to our physical notions of external things, these things cannot exist without the qualities of volume and figure, which are thus considered as qualities essential to those things, or their property, which, though alterable, is indelible.

9. To speak or think of a body, or any part of a body, as a thing without volume and figure, is manifestly absurd; therefore, every division of a body, whether physical or mathematical, must be considered as having both volume and figure, however in this manner the volume of the body may be diminished in its parts, and the figure changed. But now it is to be observed, that there is a great difference betwixt natural, i.e. physical, and mathematical bodies; for, the last have only parts as their principles, and they have nothing besides those principles of their constitution. This, however, is not the case with natural bodies; these have parts into which they are separable, as those of mathematics have parts into which they are divisible. But the parts, into which a natural body may be separated,
parated, are not the principles which constitute that natural body, for, this is considering a body mechanically, and not physically, two several views in which a natural body may be taken.

10. In considering natural bodies mechanically, it is only the mathematical divisions of a body that are contemplated; and therefore, the science of mathematics is so necessary to this way of considering bodies, and so very useful in extinguishing every change of this kind that is to be made, or conversely, every resistance that is to be opposed to such changing powers. But, natural bodies, considered physically, have other principles; and these may be again distinguished, as being either chymical or philosophical.

11. The chymical principles of bodies have properly sensible qualities, by means of which they are distinguished. Here is therefore a step in science, by which we advance into the knowledge of the proper constitution of natural things. But, as all those chymical principles are equally bodies having volume and figure, we are not thus made to understand the natural constitution of those bodies. That is to say, every different substance that may be separated from a body must be considered as a chymical principle of that body, in like manner as every part into which it is divisible must be considered as a mechanical principle of the body; but, as we never can know a chymical principle which has not volume and figure, so, all our chymical knowledge of those principles, will not properly lead us to the knowledge of that constitution, whereby the body and its chymical principles have volume and figure.

12. But if, besides these chymical principles on which the sensible qualities of bodies so evidently depend, we shall find in them other principles, different from those which are properly chymical, (and which have not any quality of volume and figure, while those qualities of volume and figure must be necessarily affected by these principles)
ciples) then, here will be philosophical principles, by means of which the volume and figure, or the perceptible qualities of bodies, will be better understood.

That there are such philosophical principles will not be doubted, when gravitation, which has been so fortunately investigated, is considered; for, here is a thing in which there is neither volume nor figure, nor is there any sensation immediately connected with that which is known in gravitation; at the same time, the volume and figure of every body must be affected by this principle, while it is not supposed, as indeed it cannot be on just grounds, that bodies have volume and figure as absolute and unalterable qualities.

13. Hence it will appear, that, with regard to the investigation of natural things, there are, first, mathematical or mechanical principles, by which these things may be considered; and that the foundation of these principles is placed in the action of the mind, by which it properly conceives external things as extended and directed, or existing with magnitude and figure. Secondly, that there are chymical principles, according to which natural things are to be considered; and these again are founded in the passion of mind, or the various sensation that may be excited by the action of these principles of things; and, lastly, that there are philosophical principles, such as gravitation, heat and cold, which principles are not known immediately either by sensation or perception, but are rationally deduced from the various changes that may be observed to take place. Now, by means of these philosophical principles, it is here supposed or affirmed, that the constitution of physical body may be discovered or explained.

14. By thus enumerating heat and cold as philosophical principles, which are then distinguished as different from the chymical principles of bodies, it may be thought that here is a confusion of things, which,
which, consistently with this system of philosophy, should be preserved distinct. Such a conclusion would be reasonable; therefore this state of the subject will require an explanation.

Heat and cold are terms which are both in common and philosophical language, applied to different things; and though, in vulgar discourse, this brings no inconveniency, for, heat and cold are considered simply, like colour, as qualities of things, and not also abstracely as knowledge in the mind, yet, in a philosophical train of reasoning, without attending to this imperfection of language or expression, some inconsistencies will appear, as happens in the present case, where heat and cold are considered as being at the same time both chymical and philosophical principles, which truly they are, but not as being in those two cases the same; for, it is as being different things.

Heat and cold, considered as things producing in us sensation, and as separable from bodies, must be considered as chymical elements, in the same manner as acids and alkalies. But this does not hinder those chymical elements from being considered as things also acting in bodies, independent of sensation by which they are known as heat and cold; and in that case, we cannot, immediately by sensation, learn any thing in relation to those principles. This knowledge, however, is to be attained by reasoning from things which are perceived, and which change in various conditions; for this is to know the laws of heat and cold, in the same manner as that of gravitation was acquired. It is this investigation, (which I have endeavoured to make in its proper place *), that is here meant by heat and cold, enumerated as philosophical principles, and proposed for the explanation of natural things.

15. It is by means of such principles as these that philosophy, taking

* See Dissertations upon subjects of Natural Philosophy.
taking the aid of every science, is to endeavour to explain that volume and figure which we find naturally in bodies; qualities which, though essential in our ideas of bodies, consequently necessary in our contemplations of natural things, are, in reasoning strictly from the most comprehensive views of matter and mind, not necessarily existing in external things, or extrinsically in relation to us, but conceived in our thought according to certain laws of action proper to our mind.

16. Thus natural philosophy, or the science of physics, is a proper subject to be reviewed in a metaphysical inquiry. For, the science of metaphysics, being founded in our consciousness and the knowledge which is most immediate, is a science by which every other may be tried, as every other science that is true must be consistent with it. Therefore, if a system of physics shall be founded in absolute volume and figure as properties,—not of bodies, which evidently they are, but, of material things the principles of bodies, then, this being inconsistent with the metaphysical investigation which has now been made with respect to our knowledge of those qualities, that physical system, according to this rule, must be considered as erroneous. Now, if a system of physics can be framed which shall equally explain natural appearances, and also be consistent with every metaphysical inquiry, such a system, to a reasoning mind, will be considered as just. Thus our systems of physics and metaphysics will mutually throw light upon each other; and thus we shall be led to a general system of philosophy, which will comprehend the whole of our actual existence.
CHAP. VI.

Of the use that may be made in Natural Philosophy of the Metaphysical System now investigated.

HAVING taken a certain view of human knowledge considered as a thing progressive in its nature, and having examined the means or mode by which it may be said to grow, as proceeding in a regular order from sensation, perception, and ratiocination, it may be now observed, that those principles have not been always properly attended to by philosophers, in forming their theories with regard to external things. In these cases they have commonly neglected to make the necessary distinction of things known by the information of the sense, and things imagined by the action of the mind.

In their reasoning concerning nature, they have proceeded upon the opinion of certain things being perceived in sense; whereas, these things are perfectly different from the external information, and are truly conceived by the mind itself; such are magnitude and figure, motion and rest. Consequently, not making the proper distinction of things known as being revealed from without, and of things only conceived from within, it was impossible that these philosophers could arrive at a proper judgment with regard to matter, a thing considered as existing external to or independent of the thinking principle, and concluded to be a cause in relation to that which in sensation is felt in the mind.

We must consider, that our understanding of things does not consist in the knowledge of any thing beyond the sense or passion, and the
the conscious principle of the mind acting and reflecting; but this understanding consists in the comparisons of several things together, whereby there are perceived in the mind similarities and disparities of those compared ideas. Things, therefore, or ideas, must be different in some respect, if a similarity is to be judged; and, in like manner, there must be some dissimilarity in those between which a disparity is to be found. But if things are so confounded, that the distinction of those known in one way and those known in another is lost, how is it possible that just judgments can be formed of things that may be improperly compared, such as sensations and perceptions, the colour, for example, and the form of things?

2. Learned and reasoning men allow that colour is not either in the body where it seems to be, or in the light by which it is produced, but that this, as well as taste, smell, heat, and cold, are truly feelings of the mind then affected by an external thing. But, at the same time, they suppose this external thing, called matter, upon all occasions acting and producing its proper effects by means of volume and figure, things which have now been shown to be conceptions of the mind, and not the properties of an external cause, nor qualities existing independent of the mind, by the proper action of which volume and figure are conceived.

Thus philosophers, in having confounded the operations of the mind, by which actual and real knowledge is produced, with that of external causes by which the mind is truly informed or has knowledge, have not sufficiently distinguished knowledge as derived both from an external and internal information; they have therefore reasoned upon principles which, in not having been suspected, had not been examined with that strict attention which fundamental truths should have required. Hence scientific evidence in natural philosophy has been neglected by reasoning men, who have contented themselves with that apparent of things, which is on all hands acknowledged.
ledged as no reality; and thus, in reasoning with all the growing knowledge of successive ages, philosophers have still formed opinions, necessarily partaking of the error which was originally in their principles.

3. It is in this manner that judgments, which in the animal or in the vulgar man are not erroneous, may nevertheless in the philosopher be found as prejudices or false opinions, which it is of the utmost importance to correct. For, though these opinions neither affect the arts of life nor the morals of mankind, they may prove fatal to philosophy, where the nature of matter and mind are to be subjects of investigation or inquiry. Is it not hence that there has hitherto appeared so much disputation among reasoning men, concerning things, where, so far as evidence is to be found, there should be only one opinion?

4. It is with a view to find this evidence, that natural things may be investigated upon new principles, in which that false judgment of philosophers, with regard to things perceived, may be corrected; and where a proper distinction may be made, betwixt things known with the evidence of sense, and those that are imagined by the proper action of the mind.

5. Imagination has been the term all along employed to express the conceived ideas formed in the mind, by which magnitude and figure are made known. And now it may be proper to observe, with regard to these imaginations or conceptions of the mind, that although they are not to be considered literally as the external thing which is the cause of our sensations, nevertheless they are evident truths, and are no deception, so far as they are real transactions, which have been directed by an external agent, and have happened in us or in our knowledge, are recorded in the memory, and are recollected or repeated by reflection and the proper imagining power of
of the mind. Hence those transactions being true, and properly
collected or related, though not perhaps immediately, with a cause
considered as a thing external, may lead, in reason, to knowledge of
nature, or to things as they truly happen, in contradistinction to the
various modes in which they are imagined.

6. Therefore philosophy, whose proper end is to trace things up
as near as possible to the first cause, should begin by unfolding those
ideas which have been conceived, and in which things are apprehended as existing in nature, without us, or independent of our
thinking principle.

7. Magnitude and figure have been found to be things which,
properly speaking, exist only in our mind, seeing that these ideas
are produced by the action of our thinking principle. This subject,
therefore, treated as a part of natural philosophy, properly means
certain laws of action, that may be investigated from what happens
in external things; by which action our mind must be affected in
order to produce knowledge; this knowledge, then, is founded upon
the passion, as well as action of our thinking conscious principle.

8. It is thus that the ideas of form and magnitude, as well as
those of space and time, may be understood as things actually, re-
gularly, and necessarily produced or created by our mind. But, so
far as those ideas or conceptions, in their production, are immediately
connected with sensation, which is derived from the action of an
external thing, these ideas of form and magnitude, of space and
time, are necessarily referred by our mind, or in our opinion, to
that external cause of which we cannot doubt the existence.

And, although we may be constrained by reason to believe, that
this particular conceived mode, with regard to the existence of an
external thing, is only a speculation of the mind itself, nevertheless
this
this speculation, which has been called imagination and conception, is sufficiently real to us; it answers completely the end of its intention, and leads into no error in our action; it neither misleads the necessary arts of life, nor alters our conception of right and wrong.

9. Therefore, as it is only the abstract reasonings of philosophy that may be affected by the natural conclusion of the animal respecting the imagined mode of existence in external things, it is only this abstracted science of philosophy that has the means, in reasoning from principles successively obtained, of correcting that first judgment, by investigating the nature or constitution of our knowledge and understanding.

10. Although it has been demonstrated, that magnitude and figure exist only as conceptions in the mind, yet, in treating of natural bodies and their perceived qualities, these must necessarily be considered as things external; for, the apparent properties of things are then the subject of investigation; which appearances should be explained in consistency with the principles that have been already discussed relating to our knowledge and its cause.

11. It will now appear, that the great end served in that preceding investigation, is to have upon solid grounds removed, in our philosophy, the supposition of inactivity, permanency, extension, impenetrability, and hardness, from the principles of bodies, or from matter considered as the external cause of our knowledge. Consequently the volume, form, hardness, and impenetrability that are apparent, come to be proper subjects of investigation, in order to find rational principles in action and reaction, by which these may be explained, or conceived consistently with every other subject of our knowledge.

Extension and direction, as modes of conception, have already been
been explained in the investigated theory of human understanding. Volume and figure as the fruit or result of our conceiving power, and as things existing externally (because they are immediately connected with the operation of the external thing the cause of sensation), will then be a proper subject of examination, in order to investigate the principles, upon which depend those compound ideas of things, imagined with the qualities of volume and figure, but more reasonably to be considered as existing in power and efficacy.

12. If consistently with this theory of our knowledge, the proposed physical investigation should be fortunately conducted, so as to discover the principles on which the determined volume and particular form of a perceived or material thing depend, then here would be a solid basis whereon to found a system of natural philosophy, which may be farther extended to the explanation of all the various appearances of things. If still success should be found to attend those endeavours for advancing knowledge in natural things, by deducing the particular appearances from causes that are general, then, from this explained system of perceived things, a convincing argument, in favour of this new theory of human knowledge, would be derived.

Thus means might be found, for establishing a system of matter and mind, in which consistency, so grateful to the human intellect, may be perceived; and in which doubt or scepticism, arising from inconsistency, may be removed.
SECTION III.

The Education of the Human Mind examined upon General Principles.

INTRODUCTION.

1. The subject now proposed is the most interesting to mankind, and therefore ought to be studied in its principles, or highest possible distinctions. This will appear by considering: With justice man is esteemed the most admirable of the works of God; yet, without education, What is man? Man is born the most helpless, the most dependent, the most ignorant of the animal kind; — Why? Because his mind is not then educated; and, in the wisdom of nature, his body is always adapted to his mind. — Man, in the natural course of things, is educated in proportion as he is reared; and, that this is in perfect wisdom, will appear by considering: It could serve no purpose to teach an animal that which he cannot practise; and, if an animal shall be considered as practising, without any species of teaching or education, this would be confounding, in our thought, the nature of things. A fire is not taught to burn; but, an animal must learn to suck, to breathe, to walk, i.e. to move its body according to a certain order of things conducted by a mind; now this mind can only act in proportion as it is informed, and thus taught to know.
The animal man is, like many of the brutes, reared by maternal tenderness. But, what is all the pains that a mother, merely as an animal, bestows upon the rearing of her child! Could all the tenderness of the brute creation, which is perfect, educate the human mind? And, without any degree of human education, What would be the state of man? There is no question with regard to the influence of education as producing a superior being, in like manner as the neglect of this produces an inferior species of men. But, the truth here proposed to be shown is this, that in the case of supposition, where no education is admitted, the animal then produced would be necessarily inferior to any of the human species that ever has appeared, so far as external circumstances have an influence in producing mind, and so far as the mind in supposition is in other respects equal to that with which it is to be compared. But in order to see this, it may be proper to make the following consideration.

2. Man, in whatever forlorn state he may be found, must have been provided for, at one time, with some care, and served with some degree of tenderness. It is only in the age of fable, that the son of man was fostered by a wolf; and, though some of the tenderness natural to a mother may be dispensed with in circumstances favourable for life, yet, the provident attention of the species is necessarily bestowed upon the infant race, without exception. Man must be suckled; he must be reared, by the care of another person, to that state in which he may provide for himself; and this person, to whom the helpless animal is intrusted, must be man. But, before man in his infancy has arrived at that state in which he may sustaine himself, he must have learned much by the necessary intercourse with mankind, in that period of his life in which he makes the most rapid progress in his knowledge; and may then have actually arrived at a degree of human education, which may be considered as in some respects infinitely superior to that of any species of brute.
3. By nature, man is indigent, ignorant, and dependent; by art, man becomes powerful, wise, and provident. Has, therefore, nature, which does so much for the animal in general, done nothing for the man? Has nature, our general parent, who has taught industry to the ant, oeconomy to the bee, and such a high degree of ingenuity to the beaver, left man, alone of all the animal tribe, destitute of every mean of life except those supplied by art, that is, invented by man himself? And, may not this very art, which mankind must invent, be considered as in nature, although nature is also to be distinguished from art? This will appear in the examination of the present subject, the education of the human mind.

CHAP. I.

Of that Education which is got from Nature.

1. EDUCATION is that operation in which a mind is made to grow. Our knowledge of this operation is, like that of any other, limited to the conditions in which the effect takes place; and it is not extended to the action which, though judged or concluded in reason from that effect, will be found, on proper examination, never, or upon no occasion, to be known. Therefore, in this inquiry into the education of mind, the proper purpose of our understanding is, to distinguish the order of the several operations, that are required as the proper means for a certain end to be accomplished; and, in each step or operation, to observe the circumstances or conditions of the action, which being known, or thus distinguished in reason, become explanatory of the action, or of the effect from whence the action is concluded, and, in common as well as scientific language, termed the cause.

2. There
2. There is a natural progress, in which the mind proceeds from ignorance to knowledge, from nothing or inactivity, to action or existence. Thus, it is only by knowledge that action is excited, or a mind produced; for, action without knowledge, such as, e.g. the weight or descent of bodies, is not considered as constituting a mind, which must first know before it acts, and then must discern or judge, in order to proceed in acting according to the nature of an animal, which is a thing immediately connected with a mind.

There being thus a fixed course in which a mind naturally proceeds, from the lowest state, or that of absolute ignorance, to the first state of knowledge, or that which is instinctive, and again from this to the highest perfection of a scientific mind, there is no other way in which a mind can possibly proceed; although, a mind may either proceed or not, that is, may proceed more or less, according as the conditions of knowledge are either afforded or withheld.

3. Thus it will appear, that teaching a mind, is only giving the opportunities of proceeding in its natural course; or, it is the producing the conditions which are necessary to knowledge; without which conditions, though a mind may continue to know, and persevere in acting in the state to which it has arrived, it could not proceed to any advanced state of knowledge, which is required for the perfectioning of a mind.

4. Such is teaching in general. But, as there are several stages of knowledge, so, in order to understand the particulars of teaching, it will be necessary to consider the manner in which a mind is made to proceed in those different stages, that so we may be able to observe and distinguish the operations with regard to which the terms learning and teaching may be properly applied, and those in which they may be applied improperly. It is thus that we may understand
stand the science of teaching in general, or the order and method of producing or educating a perfect mind.

5. In that state of mind which is properly instinctive, learning may be considered as taking place; thus an animal is said to learn, to see, and hear. In this case, where the animal may be said to learn, in having knowledge advanced, let us see in what part of the operation it is that learning properly takes place.

First, then, it is not in the passion of mind that the term learning can be applied; for, in sensation, a mind is not taught to know; it knows absolutely, the instant that it suffers; and, it has that knowledge perfect, the moment that this sensation is complete. Now, betwixt the act in which a mind is made to suffer, and the passion in which a mind is considered as knowing, there are no data for reasoning, or means for our knowing any thing farther on that subject. Therefore, it is here that the term learning does not properly apply in the operations of mind, no more than in the action of a body that falls by its weight.

6. The term learning being thus considered as inapplicable to that operation of instinctive knowledge in which the mind is only passive, it will appear, that in perception, where the mind is active in producing knowledge, learning must take place; so far as, in the first instant of perception, the mind cannot be said to have all the knowledge of magnitude and figure to which it may attain, in proceeding through that operation by which these are conceived, or this information of knowledge is acquired.

7. And here it may be observed, that, though a mind must be considered as knowing when it learns, and may be said to learn when it makes any progress in knowledge, yet, in the strict language of science, to know is not to learn, and to learn is not merely
to know. Learning is to know in consequence of something that is known, and by means of something that is done. Now, this will be found properly applicable to perception, where a mind, in consequence of sensation as knowledge, learns to perceive by means of the proper action of mind. Here, the mind may be said to learn to know in action, as before in sensation, it had been made to know in passion.

8. But though, in the first exertion of the perceiving faculty, the mind may be thus said to learn, at the same time, it cannot, properly speaking, be said to learn to know; for, it only learns to act, in order that it should know so soon as the discerning faculty shall take place, which is as soon as the mind in consequence of the passion of sensation has been made to act. But when the mind, in comparing the different excitments of sense, and the several exertions of its proper action, forms a judgment in distinguishing or assimilating its knowledge, here is properly knowledge which it has to learn. This then is, most properly speaking, knowledge, or knowledge proper to a mind. For, a mind does more than either to suffer or to act, which material things are also considered as doing. It is for this reason, that here is properly fixed the character of mind, in judging or discerning; which is an operation that the mind has to learn; and, in which operation, knowledge, in the most proper sense of the word, is produced.

9. We have been obliged to call the passion of mind, excited in sense, and the action of mind, exerted in consequence of that passion in the operation of perception, knowledge; but this is only for want of a proper term, by which should be expressed the fact or principle on which the discerning power, or reasoning faculty, has to proceed, in producing that which, in the utmost propriety, must be termed knowledge, being the production of mind. But, though we have been obliged thus to use a term improperly, by employing it figuratively
ratively as knowledge, when, in the strict language of science, it
might have been otherwise expressed; yet, no confusion of thought
is to be imputed to this imperfection of language; for, while the
same term has been thus applied to different things, these have also
been always properly discriminated. Thus, that which has been
improperly termed knowledge, has been distinguished as knowledge
absolute or primary, with which the mind is supposed to set out, in
its progress on the road to science, and in its way to learn proper
knowledge, which is relative, and respects the passion of sensation,
and the proper action of a mind proceeding to perceive. It has
been shown, that the mind must learn to know things; and this it
does, in comparing one thing with another.

10. Thus, the means of knowledge and the order of procedure
being known, we may be allowed, in the propriety of language, to
say, that a mind, in experience, (which is that natural procedure),
learns to know things. Now, this is more than knowing simply,
or having excited absolute knowledge; for, this operation of learn-
ing is relative, and properly refers to something which before had
existed, or come to pass.

11. A mind being thus considered as only learning in experience
and reason, and as reasoning instinctively and not consciously, or in
a voluntary manner, it will appear, that a mind is here taught to
know, but the teacher is not known. The means, and the order of
procedure in learning, are known; but, Where is the teacher? and,
without a teacher, How can a mind be said to be taught? It is
true, indeed, that, in this case, a mind is said to be taught by na-
ture. But, this is only saying, that we do not know what teaches.
For, What is nature in this case. Nature is not that event, in the
mind, when a thinking being learns to know a thing, in comparing
knowledge which is different in time or place, quantity or quality,
&c.; these are the means, and the order of procedure. But the
teacher,
Section III. OF EDUCATION.

teacher, this is nature; that is, it is God, the cause of all things; that is to say, it is, but it is not known.

12. Hence will be understood a common expression, that animals know by instinct, and that instinctive knowledge is taught by nature; for, animals are said to act instinctively, when knowledge and judgment are necessarily employed. Thus, for example, it is instinctively that an animal is said to know its proper food; but, this knowledge, it is evident, requires the exercise of reason, for, an animal distinguishes that thing with which it has been fed, or which it has been in the use of eating; and this is what is meant by knowing its food.

13. But is there, in nature, no other teacher, when a mind is made to know that which before it had not known? that is to say, when a mind is made to know, May not the agent be known, as well as the proper means or manner of the procedure? For example, when a mind, which only knew instinctively, shall, in conscious reflection, know itself, then here is the operation of learning; here is also a person that is taught. But, Who is the teacher? Is it that same nature who taught the animal to know its food, to know its friend and foe, to distinguish those things which have been agreeable, and those which give uneasiness, and who thus has taught that animal to act according to the rules established in wisdom for its proper conduct, in the system of sensitive and discerning beings?

Here is a question proposed, the answer to which is not necessarily required; or, this question may be resolved according to the opinion of the person who is to reason from the premises. It is only here employed in order to lead us, in the order of things, to such a step as a mind may be said to take in consequence of knowing; a step which is properly in intellect, where a mind may be said to know in a voluntary manner; that is to say, where a mind must teach
teach itself; not as acting either contrary to established rule, or out of nature, but as having done a thing perfectly different from that which it had done before, when by nature it had been instinctively led to know things, or to distinguish one thing from another, without knowing itself, or distinguishing the thing that knows from the thing that is known.

14. A person who knows himself, who not only knows as an animal by nature instructed, (in the manner which has been investigated), but who is also conscious of his knowing, such a person, besides nature, which is considered as distinct from the mind, and external in relation to it, has another instructor, not exclusive of nature, but as comprehending nature in general, to which every action must be ultimately referred. For here it may be said, with all the justness and propriety of thought and language, that a mind, by a natural power, has in conscious reflection taught itself; that is, it has performed an action which is only necessary in the system of intellect, where a mind must know from choice, or in a voluntary manner, as following a thought which is properly its own, although also the work of nature or the gift of God.

15. Here is therefore a proper distinction, of the teaching of a mind on the one hand instinctively by nature, that is, by nature alone, or in a more simple manner; and, on the other hand, by nature, not simply or alone, but co-operating with the action of the mind itself, thinking in a reflex manner from its instinctive or more simple knowledge, and thus knowing knowledge in a new career of conscious thought.

16. Self-taught is a term commonly applied to mind; but then it is always understood as meant in opposition to the instruction of art, or that of one person teaching another. It is never considered as contrasted with that education of a mind which is the instinctive operation
operation of nature, or the natural acquisition of instinctive knowledge. But, this common view of mankind with regard to this subject education, or this limited opinion concerning the nature of a self-taught mind, does not in the least affect the distinction which has now been made in relation to the teaching of a mind. For, here it has been shown, that a mind must be taught, first, by nature instinctively. Secondly, that before a mind is capable of being taught by art, it must be taught again by nature; not instinctively, but consciously, which is a step in mind perfectly different from the first, that is to say, the mind is then made by nature to teach itself. But when, by means of another person, a conscious mind is further taught by art, this does not in the least confound the distinction already made; and it only forms another species of education, which, in being explained by that preceding theory of teaching, will add confirmation to the theory.

CHAP. II.

Of that Education which is got from Art.

Art affords a third species of education; this is that voluntary instruction which is given by one person to another; and this, it has been observed, is distinguished as an artificial manner of being taught. A mind, however, is not thus taught by art as excluding nature, but as distinguishing this education from that instruction which is performed either by nature alone, or by nature and the conscious action of a mind, without the co-operation or direction of this act of art by which a mind may be also taught. Neither is this artificial teaching to be considered as excluding the self-teaching of a mind, by which a person is also taught in this third species of education, as well as in that which had in the natural course of things preceded.
preceded it. But, the artificial operation of this teaching person is to be considered as the external circumstances, or the proper conditions for this operation of self-teaching in the person taught, which here takes place, in no other manner than as on every other occasion, or as when a mind is led by nature alone to teach itself.

2. In order to understand this, we have only to consider what a person does who would teach another. Here, that which is to be taught, may be considered severally under two different heads, which will comprehend every thing that may be in this manner taught. Those are, first, action, which respects the body, and must proceed from thought, considered as the action of mind; secondly, thought, which respects the mind, and is to be excited by means of the action of that body which is proper to the teacher's mind. In the first of those two cases, it is by imitation that the mind, to be taught, is led to the performance of that action, which, having been shown, is the natural pattern for the action of that imitative animal, whose mind then teaches itself in the natural conditions of action, or those ordained in the system of animal life; and that even without conscious knowledge. In this case, the education is only to be considered as instinctive; such is the case of a parrot, for example, which is taught to speak, without consciousness or science.

3. In the second case, when a mind is to be taught to think, we surely cannot allow ourselves to imagine, that a person has any power to create a thinking substance, or to make a substance think which did not think before. All that a teacher does, in this case, is to direct the order of those thoughts, which shall arise in a mind, from the contemplation of things which it is in his power to affect and influence. Here again, there are two several cases to be considered; for, the directing mind may either, on the one hand, pursue that natural order in which, without a proper intention or design as having an end in view, it acts only from the natural feelings of the animal,
and the occasional circumstances of things. Or, on the other hand, this mind, which is to teach, may think in wisdom, as forming a design, which is then to be pursued in following the means proper to effect the end in view.

4. In the first of those two cases, it is not the acting mind that teaches, properly speaking; for, that which then teaches is the occasional effects of this acting mind; or, it is the effects of a mind then acting in the natural course of things; and this only forms the second species of teaching to a conscious mind teaching itself, by the help of nature. In the second case, again, it is in science that a mind has formed the design of directing the thoughts of another mind; and this is scientific teaching, which may be now considered.

5. There is no subject more difficult to be traced than is the beginning of scientific teaching in the human mind; and the reason will now be evident. Scientific teaching is mixed with the first instinctive progress, and the natural education of the animal man; and it is impossible to say at what period man ceases to be the mere animal, which he was originally, and becomes the animal man in having some degree of science in his knowledge. This necessary confusion, however, of things in their nature perfectly distinct, though it creates difficulty in the distinguishing operation, can afford no argument against the discriminating of those things, which, in being properly distinguished, are then truly understood.

6. There is not an operation more scientific than that of language; for, science is properly the operation of the species man, and not of the individual who also does his part. Now, language is the very means by which the species preserve science, in communicating it successively to the individuals. But, language is not the cause of science; it is science that is the cause of language. Therefore, a question here occurs, When the individual has language, in having

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learned.
learned it from the species, has such a person then necessarily science? The solution of this question is easy.—So far as the language of this person is perfect, and so far as he understands that language, he has science. Conversely, so far as the language of this person is imperfect, and so far as he does not understand the language which he may have acquired, we cannot form a proper judgment of his science from his language. A person, however, who understands the terms of abstract qualities, we may be assured, has science in some degree.

But, in order to understand what the species do, in the artificial teaching of science to infant minds, (who would also naturally acquire it in a certain degree), we must attend to that which is done in a more advanced state, when, according to the common opinion of mankind, a person is first taught science; and, to illustrate this subject, it will be proper to take an example.

7. The mathematician draws a line; and he shows, in what respect this is to be considered as a right line, in being distinguished from another species, which he also shows, in giving the proper example. In this manner, he leads his pupil’s mind, in perception, to conceive the ideas he proposes. It is thus also, that he learns him to abstract in his mind, by making him suppose, that, in the line which he has drawn, there is no breadth; and thus this person is made to acquire the abstract idea of length in one direction.

In this science now considered, where the person to be taught has already, or naturally in perception, learned all the principles on which reasoning is to proceed for the proper understanding of magnitudes and figures, the preceptor, having made his pupil understand the terms to be employed, proceeds to form a proposition by putting together, in a certain order, the scientific ideas which his pupil has then formed. Thus the mind, which before was ignorant, is made, in the natural course of reason, to produce a thought, which,
which, being fixed in its nature, is said to be a truth; and this is the
subject of further operation, when employed in a similar manner,
in order to see another truth, and thus serves to lead this person
farther into that science.

8. In chymistry, again, where the principles of the science are not,
as in the case now considered, to be found in the pupil’s mind, here
his preceptor first gives principles by showing facts, and then from
those facts forms propositions, in generalising those principles which
were at first particular. He thus, for example, teaches him the gen-
erality of acid substances, as having similar relations to a known
thing; and the particularities of this general class of substance, every
acid producing effects different from each other, in similar circum-
cstances or conditions, all of which in this case are shown.

9. The mind of an individual, being thus advanced in the route
of science, is taught, by the combination of different propositions, to
form theories, which are more compound but general rules of action,
and comprehend several propositions or truths which had been seen.
Thus a person is conducted, in philosophy, to all the height of human
wisdom, so far as, the understanding mind of man is thus made to
comprehend that knowledge which had required the united efforts of
the species, for succesions of ages not to be numbered.

10. But in this case, where the preceptor has taught his pupil, he
has done this only by placing before his pupil’s mind a chain of facts
selected by science, or the wisdom of man, for the purpose of lead-
ing the understanding mind of such a person, who yet is ignorant,
to see the truths implied in those conditions, and thus to be learnt or
known in reason. Therefore he does no more than to lay those na-
tural conditions of knowledge before that ignorant mind, which has
itself to learn in attending to those means of knowledge; in the same
manner as if, without the aid of art, they had been offered in the
natural
natural course of things; and, in like manner, as this learning operation must have taken place in relation to the species before, when there was no scientific art, or before this art had arrived at the state in which it has been found in the greater perfection of the species.

Thus it will appear, that the scientific teacher does no more by his art, than to lead the conscious and attentive mind to simple facts and truths, placed in the proper, i.e., in the natural order of science, by which that active or attending mind is made then, in the natural course of intellect, to learn.

But, in thus showing the active part that a mind must take in learning by means of that science which is proper to the species, it is not meant to undervalue the power and efficacy of scientific teaching. On the contrary, this may be considered as a great, an infinite or unbounded thing; for, what perfection of science may not the species, in the natural progress of the human mind, attain? And, what scientific acquisition of the species is to be conceived, that may not, in perfecting the art of education, be communicated to the individual? But, a person to be thus taught, must co-operate in giving the necessary attention, and thus learn; not instinctively, as judging without conscious reflection; nor yet consciously alone, without the aid of science; but actively, learning from scientific operations, although not teaching itself by means of science, which at present this person is supposed to be learning, and not to have learned.

11. When a mind is taught instinctively, then, nature is said to be the teacher; and, this teacher is not properly known. When, again, a mind is taught in conscious reflection, then, the teacher is known, as well as the person who is taught. But, in this case, the teacher, and the person taught, are one; and it is instinctively that this learning operation is performed. It is otherwise in
in this third species of teaching, where those two persons, the teacher and the person taught, are separate. Art also now takes place; but where? Not in the mind that is then taught; the art is in the teacher, who, acting from the acquired wisdom of mankind, is thus distinguished in relation to nature, in which this artificial operation also finds its proper place.

12. But this wisdom of the species, which proceeds in art for the instruction of the human mind, may be acquired by the individual mind, which had it not before, and which had been taught by means of that art. In this case of supposition, here would be a mind teaching itself, not in nature as expressed by the term instinct, but in art, that is, by human wisdom, both in the teacher and the person taught, which are now the same.

13. Every man, who has any degree of wisdom, must have science; and, all mankind have wisdom, more or less, i.e. in some degree. But though every man, who bears a part, or supports a character in society, be it ever so mean, must be considered as wise in a considerable degree, consequently as having science in proportion to his wisdom, yet this man, who has practical wisdom in a high degree, may not have any considerable share of speculative science, or scientific wisdom; that is to say, he only acquires science in proportion to the occasions which actually present themselves to his understanding. He therefore makes no progress in his science, except occasionally, when things present themselves in such an order as he may discern. He thus proceeds to know more and more in the system of actual things, by means of which he also becomes more wise, in adapting ends and means, or he becomes more capable of forming effectual design.

This, however, is not what is properly meant by a man of science. A man of science does more than become wise in receiving instructions.
instructions from nature or actual things; he learns to make himself wise, in promoting his own science. But, for this purpose, he must do more than barely to attain science, or know things scientifically; he must understand science, or know scientifically the principles of his reasoning, when he knows things scientifically. In this case, man, knowing his principles, or the elements of his science, may reason synthetically, and thus promote his science in speculation, without the guidance or direction of actual things; he then teaches himself in science. Thus man may proceed, in his proper wisdom, to promote his general knowledge; and then, in his proper knowledge, or conscious understanding, he proceeds to make himself more wise.

14. In order to understand this, it will be proper to consider, that a mind, which in thought shall form to itself a certain system of things, and shall then proceed actually in order to inform itself how far that conceived system of things is true or not, then proceeds in wisdom, and with design to know. Therefore, this mind not only teaches itself, so far as it thinks consciously, or judges of its proper knowledge, but it also teaches itself scientifically, as proceeding in the wisdom of nature, which it has now acquired. This, then, forms the fourth and last species of learning, in which a person, properly teaching himself, improves his mind.

15. This is the last or highest sphere of education to a mind, which then thinks not only according to the order of science, but also for the increase of science, first with regard to the individual, and next in relation to the species. This, then, is the art of man; an art by which the wisdom of intellect may be carried to the ultimate perfection of this species of mind.

This is that scientific art which is employed, not for the purpose of conducting action, as is the common art of man, but for conducting
ducting of thought, the proper conductor of action. This is the
proper art of man, by which he attains to a supremacy in this world,
where he directs those operations of nature that fall within the reach
of his powers. But, above all, this is that divine art, by which the
wisdom of the human intellect may be carried to the ultimate per-
fection of this species of mind; a species which, though subordinate
in its nature compared with that which has no limit in its perfe-
tion, is yet indefinite, so far as we have not seen its end, nor cannot
conceive that state in which it should be said, in reason, there is not
any thing further to be learned.

CHAP. III.

Use and extension of the Theory in regard to Artificial Education.

1. FROM this view of education, it will appear, what an active
part a mind has to take in learning any thing, and of what
importance it is for a mind to learn to teach itself in science; for,
without those general systematic views in which a mind, observing
its proper ignorance, desires to know, the greatest display of know-
ledge in a teacher may be to little purpose. In the education of a
mind, therefore, it is of the last importance to encourage that natu-
ral desire, as well as to direct it properly in relation to the object.

2. The mind of man has naturally a desire to know, or rather,
this desire is naturally produced, in the pleasure that is necessarily
annexed to the progress of knowledge, i.e. in the employment of
talents or instinctive faculties. In the natural progress of mankind,
pleasure attends every step in knowledge; for, no step is taken ex-
cept either in consequence of desire, or in being attended with a
VOL. III. M satisfaction.
satisfaction. This, however, is not the case with the artificial teaching of mankind; there is, on the contrary, in this operation, often a painful attention of mind, called forth without any satisfaction following, or without a proper recompense. In this case, the desire by which that painful attention of the mind is given, is not the desire that would naturally occur, in order for that mind to teach itself the proposition; it is only the desire to understand that which the teacher has to propose, that here actuates the pupil’s mind, and makes him often undergo a painful operation, without receiving that pleasure by which it is required.

3. Here is the imperfection of human or artificial education, which it is of the utmost importance to avoid. This, it is evident, must be done, by endeavouring to adapt, not only the subject in general, but also the particular steps in the subject, to the capacity of the mind that is to be taught, in order that as much pleasure, and as little pain as possible, shall attend every step which is made in knowledge. In this manner, there may be made to grow, either, on the one hand, a general desire of learning, when more pleasure than pain is felt, or, on the other hand, a general dislike to that operation, when much painful attention has been given to little purpose.

4. Hence it will appear, how necessity is naturally the mother of invention; for, necessity begets desire, and the desire of knowledge, or of learning, is the best security of being taught. But, the desire of knowledge implies a sense of ignorance; now, How can ignorance produce that desire? and, Does not the desire to know increase with the satisfaction? In order to resolve those questions, we must examine the nature of our ignorance, as well as knowledge.

5. Ignorance is of two kinds, absolute and relative, i.e. comparative. Ignorance, when this is absolute, is only a negative thing,
a term implying that there is then no knowledge. Now, it is impossible to conceive, how a thing that is not, or a mere negation, should be a cause for any thing. Ignorance, in this sense, cannot produce desire. Ignorance, again, when comparative, means only a less degree of knowledge. Now, if absolute ignorance cannot produce any desire, no degree of ignorance can be said properly to produce desire, although a mind, ignorant in a certain degree, may have desire produced; for, in this case, it must be evident, the cause of the desire is properly in the knowledge, which is then a positive thing in that mind, however comparatively ignorant.

6. But, though neither absolute nor relative ignorance can be properly considered as a cause for desire, which, in the simple state of the case now in contemplation, can only arise from knowledge; or a thing positive in its nature, yet, when a mind has arrived at a superior state, in consciously reflecting on its knowledge, then, this negative knowledge, or this sense of ignorance, may in some respect be considered as the cause of a desire to know. A person, for example, who knows the tastes of various herbs, and the smells of various flowers, upon seeing a new plant, the taste and smell of which he is conscious that he does not know, may then have a desire to inform his mind; and this desire may be considered as in some measure proceeding from his conscious ignorance, as the cause or the condition of the desire.

17. But it is to be considered, that this conscious ignorance, tho' a necessary condition for the desire of knowing, is not absolute; it is only a relative condition, there being necessarily required the correlative, which is the knowledge of similar things; and this then operates, in conjunction with the conscious ignorance, as a cause for that desire.

8. The example of desire now given, regards simple knowledge;
but it is equally the case in scientific knowledge, or the understanding of things; it is also the same with the actions of things, when the question is not with regard to the things themselves, but the order of event, or the connection of these with that of other things. A person, for example, who, being ignorant of magnetism, shall observe the determined motions of a magnetic needle, has naturally a desire to understand this appearance, in knowing the order of the action, and the connection of this event with others in the system. But it must be evident, that such a person, previous to the feeling this desire, must have formed in his mind a systematic view of things, as well as being conscious of an order which he does not know.

9. Hence it will appear, that as, in the progress of the human mind, knowledge, which at first was extremely limited, becomes more and more indefinite with regard to its direction, that is to say, in relation to the subject of this intellectual operation, so, the more knowledge is acquired in the understanding of things, and the greater satisfaction has been enjoyed in the progress of knowledge, the more will grow, in general, the desire to know; and thus, in this natural course of intellectual things, the cause of knowing, as well as the means of knowledge, is continually produced.

10. The education of the human mind has been now considered so far as relates to knowledge, which is the active part, and the proper motive for action. But, besides action, a mind, in order to be most perfect or useful in the system of things where it is placed, must suffer occasionally in the use of intellect. Now, this it has to learn; for, no mind naturally suffers willingly, or endures that painful or uneasy feeling which it may remove at pleasure. Hence, in the system of human education, patience, or suffering, is an object which, in the plan of the scientific teacher, should not be neglected; and, as actions, which at first are difficult, are by experience or habit
bit made to be done with ease; so, in the case of patience or suffering, this may be by habit highly improved, especially if this species of instruction shall be begun at an early period, and uniformly continued until the proper effect shall be produced.

11. But, in teaching or producing this capacity or patient suffering, an habit the most useful perhaps that man can learn, great care must be taken by a teacher, in the education of his pupil, not to corrupt the mind, in learning a base submission to that which is unworthy of a man to suffer. Man is not to suffer, like a patient brute, merely for fear of impending pain; he must have a nobler motive for his passive will. This is the applause of men; and the approbation of his own mind in reflection, which it is the object of philosophy to teach. Hence, much discretion is required in the education of youth, or in producing great degrees of this capacity of suffering; as well as there is required much wisdom, in order to make this species of education effectual to the end in view.

12. As it is voluntary suffering which is the object of the teaching here considered, so, in order to make this effectual, it must be made agreeable; for, the mind of man cannot be brought to will that which is otherwife, no more than a heavy body to ascend. But, though a mind cannot will that which is disagreeable, yet the allurements of a present motive may be overcome in the contemplation of one more powerful; and the feelings of a present sentiment may be stifled in the lively imagination of a future feeling. These are things which may in reason be compared. Hence, in the patient endurance imposed upon tender minds, a suitable enjoyment should always be in view, as well as a suitable displeasure in the transgression of a rule of conduct which has been properly acquired.

In this manner, by properly adapting the rules of conduct in proportion to the conscious understanding of infant minds; and, by proportioning
proportioning the allurements of joy, and determents of grief, to the 
object in view, the ductile mind of man may have its passive ca-
pacities educated in science, as well as the active capacities of its un-
derstanding.

13. With a view to this, the enjoyment, as well as the sufferance, 
of tender minds, should be managed with great circumspection, in 
the infant state of man, in order to avoid as much as possible the 
excitement either of joy or grief, without a purpose to which those 
passions may conduct, in the improvement of the growing mind. 
It is thus that extreme indulgence, in every joy that can be excited, 
spoils the proper relish of future joys; and unreasonable suffering, 
which may be injudiciously imposed, steels the mind against the fu-
ture efficacy of a useful motive.

14. It is in this manner, that, having in the education of mind 
an end in view, and knowing the means by which that end is with 
infallibility to be effected, the human race may be brought to a state 
of perfection, which is not in any other manner to take place. 
How different this plan from that of common education! For, in 
that case, there would be minds educated according to some design 
contrived in wisdom, and not left to the casual direction of persons, 
either acting without any regular plan, or incapable of forming such 
a plan as wisdom should direct.

15. At the same time, it must be acknowledged, that nothing 
would appear to be more difficult, than to form a general plan for 
the education of a mind to wisdom and to virtue. For this pur-
pose, at least, it would be requisite, that the person undertaking such 
a task, should understand the object of intention, as well as the 
means by which it is to be attained. Because, without understand-
ing a subject in relation to which a person is to operate, the offici-
outlines of man, misguided in his views, tends only, in folly, to frustrate the most benevolent intention.

16. Is it the uncultivated woods of North America that breeds ferocious bands, who, with an obstinacy hardly known in other parts, pursue the intention of their hostile minds; who, in the hands of their tormentors, insult the weakness of their cruel enemies, and give such a dignity to the barbarous usage of a savage people, by the splendour of their fortitude, as would have honoured ancient Rome?—No; woods may breed a race of hardy trees; but the want of culture in the soil cannot cultivate the mind of man, or be the cause of courage. Is it the water of the Ganges that has so long reared the submissive tribes, possessing nothing but their hereditary employments? Whatever effects the regular flowings of the Nile and Ganges may have had in the introduction of knowledge and industry among a people seeking wherewith to subsist, it is evident, that the race follows implicitly the manners of their parents; and that, if by a miracle the cradles of Canada and Indostan were interchanged, so would be the characters of the transplanted race. Therefore, whatever may be the effect of climate or of food upon the animal constitution of the human body, the man is only made by the education of his mind.

What caused the little state of Sparta to make so great a figure in the world? Was it the fertility of her soil, the number, or the wealth of her inhabitants?—No; it was the conduct and the courage, not the multitude or the riches of her people. But, what produced this courage and conduct of the Spartans? Was it being prohibited the use of money? Or, was it in not having the means of drunkenness?—No; the want of money does not make man wise; and the having wine, does not necessarily make a people vicious, otherwise America had never been conquered by the Spaniards, and France would be a sottish nation. It was not her form of
of government, nor her situation in the world; for these were not
singular, as was the domestic economy of her people. But, are
not those remarkable effects to be ascribed to a cause, the most
powerful in relation to the human mind; a cause to the energy of
which no bounds in human reason can be set, and which is as un-
erring in its purpose, as it is powerful in its effect? This is no
other than wise education; education calculated in wisdom for a
certain purpose, consequently, a scientific operation, producing its
proper effect with all the infallibility that arises from the knowledge
of principles, which is science. The Spartan lawgiver had in view
to educate men proper for the state; and he did not miss his aim.

17. The first step that a knowing mind makes in virtue, is to
barter its own animal interest for praise; this is a species of virtue,
which, being founded upon natural principles, may be also cultiva-
ted in the art of man; and, in that case, the culture of this art may
be subject to rules. It is in seeing these rules, that the art is under-
stood, and becomes a science; and, with such a science as this, what
a being may be made of man! How different from the animal flate
in which he is received from the hands of nature!—But, however
virtuous man, the individual, may thus be made, he only exhibits
an example of the art, in being the mere creature of that wisdom
which is proper to the species, a wisdom which is posseffed by him,
who in science sees this natural order of intellectual things.

To illustrate this: Who so virtuous, in some respects, as those
Canadian heroes, who not only suffer death, and every species of
hardship, in fighting for their nation, but mock and smile at the
tormenting hand and savage ingenuity of those who would make
them disgrace their name? But, is a man in the woods of America
born with the spirit of self-denial, and with virtuous endurance?—
No. It is there, however, that he is taught; and it is here main-
tained, that this education of the savage race is a proper examplifi-
cation
cation of the human art. When, for example, two Canadian children contend, who shall suffer the burning coals upon their flesh with the most manly countenance; Is this in nature?—No; it is in art.

18. It will now further appear, that as the scientific art of teaching knowledge, or producing the natural capacity of understanding, may, in the progress of intellect, be acquired by a mind which is thereby enabled to teach itself, so, in the progress of science to philosophy, the scientific art of teaching patient suffering may be attained by a mind acting voluntarily in wisdom for accomplishing itself, as before it had been artificially excited, to endure with patience, by a foreign cause.

19. It is in this manner that the most perfect degrees of patience and endurance may be attained, by a mind proceeding to value things according to the utmost extent of human knowledge; thus preferring that enjoyment which is intellectual, and properly its own, to the temporary allurement of a sensual pleasure; and despising the transient feeling of a pain, which does not affect the mind beyond the period of the present suffering, compared with that which wounds the mind of man, and causes grief which nothing but oblivion can affluage.

20. This is the road in which man has so often made himself illustrious; this is the way in which the highest esteem, or greatest fame, has been attained; and it is thus that the natural endurance of a virtuous and philosophic mind may be artificially fortified with a degree of courage, that has often done honour to the human species, in exalting it so much above the brute, who has no sense of glory to lead him to a voluntary sufferance.
CHAP. IV.

Difference of Training Brutes and Educating Men.

1. EVERY individual of the human species is at first an animal, and nothing more. It is in the progress of his reason, that he learns to be a man. Prevent this progress, he will continue, to his last, to be a child. But, as it is only in the progress of the rational mind that a child becomes a man, it is in like manner that all men change their nature, which at first was merely animal, and by degrees acquire intelligence, by which the mind of man is only to be distinguished from that of the brute, in whom there is every primary source of knowledge, or in whom natural knowledge is joined to instinctive reasoning.

The early period of man’s existence approaching so much in its nature to that of the brute animal, it is worth while to consider the effect of art, or human wisdom, employed in training, to the will of man, those two different subjects which thus resemble. For, if a brute and an infant mind is the same, then, from our experience in the training of brute animals, we may receive some information, which will be applicable to the education of man in a certain period of his life. If observation shall confirm conclusions drawn from the investigated nature of the human mind, the theory will be approved in its application; and some light may be thrown on human education, the most important duty perhaps of man.

2. So far as the brute animal has no reflection on himself, so as to form the general ideas of good and evil, nor is capable of acting by
by a principle, drawn from the general consideration of things in their complicated situations and various relations, it must be impossible for him to receive any intellectual education or instruction, by being led artificially to the means of knowledge in the natural order of science. For, as it is not in nature given him to have the primary steps necessary for this progress, it is not in the power of man, or possible for human art, to promote a thing which has not taken place, or for which there is not in nature a provision.

3. But, though brutes cannot be taught in knowing the general nature of things, to act with wisdom and with prudence on particular occasions, yet, they are easily made to know the circumstances in which their particular or immediate interest is affected. It is thus that they are gradually trained, in the artificial state, by the wisdom of man, to act, not according to their instinctive inclination, but in conformity with his will; not from any sense of duty in obedience, as discerning general relations in things, but from their distinguishing the connection of pains and pleasures in the acting one way or another.

4. Thus animals, who have memory and judgment, are taught artificially, in the natural pursuit of pleasure and aversion to pain; they are made to suffer and abstain, for fear of pain, and to act in a manner to which they are not naturally inclined, through hopes or expectation of the enjoyment which has been artificially connected with that action. A horse, for example, who in his natural state flies from man, is trained to come to him for his food, and is constrained to work, for fear of the whip. This is the training of an animal; it is not the educating of a mind. The proof of this is plain. The animal, trained in the highest degree, approaches no more in his intellect to wisdom, than the rest of his species in the natural state. Would a beaver, for example, who should be trained to the most wonderful acts which are exhibited of animals, be con-
sidered by intelligent men, as being any way improved in his mind? and, has not that animal, in his natural state, more appearance of wisdom in his conduct, than it is possible for the art of man ever to produce.

5. Man is a mere animal at first; but this is only when he is an infant; and then, he is incapable of being trained to any thing but to take his food in this manner or in that. He is cheerful and pleased, when he is easy; he is fretful and complains, when he is uneasy; in this he is no other than an animal. But, as an infant grows to be a child, he gradually departs from the brute state, in which he began; and he proceeds, in acquiring more and more the knowledge proper to the man. Now, it is only so far as he is a brute, that he may be trained; for, so far as he has acquired the light of intellect, he may be artificially educated, instead of being trained.

6. The training of an infant consists in nothing but the habits to which it may be exposed, in its receiving nourishment or taking sleep, in being dressed or made clean. But, this is not the case with a child; a child should be considered, in some respects, as an animal capable of being trained, to act one way or another.

7. A child is incapable of forming a principle or general rule for the direction of his particular actions; but, like an animal, he may be determined by a motive, which is not of his own forming, and which may oppose the operation of another motive which he has from nature. Rousseau's *élevé* had little occasion for this species of education, by reason of his circumstances, which, if not unnatural, were not those commonly found in life. But, in the ordinary course of things, children require to be restrained, as well as directed in their conduct, for the sake of being made orderly and obedient. How then is this to be done? They have not arrived at reasoning upon principle, or to understand a precept; they cannot see how it
is to be for their good, that they should be obedient to rule, in sacrificing a present inclination to the orders of a parent; therefore, so far as they are to be thus trained, it must be upon the principle of training brutes, by pain and pleasure.

8. Is there no difference then betwixt the training of a man and that of a brute? So far as they are trained, this species of education must evidently proceed upon the same principle. But, in order to see whether the means should in those two several cases be the same, it must be considered, how far the ends in view are the same or different.

9. In the one case, the brute animal is to be made to act merely for the benefit, and according to the will, of men; here, therefore, so far as the end is effected, the means employed must be approved of; and there is no other rule in this to be observed, except the bringing about the artificial end with as little violation as possible to nature. In the other case, what is the end in view? Is it not to make a man—an animal acting from principle, that is, according to his own will, for his own benefit in the general good? What a difference, in those two cases! In both these cases, the nature of the animal is to be constricted, and subjected to the will of man. But, if one man has his will thus subjected to that of another, he is in so far trained like a brute. Man, therefore, in order to be educated, must have his will constrained,—only to his reason. It will thus appear, that the difference between the training of the brute, and that of the infant man, consists in this, that in the one case, where man is to be educated, the will, to which the instinctive reasoning of the animal is to be subjected, is joined to the animal mind which is to obey; whereas in the other, where the brute is to be trained, these two things are separate and distinct.

10. The brute animal, who in his conduct is to be subjected to the
the will of another mind, has nothing to learn but to obey; but the brute man, or animal of the human species, who has to learn to obey by choice, or who has to learn to will in choosing how he is to act, would be no less than corrupted in his nature as a man, in being made, like the brute animal, to act by the immediate means of pleasure and of pain. Here, therefore, the education of those two animals differ toto coelo.

11. It is as a brute animal, that an infant man is to be trained; and, yet, man is not to be trained as a brute. Here is no contradiction. It is by means of pleasure and pain, that, in both these two cases, the animal is to be trained; therefore, in both these cases, the operation proceeds upon the same principle, and the artificial application of pains and pleasures are the means. But, in those two cases, the ends to be attained are perfectly different; therefore, the pleasures and pains, to be employed in the one case, would be improper in the other.

12. Now, what are the pains and pleasures which in the training of the animal are employed with such success? Are not these the immediate feelings of the animal, artificially associated with the actions to be respectfully performed, or avoided? these, therefore, are only capable of training brutes; they are not applicable to men; for, it is not the action of the man which we have ultimately in our view to lead or to constrain, but the will. It is by the power of nature we want to subject the one; it is by the power of reason we want to subdue the other. Immediate pain and pleasure are instinctive motives that constrain a mind to act, but which do not persuade a mind to will, in seeing the reason for that conduct. These, therefore, are not proper to be employed in the education of the man; for, we would only thus train, in man, the stupidity of the brute; and we would corrupt the liberal sentiment of the man.

13. There
13. There is a mediate pain and pleasure to be felt, either, sympathetically in the suffering or enjoyment of another, or in idea by means of the approbation and disapprobation of the persons whom we love. Here are powerful instruments to bend the brute mind of man, and fashion to the morals of humanity, to the virtue and fortitude of man, the child of nature. Here, therefore, we begin to change the animal mind, which, with the brute, pursues immediate pleasure, and avoids pain. The grief, the frown of a beloved mother, is, to an uncorrupted child, a rack. The propitious smile of a wise parent, who knows how to put to use such valuable means, is a recompense for all the animal suffering which it is proper to require. Those who know not how to use these means, which touch the soul, will in vain apply to those which only touch the sense.

14. The artificial education of the infant man, no doubt, has its beginning in the instinctive or involuntary training of the brute animal. But this is only its beginning; and here are two lines which separate or diverge as they proceed, until the line of education to be pursued has nothing of the direction with which it had set out. The brute is to be led by instinctive appetite, by the sense of pleasure and pain; but these are the motives which man, in his advanced state, must learn to despise, when they come in competition respectively with the approbation, the love, and admiration of those whom he esteems, or with the disapprobation, hatred, and contempt of the generality of his species.

15. If the animal and the man, thus in their respective educations, are to be conducted to ends, which are perfectly different; and if the means, for effecting the design, are not the same, then, though in both those cases, the principles upon which the operation proceeds are similar, so far as the operation respects sensitive beings or minds; yet the natures of these two minds are removed from each other as far as we can conceive. For, it at last results
results to this, that the one is to be actuated by sensual pleasure and
pain, and the other, though sensible to those motives, is not to be
actuated by them, or is to resist their influence.

16. Here, therefore, is a difficulty of which we must never lose
sight, if we would proceed in education upon any scientific principle.
The end to be attained must first be considered; and then the
means best suited to attain that end. Is the end to form a virtuous
person? Then we should know what virtue is. On the other hand,
is the end to form an obedient agent? Then, virtue has nothing
here to do with acting; no more than there is, in the making a mill
to work, any question about connections of ideas, forming habits,
and training matter to the purpose of the engineer. It must be evi-
dent, that nothing would show so much the benefit of science to
mankind, as its power in thus directing the education of man; for,
to what perfection might not this be brought, in knowing the end
and seeing the means?

17. If I had to train a slave, should I educate a man?—No; for,
to what purpose make a slave a man, unless that he may have a will
of his own, and be no more a slave? If again, I have to educate a
man, shall I in him train a slave? But, a man, educated only by
sensual motives, is a slave; and, a slave is to be trained no otherwise
than a brute. Do not, however, let us misunderstand terms, by the
imposition of forms. In every climate, there is virtue, government,
and men; under every form of government, a willing servant is no
slave; and, every unwilling citizen is only enslaved by the laws of
the society in which he lives; he, therefore, at least is no free agent,
if a man.

* A willing servant, though the property of the master, and sold with the soil, has
in his heart the freedom of a man, that is, choice; while he who is born to the proprie-
tion of the land, in being constrained by the laws against his will, is held in the very
bondage of a slave.
OF EDUCATION

18. It is not the being actuated by fear, that constitutes the character of a slave; every man who is actuated by hope, must be also actuated by fear; but it is the objects of the hope and fear which, on the one hand, constitute a slave, if these are sensual, or, on the other, make a man, if these are intellectual; and a virtuous man, or a citizen, if they are also good. Raise, therefore, the desire above all sensual objects, if you would educate a man; confine them altogether to these, if you would make of man a brute.

19. Man is affected by rewards and punishments; man, therefore, may be artificially made virtuous.—Let us undeceive ourselves. He that abstains from crime in hopes of a reward, has not virtue in his heart; and, he who acts virtuously only through fear of punishment, is virtuous by accident and vicious by design; therefore, it is not the dignified person man, that is to be affected by rewards and punishments, it is he who in his morals is a slave. There are indeed among the people those who are thus influenced; but these are only the mercenary troops, they are not the citizens of Carthage or of Rome. Can a man be bribed, to that virtue, which consists in having the most supreme contempt for every kind of bribe? Am I to be bribed in order to gain glory? or am I to be deterred from gaining glory by any punishment that may be inflicted? How vain the attempt! What bribe can equal life, but glory? and, on a great occasion, a man says, I will gain glory, though I perish. No subject more generally misunderstood among mankind than that of rewards and punishments. Would you reward a hungry man, in order to make him work for bread, by giving him gold?—No; he cannot eat gold; and, to a man who is hungry, the finding bread is motive sufficient to make him active. We reward, it may be said, a man who works, by giving him bread. It is true, we give him bread for his work; but that is wages, properly speaking, and not reward. The bread is the end in view, the work the means to attain that end; he acts from choice; his will is free. It must not
be here replied, that the man will not work, unless we give the bread, which therefore must be considered as the reward for what he is to suffer in his labour. Let not the artificial state of things impose upon us. Is the hound rewarded for his pains, in pursuing the hare? The tiger and the cat, in watching for their prey? But, how is meat to come into the mouth of man, except in pursuing the proper means? Man in this is nothing but an animal; and, if rewards and punishments, in the just or philosophic sense, is applicable to the brute or mere animal, what is the meaning of philosophers, or wise and virtuous men, when they say that a criminal is only punished as an example?

Would we make a man virtuous, by giving him reward? Is not this to confess, that virtue is not in itself desirable? To punish vice, again, with pain; Is not this to confess, that a man is not led, in sinning against the rules of virtue, to repent? When this is duly considered, we will change our ideas, with regard to the rewards which we proffer, or the pains which we inflict. It will be confessed, that it is not to men such motives are to be advanced; and that it is the education of man which is here the object in view.

20. But children are not men; and men do not spring, like mushrooms, by themselves. Men must be made of youths, and youths of children; means are therefore to be used. Undoubtedly; but let us be careful, in this work, not to employ the means which, instead of making citizens of men, are only fit to make men slaves. What would a virtuous Roman senator have done, to make his son aspire at the highest office of the state? Would he have said, my boy, if you follow this path, which you now have seen, how happy shall you be! you shall have ten thousand pounds a-year? Is this reward enough to educate a man, fit to fit in council, and command the army of the state? and, shall we double it, to make a greater man? We might as well fill the sieve with water.

But,
But, children are to be educated; and, in order to actuate children, it would be preposterous to put before their eyes the motives which are effectual to men.—This no doubt is true; but, at the same time, let us beware of running into the other extreme, in applying to children, who have conscious sentiment, the motives only fit to train a brute, who has no such sentiment.

Schools, it may be alleged, are to be considered as societies governed by laws; and, in the execution of those laws, punishment may be required. This also is true; but, What is the use of schools, except for the purpose of making men? Now, in order to make a man, or to perfect his morals, Would it be wise to employ the means fit to corrupt the morals of a man? A boy that can only be whipped into rule, is he likely by this means to be made a man? And, if there is any other means to bring a boy into rule, Could there be a greater absurdity, than to have recourse to that which cannot make him better, except in making him no better than a brute?

But, (still it is replied) in society, there is a general good; and, it is good to sacrifice an individual, when the interest of the whole requires such a violent step.—This is not to be disputed. Therefore, whip a boy, when this is necessary; but do not imagine that, in whipping a foolish boy, you teach him to think as a man. In making a boy subservient to your will by whipping, you may gain your end; and, in thus making him observe rule, you may teach him cunning. Such a boy may perhaps in time become wise, and good, as the disease is often removed, in spite of all that a pretender to physic has done to make the patient die; but this, you must confess, redounds not to the merit of your plan, unless you are able to show, that man, who is capable of sentimental or intellectual motives, may be to advantage affected by those which are merely sensual.
But, (it is urged) What signifies the ruin of one, when compared with the loss of all?—Surely nothing. Here then a victim is to be sacrificed, in order that the rest may be preserved from corruption. But, do not whip him. If you are wise, you will cut off his head. Here would be an example, like that of Voltaire's admirals, one of whom was shot—pour encourager les autres. But, to be serious, What is to be the effect of this extreme discipline?—Not to love your order; but to save their neck, or breech. Now, Will education be in this manner rendered agreeable; and, without being agreeable, will education be made useful?

In this case, of the general good, a boy is to be sacrificed; herein we are all agreed. But, to what? Is it not to order?—Well, then, dismiss the boy from the society.—Ay, but this gives a bad example; there are many boys, in the school, who would not submit to order, if they thought dismission from that society was to be the only consequence of their obstinacy.—This doubtless is alarming. What, Would none remain?—No, not one that had spirit to resist. Then, take another method; dismiss the schoolmaster. Boys will be ruled; but it is not every one that knows how to rule with the dignity of man, the steadiness of nature, and the love, the tenderness, the attention, of a parent.

Surely nothing more difficult than to reform the error of youth corrupted in the prejudice of education or bad example; it is for this very reason that virtuous education is a thing so valuable. But here is no question of reformation, in that school of man, where the object in view is to form a virtuous mind, in presenting the just morals of mankind, and habituating rational agents to inquire for truth, to love virtue, and to hate vice. The ordinary course of virtuous education will not suffice, to lead back to innocence a rational mind once lost in error. Here, there must intervene repentance; and this must come, either by the light of science and rational persuasion,
fusion, or by experience and necessity. In this last case, it sometimes comes too late. Nothing, therefore, can so much contribute to the successful progress of a general education, as to remove from innocence the contagion of seductive error; not by blindfolding reason, as they do the sense of a traveller who has to pass by a precipice; but by showing what in virtue is pleasant, beautiful and just, and what in vice is hateful, insidious and deform; in giving an idea of the misery of a transgression, which is repented of; and in contrasting this with the happiness of virtue, which increases the pleasure that is felt in the gratification of every natural desire.

22. Man is to be actuated by hope and fear. But, What is it that he is to hope, and what to fear? He is to hope for what he most admires; he is to fear that which he most detests. Here the question recurs, in relation to what a man most admires and detests. But, before this can be answered, we must understand the nature of the question: Is it that which man, by nature, loves and hates?—This cannot be; for, man by nature is nothing but an animal; and, all the natural inclinations of the animal are sensual. Therefore, it is precisely the thing which man naturally loves and hates, that is here excluded from the list of his admiralions and aversions, when these are to be employed as motives for his conduct as a man. Now, to answer the question;

23. The thing here inquired after, is that which a man should most admire and hate, in order to his hoping for or fearing an event, the idea of which is to influence his mind. We have seen, that this motive is not in man naturally, or is not instinctively acquired, as is that of agreeable or disagreeable objects. Therefore, this admiration and aversion, which is to be the motive of man's will, is the subject of intellect, and the work of science, and of art. That which among one people is most admired or detested, is not so among another. This species of motive, therefore, is not fixed, like the laws of
of nature. Our acquired admirations and aversions, which are proper to mankind and not the brute, are in their nature variable, but not precarious; for, there are in nature, and society, rules by which these may be varied. But, though this order of things intellectual be fixed in nature, and proceeds according to a wise design, yet, with respect to an individual, who may be thereby affected, this may be only a matter of accident. Shame is natural to man; but the object of that shame is artificial; and, to the individual, this object is not fixed; it is therefore to him accidental, and may be determined according to the will of those who had been before him.

If the objects of shame and admiration are not in nature fixed, but determined according to the general opinion of men; and if shame and admiration are, among uncorrupted men, the most powerful motives of voluntary action, then, the conduct of any man, or any number of men, may be brought to any thing which shall in the general opinion be approved of, provided that the concerted plan be executed in wisdom. There is no question here with regard to what is best, which is a thing fixed in nature and seen in philosophy; we only now consider, what may be thought best upon every occasion. This, according to the sense now explained, is arbitrary in relation to the generality, by whom it is determined, and accidental or occasional in relation to the individual, who is thus not trained, like a brute, by means of sensual motives, but educated, as a man, by intellectual motives, the opinions of other men.

24. If this theory is just, What a power do we perceive in man! a single Peter changes the opinions of a nation! But, what a number of Peters may be produced in a nation that is wise! Thus education, considered philosophically, will appear to be the art in which the opinions of men are formed; therefore, the opinions of men will naturally follow or resemble those that went before them, as the fruit of a graft resembles the production of its parent. Hence it may be concluded,
concluded, that, had the nature of man been actually ever perfected in the species, there does not appear to be any means by which the race might be degenerated; and then the perfect species man would have been continued, like that of the bee, the beaver, or the hare, without any degree of corruption or degeneracy. This is a view which naturally flows from the theory; it may be therefore worth while to consider it.

To say, that man was once made perfect, is the same as to affirm, that man is not a scientific animal, but is instinctive in his nature, like the brute. For, if man had naturally all the knowledge necessary for his wisdom, and all the wisdom necessary for his perfection or his happiness, how could he degenerate? He could not be corrupted by the opinions of other men; and as, from the supposition, he did not form his own opinions, so, in the continuation of the race, the perfection of the man, according to the nature of things, should be retained, unless such had been the nature of man, that what was perfect should gradually, or in the course of things, degenerate, knowledge into ignorance, wisdom into folly. But the contrary to this is the natural course of things; man improves, so far as ignorance in men is diminished, and so far as the power and wisdom of men are increased with their knowledge.

Therefore, we are led to conclude, that man is a scientific animal, first born in ignorance; secondly, proceeding, by the means of nature, to the means of art; and lastly, by the means of art, attained in his science, he is led to improve his nature. Now, this is contrary to the nature of the brute, which is perfected immediately by natural means; and which cannot be improved by the art of man; however it may be made subservient to the conveniences of life, by man thus training the docile nature of the brute animal to his purpose.
26. The social education of man being thus considered as an artificial operation, and the moral nature of man being thus determined in an arbitrary manner by those who were before him, is virtue, which is thus instilled into the mind of man, to be considered as the prejudice of education, in like manner as the opinion of the vulgar, or their belief with regard to the magnitude and distance of the sun and moon, may be founded implicitly upon those of other men?—Yes, surely; in both those cases, the opinion of the vulgar is matter of superstition and not of science. But, it does not follow from this, that virtue, if truly in the nature of things, may not be made an object of science, and thus be determined by a man himself, independent of the prejudice of education, or the opinion of other men.

27. Thus we have seen, that, with regard to the mere animal mind, there is not in human wisdom, or in art, any means for the education of this species of being; it is the work of nature who has provided means which are infallible to the end in view: Nevertheless man may interpose his art, and train the animal mind to his own intention, although he cannot educate the animal mind. Artificial education, then, respects the human mind alone; and the means, to attain this end, are two-fold. First, superstition, in which the opinions of man are directed and determined by others, in having their approbation and condemnation as the standard of his ideas of truth and falsehood, good and evil. Secondly, science, in which the opinions of man, however directed, are by himself determined, in seeing the reason for his choice, and knowing the nature of good and evil.

28. Hence, in the education of man, two species are to be distinguished. One is the education of prejudice, or superstition; the other that of science. The one is common to all mankind elevated in society; the other only belongs to those who are to be employed in
in the regulation of society, the improvement of mankind, and the instruction of other men.

Proper End of Education, as being the System of human life, the good of the species, and the happiness of the individual.

1. EDUCATION has now been examined in its principles, and considered as properly consisting, first, in the production of the capacity of knowledge, as a mean of wisdom, and as a motive for action; and, secondly, in the production of patience, as a mean for the occasional endurance of a person properly instructed. It is thus that the human mind is led, first, in knowledge, to wisdom, and then, in patient endurance, to virtue; and this comprehends the education of man, thus brought to perfection by the joint operation of nature and of art, in several operations, which may be all scientifically distinguished, and thus properly understood.

The purpose of this education of a mind may now be examined, with a view to discover that order of intellectual things, in which a mind, from the instinctive passion of pleasure and pain, is made to acquire the highest sense of either misery or happiness, according as it has been conducted, in its active pursuit, either by motives of folly, on the one hand, or by the principles of wisdom, on the other.

2. In the instruction of nature, every necessary operation of the sensitive animal is conducted by the passion of pleasure, which always takes place, or is excited, in a due proportion to the importance of the task to be performed. But this is not all the means employed
employed in the wisdom of nature’s rules, contrived for the conduct of the animal life. For, the transgressions, and neglect of those necessary operations, are also made to be attended with a sense of pain; and the degree of this passion is justly proportioned to the important consequence of such transgression or neglect. Thus the natural education of the animal mind is enforced by a double motive; and this may be considered as forming a system of things contrived in wisdom, that is, in the best manner to effect a certain end. A view of this wise institution of nature may now be taken, in order to understand the system of animal life.

3. In the animal operations that are performed by the action of mind, there are two different powers or motives employed, in order to bring about the purpose which is intended. The one of these powers acts directly to the end in view. This power, however, though acting directly for the end, acts not immediately, but only in consequence of that end being then pursued; this, therefore, is the proper condition for the exertion of that motive. Such is the motive of pleasure, considered as a power to effect a certain end; this motive is only excited when the end is pursued in the action of the animal; and therefore it could not be the first promoter of the action by which the end is to be attained.

4. The other power, which is pain, acts indirectly to the end; this motive being only exerted when the end is not pursued. But the end, designed in the animal system, could not be attained by this motive alone; for, this motive is indirect, in relation to the end in view; and it exists, as a cause for animal action, indirectly, that is, only when the end of nature is not pursued, or, when an action of the animal leads to an end the direct opposite of that which is required. This indirect action might therefore be continually exerted, from this motive pain, without accomplishing that end, or ultimate intention, considered as the purpose of nature in the system of
of animal life. But, by means of those two powers, which have been now considered, it will be evident that the purpose or intention must be fulfilled. For,

5. The end to be effected must either be pursued or not. If, for example, this end is not pursued, then one of those powers, as a motive for animal action, must be exerted; or if, instead of this end of nature not being pursued, which is a supposition of inactivity, the opposite to that end is the object of the action which is supposed, then, not only this motive of pain, as in the former case, is excited, but the intensity of this passion must be doubled. If, on the other hand, the proper end of nature is actually pursued, then pleasure, which is the other motive, is excited; and thus, to the first promoter of undirected action, there is now added a motive of action tending directly to the end to be effected. Hence it is not conceivable, either that the action of mind, required for the purpose of nature, should be neglected, or that the direction of this action should be diverted from its proper end, so far as no other motive interferes.

6. It is not enough to have observed the wisdom of this institution of pleasure and pain, as two distinct motives occasionally exerted, and either one or other of them necessarily existing in all the actions of animal life; we must also attend to the constitution of those two motives, in relation to power or intensity, this not being uniform, but gradually increasing or diminishing, according as occasion shall require.

It has already been observed, that the degree in which these indifferent passions are excited, never either exceed or fall short of that just measure of intensity or force which the occasion or importance of the operation may demand. The pleasure, for example, of eating and drinking, is only in proportion to the necessity of the animal,
animal, that is, to the degree of hunger and thirst; and the pain, upon the occasion of hunger and thirst, is gradually increased, like that of every other, in proportion as the life of the animal becomes thereby endangered. Now, in this constitution of those motives, perfect wisdom is displayed; for thus, amidst the various solicitations of sense, or demands for animal action, the mind of the sensitive and distinguishing being is always led to that which is most necessary or proper to be done. No animal, therefore, acting under these conditions alone, and from no other principle, can be said to err; nor, though he reasons in distinguishing the things that give him pleasure and pain, can he be thought capable of either vice or virtue.

The constitution of those two powers, pain and pleasure, as motives to determine action in the mind, is also so ordered, in relation to each other, that the gradual diminution of the one terminates in the insensible commencement of the other; so that apparently there is a place, upon many occasions, where neither of these motives seem to operate in the action that is nevertheless by them undoubtedly conducted. This is also contrived in the wisdom of nature’s oeconomy, where no more power is ever employed than what is absolutely necessary for ensuring the end to be effected. Thus there is perfect wisdom to be observed in the constitution and disposition of those powers, or of those motives that lead to the accomplishing the end of nature, attained in fulfilling the several actions of the animal, or the purposes of life.

7. But, in man, the purposes of life naturally lead to those of science, where the human mind takes pleasure or delight in the contemplation of truth, that is, in understanding the relation of abstract ideas, and observing order in action or events. In like manner, his mind is either displeased with, or hates the thought of inconsistency and contradiction. But, the end here proposed, in this system of nature,
nature, does not immediately respect the purposes of animal life; the object here in view, is to make men of science, from animals which reason immediately for the purposes of life.

8. That there is truly such a pleasure necessarily attached to the contemplations of science, and a natural aversion to the thought of disorder, will appear by considering. It is not from the animal constitution of the human mind that this species of sensibility arises; no person views with uneasiness an object that is out of proportion, until he has attained, through science, to this knowledge of proportion; and, the mere animal cannot be affected in that manner by such an object; for, he has not the science in which this knowledge must be attained. This sensibility to beauty and deformity is called taste; and, it is only by having scientific ideas, that taste is acquired by mankind *

9. Thus it will appear, that here is the same order of design, continued in the natural prosecution of the intellectual system, as that with which it had been begun in the necessary operations of life; for, here the conscious satisfaction and disgust of scientific pleasure and pain, felt in the mind when thinking of truth and inconsistency, of order and disorder, of beauty and deformity, are the two motives by which the operations of intellect are promoted. And, in this case, there is a certain end to which the mind is directly led by the sensation of delight, which grows more and more in the enjoyment. There is also a certain feeling of uneasiness or misery which operates, as a motive, indirectly to the same end, in being continually excited, when an active mind is not employed, or is not pursuing that end of intellect, for which the mind of man, in the wisdom of nature, and the benevolence of his Creator, is ordained.

10. But, no less wisdom is displayed in the constitution and disposal

* Part II. Sect. I. Chap. IV.
posal of these intellectual and scientific motives, when considered in relation to those by which are ruled the operations of life, or by which animal action is conducted. For, as wisdom was observed with regard to the system of pleasure and pain, already considered as motives for the instinctive actions required in the animal, so now, when a superior species of mind is to be educated, equal wisdom may be discovered in the order and constitution of this intellectual system of sentimental motives, as being, in point of energy or power, inferior or subordinate in relation to the instinctive promoter of that animal action, by which the preservation of the individual, and the continuation of the species is secured. Had it been otherwise, the operations of nature would have been conceived in folly, as in effect defeating the proper purpose of the intention.

II. The pleasure of seeing truth, and the disgust which is felt at the appearance of inconsistency, is first instinctive; but, it begins with little force; and then, the motives of animal action are comparatively strong. This intellectual enjoyment, however, grows in the progress of a scientific mind; and, it gradually becomes the source of much delight, in the study of nature and philosophy of science. This is a truth that every one must find in his own reflection; without this conscious knowledge, words could not convey the idea proposed for communication; and, the having this experience of intellectual enjoyment, supersedes the use of any further argument. It is no less certain, for example, that animals have pleasure in food, than that a scientific mind is charmed with that investigation of the nature of light which was made by Newton.

But, this source of entertainment, for the human mind, is not confined to the mind in which the speculations of truth, and the wisdom of nature, are first discovered; nor, in that mind, to the rapturous enjoyment of the first discovery. The instinctive sympathy of the human mind leads man to communicate his joys and griefs; and,
and, men of science take pleasure and delight in communicating knowledge to the species, as in a manner multiplying their own intellectual enjoyments. Thus nature has anxiously endeavoured to make man wise, or wisely provided means for his becoming, from an animal, a scientific being.

12. It has been shown, that there are two different species of education with regard to mind in general, that is, to the brute and human species, the animal and intellectual mind. The one species is natural education, the other artificial. It is only with the last of these that the present examination is concerned. It is thus in analysing education, like every other subject of science, that, having considered every part, we may arrive at the understanding of the whole.

13. The artificial education of the animal and human minds, will be found to differ as much in the end or object, as in the means employed. In the training of the animal, there is but one end in view; this is to make the animal useful or subservient to the agent who employs the art. But, to the animal thus trained, no natural benefit from this education is derived; on the contrary, to any other purpose, except this one of serving man, the trained animal is just so much worse for the general purpose of nature, or his proper end, as he is thereby adapted to the artificial purpose of man, in being changed from his natural state. The dog, for example, who is trained to the purposes of domestic life, if turned loose to nature, could he subsist himself, like the dog who never had received from man any species of education? On the contrary, he might perish, where the dog of nature might easily subsist himself. But, man often employs the natural talents of the animal in applying them to his particular purpose, when all the training of the animal consists in the subjecting his natural liberty to the bondage of a master. Thus the hawk, for example, is employed by man in the exercise of his natu-
tural or instinctive talents; and, so far as he exercise these, he is not disqualified from the state of nature; but, so far as by artificial management he is subjected to the will of man, instead of pursuing from his first flight the course of nature, he is just by so much become more useless to his species.

14. Man, again, in his artificial education, not only may be made subservient to the use of others; he is also made more useful to himself. A father, in artificially procuring the assistance of his son, enables that trained person to subserve himself.

But, not only does a man, by means of education, become more useful to himself than he would have been naturally, as well as useful to him by whom he had been educated; he also may be made more agreeable to others, and more happy or agreeable to himself. It is this that properly constitutes human education. This is a thing of which man, as a solitary animal thinking by himself, could never have formed an idea. Here, therefore, is the education of the man; and humanity, in general, is interested in it.

Every human creature, to be a man, must have in some degree the manners of a man. Without language, what would man be either to society or himself? Mankind, in general, has dress; therefore, without some conformity in this to the manners of man, how disagreeable would be the naked animal in society! Has not man to learn the attitudes of grace, and regulated movements, which increase the happiness of mankind? In seeing beauty, the taste for beauty grows. Mufic and song, architecture and decoration, sculpture and painting, all come under the principle of order in the thing that pleases; and, all this belongs to human education.

Man is not for himself alone; he is for society, in which he has his protection as an animal, no less than his accomplishments as a man.
man. He enjoys in society, and he must act for it, in rendering service to his tribe. He becomes a general, in war; and, in times of peace, a lawgiver. He records the actions of the virtuous, and the brave; and, in so doing, he sows the seeds of honour, and of glory, in the race. From social education, man has all his natural enjoyments multiplied; and, in the exercise of his acquired talents, the man who is accomplished in the perfection of the species, returns the action of benevolence, in operating for the happiness of other men.

15. Thus human education, as here already explained, is an operation not proper immediately to nature; but is properly natural to the species man, or to man naturally associated and become wife. Here, in this operation, the individual is instructed; and it is the species that is properly the teacher. But, what is the proper purpose of the education of the mind, in communicating science to the individual? Is it to produce men skilled in mathematics, astronomy, physics, and cosmogony? &c.—No doubt it is, so far as this is the route in which science is pursued. Is science, therefore, the end or intention of nature, considered as the cause of things and author of man?—Science, in general, is the means, as well as is reason, sense, or knowledge; and, in a philosophic view of the subject, we must carefully distinguish the means, so as not to mistake them for the end in view, or that which ought to be pursued as the object of nature’s intention, although every step in this progress of mind affords peculiar satisfaction.

16. The end, in this case of science, and view of philosophic minds in the education of man, is twofold; for, on the one hand, it respects the arts of life, which are here discovered, and affords the greatest advantages to the animal man. But, on the other hand, what are all the arts of life and the elegances of man’s art, when compared with philosophy, the proper end of science and object of human knowledge? Is not the sleep of the labourer as luxurious in his
his cottage, as that which is enjoyed in a bed of state? and, is his life more miserable in that he is not idle. Has not the savage as much pleasure in satisfying hunger and thirst, as the most refined sensualist? Yet, no man is content with meat and drink, and sleep alone; there may be much misery in the mind that is limited to these enjoyments, a misery which nothing but the exercise of intellectual talents, or which nothing but philosophy in some degree or shape, of which there are an infinity, can remove.

17. It may be demanded, What is this philosophy that gives such consolation to all ranks of men? This question may be also easily resolved; for, This philosophy is that occupation of mind, and that exercise of talents, which are employed, in order to procure an intellectual pleasure and a rational contentment. It is the pursuit of that pleasure which has nothing sensual in its nature; a pleasure which leads to the independent happiness of man enjoying in his own opinion. Every man has some contemplation of mind in order to procure contentment, some future prospect on which the happiness or misery of the present hour depends. But, the difference, betwixt those philosophic objects that are variously pursued by man, however great, however it may properly be said to be indefinite, is yet only in degree; the acquisition of a gawdy feather to ornament the head, and the discovery of the longitude, so far as these several motives interest the happiness of the human mind, they may be considered as in kind the same, and differing in degree.

But, in thus giving every man who is capable of happiness and misery some share of philosophy, we must not confound the vulgar with the scientific view of the subject, in not distinguishing a part from the whole of a progress; for, as the man who knows length and breadth is to be considered as instructed in science, the man who acts upon any principle for attaining happiness has acquired philosophy. The philosophy, however, of that man is only perfect, when he
he can form the best principle of action in every circumstance, and act from that principle on all occasions, so as to secure his happiness beyond the fortune of contingency.

18. Perfect philosophy is that extensive view of the human mind which comprehends the order of the intellectual system; a system where every thing tends to give means of happiness in the motives of a general enjoyment; and, where this benevolent end is also enforced by a sense of misery, which takes place in departing from the order of that system. Now, this order is that of the moral system; a subject that, in the course of the work, comes to be considered.

Therefore, the end which nature has in view, in the education of man, is happiness; and, the means are order, knowledge, and the knowledge of order. Order must exist, before we are made to know; because, we are made to know by means of properly ordained things. We must also know simply, before we learn to know order; because the knowing of order is the natural progress of our knowledge. Thus, in nature, we find three different orders of things. First, the physical order of material things, which constitutes the system of an universe. Secondly, the order of moral things, in which we are made sympathetically to suffer and enjoy in the affection of our species. And, lastly, in the order of metaphysical things, by which we are made to understand ourselves, and know the relation in which we stand with respect to the efficient and final cause of our existence. Physical and moral causes are thus made the means of educating man, and bringing him to that state in which he becomes an intelligent being, able to inform himself, capable of avoiding misery, and willing to pursue happiness.
CHAP. VI.

The Distinction of Natural and Unnatural, of virtuous and vicious Education.

1. **VIRTUE** is a certain sentiment, thought, or opinion of the human mind, with which man is not born as he may be said to be with sense and reason; that is to say, virtue is not an instinctive action like reason, but a scientific opinion by which a conscious and reflecting mind is to be conducted in its future actions. Those actions, therefore, are voluntary, as having followed conscious thought; and, they are conscientious or moral, as being followed by a conscious feeling of good or evil, of approbation or disapprobation, and of happiness or misery.

This scientific opinion of the mind, which is concerned with voluntary and moral action, relates to an event that is to follow, and to a cause, or motive, for the action of that mind which had determined. It is upon this occasion that a conscious judgment must be formed, in this foreseeing and reflecting mind, How far the motive, from whence this action springs, is to be approved of in its own reflection; and, How far the events, which necessarily follow that action, will be approved of in the judgment of other minds which shall know this transaction; for, if the motive and action shall be on all hands disapproved of, then it is impossible that happiness of mind can follow the determination of such a conduct, which therefore is not virtuous, however agreeable or pleasing it may be in the present moment.

2. Thus it will appear, that, in order to be virtuous, a person must
must be wise, and must have a knowing a foreseeing mind; the very opposite to that of the brute, who follows implicitly the instigation of immediate desire and aversion, without considering what he is doing, why he does it, or what will be the consequence. But, this is being virtuous upon principle, that is, by reasoning from the most distant relations of thoughts and things; consequently, in order to be thus virtuous, it would require the highest accomplishment of a reflecting, conscious, and scientific mind; therefore, it may be proper to inquire, first, how far it is necessary that a person, in order to be virtuous, should have a reflecting, conscious, and scientific mind; and, secondly, how far there is necessarily required supreme degrees of intellect, in the mind of a person who is to be esteemed virtuous.

With regard to the first, it has been already shown, that no person can reason upon principle who has not a reflecting conscious and scientific mind; it has also been shown, that all mankind in society, children and idiots excepted, have such a mind, although the power of reflection and degrees of science may be extremely unequal; therefore, it only requires to be now considered, how far these superior degrees of intellect, which may be attained in philosophy, are necessary in a person who is to be esteemed virtuous. This question will be easily resolved, when we have formed a clear idea of what is required in such a person in order to be esteemed virtuous.

There are two ways in which a person may be virtuous or esteemed such; for, first, a person may be virtuous in practice, in either having no temptation to transgress the rules of virtue, or, in obeying implicitly rules of conduct in which he had been educated, but without seeing the reason or acquiescing in the truth or justness of these rules; for example, a person having been educated in the observance of this rule, that he should not steal under the pain of being punished in a future time, this person may, from fear of future pain,
pain, observe the inculcated rule in his conduct, without knowing either why he should or how he shall be punished. Such a virtue is actual, and it may be termed practical, in order to distinguish it from that which, on the other hand, may be termed virtue upon principle, which is the second kind now to be considered.

A person who is practically virtuous must have received a proper education, and this is a step pursued in consequence of the wisdom of the species. Such a person acts properly on all occasions by reasoning, not instinctively like the animal, who conducts himself on all occasions by reasoning according to the wisdom of nature, but scientifically according to the wisdom of the species man, who has discovered rules of conduct for his good, or lasting happiness. Such a person has therefore, from an animal, become thus wise, as acting properly from human wisdom, but not from the proper wisdom of that individual. This individual, however, in discovering the truth or justness of those rules of conduct, wherein he had been educated by the wisdom of the species, attains to wisdom, which is then properly his own, in following the means which, in this case, he now sees will conduct him to the end which he has in view. Such a person is virtuous upon principle, even when he should have no opportunity of exercising his virtue, which is then not actual, but in disposition.

This leads to the consideration of that negative kind of virtue, already mentioned when examining the two ways in which a person may be esteemed virtuous; for, a person upon many occasions may act according to the rules of virtue, without either virtuous principle or instruction. But, this case of supposition could not properly be called virtue, which is a thought or opinion originating in, or immediately derived from, the conscious and scientific operations of the human mind. This virtuous conduct, now in supposition, would be properly referred to the rules of nature, whose wis-
dom it would then properly be, but not virtue which is properly human.

3. But, Is there actually in nature such a wisdom as this to be observed? or rather, Can there remain any doubt, with regard to this truth, in a mind which observes nature? Does not every species of animal actively operate towards happiness, in preserving itself, and in continuing the race? Is not this the very virtue in question, the wisdom of nature? And, Is not the species man conducted by this wisdom, as well as by that which is proper to himself, and which then is properly virtue.

4. Man naturally loves man. He does not hate his fellow creature, unless when he is offended. But offence is not in nature, as being her design; it is occasional, and originates in folly or mistake, which is the property of man. Here is therefore the wisdom of nature, by which a man is made to love himself, in the first place, and his neighbour, in the second. Man also naturally avoids pain himself, and sympathetically avoids giving others pain, which he thus feels instinctively, in a natural reflection. He, in like manner, delights in giving pleasure, if not offended or misled. It is thus that the wisdom of nature operates steadily towards the general good or happiness of mankind; while the wisdom of man also operates occasionally to the same end, although his folly often opposes that intention.

5. It will thus appear, that man, conducted in the wisdom of nature, which is perfect, cannot err; but man, conducted by his own proper wisdom, which is acquired in pursuing science, cannot be always right, so far as his science is not perfect. Man, therefore, occasionally errs, in forming rules of conduct; as he occasionally errs, in judging with regard to the truths of science. He does not however necessarily err; at least, he does not continue in his errors; he
is hence naturally taught to seek for truth, and thus to reform his thought, in correcting his departure from the rule of right, which is that of nature.

6. But, though the virtue or wisdom of man is thus subject to defect, yet, error or defect in the science of man does not constitute vice; for, wisdom, though founded in science, is different from it. Vice is the conscious transgression of the rules of virtue, or the neglect of those rules which a mind is conscious should direct its conduct; and vice is not the simple ignorance of mind, or mere absence of virtue in a mind that does not know. Hence, though perfect wisdom and perfect virtue may be considered as necessarily concomitant, yet, as a mind may be conducted in its actions by the wisdom of nature, which is perfect, without having any degree of virtue, which might be called properly its own, vice, which like virtue, its opposite, is proper to the mind of man, cannot be conceived as taking place in any other mind than in one which has virtue in some degree.

7. Vice therefore, as well as virtue, requires scientific knowledge in a mind. But it is not the scientific knowledge of things and their relations, that is sufficient for this purpose of being capable of vice and virtue. For, though this species of knowledge, in a certain degree, is absolutely necessary for that end, yet this is chiefly as leading to that progress of intellect, where thoughts are known as well as things; and where our sentiments are made the subject of the understanding, or are distinguished, as well as the more simple feelings. Neither is it sufficient thus to reflect upon our own thoughts and know our proper sentiments, it is also necessary, in order to be capable of virtue and vice, to form similar judgments in relation to the thoughts and sentiments of others, of persons endowed with similar powers and faculties with those of our own mind. Thus, to give pain or misery to another person, without just cause, being contrary
trary to the rules of virtue, is also known to be in vice. Hence, virtue and vice are relative ideas, which must be acquired together in a scientific mind, like those of great and small, of good and evil.

8. Thus it will appear, that though the mind must know vice in order to know virtue, yet every thing in nature leads to virtue, so far as the mind necessarily desires happiness. For, happiness cannot be found in vice, however vice may be purged unwisely in departing from the rules of virtue. The mind of man is not led to virtuous conduct instinctively, but in science, by which the proper relations of sentiments are discerned, the propriety and impropriety of actions. Therefore, the mind, thus proceeding in virtue, cannot proceed without error; for, every sentimental feeling will not have its just value in our opinion, when we are to judge both with regard to others and ourselves; and, without the just value of those feelings, it is impossible to conduct actions which shall be virtuous. But, to judge of others feeling, we must feel ourselves; and, there are two ways in which sentimental feelings are to be acquired; first, by nature, or the design of God; and secondly, by art, or the design of man. These may be now considered.

9. Naturally man becomes virtuous as he becomes wise, in like manner as he necessarily becomes wise, in proportion as he naturally proceeds in science. For, if a man is to teach himself wisdom, in the proper understanding or distinguishing of ends and means, he will also naturally teach himself virtue, in distinguishing his happiness and his misery, with their causes. For, What is virtue, but the means of happiness? Therefore, the mind of man, proceeding in wisdom, can arrive by nature at nothing but virtue, as an end; that is to say, virtue is the rules which are naturally formed, in a wise person's mind, for the conducting of his future actions; or, it is the rules of nature appointed for the happiness of the creation, and observed or understood in a scientific view of things. Man cannot
but desire happiness of mind; and the certain means, for attaining to this state of mind, is nothing but a virtuous conduct.

Thus, in whatever way the mind of man is made by nature to proceed through science to wisdom, and through wisdom to the knowledge of supreme good, or the happiness of mind, sentiments or opinions are acquired, which, in a general system, are considered as constituting virtue; and, this virtue is then attributed as a quality to that mind, thus educated by nature. In this manner, therefore, a voluntary agent arrives at perfection, after having proceeded, from the first instinctive feelings of pain and pleasure, through all the conscientious sentiments of happiness and misery.

10. Thus we have considered the first manner of acquiring sentimental feelings and conscientious sensibility; this being the education of man by nature. But the natural education of a mind properly relates to the species, and not to the individual who is necessarily taught in consequence of the wisdom of the species. Not that the individual is thus precluded from the natural education of his mind; but a single mind confined to the education of itself, without the influence of the species, would make a very little progress compared with that state to which a mind may be brought, in teaching itself with the assistance of the species advanced in science and in wisdom. Therefore mankind, in general, may be considered as possessing minds advanced in both those species of education, that is, by nature and by art.

11. Man being thus brought to have sentimental feelings, and virtuous sentiments, in two different ways, it is necessary to distinguish that virtue, and those sentiments, which, however artificially produced, are concordant with the virtuous sentiments of nature, which are true, and those which are not true, or are false sentiments, however truly acquired, and called virtuous. This will be understood
in considering: Nature can teach nothing but what is true. Man, again, may teach that which is not true, or that which is erroneous, in misleading minds, that is, in not leading to the end proposed, which is happiness. For, the science and the wisdom of man is imperfect; therefore, the sentiments which he intentionally produces, and the precepts of virtue which he endeavours to inculcate in the growing mind, are always subject to error, more or less. Thus false sentiments are acquired by means of art, or the design of man, which through ignorance may oppose that of God, or the design which is found in nature. Consequently, here is an education that may be termed vicious, as leading to a conduct which is contrary to virtue.

12. Thus it will appear, that vice, which is the conscious transgression of the rules of virtue, is not in nature, but in art; and that when this is acquired in education, the wisdom of man is then deficient, or folly then prevails in not judging properly of good and evil.

13. If we shall thus consider virtue as being the natural state of man, that is, the state to which he is naturally led in the progress of his intellect, then, vice will appear to be the corruption of that natural or virtuous state. In this manner, vicious education, and the corruption of the human mind with regard to morals, may be considered as similar, or almost the same. Corruption means a change, from a state which is useful and agreeable, to one which is useless, noxious, and disagreeable. Now, morals is a state of mind, in relation to sentiments or motives of conduct, that is useful and agreeable; corruption, therefore, with regard to this sentimental state, is a change to the opposite. In order to illustrate this change in the sentimental state of mind, we shall now consider a similar change in our sensual state, or those motives which influence the will immediately through the sense.
There are certain things which naturally please our taste, or please mankind in general; and, in like manner, others will displease. The one of these is said to be a natural state of mind or taste; and, if this were changed to the other, that is, to be pleased with the thing which had displeased, and to be displeased with that which before had pleased, we should say, that such a person’s taste had been viciated or corrupted. But this change, in our sensual state, is by habit actually brought about; and this also happens in our sentimental state. It is thus that our moral feelings are corrupted, and the mind trained to vice instead of virtue. Here then is the vicious education of the human mind, if vicious sentiments are made to grow; and here is the corruption of the intellectual mind, if, in the course of education, virtuous sentiments are stifled, and vicious sentiments infused.

14. It will also thus appear of what importance is the education of youth, almost from the first moment of existence; and how difficult a task it is to change a nation, whether from barbarism to be civilized, or contrarily from a civil to a barbarian state. It is in this manner, also, that will appear the importance of science in a civilized state, that is to say, the progress of science by which the species are led to virtue in a philosophical view of things. For, thus may be established a morality of the purest nature, with a superstition, for the vulgar, founded in benevolence, and contrived with all the light of human experience, which nothing but the succession of ages, and various fates of nations, can procure. Thus philosophy, which is the perfection of the human mind, proceeds properly in science, and is necessarily founded in history, which is either natural or moral.

15. It will hence appear how dangerous for the practical virtue of a nation it may be to take away superstition, from minds incapable of philosophy sufficient to procure a virtuous disposition. Is it not better to leave such minds in the superstitious observance of precepts which
which are truly virtuous, rather than to give them a philosophical
instruction, which shall not be sufficiently perfect to procure a prin-
ciple of virtue, instead of the precept which is lost? For, in science,
no precept, or principle, is admitted of, without having seen its evi-
dence; but, in superstition, principles, i.e. precept, is taken for
granted, or believed on authority, and then this principle is employ-
ed in reason to form conclusions which are to affect the conduct of
this person, who is thus influenced by another. Therefore, a person
may be taught in superstition to be virtuous, so far as relates simply
to his moral conduct.

16. This, then, would be properly a virtuous education; not as
teaching to know what is truly virtue, but as teaching how to act a
virtuous part in that society, where he had his morals in being train-
ed to his virtue. But this education, which in the eye of society or
of moral man is virtuous, would, in that of philosophy, or the sys-
tem of perfect virtue, be only superstitious. For, in a philosophic
system, a person must not simply learn to act from hope or fear, in
order to promote the general good; he must learn to know or un-
derstand the general good, in order to enjoy that happiness which
he voluntarily and wisely then promotes.
SECTION IV.

Of certain Speculative Subjects, naturally flowing from Science, and interesting to Philosophy, or the happiness of Man.

CHAPTER I.

Of Efficient and Final Causes.

1. CAUSE and effect are considered as events, things that have happened or come to pass; and this is the only light in which we can conceive them: For, although we may be convinced that there is a first cause, which has been always, this is only because we cannot conceive an event to happen without a cause; and, therefore, we suppose that the first cause is no event, but has been always, and will be without end. Now, this opinion, although a supposition, is a conclusion that we are in reason constrained to make; but, it is a species of argument that is in its nature perhaps unique: The proposition and its contrary are both inconceivable. In this case, however, philosophy, or our general knowledge, must assist us in deciding a point apparently so equally balanced. Let us now endeavour to take this view of the subject.

2. We necessarily conceive every event to happen in time, and every perceived thing to exist in space, (Sect. XII.) this is the constitution
constitution of our mind, or thinking principle. But, there is no reason to conclude space and time as any thing more than mere conceptions in our mind. Therefore, when we say, that the first cause is always, and that the effects of this cause are everywhere, we only, or properly, mean, That although we cannot in reason conclude any thing to happen without a cause, while every thing, which we know either to happen or to be, must happen in time and be in space, yet, there is no reason to conclude the first cause, as being limited by space or time, this cause being a thing not known, but judged from all that is known, from every thing that happens in time and space. Therefore, the first cause, although acting and efficient, is no event, and has not come to pass; and, although this first cause is necessarily concluded from all that is known, it is in like manner concluded as infinitely different from every known thing.

3. Hence it will appear, that this first cause is known, not by conceiving what it is, but by finding in reason what it is not. The conclusion, in this case, is not formed, as is done upon other occasions, by reasoning from our knowledge, as the principles of our understanding. Here, it is on our proper ignorance, and conscious impotency, that we found our judgment of the knowledge and power of a Being far above our understanding. Now, as this must appear to be the only way in which we can arrive at any knowledge, with regard to the first cause, this method of investigation, to a reasoning mind, will be satisfactory or convincing, although it would not be so upon another occasion, or, although not applicable to any other subject.

Skepticism is the incredulity of scientific men; or it is the credulity of absurd principles; and this arises from the want of proper principles in those who will philosophize, or draw general conclusions, beyond their science. But, atheism, so far as this is an assertion, that there is no first cause, is an expression which has not properly
properly a meaning. For, they who are to make this assertion, must either found the negative proposition upon some principle, or they only persuade themselves that they believe what they cannot comprehend. But, if atheism is to be founded upon some principle, I confess myself ignorant of what this principle may be. It is evident, that the conclusion of evil, in the constitution of things, leads not to atheism, but to daemonism; and, the allowing of both good and evil, leads to politeism, or to different principles in the first cause. But, I believe, no man of rational understanding can find any principle for concluding that there is no first cause; for, this necessarily implies, that he understands how things could be produced without a cause. Now, if a man has seen this truth, That things may be produced without a cause, he has but to reveal it, that so it may be believed by other men; but, to deny the existence of a first cause, from no other reason than this, that to him the first cause is unknown, would be equally absurd, as to deny his own existence, because he knows not how he had a being.

4. Thus we will be justified in affirming, That the first cause is absolute, self-existing, efficient, and final. All other causes, again, are only apparent, as happening in the order of our thought, and occasional, as having come to pass in consequence of a preceding action; it is therefore only relatively, that they can be considered as either efficient or final. Every known thing that causes, has been also caused; and every cause, which is an abstracted idea, was an effect, as, in like manner, every effect will be a cause. All this arises from the nature of our knowledge, or constitution of our mind, which we thus learn in studying the nature of things, in like manner as we can only understand the nature of things perfectly, in studying the constitution of our own mind.

This view of the subject will now be confirmed, by examining our
our conceptions of cause and effect in relation to the different subjects of science, taking these in the order of nature.

5. In the science of physics, cause and effect, according to our common conception, are not things inseparable; for, in this subject, causes and effects are either more or less immediate or remote. One man is considered as being the cause, e.g. of another man's death; but, one man is not the physical cause of another's death immediately; for, there may be interposed an instrument of death. Neither is the sword which kills a man the immediate cause of his death; for, it is the wound which is the effect of the preceding causes. Neither, in like manner, is this mortal wound the immediate cause of death; for, the effusion of blood, which is the effect of the wound, is the more immediate cause of the death which is to ensue upon that event.

6. Thus, causes are considered as being either more immediate or remote. But, is the immediate cause of any thing ever known? The moon, for example, is the cause of the tide. But, is the moon the immediate cause of this known effect? So far as gravitation is considered as a general law of motion in bodies, it is, properly speaking, gravitation that is the cause of the effect or of this action of the fluid; and, the moon is then properly the condition in which that action is performed.

7. But, how shall we know what it is that performs an action? Action is only known in change; change cannot be conceived without action; but, the active thing, by which we are made to know, when action in external or physical things is judged, this to us is utterly unknown; and, it will appear, it is impossible that it can be otherwise. For, if we could know that which causes us to know, this would be to know without a cause; and, this can only
ly belong to the first cause, which is considered as knowing absolutely, without the mediation of any thing.

8. Thus it will appear, that, in external things, (which are the proper subject of physics as a science) causes properly speaking are not known, but are judged in reason to be; and that, in those cases, it is the effect of a physical cause which is the immediate subject of our knowledge.

9. In mathematics, on the other hand, there is neither cause nor effect, properly speaking. That two things severally equal to a third are equal to each other, is a thing actually conceived in our mind; therefore the cause of that action, wherein this conception is formed, if known, would be the proper cause of our knowledge in this case, or of the mathematical truth considered as an effect. But, the cause of the action of our mind is unknown; and it is only from the effect, known in our thought, that this action of our mind is in reason judged as its cause.

10. Thus, in mathematics, a first principle, or axiom, is properly an effect; not the effect immediately of an external cause, but of an action in the mind; and this action is the more immediate cause. But, the operation of mind acting upon knowledge is termed reason; and the consequence of that operation is properly the conclusion. Now, the conclusion, in one operation of mind, may be the cause in relation to another operation, of a similar nature, which is to succeed; and then it is a cause, which, properly speaking, or in the language of science, is termed a principle.

11. But, it is now to be observed, this is reasoning in metaphysics, and not in the science of mathematics, where there is conceived no action, consequently no causation or efficiency. Things are conceived to be; they are also conceived to be either equal or unequal;
equal; but, being conceived in either of these modes, they are supposed to be unchangeable. Hence mathematics, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with either effect or cause.

12. In metaphysics again, where our knowledge is the proper subject of the science, action is properly knowing; and there, the cause of action is nothing more than the conditions of it; for, that is all which we know with regard to the cause of our knowing. Now, as in physics the order of effects, or sensible events, i.e. events known by means of sense, is all that is known immediately, and out of which we form the relative conception of cause and effect, so, in metaphysics, it is likewise this order of events, not known by means of sense, but by that faculty of mind wherein we reflect on what has happened in our knowledge, that constitutes the subject of our reasoning, when we conclude one of those events to be the cause, and another the effect. It is thus we form a system of mind, as, with respect to physical things, we do of matter. This may be illustrated.

13. When I say that sensation is the cause of my perception, and this again the cause of discernment when I judge, I only mean that this is the proper order in which these things succeed each other. The cause of sensation is external; because, it is not from within. Nor that we know what is without the mind, but because we are conscious that sensation is not from a cause which is in or proper to the mind. Sensation is the last step to which we can ascend in the investigation of our proper knowledge by reflection; consequently, being conscious, that this primary knowledge, which we call sense, is not of ourselves, or following any other event in our mind, we judge it to be from without, and derive it commonly, though very erroneously, from that which the mind conceives in perception with magnitude and figure.
14. Sensation is the proper cause of perception, in which magnitude and figure are known; because it is in this order that these things succeed each other: But, magnitude and figure cannot, in any manner, be considered as the cause or condition for sensation. Sensation doubtless has a cause; but, of that which immediately precedes sensation, we have no degree of knowledge, in this manner of judging by consciousness and the reflection of the mind. It is here, therefore, that metaphysical causes stop, and, in the more general order of things, run into physical causes, which are considered as existing without the mind, and are known by judging from that which is known in sensation, and is imagined in perception. This again may be illustrated.

15. Light is considered as the cause of vision, in like manner as the visible body is the cause of the reflection of the light by which the body is known. But, light is a physical cause; and, the sense of light, or colour, is a metaphysical effect. The one is knowledge in our mind; the other, while viewed in that physical sense of things, is considered as a thing as much out of our mind as is the object which is perceived by means of that light. That this light enters the eye, forms a picture on the retina, has an effect upon the brain by means of the optic nerves; all this, in the system of body, is true, or not called in question; and these are then all physical causes and effects; but still, these things are infinitely removed from sensation, which is no physical event. Let us now state that case.

16. That a physical cause should produce a metaphysical effect, that is to say, that a material thing should affect an immaterial substance, is inconceivable to us; it is an expression which either has no meaning at all, or has a meaning which is evidently absurd. For, a material thing is either known or not known. If not known, as indeed it is not, then, we cannot reason from that thing as affecting our mind in sensation, although we may reason from sensation in judging
judging that this knowledge must have some thing as a cause. If, on the other hand, the material thing shall be supposed as known; then this thing is body, consisting in magnitude and figure. Now, that magnitude and figure should produce sensation in mind, is no other than to suppose mind to be affected by body in the manner that one body is affected by another; consequently, that mind is body, which is a contradiction, and therefore absurd.

17. Thus it will appear, that some action is necessarily conceived as interposed between the last physical effect of light and the first event in knowledge, when the sense of colour is excited. This action, therefore, is not properly a supposition, for it is judged necessarily; and, although it be a thing judged and known in no other way but that of reason, it is not therefore uncertain in any degree, for, it is necessarily inferred from that which is known. Consequently, this conclusion is infinitely removed from the nature of a mere supposition, which is made arbitrarily for the purpose of science or the investigation of truth, and which, in being mistaken for an inference of reason, leads reasoning men into error.

18. Thus, wherever there is change, action is there in reason judged to be; and, where ever there is action, there must be cause, which is known in general from the effect; there being only one cause which may be known in another manner, and which therefore may be known without the effect. Now this is our own will, the effect of which is not known consciously, as is its action, but is judged by the mediation of some other knowledge, and then attributed, as an effect, to the action of the will, with which that knowledge is properly connected in the order of things. (Part 2. Sect. 6.)

19. This action of our will is known immediately without any external information; and, it is known to be a cause by its connection with an external event, which is then an effect, the co-relative of
of cause. In like manner, sensation, which is a passion of our mind and not an action, is known immediately, but it is only known to be an effect in reasoning from the analogy of things, or upon general principles, where that which precedes in the order of events is considered as the cause. It is in this manner that the modification of an organized body, such as that of our eye or ear, is considered as being a cause for the passion of our mind, when we see light or hear sound. Thus this action of light and air, upon the organs of sight and hearing, is the physical cause of sight and hearing, though not the immediate cause, for, betwixt that physical cause and the metaphysical effect, which is knowledge or the information of sense, there is interposed both a certain effect in the body, which may be known, and a certain action upon the mind, which cannot be farther known than in the effect sensation, by which it is in reason judged to have been.

20. As in sensation, which is the passion of mind, and an effect of external action, there is knowledge, so, in perception, which follows this passion and is an action of mind, there is also knowledge; and this forms another species of knowledge, or knowledge of another kind. Here, therefore, are metaphysical causes and effects, which are events succeeding in a certain order; and this succession is pursued in the order of intellect. For, the mind from its knowledge reasons, judges, or concludes, in producing new knowledge. Here again we are conscious of both cause and effect; for, we are conscious of judging from compared knowledge, and we are conscious of comparing knowledge and ideas as principles in order to form a judgment; but the action of the mind interposed betwixt these principles, which is then in place of a cause, and the judgment or conclusion, which is in place of an effect, is not otherwise known than in being judged to have been in reasoning from that which is properly known on this occasion.

21. In
21. In the science of morality, causation is in the mind. In this case, opinions, formed conscientiously or in science, are the effects of action proper to intelligent minds; and, the act of the will is considered as the effect of these moral causes. But, it would be departing from our design, to pursue this subject of moral cause, which has been here mentioned only to show its place in the subject now under consideration, and will be particularly examined in the next section.

22. In the examination which has now been made with regard to human understanding, the mind has been considered as first informed by the action or influence of an external thing; and it has been demonstrated, that the mind acts, in relation to that information of an external thing, when the knowledge of magnitude and figure is, in perception, acquired by the mind, or produced in our thought. But the nature of this external thing, with which the mind is thus connected, whether mediately or immediately, has not properly entered into the consideration, neither can it with any degree of propriety enter a metaphysical investigation; for, the examination of that material thing, so far as it is the subject of our knowledge, is a physical consideration, consequently, must not be examined upon metaphysical principles; no more than a metaphysical subject is to be examined upon those principles in which, sensible and perceptible qualities entering, the thing is then considered as existing physically with magnitude, figure, colour, &c. Were we to consider the subjects of one science with the principles of another, this would be the same as to judge things with magnitude and figure from those that have colour and smell, or vice versa.

23. It is in this manner, and this alone, that science may be pursued with compleat evidence, as, for example, that of mathematics, and to the perfect satisfaction of thinking men, by having the subject of every science judged or investigated by its proper principles. But,
But, science being thus established with uncontroversial evidence, in a general admission of its truths, whether physical, mathematical, moral, or metaphysical, philosophy may then proceed, to consider the investigated subjects of the several sciences with a more extended view, in order to form general conclusions, which, in not transgressing any science, may be conform to some particular science, of sufficient weight in the scale of reason to command belief.

24. According to this philosophical view, it is now proposed to examine this subject, the connection of the mind with external things, or with the living body to which it is considered as attached. The object of this examination is to find some general conclusion with regard to the final cause, or proper end, of mind.

As, in physical subjects, every thing is found connected with a final as well as an efficient cause, so, if after due examination of this general view of nature, of which our knowledge is rational, and of the human mind, of which we have a conscious knowledge as well as a rational understanding, we shall find reason to conclude our ignorance with regard to an end or period of existence, which is not the case in relation to the animal or material part of our constitution, then, however imperfect this conclusion may leave our science with respect to the will of God, or the operations of nature in a subject not yet discovered, (the future state of mind), nevertheless, in a matter so highly interesting to a being of foresight, one who is apt to torment himself with the idea of an end to his existence, it must be of the utmost importance to know, that it is without any reason he thus torments himself, by forming an idea, which, like that of a centaur or of a fiery dragon, is only the operation of fancy, without any rational support in nature or in truth.

25. Now, though these thoughts, which interrupt the tranquillity or trouble the happiness of a person who reflects, arise naturally from his ignorance with regard to his future state, yet, this ignorance of futurity
futurity will cease to operate in that disagreeable manner, after he has attained a full assurance of the wisdom, power, and goodness of his author. But, this assurance can only be obtained in the study of nature, and general views of philosophy; and, to those who cannot arrive at this advanced state of human nature, superstition, which may be founded on philosophy, must supply its place.

C H A P. II.

Mind considered in Relation to its End or final Cause.

1. MIND is the subject which we want to examine, and with regard to its final cause or end. But, it will be necessary first to examine living things, from whence our notions formed, and to which our language is more properly adapted.

Life and death are terms not absolute, but relative; and they express two different states, in either one or other of which all material things are considered as existing. Life is the positive, and death the negative of these two states of conceived existence. Life may therefore be defined, in describing what is actually observed in that state of things; but, death cannot be defined, except in relation to that other state of which it is properly the negative.

2. Life may be defined as being an active state, in which the species of things is preserved amidst continual change; death again is either an apparently inert state, in which no action or change takes place, or positively an active state in which the species of things is changed, according to a different order from that of life. That life and death, considered as active states of things, have each...
them an end which is pursued; but, that end, which in the one case is pursued, is avoided in the other.

3. In living things there is genus to be observed, as well as species. Animals are of a different kind from plants; for, all the species of animals have something in which they agree, while they differ from plants; and, it is the same with plants. But the genus of animals and plants agree, in having life, and a capacity of acting for the preservation of their species.

4. Although life is the positive state of things, and death a negative in relation to it, yet every individual living thing in the genus of animals and plants, being necessarily subject to death, this negative state comes to be a part of the character of both these genuses of living things. And thus, in living things, at least so far as respects the animal and vegetable life, there is a progress from a state of life to a state of death. But, as the matter is limited, and the genus is to be continued, it necessarily follows, that, there is an equal progress from the state of death to that of life; and that these changes must succeed each other in a continued round, so far as the state of life is to be perpetuated.

5. There is thus established a system of change, which takes place both in dead and living things; and those two changes, which are severally made, although different in their natures, or efficient cause, are necessarily connected in their final cause, or end.

6. Of those perpetual changing things, two different systems are distinguished,

* If there is an intermediate genus of things, in which the properties of the animal and the plant are conjoined, this does not alter the distinction of animal and vegetable; for this distinction is founded in real difference, while they agree in being living things, the individuals of which are necessarily subject to death.
distinguished, the animal and vegetable systems. But, these two systems are connected; for, animals are fed by plants, and plants by animal bodies. Therefore, besides these two systems of animals and plants, there is a more general system of living changing things, which comprehends both, and in which there is admitted the change of matter from the one system to the other.

7. Thus there are many systems to be observed in material things. There is a system of the globe; and there is a solar system, in which this globe is placed. As the system of the globe is immediately connected with the solar system, so is that of plants with the system of the globe; and as the vegetable system has an immediate dependence on that of the globe, so has the animal system a proper dependence on that of vegetables, for, it is from these ultimately that all animals are fed.

8. The animal system, which is more immediately connected with that of vegetables, is also the most removed in its connection with the solar and syderial systems. But, on the other hand, this system of living animals is immediately connected with mind, and with the system of intellect, which belongs to mind alone.

9. It is in sensation that the living being, and a mind, are immediately connected; and this is the last step in the gradual progress of material things to mind, which here begins in knowing. For, without that action of the organised living animal, by which the sentient being is affected, it is not conceivable how intellect, which is founded originally on this information of the senses, could begin.

10. Mind, beginning in sensation, proceeds, in the first place, for the conducting of the animal system; and for the continuation of the species, in the preservation of the individual. This individual again is so contrived, as to be occasionally subject to lose its living state,
state, before the proper period of its natural progress; and thus to return into the circulation of the mundane system, without performing all the offices appointed for it in this order of things. It is therefore actuated with a sensitive, perceptive, and discerning mind, which thus appears to be calculated for conducting those animal powers to a proper end, the preservation of the individual, and the continuation of the species.

11. In abstracting at present any consideration with regard to the mind of man, we may contemplate the universe of matter, and this simple species of animal mind, as thus connected. A multitude of luminaries are placed in space, at distances which are incalculable. Round these revolve numberless bodies in various orbits, at various distances, and of various dimensions, which forms a system of comets, planets, and satellites; at least, in such a system is placed the globe of this earth. This forms a world in which there is to be observed three different systems, which may be severally considered. The first is a system of bodies changing according to a certain order; but these bodies are not living, and the epithet of dead is commonly, and not unproperly, applied to them, as also that of being inactive, which is not so proper. But this may require some explanation.

A body can only be said to be dead that once was living; in this view the system of bodies now considered may with some degree of propriety be said to be bodies that are dead, so far as containing animal and vegetable bodies which are dead and in that state of change by means of which they are again to become living bodies. Now this may be properly termed the state of death; not as being necessarily inactive, but as being in a state different from that of living bodies; and as acting according to more simple laws than those of living things. On the other hand, so far as these bodies of the mundane system are considered as being sui generis, abstracting
every consideration of the animal and vegetable systems, it will appear that they cannot with propriety be considered as either dead or living; for, a living body is one that has a peculiar constitution, to which is annexed a power of acting in a particular manner, and which power is lost in changing the living constitution of that body. Now, there is no such constitution observed in the bodies of the mundane system which are commonly called dead; air, water, earth, for example, form bodies, which never lose their powers of action, however those bodies are modified or changed. The term inactivity can never be properly applied to those things except relatively, they being always positively active in some degree, and in some respect; and the term living, or that of dead, cannot with every degree of propriety, or cannot positively, be applied to these bodies of the globe which constitute the mundane system, independent of animals and plants. These bodies are never living; therefore they are not, in the propriety of scientific language, ever dead. They are never inactive; for they are always acting in some manner, and exerting power in some degree. Therefore, though neither dead nor living bodies, they are the constituent parts of a body which is living, so far as it contains a peculiar system of its own, from which arises power or capacity of effecting a certain end, which is then the object of that system.

This first system of bodies, which properly speaking are indifferent with respect to life and death, is connected with a second system of bodies which, properly speaking, are living bodies, propagating their species, and thus continuing their kind, although, as individuals, they must all necessarily perish. But, though they are properly living bodies, they do not appear to be bodies with any species of animation. This last is a kind of body only found in the third system of the globe.

The animal system, which is the third in this order, is not only, like
like that of the globe itself, a living system, and, like that of vegetables, a system of living bodies, it is also a system of living bodies animated with a mind, and thus acquiring powers of action proper to this peculiar constitution; and at the same time is an end, to which, in the order of things, those two preceding systems are subservient in their purpose.

12. It is thus that we are led to the knowledge of a compound system of things, which in the eye of intellect may be considered in two different lights, i.e. physically and metaphysically. With regard to the first, those living bodies are considered as having a natural structure, or mechanism and organisation, by which they are made to grow and propagate their species. There is also in the constitution of those bodies another species of organisation, defined for acting in relation to the mind with which that body is connected, in order to produce sensation. Secondly, the compound system may be considered metaphysically. In this view, mind actuated by something external, or independent of it, is made to know, and to conceive things with magnitude and figure, with mechanism and organisation; which conceived things do not exist any otherwise than in this mind, which thus in acting properly, according to a certain order of things, is made to conceive.

13. Besides the knowledge and conception of magnitude, &c. by this external information, mind is considered as, in memory, forming ideas; and as, in reason, judging or comparing its knowledge and ideas. Now, as in the physical view the animal body was considered as acting for the purpose of mind, here, in this metaphysical view, mind is brought to action, for the purpose of that animal system by means of which it had been considered as informed.

14. So far as this complicated view of things is considered, there is, in all that action, a limitation, and, in the effect, a certain end or termination;
termination; and in this our knowledge may be said to be scientific and perfect, so far as it is properly defined. Of this we form a system which has been now considered as the animal system; having abstracted every consideration of intellect, which does not appear to be necessarily connected with the animal.

In this view of things, the ideas which we form of the organized body of the animal, and that which we conceive with regard to a sensitive and a discerning faculty connected with that body, are both of them perfect, and each of them properly adapted to the other; and this forms one complete view or system in our idea. But this is only the simple animal mind, which judges indeed of actual things, and that also by means of idea. It does not judge, however, of ideal things, or the abstract principles of its proper knowledge: It is therefore limited to the information of sense and perception, with the ideas formed on these to a certain extent in one direction, without being able from these to abstract and generalize, and thus reason indefinitely in the production of new knowledge. Hence it will appear, that there is another view in which the human mind is to be considered, in the science of metaphysics which is now employed; and that this subject forms properly the intellectual system, founded on or proceeding from the system of a knowing and discerning mind, a thing which necessarily precedes intellect, as thus understood.

15. The intellectual system, which is proper to the human species, is considered as being founded on the sensitive and distinguishing mind of the animal, but as proceeding in a new career beyond the ultimate completion of that simple reasoning or distinguishing mind. It is thus that the intellectual mind of man is made to understand himself, as well as other things. Instead then of distinguishing, like the animal, things which act in a certain order, he understands the action in distinguishing that order in which they act; and he understands design in distinguishing the purpose for which the action is
is intended. The mind of man thus observes wisdom in the proper adapting of ends and means; and becomes wise, as well as knowing, in the exercise of that intellect, which is thus made to grow. But, this progress is indefinite; it is different from that of the animal mind, which has a limit; and it is a progress of knowledge to which we cannot set any termination.

16. In the animal system, considered as subsisting in a composition of body and mind, there is a limited progress of mind, and a determined purpose of matter; but this is not the case with regard to the end or final cause of the intellectual system. This intellectual system, a thing begun in our proper knowledge, is a progress of which we know a part, by the utmost exertion of our understanding power; and this part of that intellectual progress is necessarily conceived as a thing already come to pass; but there is another part of which we are totally ignorant, and of which we want to form some idea. The part which we know, of the intellectual progress, is necessarily conceived as already come to pass; but the part of which we want to form an idea is not arrived; and it is supposed to be perfectly different from that which has been. Therefore, What title, principle, or reason, have we to judge of a part to come, which, according to the supposition of the case, is not to have the least resemblance or affinity with that which is then passed? Analogy here cannot be of any use; and, we might just as well, in the science of physics, have determined, a priori, what was to have been the effect of touching a needle with the lodestone, as, in metaphysics, to say what is the end or termination of the intellectual mind.

17. The end or purpose of the animal mind, which distinguishes its knowledge and its ideas, so as to know things and their immediate connections, is evidently to form the system of a living animal, which has to preserve itself in various circumstances, and to continue the race in the propagation of its like. It has further for object to be
be the foundation on which intellect, or the conscious operations of an intelligent being, is to grow. Thus intellect, or what is properly man, is not connected immediately with a body, but is connected immediately with a mind, on which the conscious person or intellect proceeds; and this mind is again connected with a particular living body.

18. In this case, the apparent connection, of our conscious mind with a particular living body, can draw to no conclusion with regard to a termination of that conscious principle, or thinking substance; although it necessarily does, in the supposition of the reality of that body as a part of the constitution of that thinking person. This will appear from the following argument:

This natural body, so far as it is conceived to exist in magnitude and to have figure, is nothing independent of our mind or thinking principle, which thus conceives, or forms ideas in relation to which it is to reason for the production of intellect; therefore, How is an intellectual mind to be limited in its existence, by an idea of its own production? Whatever opinion a conscious person may form in relation to the changes of his proper ideas, this cannot serve as a principle in reason, to conclude that such a mind shall not think, or form any idea at all.

Now though, without the information of an external thing, of which we are otherwise totally ignorant, we must conclude, that we could not have thought; yet when, in consequence of an informing cause, we have attained to the power of consciousness and thinking, and have acquired a power of producing more knowledge without the further information of the external cause, then, however this thinking being may proceed in knowledge, and change its thoughts in succession, it is not conceivable in reason, that is to say, we have no reason to conclude that it shall cease to think, or that, instead of proceeding
proceeding in knowledge, it shall retreat again to ignorance. When, therefore, such a supposition as this, of a termination in mind, is formed, it must be considered as unreasonable, being without any foundation or support in the truth of things. But this is a view that is only to be attained by means of science and philosophy, it lying beyond the reach of common sense, or even of simple science.

19. By way of illustration, another truth may be considered of an inferior kind, but similar in its nature, as not attainable by common sense alone, it requiring great extent of science to arrive at the evidence of such truths. This is the *vis in finita* of bodies continuing to move perpetually if not resifted; and also another truth, which is, that, however resifted, moving power is never diminished or lost, notwithstanding the contrary of those propositions is apparent. It is in like manner that, with regard to the continued progress of the intellectual mind in knowledge, notwithstanding in the common view of things this progress is apparently brought to stop, and to have a termination, yet, this fallacious view may be corrected, in the investigation of an evidence which requires the highest powers of an intellectual mind to attain; for, it is not by reasoning in science alone that such a conclusion as this may be arrived at, but from a more general reasoning, in which the knowledge of all the sciences is required.

20. Thus it will appear, that there is no subject of our knowledge in which it is so difficult to reason with any degree of evidence, as with regard to this final cause, or end of mind. For, first, if it is physically that we are to judge with regard to the subjects of our knowledge, then, the system of living animated bodies will appear to be part of the mechanical constitution of the mundane system, existing in magnitude, and having figures properly adapted to the purpose of the design. They will also appear to have a particular structure of their own, whereby, like plants, they grow and propag-
gate their species. They will moreover appear to have a species of
organization peculiar to themselves, and adapted for the purpose of
informing mind upon occasion of certain actions from without.
External information, then, is the proper cause of this mind, which
is now considered as connected with that living body, and made to
grow or to proceed in knowledge.

On the other hand, if things are considered metaphysically, we
shall find, that those mechanical notions, of magnitude and figure,
are merely imaginary; and, that these are formed by the operation
of mind itself. Therefore, although there is certainly an external
thing, by which the mind in sensation is made to know, so far as
the term external may be figuratively applied to mind, yet, this
cause does not exist in the manner that we imagine, that is, as sub-
sisting in magnitude and with figure. Consequently, those living
bodies, which appear as a distinct system in themselves, are, upon
the further progress of our knowledge, found to be active causes
employed in the information of our mind, which is thus made to
proceed in knowledge.

21. Hence there is opened to our view an intellectual system,
which is nowhere limited in its duration, or bounded in its nature.
But it is otherwise with that particular mind which we conceive to
be connected with a living body; for, if a mind, which has neither
magnitude, figure, nor parts, is supposed to be connected with, and
informed by a living body, then, upon the change of this living
state for the other, i.e. the dead state with which the mind is not
connected nor informed, what becomes of that immaterial being
which only had its knowledge through that living body, and from
which material things it had abstracted all its proper ideas? When,
again, that dead body is resolved in the order of the mundane sys-
tem, and is afterwards admitted into the system of living animals
which have a mind, then, from whence comes this continual supply
of
of minds which are required for the preservation of this conceived sympathy of things? Here, according to the principles of reason, which in this case is that of analogy, we are constrained to conclude a transmigration of mind, as well as a transformation of matter, in the system of living animated bodies, which is thus to be considered as continually remaining in general the same, although successively changed in its individuals or particulars.

22. If this reasoning is admitted, then it would appear, that here is a material and intellectual system not conceived in perfect wisdom. For, if this system of things is considered as means, then, here would be means without a proper end, a thing of which wisdom will not admit. If, on the other hand, it is to be considered as an end, then, here would be an end without all the power and wisdom that may be conceived; for, why perpetuate a progress in which there is nothing more performed than had been done at first, when the system was complete; or, why produce an eternal circulation of matter in the system of the world, and of minds in the system of animated bodies, when in this constitution of things no farther progress of design, or exercise of power and wisdom, would be made than in one circulation?

In this case also, it must be observed, that, from the metaphysical consideration of mind, the same conclusion will be made of a perpetual operation to no purpose. For, in the progress of an animated body, the mind is informed with knowledge, and is then made to advance in science; the beginning also of this system of intellect seems to be the proper purpose of that animal system by means of which mind had been informed; and yet this knowledge of mind, and progress in science and intellect, is to end in ignorance and oblivion, upon every change of mind. Thus the system is supposed to be operating continually with no other purpose than to again undo what had been done before.

Thus
Thus though in considering severally the system of animated bodies, on the one hand, and the intellectual system, on the other, we necessarily conclude wisdom in the proper adapting of ends and means; and, though we likewise observe wisdom in the proper connection of those two systems in a certain order, that is, in the mind being informed by means of the action of those living bodies; yet, in supposing any other connection of those systems, or in supposing material bodies to be things equally subsisting as thoughts or ideas, we are led to an inconsistency in our reasoning, by concluding at one time perfect wisdom in the works of creation, or operations of nature, and at another time the want of wisdom in that design. Therefore, we are under the necessity of allowing, that this view of things, in which absurdity, or so much imperfection, is conceived, must be wrong.

23. Hence, in ascribing to nature wisdom, which no reasoning and enlightened mind can refuse, this ineffectual system, which is contained in that compound idea of body and mind, as things equally subsisting and independent of each other, must be rejected; but we cannot reject the system of our mind and intellect, of which we are conscious, or which we know immediately, and by which we now reason on the subject. Therefore, on the one hand, there cannot be conceived any delusion with regard to the subsistence of this intellectual being in which we think and reason, and in which we believe and disbelieve. On the other hand, our idea of body with magnitude and figure, which is said to be material, and thought to be a substance or thing subsisting, has been already investigated as an idea produced only in our thought, and as having no other subsistence except in our mind, which is a thinking substance.

24. Thus, that false view of the compound system of body and mind now considered, and which, in the imperfect progress of the scientific mind, is so naturally, so universally adopted by mankind judging
judging in what is called common sense, may, in a more philosophical investigation of the subject, be properly corrected; and this without, on the one hand, imputing any natural imperfectness to the information of sense, and operation of reason, by which the mind may be conducted to the highest intellectual knowledge; and, on the other, without leading the understanding mind of the philosopher to that absurd conclusion, of nothing being fully known, because many things are unknown, and some things have been misunderstood.

Let us now consider the nature of man, in comparing him with our ideas of living sensitive beings, that so we may see the error of supposing man to be perishable with the brute.

The brute animal has sense, perception, and sentimental passions; he has reason also, or a comparing operation in relation to that knowledge. But this reasoning operation, in the brute, has no tendency to produce opinions in his mind, which may serve as principles in a further progress of his reason; it only serves to determine his actions, which ultimately have for object the preservation of life, and continuation of the race. Now, these actions are in the animal not voluntary, as being a system in his own mind, or contrived by his proper wisdom; they are necessarily in consequence of that supreme design in which the animal system has been made. But this is not the case with man, so far as he has an intellectual part, a progress of being infinitely beyond the reach of brute animal capacity.

Man is by nature made an animal; but, the proper purpose of his animal nature is to serve his intellectual capacity. In distinguishing the differences and the similarities of things, man reflects abstractedly, and reasons scientifically; he thus forms conscious opinions, which are not in nature as comprehending animal life, although in nature as comprehending the intellectual constitution of the man. It is only
this intellectual constitution which is considered as man; the animal of the human species who shall be incapable of acquiring language, or knowing number, is nothing better than a brute animal. From his shape, indeed, we are prejudiced in his favour; and, from political reasons, we must respect his person, though without the marks of intellect; but, philosophically considered, he is not to be esteemed as having advanced anything beyond the brute animal, which every man is born.

If man be thus evidently of a superior nature compared with the brute, and if it be only in the brute nature that man lives and dies, all that is properly man may exist, after the animal nature of man is at an end, and may proceed to improve in the exercise of its proper functions, after the cause of those functions is no more required. The animal nature of man is no more than the instrument or means by which human science is attained; therefore, that end being attained, the means become unnecessary; and, it is reasonable to suppose, that, in order to make a further progress in the system of intellect, some other means may be required when the animal nature shall be changed.

25. So far, therefore, as reason is employed, in conducting the intellectual mind to that degree of knowledge where principles are acquired, for the further progress of a reasoning being, independent of that primary information which is the effect of an external cause, the conscientious mind would appear to be above decay and corruption. This idea, of decay and corruption, we have formed in the contemplation of the material system; it is an idea not so naturally suggested in the more superficial thinking of the man, as in the superficial reasoning of philosophy; and it is an idea which, though to the animal man of little importance, as not occupying his thoughts, which are either agitated by the passions, or employed in the necessary affairs of life, is of the highest concern to a person who, after satisfying
ing the animal desires, employs his mind in contemplation, in considering what has been the natural order of things which now are past, and consequently, what will be the course of future events.

It is for such a mind as this, that lives in thought, and reflects upon its proper action, to inquire concerning the nature of life, and to reason in relation to the final cause of thinking. Such an inquiry is not for minds who may be said to live only in order to enjoy the means of living, and who, without seeking after causes, content themselves in knowing the sensible effect: Such are by far the greatest part of mankind. To these, the trouble of forming an opinion, by a painful invesigation of fact, and long deduction of argument, may be spared, in the belief which then is naturally given to the opinions formed by other men. But, to the few who examine for themselves, and only admit, as truth, an opinion for which the evidence has appeared, the following inquiry may be made the subject of their thought, viz. Upon what is founded the conclusion, that there should happen to the intellectual mind such a change, as corresponds with our idea of death in bodies which have been animated? and, to help this inquiry, the following observations may be offered.

C H A P. III.

The Final Cause of Mind considered as a Future State.

1. Of every thing without us, our information is by sensation; and we cannot have any other knowledge of the subject, except that which comes by those means. But, sensation cannot give us any information of bodies; because, there is no affinity between the magnitude and figure of bodies, and any of the sensations of
of our mind; the ideas of body are acquired not by sense, but by imagination,—not by the passion, but by the action of the mind. Neither can sensation give us any information of another mind, further than this shall be reasonably implied in that knowledge which we may attain by means of sensation. But, our knowledge of mind is absolute and immediate, in our consciousness of ourself; and, this knowledge is, in its nature, superior to any thing that we ever can be made to know respecting that order which is observed in external things. Hence, that we are, that we have been, and that we will be, are the most certain of all propositions. To doubt these, is impossible; and, to endeavour to prove them, would be absurd.

2. That there are also other minds, similar to this mind of which I am conscious, and apparently connected with those things which are without the mind, or of which the information comes by means of sense, is a truth that cannot be called in question, because it is regularly deduced from that knowledge which is absolute. At the same time, it must be observed, the certainty of this proposition is of an inferior order to that of our own existence; for, it is only in reasoning that we form the conclusion of the former, and the latter is the principle on which the reasoning then proceeds. No conclusion, therefore, that is formed with regard to those minds which we thus conceive to be around us in the world, can affect that knowledge which we have of ourselves.

3. Hence, whatever it is which in sensation gives us knowledge, and is considered as external to our mind; whatever is the real state of those minds which are judged to be like our own, being apparently connected with bodies similar to that with which we are ourself connected; and, whatever may be the state of those minds, after the bodies with which they are connected appear to die, from this no conclusion can be formed, in philosophical reasoning, whereby our consciousness knowledge, and the reasoning more immediately
founded thereon, may be affected. But, this will require some explanation.

Animated bodies being considered as things truly existing without us, or independent of our thought, then, in the death of those bodies, there would be reason to conclude an equal change in the mind connected with that body; and consequently, such a future change in our proper mind. But, that there is truly no such thing as those bodies existing in that manner, has been fully proved. Therefore, our knowledge of other minds being founded in our knowledge of the living bodies with which we judge them to be connected; and our knowledge of those external bodies, as things actually existing independent of our thought, being absolutely false, the conclusions which we may have thus incon siderately formed, with regard to our own mind or thinking substance, will appear to be conclusions not formed in a just analogy, and therefore may be corrected in a jufter view of our own thoughts.

4. There is a thing with which our conscious mind appears to be immediately connected; and this, according to our idea, is a living organised body. Now, let us consider, what is the effect, upon this conscious mind, of changes which happen in that living body with which our mind appears to be immediately connected. This body changes in every respect, except that of living, without our mind being in any degree affected; that is to say, our conscious and knowing principle remains the same, through all those changes which happen during life, and which, though gradual, are total changes.

5. Now, although this changing organised body is supposed to be the mean employed for the purpose of that knowledge from whence our mind conceives external things with magnitude, figure, &c. yet, we have no farther knowledge of external things, except that they are
the means of that information which we have by sense; this being properly the order observed in our knowledge, of which we have not any farther understanding. Thus, our ideas of those supposed external things, in which magnitude and figure, motion and rest, are contained, are to be considered as nothing but the way in which our mind is instinctively led to conceive those things. Therefore, our animal ideas, thus investigated by means of science, cannot satisfy a mind, reasoning with the enlarged views of philosophy, that such things subsist in a separate existence independent of our thought.

6. We are now arrived at this conclusion, That external things, as we conceive them, do not exist independent of our mind, and that our mind, of which we have a conscious knowledge, exists independent of those external things. At the same time we are certain, That there is something existing independent of our mind, being properly the cause of our information; which thing, though not known, is known not to be body. But if we are fully satisfied of these truths, which it is in the power of reason to effect, then, How can any species of reasoning, in relation to any known change of external things called body, affect our judgment with regard to our own existence, which is independent of those external things conceived with magnitude, figure, motion, &c?

7. Thus it will appear, that an opinion, which may be formed, concerning any other change of mind, besides that of a progress, under certain conditions, from less to more knowledge, is only conjectural, and is not founded in the strict reasoning of science and philosophy; and that any notion, which we may form respecting the end or death of mind, (to use a figurative expression,) at the same time that it is a mere conjecture in relation to an event of which we have not any information, is only founded in an argument of analogy which does not in any degree apply. However, therefore, we may be disposed, in reasoning scientifically, to doubt or question with re-

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gard to events, of which we have no proper knowledge or experience wherein to found a judgment, we will also by this means avoid the forming false conclusions, in reasoning from a supposed analogy, which has been actually found not to take place.

8. To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, That, as there had been a period of time before which we either did not think or did not remember, this period corresponding with that of our infancy when we began to know and think, so, there may be a period of time, corresponding with that of our death, when the mind shall cease to think and know, or to remember; and, therefore, that there is as little reason to suppose the mind shall exist or know after death, as it had existed before our knowledge. This argument being specious, it may be proper to answer it particularly.

9. There are two different principles on which this argument is founded, viz. our idea of time, and that of memory; these therefore may be taken separately into consideration.

Time is nothing but a mere idea in our mind, or a thought created by the mind itself; therefore, to consider a period of time before the existence of our mind, is not a fact or a scientific truth; it is a position, such as that of a right line, from whence we may reason so far as the conditions of the position are preserved, and so far as properly connected with matter of fact, and no farther. Therefore, it will be just reasoning, to say that there is a period of time after death, as there is before knowledge. But this is only knowing our thoughts, and not knowing what is to happen after death. This will appear by considering; with equal justice it may be affirmed, that, as before thought and knowledge there was not time, so, if there be no end to time, there will be no end to thought and knowledge, the end of the one of these implying the end of the other reciprocally.
ciprocally. Thus, in this mode of reasoning, we learn no more, with regard to the future state of mind, than with regard to that which had preceded knowledge.

It is not meant to infinuate that the mind had been eternal, in having always known; such a position as this would revolt our conscious knowledge and reflection; for, no person capable of reasoning with any degree of accuracy but must conclude, that our knowledge, which is progressive in its nature, had a beginning, or, in other words, is not without a cause; but from thence to infer, that time was, before our knowledge, is a conclusion of a very different nature; and this not being founded immediately on matter of fact, cannot be held as a principle from whence to reason for the investigation or discovery of actual truth, that is to say, of future events.

Now, time, which is a mere conception of the mind, cannot be employed as a principle, from whence to conclude that the mind shall cease to know, unless it actually appeared that time should have an end. And, from our having it in our power to conceive time past and time to come, we have no reason to conclude that any thing actually exists besides our mind, on the one hand, which knows, conceives, and understands, and the cause or author of our mind, on the other, by which we are made to know, to reason, and to proceed in thought, which is our actual existence.

Our notion of eternity is fallacious; to suppose that flowing time had been without a beginning, is the same as to suppose that the globe of this earth, or any heavenly body, had for ever rolled in space, or had been, without having had a beginning. Space is an idea in our mind; and so is time. We have had a beginning, because we are not without a cause; but, to suppose that the cause, of that which is, had been without a cause, implies no contradiction; for, that which is considered purely as a cause, cannot without absurdity
aburdity be considered as an effect. Now, every effect must have a cause; but, cause is first in the order of things, or of our thought; consequently, it would be to transgress our knowledge, to suppose any thing preceding the cause which is general or first in existing things. In language, therefore, to express this thought, we say, that the first cause is eternal; not as having passed through a time which is supposed without any limitation a parte a ante; but as having caused our idea of time, which actually is, and which is conceived as flowing in the course of our existence.

When we consider time as flowing in an order of actual things, we think justly; for, such is the actual constitution of our mind, which exists. But when, with this conception of our own existence, we compare the existence of any thing supposed as existing in a state, or as subsisting without change, we then find a discrepancy, which leads us to suppose, either a state of time, or end of existence. But nothing is more false than this supposition of a state in nature; nothing in nature has any state or subsistence without change. We exist in nature; but, it is not in a state that we exist. The nature of our existence is a progress. But, to this progress to apply the idea of a beginning and an end, is perhaps a thought not accurate or just, in the rigid view of science. We are in time; because our being is a progress. To suppose this progress not to proceed, is to suppose an end to time; but, to suppose this end to thought, in which time only is, would be to suppose another cause in our progress, or in the constitution of our being. Now to suppose another cause in our being, or another intention in our cause, is not warranted in sound reasoning from the principles of our knowledge.

Whatever therefore may be the progress of our intellect, in which only we exist, and of which we have as yet no knowledge a parte posita, it being only in reflection that we know, it would be only in the error of our science that we should conclude an end to our being,
of which we know not the beginning, although we know that we had not been ourselves the cause of our existence. If it is so, that we have not been the cause of our existence, it must be reasonable to suppose, that it is not in our power to foresee an end to that progress which subsists independently of us; and we might just as well conclude, that, in physics, the system of the heavens and earth should fail, as that, in the system of intellect, or our existence, that which is, should not be, or that which had proceeded should proceed no more.

The supposition of our non-existence implies not necessarily any contradiction, no more than that bodies should not gravitate, or man be naturally benevolent; but, though such a supposition be not in itself absurd, it does not follow that it should be true; and it does not appear to be consistent with that which truly is. Had man himself caused his existence, he might have equally laid aside his being, and again returned to his original non-existence. The being of man is certain. If therefore it is in wisdom that man has been made to exist, why suppose that this existence should not have a purpose, or that man, in proceeding to be wise, should proceed no farther? The question therefore, in relation to man’s future existence, turns on the examination of his present progress. Is it in wisdom that the existence of man has been caused, and that the progress of his being has been ordered?—we only judge of that which is past in our knowledge; and in thus judging, we must conclude, that, whatever may have been the cause of our existence, we proceed in the order of that cause to know and to enjoy; not indeed to know without error, nor to enjoy without suffering; but to be wise in learning to correct error, and to be happy in learning wisely to avoid unnecessary suffering.

If in this design there is to be acknowledged perfect wisdom, as belonging to the cause of our existence, and if in this disposition
of things there is to be perceived nothing but benevolence in the
system of our being. By what rule of reason should we conclude,
that this system which this moment we have judged to be wise and
good, should in a moment after be not wise, or ineligible, and not
good, or not calculated for a general happiness? If, in reasoning
upon the nature of our existence, we find not data from whence we
are enabled to conclude, in that case, we should suspend our judg-
ment; but if, in reasoning with all the aid of science, we should be
satisfied, that the constitution of our being has been calculated in
wisdom and benevolence, nothing could be more unreasonable than
to suppose a change of that design; for, this is to suppose deficiency
of wisdom and benevolence, in the first cause.

Having thus seen, that, from our idea of time, no proper con-
clusion can be formed with regard to an end of mind, by reasoning
with all the light of philosophy upon the subject, our idea of me-
memory is next to be considered, in order to see how far an end to the
existence of our mind may be concluded or not, from what we know
in relation to the subject of our memory.

Our memory respects first our knowledge; and secondly our in-
tellect. These may be severally considered. With regard to the
memory of our absolute and primary knowledge, this is an action of
the mind by which a certain image or representation of its passion
is formed, or its absolute knowledge reproduced in reflection. Now
this species of memory is not a durable thing; at least, it is subject
to decay; and indeed, it is evidently not intended to be a thing that
should last always, but on the contrary that it should decay; and
the reason for this will now be made to appear.

Sensation which we have all along considered as knowledge,
and have distinguished as knowledge absolute and primary, is not
knowledge properly speaking, that is, intellectual knowledge, or
that which mankind always consider as proper knowledge; it is however first, and the proper means of that intellectual knowledge, which is the end in view when the primary knowledge or sensation is excited. Now, for this purpose, or in order to bring about this end, idea, or memory of that passion or primary knowledge, is required, and is required to be a temporary thing, or a thing necessarily decaying after it is produced, so as in the progress of knowledge it obliterates, if not properly renewed, as has already been fully shown. (Part I. Sect. VII.)

But, memory in relation to our intellect is a very different thing; our intellectual knowledge is not a thing of which we may be said to form an idea, as we do with regard to the information of sense; for, in this case of intellect, our ideas are actual knowledge, or this knowledge is the proper production of our mind. Now, though the mind in this case does not produce knowledge without a cause, yet, the cause and the effect being both in the mind itself, the intellectual knowledge is properly its own, in not being immediately or proximately derived from a first or an external cause, such as is foreign to the mind. Therefore, to call intellectual knowledge idea is perhaps an impropriety of speech, such as is apt to mislead the understanding in confounding different things; and, when this intellectual knowledge is said to be ideal, it is only hereby meant, that it is not under the immediate direction of an external cause, but must be considered as the proper action of mind proceeding on the information which it had already received, and upon the ideas which it only had learned to form, in having been passive and actuated by a first or foreign cause.

In order to understand this, it may be considered; that, as the material universe has been found to consist in moving and resorting powers, and to subsist only in our idea or thought by means of the conception of different powers and motions, so, our proper existence
will be found to consist in powers of knowing and reflecting. Thus it will appear, that we subsist in passion and in action; for, had we never known in passion, we never should have acted in discernment. But, so far as our essence is in knowledge and conscious thought, we could not be what we are, without the proper action of our mind, knowing itself by reflection as well as informed from without. Therefore, it is in activity that we subsist, that is, in thought, where there is a continual progression. This is a fact, for proof of which reference must be made to every person's reflection or experience. Let him try if he can subsist in any other manner; and let him consider if there is not a continual progress in his thought, even when he would most incline it to be fixed. Upon examination he will find, that want of recollection for the train of his thoughts is apt to persuade him, that he had fixed his thought upon a subject without change, or that he had not been thinking, when truly he had been thinking, though not in such an order or on such an object as may be again the subject of his reflection; that is to say, not upon a scientific subject, for, no other can be made the object of reflection in review. By attending properly to this, we shall find, that there is not an instant in our life without a thought, and not an instant in our thought without a change.

If our life consists in thinking, and if our mind subsists in a progression or change of thought, then, what is death?—Death, in order to be totally different from life, must be a stop to the natural progress of thought, and an end to all reflection. But what reason is there for such a conclusion?—Even since we knew or had knowledge, our intellect, which is our proper existence, has proceeded in a continual succession, or succeeded in a continual progression; this is a fact of which every conscious and reflecting mind must in reasoning become as certain as of any other whatever. But, from this fact, it is impossible to conclude that the progress, action, or change which happens in our intellect, should stop; and, there is nothing else
else in nature which, by analogy, can indicate such an event: Every thing in nature subsists in continual change; no rest or inactivity is found in any thing.

The just conclusion, therefore, from every thing which we know, is this; that things, which subsist in change and in succession, cannot of themselves cease to act, or to proceed; no more than, if they had ceased to act, can they be conceived as capable of acting themselves; this necessarily requiring a cause; in like manner as a thing acting in a continual succession must require a cause for not acting, or not continuing to be. Now, this cause of non-existence, although not impossible, does not appear, so far as we reason in relation to time and memory. Therefore, however mind, so far as it is supposed to have had a beginning, may be also conceived to have an end; and however this conception may be in argument supposed, in order to form a proposition, this does not in any degree approach it to the nature of a fact, which is to come to pass or happen; and, to believe this, or receive it as a truth, without proper evidence, would be mere superstition.

10. Our mind, which is to subsist, being thus considered as consisting of intellectual knowledge, it does not appear to be a fact, that this intellectual knowledge is in its nature necessarily decaying or obliterated. While the faculties of mind are exerted, we proceed to increase in knowledge; and, the more we proceed in this species of knowledge, the wiser we become. It is not indeed always necessary to proceed in wisdom, here, in this state, where, besides that intellectual knowledge which is the means of wisdom, there is also a continual production of real or absolute knowledge, as the means of that which is intellectual. In this present state our mind is always proceeding, but it does not always proceed equally to the end of its intention; at least this seems to be the case.

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11. Hence
11. Hence it will appear, that this life, instead of being considered as a state of probation for moral agents, should rather be considered as a state of information for beings capable of intellectual knowledge,—beings who may be more or less happy in the enjoyment of those faculties which they possess. In this view it will appear, that we have reason to expect happiness in a future state, in proportion as we make progress in our present. In proportion, therefore, as we settle our affections on intellectual instead of animal pleasure, so much the more certain we are of a future state of felicity, in thus answering the end of our present existence.

To say that an ignorant savage, or a person who takes pleasure in nothing but filling his belly, shall be as certain of a future state of felicity as one who may be truly called a philosopher, would be no less than to impute folly to nature. For, Where would be the wisdom in appointing means to a certain end, if that end may be attained without those means? Hence, the proper means to ensure enjoyment in a future state, must appear to be the doing of our duty, in following nature’s laws. Now, the law of nature, with regard to intellectual beings, is to increase in wisdom by pursuing knowledge.

12. The mind has been considered as subsisting in knowledge or the exertion of its faculties, and, therefore, as having a beginning or continuing in a progress. Now, on the supposition that the faculties of mind decay, and that knowledge, which had begun in sense, shall gradually terminate in the loss of every faculty, by having the order reversed in which these had been acquired, in that case, the intellectual mind must be considered as coming to an end with sense, and finishing with life. There are some appearances which might be apt to lead one to that supposition; some of the faculties of mind are commonly with time impaired, and sometimes evidently decay before life is at an end. Thus there is some appearance on which might be founded an argument for the termination or resolution of the
the intellectual mind, as well as an end to sense, in the system of nature. This argument will deserve examination.

If we shall suppose the intellectual mind as consisting in the faculties of sense, memory, and reason, faculties essential to the attaining of intellect; in that case, it is evident, the total decay of those faculties must imply the end of mind; but, so far as this supposition is not necessary, the argument founded on it will be inconclusive. Moreover, if it could be made to appear, that the intellectual mind may exist without those faculties which had been essential to its production, it would be reasonable to conclude, that we know no end to the existence of which we are conscious in ourselves. It will therefore be proper to examine those faculties, how far they may appear essential or not, in the existence of the intellectual mind.

Sense is a faculty essential to mind, so far as, without this mean of knowledge, we have no reason to suppose our mind should have existed. We may also conceive a certain species of mind to which sense being essential, the reasoning faculty could not act or be exerted without the immediate and continual information of the sensitive faculty. But this is not the intellectual mind in question; for, though we may allow that without sense there had been no reason; and that without reason there is no intelligence such as we suppose in the conscious mind of man, yet, we are conscious of our exerting the faculty of reason without the immediate operation of the sense, consequently, without the passion of mind which had been necessary in the production of our intellect.

Instead of the passion of mind, which is not continual, reason employs idea. But, though without sense idea could not have been, yet, being once produced, it may and does exist, for the purpose of intellect, without that sense on which it had originally depended for its existence or production. In like manner, memory and idea are
the means of knowledge; but, knowledge being by this means attained, Shall we conclude that this thing subsists in that by means of which it had been produced? with as good reason might it be maintained that the intellectual mind subsists in language; for, without language there is no reason to believe that the mind of man could or would have arrived at the degree of intellect which marks the improvement of the species in the individual; yet, language is only the mean of communicating knowledge, after it has been acquired; and, language may be taken away, without knowledge being immediately impaired.

Reason is a faculty essential to knowledge, so far as reasoning is the very progress of mind in which we know; but, Will it be thence necessarily inferred, that knowledge cannot exist without reason, or that the supreme Mind, the cause of knowledge, who necessarily exists and has designed all things, must reason in order to know? surely there is absurdity in supposing the Author of our nature, who had appointed reason as the mean of knowledge in our mind, to be under the necessity of using the same means, in order to acquire his knowledge which is absolute, is infinite, and is always. But, if knowledge is, and has always, existed in the supreme Mind without reason, a faculty appointed for the progress of the human mind in knowledge, there cannot be any inconsistency in supposing an end to reason, without an end to the existence of a mind which had necessarily employed that faculty in acquiring knowledge.

Reason is not knowledge; reason is a mean for the acquiring of knowledge in minds which are finite, that is, in minds proceeding from a state of ignorance or non-existence to a state of knowledge or of being. Reason therefore is necessary, perhaps, for the beginning or very existence of what may be properly termed mind, although there must be some species of knowledge before the faculty of reason can take place; but, however this be, we are certain that, with
with regard to finite minds which are to arrive at intellect, reason is a mean necessarily employed in order to attain that end. But if reason is only a mean of knowledge, then, in reasoning for this purpose, there must be some other faculty, besides that of reason, which in reasoning knows. Now, this knowledge may subside when the faculty of reason should be at an end. Plato, however well he reasoned, might lose that faculty either in the decay of nature or by an accident, which in relation to the mind is all the same. If, therefore, Plato ceases to reason, are we to say that Plato ceases to exist? Is not the soul of Plato the same, whether a stone shall strike the head of Plato or not? That Plato exists, however deprived of his reason, will appear by considering; Plato will be himself again so soon as the disease is removed in which he lost his reasoning power. But, the reasoning power of Plato can only be impaired by the operation of disease, whether occasioned by means of a blow, or only in the progress of his body towards death; and though, in the one case, we may see Plato the reasoner restored to his faculty, and not in the other, this makes no difference in the argument; for, in both cases, it is disease, or disorder of body, that by which the faculty of reason is lost. If, in the one case, when the reasoning faculty is lost, that which in Plato knows by reason is not in the least impaired, What reason have we to conclude that in the other case, which is perfectly similar, the knowing power of Plato is no more? Here would be an absurdity in reason, an error in our science, or the misjudging of things as being dissimilar, when they truly were the same.

13. The natural progress of mind is from ignorance to knowledge, and from an imperfect to a more perfect state; nor is there any retrogradation in this progression of a mind, no more indeed than there is in an animal body; however in both cases we may, and often do, impose upon ourselves in reasoning. Thus, for example, no body ever grows young; the natural progress is for bodies to grow old. But we, who judge old age commonly by certain appearances and decay,
decay, are apt to think that a person is become more young, in the constitution of his body, when he had recovered of some disease which had rendered him apparently more old. In like manner, the natural progress of our mind is to become more knowing; no person can unknow what he knows. We lose indeed the power of recalling ideas which have been long dispersed; but, this is not losing any progress which our mind had made. Ideas not recalled may indeed be considered as means lost for the farther progress of knowledge; but, in the natural progress of mind, ideas are only lost in proportion as others are acquired. Therefore, in this apparent decay of memory, there is no stop put to the progress of mind; and, a fortiori, no vestige of what may be termed retrogradation.

Thus it will appear, that the impairing of the faculties of mind, which occasionally happens in the course of years, is not like the impairing of the active power of an organized body, which happens necessarily in the course of nature. In the one case, the mind, a limited being, is only under conditions adverse to its further progress, or the proper employment of its faculties in order to improve in knowledge. In the other, again, the animal body, having, according to the laws of the material system, arrived at its perfection, must decline, like the sun at its meridian; not for the purpose of undoing that which had been wisely done, but for the wise, and, we hope, benevolent purpose, of conducting mind towards perfection, which is a state however at an infinite distance. Now, it is in seeing the nature of this infinite perfection, to which mind may be conceived as arriving, and in understanding the natural progress which an intellectual being makes from its first information of sense, that a rational or satisfactory judgment may be formed with regard to the final cause, or future state of mind.

14. If, in this case, we shall reason without sufficient information or knowledge of the subject, we would then philosophize erroneously.
ously or without science, might believe in superstition or without evidence, and should certainly terminate in some conclusion which, in the progress of reason, must appear inconsistent, and which, instead of enjoyment, would procure disgust. But if, from the perfect knowledge of a progress which is within our reach, we shall form just conclusions in relation to an end to which that known progress tends, then, in knowing this perfection of the intellect, as a mathematician does of the circle which he never saw, we may, in the increasing of our knowledge, improve our being or existence, and, in the improving of our mind, promote our happiness.

15. Now, if there be a state of perfection beyond human intellect, in the progress of finite minds, which seems to be a philosophic truth, and therefore a moral, though not a metaphysical principle, then, it is probable, that reason may still be employed in that higher sphere of knowledge. But, if perfect knowledge, which can require no mean, exists without the information of sense, the substitute of memory, and the means of reason, In what are we to place the nature of a being proceeding from the one extreme of ignorance and nonentity, to the other of perfect knowledge and endless existence? It is only the present state that we can know with certainty; although, in reasoning, we may be allowed to conjecture, with regard to that which has been, or that which is to be.

16. But, this present state of mind, which we know with certainty, is that of intellect; no mind can know itself but such a mind; that is to say, a mind cannot arrive at intellect except in knowing itself or its knowledge. Now, in this state of intellect, a mind may either in reason look back to that state from whence it had proceeded, which is the animal state, and which has been already largely treated of, or it may look forward to a state or sphere in which, proceeding in a similar manner, it may arrive at a degree of perfection unknown in the present state in which we reason; and then, we may be
be allowed to conjecture, in relation to the nature of that future state.

17. So far as, in the original brute state of mind, pleasure and pain had been wisely ordained for conducting to the present state, in which intellect enjoys most perfectly the knowledge of nature and the means of life, and also begins to enjoy the progress of its being, in learning to know the nature of itself and the benevolent intention of its Author, we must suppose means similar to these employed in a further progress of mind, in order to arrive at a more perfect state of knowledge and enjoyment of itself.

Thus we may with confidence affirm, that, in every future state in the progressive nature of mind, pleasure and pain, or happiness and misery, are the means employed in wisdom for attaining a certain end, which is the greater and greater perfection of knowledge and enjoyment. Here are, therefore, causes constantly operating for a general good; consequently, here is the operation of a powerful Being, who is equally benevolent as wise.

However, therefore, intellectual beings may dread pain and misery in the transgression of their Creator's laws, they have no reason to apprehend evil as an end or final cause, or any species of punishment for that which in their nature they could not avoid. Whereas, the transgression of nature's dictates subjects a sensitive being to pain, and a rational reflecting being to repentance. In this case, to form the vain hope of avoiding misery, which is appointed for the regulation of voluntary agents, (as pain is for those that are involuntary) would be no less than the absurdity, of supposing in nature that irregularity, imbecility, and folly, which are only in ourselves.

18. In a subject so far removed from the instinctive discernment of
of the animal, every conclusion may be esteemed of so much more
importance as it is procured with difficulty; an obvious truth, how-
ever useful, cannot have that estimation which is placed in the ac-
quirement. That fire, for example, will burn, and water drown an
animal, are, no doubt, truths of the highest importance. But, to
whom? These truths are of such importance only to an animal who
has the instinctive knowledge of these truths, or rather, who has
naturally the means to avoid that evil without so much as knowing
truth; and it is only to a man, an animal with science, that these
propositions are truths. But, to him, these truths are not of a high
importance; for, they are not more important than this, That two
things, severally equal to a third, are equal to each other.

There is, in the discovery of truth, a certain pleasure, which, to
be known, must be felt; at the same time, the intrinsic value of a
discovered truth lies in its use; but, it is impossible to say what may
in science be the consequence of a truth that is discovered. That
bodies, for example, are not truly coloured as they seem to be, is a
truth which required much science to discover; and, we are apt to
admire the discovery, without thinking it of much consequence;
but, this is only not observing the important consequences that may
in reasoning be deduced from that truth. In like manner, to find,
in natural things, which are conceived to be hard and solid, that
figure in hard bodies is not truly preserved as it seems to be, nor
volume in those that are solid, may, at first sight, appear to be truths
of a trivial nature; it is, however, in attending to these scientific
truths, and discovering their importance in philosophy, which treats
of matter, and establishes principles for the explanation of appear-
ances, that may be removed some inconsistencies in our philosophi-
ical opinions. As, therefore, the links of a chain are all important,
being mutually dependant on each other, so, in science, where each
proposition once demonstrated becomes a principle, no truth can be
demonstrated that is not of importance.
To know truth is far above the common use of reason, by which
the animal mind is conducted for the purpose of that system in
which it acts without error, ignorance, or knowledge of truth. The
mind that knows truth has made a step beyond the animal, and has
entered on a progress in which, not without a reasonable hope, the
man, who as an animal is mortal, may aspire to immortality, in the
enjoyment of his faculties which cannot die. Now, so far as this
view of the human intellect, or of our mind, shall be found in reason
to be just, or, so far as there is the least reason for such a conclusion,
here is a most important truth.

19. It is in this career of mind that man proceeds in approaching
to that state of existence, in which the instinctive monitors pain
and pleasure, as conductors of his animal action, and causes of his
knowledge, are no more required. Thus is formed an idea of a
future state of mind, not from knowing what is that future state;
this is a thing impossible; but in knowing what that is which, in
the present state of mind, may subsist without the immediate influence of material things. Now these things, though required in or-
der to bring about this present state of mind, are not necessarily em-
ployed in the exercise of intellect after it has been produced; con-
sequently, they may not have the same employment in a future state
of mind.

20. Here is a conclusion which is a reasonable conjecture, and
which, according to the rules of science, in order to become a truth,
would require the concurrence of some other fact, or matter of ex-
perience, by which it would be then approved. But, where shall
this be found? This is not a mathematical question, where the
truth is founded on a fact already performed in the proper action of
our mind; neither is it a case in physics, where an experiment may
be devised, and where observation may be made. In those two
cases, to conclude without the evidence which is either founded in
our instinctive knowledge, or, deduced from our observation, is to judge without science. But, when, in metaphysics, a reasonable conjecture has been formed, in judging from our knowledge, and when, in this case, more immediate evidence appears to be a thing impossible, then, though the conjectured proposition does not thus become a matter of fact, or a truth of demonstration, nevertheless, it stands still upon reason, and is thus infinitely removed from the case of an arbitrary supposition, which has no foundation in reason or in truth, such as, for example, the supposition of paradise, where the gratification of sense is to be enjoyed. This, therefore, is properly a philosophic truth: it is not a principle from whence we may reason further in order to produce science, or discover other truths, whether physical or metaphysical; for, it is an ultimate proposition, and a truth from whence we may reason in order to produce happiness.

21. The proposition here considered respecting the progress of mind in a future state, would appear to require no further approbation beyond that of being a reasonable conjecture. For, this being supposed as fully ascertained, or become an absolute truth, what conclusion would then follow beyond that which may be properly deduced from the reasonableness or probability? The absolute certainty of a future progress of mind could not serve as a principle from whence we might in reasoning advance our knowledge of the present state; because, it is only from our most perfect knowledge of the present that the future state is known. Here, then, in that supposition, there would be a superfluity in reason, or an inutility in nature. Therefore, in finding that the author of our being has denied to our nature the knowledge of that truth, we have the fullest reason to believe, that this is so ordained in wisdom and benevolence; and that, whatever be the nature of that state which is now unknown, it must be a state of as much felicity as can be judged proper for the purpose then in view; for, this is judging, from the present,
present, that which is to come; and this is all the evidence that
reason, or the nature of things, admits of in our knowledge.

22. To expect or suppose, on the one hand, the animal pleasures,
in a future state of mind subsisting in a progress of intelligence, is
to be ignorant of the animal nature; for, to what purpose give mo-
tives for action which is not then to be performed? On the other
hand, to deny the enjoyment of such a mind in the advancement of
its knowledge, is to be ignorant of the nature of this intellectual
being man, who subsists in knowledge, who, in knowing truth, re-
ceives a satisfaction that is never cloyed, and who, in proportion as
he thus enjoys, is more and more disposed for a similar enjoyment.

23. To illustrate this growing of the pleasure of truth, in a mind
disposed to receive it, the science of mathematics, which has so often
been studied merely from that pleasure, will serve for an example.
Now, what man would sacrifice an ox for the discovery of the first
mathematical truth? No man is conscious of receiving any pleasure
on that occasion; but, in the advancement of that science, after the
mind has acquired a taste for this species of knowledge, a single truth
has been esteemed worth a hecatomb.

Nor need we wonder at the enjoyment of a mind in the discovery
of truth, or contemplation of the wisdom of things; for, What is
truth; and what is mind? Is not truth the word of God, which
then is understood by man? and, Is not the essence of the human
mind the will of the Creator? If then happiness and pleasure, pro-
ceeding from the author of our nature, are for the purpose of con-
ducting us on our natural course, (in like manner as pain and misery
are also to constrain such voluntary agents in the path where they
should go), must not truth delight the mind of man in proportion as
it is perceived? and, Is not the perceiving of truth the necessary
operation of a scientific mind?
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Does not this view of human nature explain the general desire of knowledge in the mind of man, but more particularly in the mind which is once enlightened with a general scientific view of things? Is not thus also explained the distinction that may be observed of the ignorant stupidity in a mind not made for, or unacquainted with, intellectual knowledge, and the anxious misery of a reflecting mind when without the means of intellectual enjoyment? Hence the very shadow of natural instruction, such as is found in books, and on the theatre, gives so much entertainment to a part of mankind. Is not this reasoning also fully confirmed in observing the general progress and successive affections of the human mind? For, a simple mind is first entertained with sensation or mere knowledge, and with matter of fact without relation; next with the knowledge of mere history without science, then with science, and last of all philosophy. This is the natural order of those things; and, in no other order can those several things be made to follow in the human mind.

To see this, we have but to consider, that an infant who is delighted with the acts in which simple and undistinguished knowledge is received, that is, with sensible objects and unconnected matters of fact, cannot be entertained with any thing above the measure of its understanding; this is impossible. A child, again, the moment he can understand a tale, has the greatest enjoyment in that history. At this time, more abstracted science has for him no pleasure or allurement. But, after learning science, Who is it that is not charmed with philosophy? So greedily the mind pursues this pleasure, that men are led to philosophize without having sufficiently undergone the tedious operation of acquiring science. Thus they are led to form false theories, in the place of truth; and, in proceeding to reason from those theories, the intellect of man, instead of being pleased with the harmony of his thoughts, is shocked with the discord of inconsistency; instead of satisfaction which true
science gives, the inquiring mind is filled with regret, and is at last
disgusted with absurdity.

24. This view of our philosophy is a just representation, or a
proper state of human nature; and this is all we have in justice to
lament that state. But, even such a reasonable plaint as this would
only be the unadvised result of a narrow view. For, though to pro-
ceed in forming knowledge, and enlarging the power of intellect, is
an operation that may be considered as superior in relation to the
genus animal; and, though man thus appears to assert his title to a
divine origin, yet, to proceed directly in that glorious path, without
error and deviation, would be more than falls to the share of human
science, as not to proceed at all, would be less than man. Here,
then, is the natural order of human intellect; and thus pleasure and
pain, happiness and misery, are, in the wisdom of this order, made
to conduct our progress.

25. To suppose that the Author of the intellectual mind cannot
prolong the enjoyments of the growing understanding beyond a
certain period, or cannot make it know under conditions different
from those in which it first had known, is both absurd, and incon-
sistent with the truth of things; it is absurd to think that he who
made the mind to enjoy, should not be able to make it still con-
tinue to enjoy; and, it is a fact, that the intellectual mind is made to
know, and to proceed in the enjoyment of truth, without the con-
ditions which were at first indispensably necessary to its knowing.
No man, for example, could have been a mathematician without
the use of sense; but a mathematician, without the immediate em-
ployment of sense, proceeds to enjoy in the improvement of his
knowledge.

26. But, in thus acknowledging the power of continuing the
human mind beyond the period of the animal man, it may be made a
question
question if this is the will of the Creator. It must be evident, that the immediate or absolute resolution of this question cannot be founded in human science; for, where is the science that can lead to the knowledge of that which has not been in any manner or degree? Science is only an operation of the human mind founded on our knowledge; science makes us understand that which without distinction we had known instinctively; but science has no power to make us know. By means of science, the mind of man attains the wisdom of nature, in discerning the order of things; but, science is not, like sense, the organ of information, by which the knowledge of nature is revealed to the mind without any understanding. Thus it will appear, that science may make us understand a state of mind which had been known; but, as it cannot make us know, so neither can it make us understand that which is not known.

But, this question, which is not in science to resolve, may be made the subject of a philosophical inquiry, in order to understand its nature and importance. We may thus perhaps arrive at some conclusion, which, though no direct resolution of the question, in giving the absolute knowledge of a future state, may be equivalent, in procuring satisfaction to the mind in the discovery of truth. With this view, the subject may be further inquired into.

CHAP. IV.

Arguments for our belief of what is called a Future State.

1. In science, to disbelieve requires evidence, no less than to believe; that is to say, a proposition cannot be denied on no other reason besides this, that it is not proved. Let the proposition,
for example, be this, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, then, this cannot be denied in reason, \textit{i.e.} disbelieved, merely because it has not been proved. At the same time, until it is demonstrated, this proposition cannot be admitted as a scientific truth, or a principle from whence again to reason. Now, to know scientifically that there is to be a future state of mind, must have for object to know or understand what is that state which is to be. But this we only can learn from that which has already been; for, we have no power of divination; and, we have it not in our power to form an idea of a thing in relation to which we have no knowledge. A man born blind, for example, will never acquire the idea of colour; for, this is only to be known in having sight.

2. Thus it will appear, that the proper way to know the future state of mind, is to study the present state. Therefore, after every thing is known which in the present state may be attained by a scientific mind, we shall be able to form a judgment with regard to that which is to come, or to say how the mind shall act and be affected, under every condition that may happen, that is, what shall be the effect of causes, which only are known in the proper understanding of effects; for, until the relation of every event which has happened in the present state of mind, has been investigated, a person, who knows the importance of such general views, will not pretend to judge from data that are insufficient. Hence, we shall be disposed to suspend our judgment in relation to that state, in which the mind is supposed to act no more by the information of sense.

3. In not deciding what is to be the future state of mind, we do not conclude that there is to be no future state. We have already found, that, consistently with our ideas of intellect, there may be a future state of mind; seeing that, in supposing an end to sense, it does not necessarily follow, that there will be an end to mind which is already produced or informed. But, what this state is to be, is a very
very different question. Whether the mind is then to act and enjoy without any passion or information at all, or whether it is then to be informed in a new manner, different from that of sense in which it had begun to know, are questions either above our reason, or which our present state, with regard to science and intellect, is not sufficiently advanced to resolve.

4. But, without either denying a future state of mind, beyond all information of sense, and without saying precisely what that state is to be, there is another subject of inquiry; for, it may be made a question, How far it would appear that it is intended, by the Author of our being, that we should know the nature of our future state. If, in considering this question, it should appear, either that there is not any purpose for this knowledge, or that the proper purpose of this desire of the mind, longing after that knowledge, is to lead us to the study of the present state, in which we learn the wisdom and goodness of God, and thus become wise and good, then here would be observed a display of wisdom and benevolence worthy of our idea of its Author. For thus, while there is nothing done in vain, there is a proper purpose for every exertion of our intellectual powers, as well as animal faculties, in the actual production of which consists the pleasure of the animal, and the happiness of the man.

5. Thus wisdom and benevolence will appear to be united, in joining together the means and ends, the utility of the system, and the happiness of the being who, in knowing it, is made to act consistently therewith. Hence, a double source of enjoyment, first, of pleasure, and, secondly, of contemplation;—of pleasure, which is an enjoyment that properly is animal;—and of contemplation, which is the rational enjoyment of the human mind. The mind of the brute animal, which reasons for the purposes of life, reasons in necessity from the instigation of more immediate pain and pleasure, he therefore acts instinctively by the laws of nature. But, the mind
of man reasons scientifically, when he reasons voluntarily; and, when he reasons voluntarily, he reasons in order to enjoy. He therefore, besides having instinctive pleasure like the brute, has a voluntary pleasure in the exercise of reason.

6. It is only such a being as this, who reasons consciously or by choice, and not ignorantly or by necessity, that may be conceived as existing separate from life, or in pure thought, and enjoying a state of existence altogether independent of those external things by which we are now so much affected. Such an existence would proceed without having, on the one hand, the incitement of pleasure to lead to action, or, on the other, the admonition of pain to forbear: These informations of mind, by which it is conducted in its present progress, being derived immediately from sense, which, in a future state, is here supposed to be at an end.

7. The arguments which have been now employed for a future state of the human mind, will not apply to that of the animal, who is only excited to action by external motives, without forming a conscious thought, or an abstract speculation which is properly his own. There would be an absurdity in supposing the animal mind to exist, after the motives which make its faculties to act shall cease; for, this can serve no end. On the other hand, if we shall suppose that these faculties may proceed after the action of the material cause has ceased, this is to suppose that the animal mind is not what it is here represented or supposed, but that it is an intellectual being, thinking consciously, or acting from its proper motives. Now, this the human mind certainly does; at the same time, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude, that any of the brute creation arrive at such a perfect state.

If nature were to give to the animal any other faculties than the instinctive principles which are required for the conduct of his life; and
and if that animal were to have no future state for the progress of his intellect, then here would be an useless superfluity. If, again, the animal actually has no other faculties than those necessary to the economy of his life, then, to suppose a future state to that animal mind, after the purpose of it were at an end, would surely be absurd. The question, therefore, now to be resolved is this; Whether or not the animal actually has those intellectual faculties, which are unnecessary to the economy of his life?

In order to resolve that question, let us consider the fly which, allured by the smell, lays its eggs within the mass of carrion. The egg is hatched, and the maggot is sustained by the instinctive appetites of its nature in eating its food. Come to the maturity of its growth, this maggot is then locked up in a state of change, without any visible sense or action. From this vegetating state, as it may be called, the first animal is changed, and comes out another personage. He flies about, and seeks the partner of his animal economy. Instinctive passion leads them to the end of their intention, and they propagate that race which is required in the economy of this world. But, What other state can be supposed for that animal? Is he to comprehend the physical system, in judging scientifically? or, Is he to investigate the intellectual system, in pursuing the science of his proper thoughts?

It is in this manner that the animal man proceeds in this life, forming to himself an intellectual existence which becomes independent of his sensual system. Such a person then may live, when the first conditions of his sense and reason shall be at an end. Such a person then may undergo a change, which in the simple animal cannot take place.

8. We speak of a present, a past, and a future state; and, in science, this is right; for, it is thus that we distinguish in our being or existence,
existence, in like manner as in mathematics we distinguish length and breadth, &c. But, though this is in science, it is not in philosophy or perfect science, that is, the science of our science; for, this subject being examined with all the light of human reason, it will be found, that there is truly no state in our existence, no more than there is in the subsistence of a body which is conceived as of a certain magnitude and figure. Those states in the existence of things are only apparent; like the earth, which appears to be at rest in common observation, but, considered philosophically, is found to be in continual change, and never was, nor ever will be, in the same place where it had been before.

9. If we shall thus correct the inaccuracy of our way of thinking, in relation to the manner of our existence, we shall then be led to conclude, that we exist not in a state, but in a progress. In that case, therefore, the proper inquiry, for our understanding, is not either what we were before, or what we will be after life, which is considered as the present state, but what is the proper manner of our actual progress, and what is the proper end or intention of this change which is truly made. For, if we can find data from whence to reason or conclude, and if we are to be considered as voluntary agents, who have a choice in the direction of their natural progress, there may be some utility in that inquiry; and we may thus learn properly to conduct our change, so as best to arrive at or attain the end of our intention.

10. It has been shown, that we exist in knowledge; at least, it is in knowledge that our mind proceeds to change. But as, in science, or human knowledge, there is to be distinguished a progress that is true, as leading to the proper end, and another that is false, as misleading man; a science that is just, and another that is erroneous; so, if there is a proper end to be attained in that progress, it must interest us to conduct it either in the one way or the other. Consequently,
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11. We do not now seek to inquire into the proper end of the animal mind; for, this we have already fully investigated, in considering this as the beginning of intellectual knowledge. It is of the mind of man, who foresees and inquires, that we now desire to discover the proper end or intention. But, this is best understood in comparing it with the mind of the animal, which may be considered as the preceding state of that which is properly the mind of man, and of which, in its turn, we want to know the end or purpose. Now, let us see the difference of those two things which have once been separate, which are now together, and which may be further separated in a future state. For, if there be truly no essential difference between the intellect of man and the mind that is merely animal, no argument could be founded upon the nature of those things, which could lead us to conclude the one should exist when the other is at an end, that is, when it shall have produced its full effect, and is no longer necessary.

12. In the constitution of the mind which is merely animal, What is there to be observed? What is there of essence and necessity?—There is sense and perception.—Is there any more?—There is also memory and reason; to know what is salutary and noxious; in other words, to distinguish pleasure and pain, or pleasant and painful things. Not pleasure and pain the general idea, on which is founded that of good and evil, but pleasure and pain the particular, which is present passion and instinctive generalization, or assimilation (Part I. Sect. IX.). This is, at least nearly, the extent of that which is purely animal; and it is the proper foundation for that which is more than animal, in being intellectual.
This world is made for that animal oeconomy, or this is the order in which we know our existence. But the brute mind does not know any order; and therefore, it does not know this world, which we properly consider as necessary for that oeconomy. In this material system there is every mean of pleasure, and here is the perfect attainment of a limited demand, the full accomplishment of the end required. But the animal mind, which pursues pleasure in serving the end of his intention, knows not any thing of this; for, he has not, like man, the idea of ends and means. This instinctive agent knows, for, it feels pleasure and pain; it acts knowingly, or by reason, for, it pursues pleasure and avoids pain. So far it acts knowingly, reasonably, or instinctively, in contradistinction to body which we conceive to act without reason or reflection, though not without rule and perfect order.

13. The animal mind cannot act knowingly, or by means of knowledge its essential property, without reflection, which includes memory and reason. But this mind may reason in order to act, without thinking consciously in order to reason. In the one case, the instinctive faculty of reason precedes the action which is directed by knowledge. In the other, the conscious action of a mind precedes reason; and this rational faculty is then conducted by that mind which before had been conducted involuntarily by its reason. For, the mind which thinks consciously in order to form a conclusion from its knowledge, has the will to know, when it has the opportunity; and it has attained the power of producing knowledge, in a certain order, which it may also learn to know. But if this voluntary inclination, which leads the mind of man to science, is not to be found in the mere brute, then, here is the point of partition, between the mind which is purely animal, and that which proceeds to act for another purpose. Now the question may be put, What is this other purpose, which a scientific or intellectual mind, such as thinks in order to reason, is made to pursue?
14. Is this purpose pleasure?—no; this pleasure, meaning sensual, is the proper purpose of the animal reason, and is the only proper, or immediate, purpose of its action or pursuit. Sensual pleasure is never, or not immediately, the pursuit of intellect, however intellect may be occasionally employed in order to promote this pleasure. The purpose of intellect is to know, not as the animal for the means of life, or for sensual pleasure as an end, but for the sake of knowing, that is, for knowing knowledge, or for the pleasure of knowing. This pleasure, then, of knowing is perfectly different from the feeling of pleasure, which, so far as a passion, we have termed knowledge: the pleasure which I feel in eating and drinking is certainly knowledge by which I am actuated and informed, as I am by light. Now this knowledge I had once, without having any more; and then I was an animal, and no more but an animal. I then had pleasure to direct my actions, I now have principles to direct my pleasure; for I now eat and drink when I have no instinctive motive or desire; I also, from motives which are not animal, swallow medicine or poison which gives me pain; and, in like manner, I abstain from meat and drink which are within my power, not from satisfaction or disgust, but from motives which are purely intellectual. These motives may be wrong, or I may have reasoned erroneously in forming those motives, or principles for my conduct. Nevertheless, they are perfectly different from those which are animal, natural, or instinctive, which may have an end when they shall cease to affect me, but which never are wrong, as leading me necessarily into error.

15. The pleasure of the animal feeling is made to conduct the system of life, in preserving the individual and continuing the species. But, is the system of intellect for nothing? Do we observe infinite wisdom, so far as regards the means of intellect, and are we to conclude, that this divine fabric is to disappear in the resolution of a natural body, an ideal thing? Is the mind of man, which makes itself
the proper object of its operations, to be annihilated, because material things consist in change? Must this intellect, which has proceeded so far in consequence of the system of changing things, be then supposed to proceed no more, while that system of things, on which it had proceeded, may be conceived to proceed for ever? and, Is this ray of the eternal existence to be quenched, without a reason or a consequence?—We do but deceive ourselves, in putting a termination to the course of intellect; we cannot rationally form the conclusion of perfect wisdom directing the animal economy, in order to accomplish a system of intellect which is then to go for nothing. For, though we may conceive this in the possibility of imagined things, we cannot conclude that it will be so, without reasoning inconsistently with our principles, or absurdly, in supposing wisdom at the same time perfect and imperfect. Perfect wisdom does not exist without effect, and cannot effect that which would be in vain. Human wisdom may err, in undertaking a conceived end without the proper means, and also in employing means without a proper or corresponding end in view; but this is only so far as it is not perfect wisdom.

16. The system of intellect is the property of man; it is all that he has of absolute certainty, the rest being imagined in the necessary operations of his mind. If this intellectual system, therefore, has not a proper purpose, or is in nature discontinuous as ending in nothing, then, this world and we ourselves, all that we admire and all that we enjoy, have been contrived in vain, have been appointed without wisdom; for, in our apprehension, to make and to unmake, is to have acted in vain, to have conceived in folly. If the intellectual system, which is no other where than in us, shall be conceived as terminating with our thought in which it had been produced, the mind of man, who is esteemed wise, has been contrived without wisdom. But, will this be believed by people who are capable of thinking? and, shall we say, that the artist, who makes a clock to measure
measure time, knows not the order of succession, the disposition and proportion of his wheels and pinions? But, if the artist, who contrived human intellect, has contrived this in perfect wisdom, why suppose the contrary, in apprehending a foolish end to our existence? If the efficacious cause of our existence, which is that alone of which in this life we may judge immediately, is found to be in perfect wisdom, by what species of reason can folly be concluded as belonging to the final cause?

By means of sensation, we are made to perceive; by varied sensations and perceptions, we are made to reason and reflect upon our knowledge; and it is thus, in employing the faculties of our mind, that science, or the knowledge of generals, is acquired. Now, this knowledge of generals leads the understanding mind to the discovery of important truths, to the formation of wise designs, and to the pleasure of refined enjoyment. Here then is a gradual progress of the intellect; but, what a distance between sensation as the means of knowledge, and the enjoyment of that supreme pleasure which the perfection of science may procure! If there be thus a progress of mind by means of sense, but carried far beyond those faculties which had been necessarily employed as the means; and if we do not see a necessary termination to this progress, it will be reasonable to conclude, that there is no design in nature here to terminate, nor any deficiency in creative power for the continuing of this system which gives pleasure at its birth,—which, contrary to the sensual system, is made to please most in the full fruition,—and which is calculated to grow in the pleasure of enjoyment *

Bb 2

* Among other excellent arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one drawn from the perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without a possibility of ever arriving at it; which is a hint that I do not remember to have been opened and improved by others who have written on this subject, though it seems to me to carry a great weight with it. How can it enter into the thoughts of man, that the soul, which is capable

The
The end of human life is nothing but a term at which sensation, the first means of knowledge, ceases to be employed. In this view, death is only the beginning of a further existence, the institution of an immaterial, i.e. an intellectual being, and the commencement of a purer progress, in which reason may proceed without an impulse from directing passion. This is the second life; a life in which the means of the first stage become unnecessary. Perhaps even reason itself, by which in our first life the progress of our being is conducted, may, in the progress of a second life, become as useless to the improved understanding, as sensual objects to the reasoning of enlightened science.

But, where to leads this reasoning?—not to make us know what will happen to our being, in the future system of divine wisdom; but to let us understand our ignorance; to see our error, in limiting the progress of a living intellect with the caducity of a mortal frame. Visionary scenes may please in speculation, as beauty and symmetry do in contemplation; but, nothing can give satisfactory enjoyment to the human intellect except that which is in truth; and, truth is not properly in that of which we do not see the evidence. Should we build a world of conjecture, a continued system of
of life and animal enjoyment, on the baseless fabric of a temporary
being, we might entertain the fancy and delude the understanding;
but, What is this to a state of mind in which the forms and qualities
of things are useless?—Let us once be persuaded that we truly exist
in ourselves, and not within a frame of formal qualities, or depend-
ing on the imagined system of substantial forms, then, reason may
be usefully employed, inquiring what has been the final cause of
this our being, and learning, from the nature of our existence, to
judge of that efficient cause by which we are to be.

There is nothing in which we are so ignorant as the nature of
our future state. But, from this ignorance, dogmatically to conclude
a state of non-existence upon the termination of a sensual system,
is surely an absurdity which science should detect. We think that
we exist in time; the truth is, time exists in us. If time independ-
ently exists, how is it possible that it should be finished? If time,
again, does not exist without us, but is only formed in our thought,
as certainly it is, how is our existence to be changed in the duration
of ideal time, or in the course of transitory thoughts? How is a
time forming mind to finish its career, while time, endless succession,
continues to proceed? and how are we to form that thought which
shall be final, and shall not be succeeded by another thought? we
are ignorant, indeed, with regard to what may be future thoughts;
but this nevertheless is certain, that it is not on material causes that
immediately depends our thinking substance. Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to believe, that our thinking substance should continue,
when an end is put to sense; and it implies no contradiction, to
suppose that this will be. But, to suppose that infinite wisdom
should contrive a system of intellect, that were only to subliterate
that temporary thing sensation, and were to vanish with our animal
existence, is a thought without the least support in reason; for, it
is inconsistent with all other thoughts, with those at least that are
founded on the strictest truth and soundest reasoning.

Since
Since therefore we find no folly in the works of nature, nor any imperfection in the system of our mind, it is not in reason to conclude, That the human intellect, which is capable of perfecting itself and comprehending nature, should, like an ignis fatuus, shine without a purpose, and perish in the folly of a vain existence.

17. That, which is, will be; a truth which has been, or has appeared, will ever be a truth; it is equally a truth every where, and always. But, truth is the operation of intellect; and, shall we suppose truth to remain, while the intellect is to cease? we are often led into error in reasoning from our animal ideas; thus we conceive the work of a person to remain after he himself is at an end. But this proceeds from our supposing things to be, and us to know it. Whereas, things truly are not; it is only we that are; and things are only what we think them. Truth is a thought that never changes; so long as we are, truth will be. But, this cannot be said of error. Error is a thought which occasionally changes; and must change, if we proceed to think in science, or in the order of intellect.

Truth therefore, and the order of intellect, are necessarily co-existent things; and, if truth be eternal, so must be the mind of man in which this is conceived. But, if human intellect, in which truth resides, shall be supposed to cease and be no more, then, What comes of truth? It may indeed be answered, that truth has always been in the divine mind, and will there remain the same for ever. This indeed cannot be denied; but this argument is equally applicable to intellect as to truth. Therefore, the proper meaning of that expression is this; we necessarily conceive a cause for that which exists, as we cannot conceive anything to exist without a cause. Now truth exists, and so does intellect; but not independent of us, who know truth, and who reason knowingly. At the same time, we do not exist independent of our author, who is the cause of us, and of the faculties
in which we exist; and, it is only in knowing this, that we know there is, in God, both intellect and truth.

18. If in reasoning scientifically we are to judge of things above the reach of vulgar minds, and to employ our faculties upon subjects far removed from animal life, if not absolutely independent of it, let us look around us, and satisfy ourselves in the first place with regard to the perfect wisdom, displayed in that system of the world in which we conceive ourselves to be, but which more properly is conceived as being in us, we shall then entertain no doubt of human intellect being, in nature, an object of infinitely greater importance than that great system of endless bodies, which give perpetual light and heat, and which continue in motion. Even the animal mind, or lowest stage of intellectual existence, is necessarily, in our estimation, infinitely beyond anything that can be conceived of simple power and mechanism. But, human intellect is a progress of mind infinitely beyond what is necessary for all the purposes of animal life. Now, what would be this universe, so beautifully calculated for a system of living plants and animals, without that animal life for which in wisdom it is made to serve as means? Would it be any better than that chaos from which, as poets say, it sprang? What, again, would be the life of such animals, who should only look up to the sun for heat to actuate their torpid limbs, and to the moon for light to guide their annual migration?

The system of this world is doubtless great, compared with the lesser parts of which it is made up, or which it comprehends; But, could such a limited system reflect pleasure and contentment, to a Being possessed of omnipotence, and capable of nothing that is finite or imperfect? Even the mind of man, who is but a step removed from the brute, is not satisfied with this inferior order of sublunar things; he looks up with infatiable desire to the firmament;
ment; he attempts to found the extent of boundless space, to see the limit of light, and to read the book of which he only has made out a sentence; in the midst of animal enjoyment he will abstract himself, that he may seek to know the author of his knowledge, the cause of this his present existence, and the fountain of his future hope. Endless is this book of knowledge which man has been made to understand; infinite is this field of refined enjoyment which he has been made to enter; and must he then be made only to know the character, without being suffered to read the work,—only to see the means of fulfilling his desire, without being suffered to quench his thirst, in drinking at this source of intellectual delight? Must he just taste this fruit, delicious in itself and made for his enjoyment, only to regret his loss,—only to know that his desire shall not be satisfied? Consult the heart, and say if this supposed conduct is reconcilable with human equity? But, is there any other equity?—No. Justice is equally perfect, whether subordinate or supreme: from the first equation to the last, justice is unchangeable, like truth. The wisdom and power of God are infinite; because, these attributes are unmeasurable. His justice is no less unlimited; but, the infinite of equity is surely not to be unequal.

19. We are now inquiring after the proper purpose of reason, in a being who has to know knowledge; we want to see the proper object of pursuit, for a mind which thinks in science. It must be to know; for, this is the very essence of mind; but, this knowledge is not simple pleasure. Simple pleasure has only for object, to determine action according to a certain order, which is appointed in the system of sensitive beings. These beings are then conducted by the influence of external things, and informed by the passion of pleasure and pain. Is it to know bodies, or the world which is composed of those bodies?—No; for, the world or those material things are the means by which the animal mind is led to know, or
to feel pleasure; that therefore which has informed a mind, cannot, in strict science, be the subject on which the same mind has to act, in forming knowledge. These, indeed, are things which are in our reasoning generally confounded; and no wonder, for, they are both at the same time in the same person. But, by reasoning abstractly, we may separate or distinguish, in our science, these two things; and thus it has been here affirmed, That the animal faculty, which is actuated or made to exist by means of external information, cannot be that which is employed in order to analyze itself, and to know the system of these things in which it is made to act for the purpose of another system. This is the intellectual system, which takes place after the animal system, and forms this thing now discriminated from the animal part on which it is founded.

The purpose of the intellectual part of man, not being pleasure or sensual knowledge for the purpose of animal enjoyment, must be knowledge of a higher order, and an enjoyment of superior excellence; an enjoyment placed beyond the means of animal pleasure, or not immediately depending on those means. If, therefore, there is in us two distinct beings, as is here alleged, the one ingrafted on the other, and grown together though distinct; and if these have each its separate enjoyment, however also occasionally simultaneous, then, this may be made the subject of our knowledge, in the scientific reflection of our intellectual part. Now, is there not, in fact, a happiness enjoyed by a person of a cultivated mind and an enlightened understanding—a happiness not founded on the sense which gives instinctive pleasure, and a happiness independent of the brutish satisfaction of a living being? Is there not also a misery which this mind may suffer? a misery independent of the pain necessarily, and so wisely, annexed to the injury of the animal which feels.
We have now put a question which every person, who can see this argument, will answer for himself. To endeavour to demonstrate this, would betray an ignorance, which, though natural to man reasoning in science, would be inconsistent with the rules of science in which man reasons. To a person who can make himself the object of a regular reflection, there needs no argument to persuade him that he is happy when he enjoys, and miserable when he suffers. Sophistry may confound our reason or our arguments, it cannot pervert our nature, or invalidate true science; and it would be the abuse of eloquence, to employ it on a subject which may be spoken of, but which cannot be spoken; which may be in language expressed when it is known, but of which no expression of language, no definition of science, could give an understanding, if it were not known.

20. If there is such a thing as an enjoyment purely spiritual, in having no immediate dependence on sense and perception, and purely intellectual, as having in itself the principles of its rational gratification, it is here that we may fix the beginning of a mind which is not animal, and which, of consequence, is not mortal. The moment that a mind has learned to form to itself a subject of knowledge independent of sensation, and to consider this conscious operation as an object for its pursuit, and as the means of happiness or enjoyment, this agent, now exempted from material necessity, has begun a new career, in a system of conduct which may lead it to exist, independent of its former causes, its antecedent state, or its animal life.

21. The world, or external things, which had entered as the proper means, into the system of animal life, exists, for a mind which is purely intellectual, no farther than as the means of forming its ideas. So long as we live, we must respect the world, material causes,
causes, and their sensible effects; for, this is the intention of our nature, or the wise constitution of our present being. To be insensible, would be not to live; and to neglect sense, for no other reason but because it is only natural or material, would be to offend the laws of nature, and would be reasoning like a person said to be out of his senses. But, though we have a just respect for the effects of material causes, this does not hinder our entertaining a still higher respect, for those that are not material, for the effects of causes, which, instead of being temporary, natural, and material, are eternal, intellectual, and moral.

22. Now, does not this superior respect actually exist? Where is the man who can say, that he is so much of the animal, as never to have sacrificed pleasure for the enjoyment of a moral satisfaction? —That man does not exist. It is not meant to say, that man is not born a brute; it is not meant to say, that we find no brutish men; but, no man exists, or he is not man, who has no sense of moral satisfaction, who, tastes no other joy than that of sensual appetite, and brutish passion. If a man may make himself to be regarded as a brute, he surely has something that distinguishes him as a man. A person does not forfeit his title to humanity, in having those appetites and passions which belong to his animal nature; but, without something more than these, he is still a brute as he was born; and, this something, which is added to the animal, is only that which constitutes the man.

23. If this limited mind, which may be termed brute, were to be considered as the nature of man, What reason could there be to look for a flatet, or existence, beyond the death of that part by which he had been actuated, and for which only he had been made to reason? —Nothing could be more unreasonable. But, if there is in man a principle of reasoning, of existence, and enjoyment, distinctly diffe-rent
rent from the animal. What reason can there be for limiting the fate of this intellectual existence, like that of the mortal part dependent on material things? This, therefore, is not reasonable. Hence, all that we want, for the compleating of the argument, is to be satisfied that there is a principle, in man, distinctly different from that which, in the brute or animal, is informed by sense, and made to reason for the purposes of life. Now, there is nothing, in the compass of human knowledge, more certain than the existence of this principle; for, whether this argument be approved or disapproved of, there is evidently a principle which goes in quest of truth, and thus procures enjoyment independent of life, sensuality, and passion. He, therefore, who reasons upon the subject, confesses the truth of the proposed argument.

What made Leonidas devote his life at the Straits of Thermopylae? What makes a man of honour prefer death to an imputation on his virtue?—It is something which is not proper to the animal; for, it is a principle which acts in direct opposition to that of preserving life. Here, then, is a principle purely intellectual, a principle which, if properly founded, that is, not conceived in error, may, like truth, become eternal and immutable, as having no relation to any change of space or time, to any thing sensual or material. Therefore, to suppose this principle immortal, that is, independent of material things and the laws of life, contains no absurdity; to suppose it mortal, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the principles of our science. We may forget what we have thought of, but we cannot conceive our thinking principle not to think; we might as well conceive our foot not to be extended. Neither can we conceive the non-existence of that which in us is; we may as well pretend to conceive that the whole is not greater than a part. The principle of moral rectitude is in the mind; it is not in space, or time, or body. This principle is, like that of truth, unchangeable;
able; the abolition of it is inconceivable, and therefore cannot be supposed, if we have reasoned right.

If there are in the human constitution two species of existences, the one by means of sense, the other by means of intellect; and, if the one of those existences be to continue, while the other is to come to an end, it would be wise in man to esteem that species of existence which is to continue, above the other, which is only temporary. But now, instead of supposing man choosing from the known nature of his different states of existence, we may examine the constitution of the human mind, in order to judge with regard to the intention of nature respecting a future state. For, as man is endowed with a sensual and an intellectual existence, the one of which certainly comes to an end, it would be consistent with the benevolence and wisdom of nature so to form the constitution of man, as that he should prefer and esteem the enjoyment of that existence which is to continue, and that he should undervalue and despise the species of enjoyment which holds only of the temporary existence.

Here is an argument in favour of a future state which is of the greatest importance; it depends upon two principles; first, that nature is wise and benevolent; secondly, that such is the constitution of man, as actually to esteem and prefer his intellectual enjoyment, compared with his sensual pleasure. Now, with regard to the first, we must refer to the general course of nature; the second, again, is a proposition which we shall have occasion afterwards to prove, in the view we are to give of the moral system.

24. If there is thus a regular state of existence for mind in thought, independent of the motives or cause of life which is purely animal, we may now inquire into the end or final cause of this system of intellect.
As pleasure, in the animal, leads to life, so there is an enjoyment as the means of conducting intellect; and, the end is knowledge, or higher degrees of that scientific progress. Now, in the indefinite production of this series of intellectual things, do we not necessarily confound the ends and means, the enjoyment of the knowledge, and the knowledge of the enjoyment? Hence it will appear, that conscious happiness is the thing which we here inquire for: It is happiness, in an infinity of different modes; happiness, in the enjoyment of knowledge multiplied in an indefinite progression; and happiness, inseparable from the essence of existence, which is only in our knowledge.

But, happiness is necessarily contrasted with misery. What then becomes of misery, when sensual pain, like animal pleasure, is at an end? Let us endeavour to resolve this question.

25. In the system of intellect, a state of real existence, ignorance is misery. Not that species of ignorance which implies no knowledge; for, a mere negation, that which exists not, cannot be a cause for that which is to be. But the positive thing, which is here made synonymous with misery, is that conscious ignorance, which, in science, leads the mind to inconsistency and error; and which, in conscious error, leads the rational mind to seek for truth, as the source of its enjoyment. Here, therefore, misery conducts to happiness; so far as it may attain that end. This is the ignorance which necessarily begets misery in the mind which knows error, and which is capable of knowing truth; and this is the means which infinite goodness and wisdom has appointed to conduct man to an endless source of happiness, in like manner as the sense of pain is in the animal calculated for the preservation of his life. Hence, this pure intellectual system of mind, considered separate and abstractly from the material system, or that of animal life, is still a composition of happiness and misery, which, in the progress of that system, are continually
ly changing their power or their proportions; and, nothing but infinite or absolute knowledge can be considered as exempted from the influence of occasional misery.

26. If, therefore, there is a Being, of infinite power and knowledge, as the cause of our existence, a Being whose wisdom and happiness are absolute, of which ours is as it were the emanation, then, there can be no doubt of this Being having the power of producing or continuing our existence, to a state of felicity to us as yet unknown. But, to believe that the same cause, which made us to be in a system of intellect, where all conduits to happiness, should act inconsistently with himself, in forming us to misery as an end, or, to no wise end as a purpose, is, in reason, an absurdity unworthy of a man to entertain.

27. Let us now briefly state the argument, in order to comprise, as much as we can, the subject in one view.

All things, of which we have absolute knowledge, consists of two kinds; the one material and sensual, the other scientific or intellectual. In the constitution of our being, there is a sensual part, which is temporary or a finite thing, as being necessarily connected with those which are material; but this is not the part which properly constitutes man. Man is an intellectual being, who is indeed beholden to material things for his information in this life; but he does not necessarily depend upon material things, neither for the progress of his intellectual being, nor the existence of his conscious principle.

Here are two different beings, or two distinct kinds of things, which actually exist; the one material, the other intellectual. Of both those beings we have knowledge, which is perfect or undoubted; and now we may consider how far those two different beings are
are found to be both contrived equally, in respect of wisdom and benevolence; or rather, let us see what is the consequence of finding the one of these to be created upon the same principles of order, wisdom, power, and goodness, with the other.

Material beings, so far as we are able to perceive, are all contrived in perfect wisdom. They have existed as far back as it is possible for us to have a retrospect; they subsist in an order which gives us pleasure to behold; and they are preserved in a system contrived wisely for an indefinite duration. Individually they are not made to continue long beyond the perfection of their progress, to which they arrive in time, and then decay. But, the perfection of this system of things is still continued in the succession of individuals, which are all formed of the same matter, and proceed on the same principles of life and reproduction. Such is the system of things with which human intellect is immediately connected. Nothing is wanting to perfect or complete this system; there is no deficiency of wisdom in the plan, nor in the execution any want of power; and every thing is contrived in the best manner to promote the lives of individuals, and to secure the permanent prosperity of the whole.

Thus our knowledge of this part of nature, leads us to conclude the exertion of endless power, and of consummate wisdom, so far as we find a state of absolute perfection in those material beings. It also leads us to conclude a final cause, which is, the being subservient to that other species of existence with which the sensual system is, in the material life, connected.

Now, this intellectual existence is to be made the subject of examination, how far equally contrived, as the other, in power and wisdom. Here it will be proper, first, to consider the intellectual system, so far as we know, and understand the nature of that thing; and, secondly, to reason from what we know, concerning that of which
which we are absolutely ignorant. For, though we may not thus inform ourselves, in acquiring knowledge hidden from our present view, or above the reach of powers in our capacity, we may rectify the false conclusions of a hasty judgment, and correct the error of rash conjecturing man.

Nothing can appear more perfectly contrived in justice, wisdom, and benevolence, than is this intellectual being which we now examine. Man is born to wisdom; wisdom leads to pleasure and enjoyment; and this is a course of things which man necessarily arrives at, in the progress of his nature. This intellectual system, therefore, so far as it is known, appears to be contrived in all that wisdom and benevolence which is found in nature. But, of this system we do not fully see the final cause, as we do of the other; we only know the efficient cause of the intellectual system, so far as the material system is employed in its production, though not necessary to its continuance; and we cannot see an end to this system, as perhaps we cannot imagine to ourselves a final cause for the existence of this intellectual state; a state of which we are conscious in our own reflection; and a state which is undoubtedly known.

But now we are to allow imagination to proceed in relation to this subject, and to suppose an end or termination to this being, for the rearing of whom all nature is employed. Would such a supposition be reasonable on our part? or, is it consistent with the order of nature, which we have found uniformly supported in wisdom, justice, power, and goodness? Nothing is more plain than the resolution of that question. There are two systems of things now compared; the one of these is actual; and it is also perfect, as well as wise and good; the other is supposed, and it is supposed to be imperfect, consequently not contrived in perfect wisdom, or not the operation of Omnipotence. Therefore, our supposition is unreasona-

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able; or, in reasoning from the known wisdom of nature as our data, we find that such a supposition is absurd.

The supposition which we have been now endeavouring to refute, is not that of a future state of misery, but the supposition of no future state. To one who were afflicted with the thought of losing his existence, it would be no consolation to find that he had every reason to deplore the loss which he now supposes; although, to one tormented with the prospect of a future state of misery, it might perhaps be some comfort, to suppose he might not then exist. But, to a person neither apprehensive of annihilation, nor of a future state of misery and punishment, every reason for regretting the loss of life, must increase the hope of future happiness, and the confidence of meeting nothing unworthy of a man to accept, and nothing unworthy of a bounteous Creator to bestow.

28. Whatever therefore is to be the nature of our existence, beyond the limit of our present knowledge, and after the system of life shall be supposed to cease, we may be assured of this, that it will be contrived in supreme wisdom, and executed without the shadow of error. Could we wish existence upon any other conditions? Or would we desire to have our being submitted to the guidance of blind chance, to a system of absurdity, or the disorder of error without a ruling purpose? But, having the confidence of being under the disposal of perfect wisdom, we may be assured, that, as the constitution of things, which is and has been, is the best, so is the design of that which is to be. Here, therefore, is a happiness within our reach, a happiness which it is not in the power of casual things to rob us of, and a happiness which may be communicated to every rational person. But this happiness, which must be either founded in science, or in superstition, is the proper result of philosophy.

It has been shown, that science leads the mind, in the progress of intellect,
intellect, to wisdom; if, therefore, it should also appear, that the natural consequence of wisdom is philosophy; and, that the end or intention of philosophy is happiness or enjoyment, then, in whatever light our life or existence is to be considered, whether as a present state, or a continued progress, we shall have all that we can desire, in arriving at philosophy, which conduces us to our happiness. Thus we shall be satisfied, that, while curiosity leads the mind of man on all occasions to inquire, and, in the satisfaction of his intellectual progress, to increase the pleasure of his knowledge, it is only this progress of his inquiry, which leads to see the wisdom and benevolence of nature, that may procure an absolute contentment in his present state.

This subject is to be now examined, in what remains of the work, and is properly the science of morals, which leads to philosophy, or self enjoyment.
SECTION V.

Science of Moral Action, or, the Conscious Operation of a Scientific Mind.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory to the Subject.

1. We have been drawing conclusions, with regard to that which may happen in a future state, from what has already happened and is known at present. We are now to consider what influence the foresight of mankind, with regard to what will happen, has upon that action of the mind called will, by which the present conduct of a person is determined. For, if there may be observed certain rules, or laws of action, in which future events are determined; and, if these are to be properly derived from the mind itself, and not immediately from material things, this may be made a subject of science wherein moral causes will be known. Thus our wisdom may be increased, in seeing an order of eventual things, which properly belongs to the intellectual system, and which interests us much to know. This subject, therefore, is a contemplation distinctly different from that of natural philosophy, although ultimately, or in a more general view, these two subjects are found to be necessarily connected.
2. In the science of physics, our reasoning proceeds from effect to cause; the intention of the science being there to discover causes by means of effects, which are the more immediate object of our knowledge (Part II. Sect. VII.). In the science of morals, again, (a subject which is proper to the mind as respecting our opinion), it is otherwise; for here, the mind is to reason from causes, which are known, to effects, that is, to events which are to be. Therefore, the proper object of science, in this case, is to understand what effects are to happen, in consequence of causes which are known, in having been the operation of a mind which is conscious of its thoughts.

But this is only an inferior species of reasoning, or a lower sphere of science, corresponding to that which is vulgarly understood by common sense; and it requires reasoning in a higher sphere, that of perfect science or philosophy, in order to investigate the causes of those causes. But we may thus proceed, in scientific reasoning, until we arrive at something which is ultimate in relation to the subject, or in which our knowledge is absolute, and cannot be carried any higher. In that case, morals would not only be a scientific subject, which it is naturally to mankind, as necessarily importing the idea of cause and effect, but also a scientific subject known scientifically, as being distinguished in every sense, and understood in having all the evidence of which the nature of things admits.

3. As the knowledge of truth and falsehood, of judgments that are just and those that are erroneous, is necessary to the progress of that branch of science by which man becomes wise in seeing the system of nature, so the knowledge of good and evil is no less required in the progress of the moral system, which regards the happiness of man, and is founded wholly on his own opinion. But man, alone without a fellow creature, however wise in comparison with the brute, could not be a moral agent; his social passions and affections could not be called forth by sympathetic emotions; and no extent of
of reasoning could teach him how to feel the joys of social love and conscious virtue.

The judgment of another person concerning that which I think either right or wrong, true or false, is to me of the utmost importance. It is a source of information from without, from the operations of another mind. Now, though that mind be of no more authority than my own, it still must have its proper weight in my opinion, as coming from a source which is in things, and not in thought alone. Without this testimony of reality, our opinions would have nothing but the authority of a thought; and, our thought might then be in some measure like a dream. I do not mean to say that there is any thing of greater authority than the operations of our own thought, i.e. an opinion well considered, and not a transient speculation. An opinion which I had not only formed deliberately, but of which I had well examined all the principles, is an opinion which must be above all other authority in my mind. Nevertheless, an opinion of which I may be doubtful, may have its weight increased or diminished by the concurrence or the opposition of another mind. But, when I have formed a settled opinion, and when I find every other mind which is duly informed to be of the same opinion, I herein meet with an approbation which is distinctly different from my thought. In that case, I meet with the approbation of reality to an opinion of which I had no doubt; and I here meet with the approbation of my Author, or of the cause of that by which upon all occasions I am informed. Here is more than the truth of our own thought; here is the truth of nature, and the revelation of the superintending Mind.

How necessary, therefore, is society to man!—If he cannot think sufficiently for himself, he finds in society minds which think for him, and by which he is taught to think. If he thinks for himself, and knows the nature of his own thought, he finds that it is found-
ed in a source which cannot err; and he finds error only placed as a mark to lead him in the way in which he is to find the truth.

4. Willing is no less necessary to man, as a moral agent, than is knowing; and, in order to arrive at the philosophy of morals, man must know the nature of his will, in analyzing that faculty which, in the commerce of his species, he had learned wisely to govern.

That all mankind believe their will to be free actually, or in fact, notwithstanding the reasoning of speculative men, must appear by considering: If will or volition be conceived in the manner of physical events, with which it is either more or less immediately connected, and this volition be supposed necessarily to flow in that order of eventual things which we are made to know a posteriori, as depending on a foreign cause, then man could not be made to think himself responsible for what he did in consequence of his will, which had been determined in the necessity of things foreign to the mind, therefore, no more his own than is the weight of his body, for which he is not responsible. But, every man, or every animal of the human species who deserves that name, considers both himself and others as being always more or less responsible for their actions, that is, for those that are determined by their will, however little they think upon the subject, and whatever conclusions they may be led to in their abstract reasoning. Consequently, no truth more certain than this, that there is naturally in the mind of man such a notion as freedom in our will.

This notion may be now examined, in tracing that opinion to its proper source, not with the intention of showing that the will is not truly free, as it is thought to be, but in order to understand in what sense a will may be considered as either free or not free; and thus to understand the common sense or opinion of mankind in relation to
to this subject of free will and voluntary action, for which they are always considered as being accountable in reflection.

5. In debating the subject of free will and necessity, philosophers have not brought it to that conclusion which science requires in order to command belief; and thus they remain, on both sides, as they began, each in his own opinion. Such is the case with Dr Priestly and Dr Price, who endeavoured to convince each other to no effect. Such is the case with the late David Hume and Dr Gregory, the most estimable of men, though differing thus in opinion. Nothing can better illustrate the state of science, in relation to this controversy, than this last attack. I shall therefore now examine it.

Dr Gregory wants to show, that the motives, by which voluntary agents are determined in their actions, obey laws different from those observed with regard to physical causes. Mr Hume having alleged, that motive and action, like cause and effect, were always conjoined; this is the proposition which Dr Gregory, in his Philosophical and Literary Essays, means to disprove.

It is acknowledged, I believe on all hands, that those two things, viz. motives which affect the mind, and causes which produce motion, are perfectly different; as also, that there is the greatest analogy between them, whenever they may be with propriety compared. The only question is, How far they may be always compared; or how far, in generalising those two kinds of causes, they may be brought under one law.

One thing is evident, that the subject has not as yet been scientifically discussed, so as to procure conviction; for, Dr Priestly and Dr Gregory zealously embrace opposite opinions in relation to that subject; and it will not be alleged, that these gentlemen want either acuteness
acuteness to see the force of reason, or candour to acknowledge it, when they should perceive the truth.

But Dr Gregory thinks he has brought the argument to the test of experiment, and thus obtained a demonstration. I am far from thinking that this is the case; and I will now give my reason for being of that opinion. I do not mean here to enter into the dispute between the doctrines of free will and necessity; I am only to endeavour to show, that Dr Gregory's proposition is nowhere calculated to determine the dispute, as he thinks it is; and that, on the contrary, it implies an argument which may, perhaps, be employed against that side of the question which the mathematical proposition is intended to support.

The two things, in this case, to be compared, are physical and metaphysical motives; and the question is, if the metaphysical motive be always conjoined with its action or proper effect, as is acknowledged to be the case with the physical motive, commonly called the cause, which is always conjoined with its proper effect? In order to make this the subject of experiment, Dr Gregory proposes a case, in which a metaphysical motive is to be applied, and a physical effect is to be the subject of observation, in order to see if the motive he conjoined with its proper action as an effect. I am now to state my objections to this method of proceeding in metaphysical investigation.

If we are to judge of a motive, to see if it be conjoined or not with its proper action as an effect, we must know and examine that action, in order to determine whether or not it has truly taken place. But we are not to go to a physical effect, in order to judge how far this effect, in following a metaphysical action as its cause, shall demonstrate whether the action properly belonging to the motive had followed it or not; it is only the effect of that action, and
not the action itself, that may appear to us, who are not in the mind
to which the motive is applied; and this effect is only implied, by
inference in our reasoning, as having followed in a certain train of
events, which we are by this means led to perceive.

A metaphysical motive operates in the judgment of the mind; and
the effect of this motive is upon the will; it is not upon the body,
that is, not immediately. But, in the case proposed, the effect to be
observed is in a physical body. It is true, indeed, that this body is
to be moved by the mind to which the motive had been applied;
but, it is to be moved by the will, which, again, is to be influenced
by the motive; and now the only question is, with regard to that in-
fluence, How far it is proper to the motive, as always following it?

In Dr Gregory’s proposition, the offer of the reward may have
had its proper action or effect upon the will of the porter, as I be-
lieve it would; and, the porter may have been, consequently, will-
ing to fulfil the conditions prescribed, in order to gain the fee. Let
us suppose that he were willing to gain the double fee, by being in
two places at the same time, for in no other way can he obey the
two motives; How are we to know this?—Not surely by looking
at the motion of his body, as Dr Gregory proposes, when he reasons
upon the principles of body moved by impulse; for, metaphysical
motive, which affect the mind, have no impulsive power upon bo-
dy, so as to make it, like a billiard ball impelled by two forces acting
at a right angle, move in the diagonal. Here, the mathematical pro-
position will not at all apply. The motives are applied to the por-
ter’s mind, and they are to have an effect upon his will, through the
means also of his judgment. His will being thus influenced, he
judges again, how far the means are in his power, to attain the end
or object of his desire. It is not until this point is fully settled in
his judgment, that the porter’s mind begins to actuate his body,
which is to be the object of our observation according to the reasoning of this author.

It is only by conscious reflection that we can know if the proper action, or effect of a metaphysical motive, has been conjoined with its cause, that is to say, whether the motive has had its usual influence on the will. We indeed often judge of other people, in such cases, by the physical actions which follow or take effect from the will of the person. This is the only way we have to judge of a mind with which we can have no immediate communication. Now, though a wise person may thus judge often right, he cannot do so always; because, he has not always proper data whereon to form a judgment. It is only by supposing motives regularly conjoined with their actions or effects, that an intelligent mind is to form a judgment, from the sensible or perceptible effects, what had been the cause, or conversely, from a known or supposed cause, what will be the actual effect.

But, from the very proposition here made, of trying the metaphysical question by the observed or physical effect, it is plain, that there is implied the acknowledgment of this truth as a principle, viz. that there is a known rule for judging of the influence of motives; otherwise, why propose an experiment? Without knowing the rule of gravitation, for example, our astronomer could not have been sent to Sheehallion, in order to try if the pendulum gravitated to the mountain. In like manner, without knowing the rule or order of metaphysical causes and effects, we cannot propose an experiment to try if that order be observed; for, nothing can be learned, or no reasoning proceed, from disorder. But, the confessing such an order implies the necessary connection, or natural succession, of those things.

When, therefore, that case is proposed, of trying the influence of motives
motives upon a person's mind, this is to presume, that every human mind, entertaining the same sentiments, and under the same circumstances, would act in the same manner. But, before this experiment can be fairly made, we must be able to command those sentiments and those circumstances; and this, in the proposed experiment, is not in our power; we may indeed suppose them; but then the conclusion will be properly our own opinion, and not the information of nature.

The case being thus stated, I may be allowed to observe, that this contest of men well qualified to investigate nature and judge of causes, which is the object of philosophy, affords the best presumption that both parties are equally right, although neither of them have reached the truth; and that they have both sought it in different directions. This may be easily explained by considering, that things are either absolute or relative, and that those reasoning men have not sufficiently distinguished their ideas of freedom and necessity. If, therefore, absolute freedom on the one side, and absolute necessity on the other, have been employed in reasoning, when another idea should have been distinguished, in that case, the reasoning of neither party can convert the other; and, in order to come at truth, they must each depart from their particular opinions.

6. If, in the knowledge of morals, which is considered as proper to mankind in general, our will is to be viewed as a cause of which we have immediate knowledge, or which we know a priori, without judging from effects, which are only known a posteriori; and, if to this known cause there is to be ascribed an effect, a thing which has not happened as yet, then, there is no other way in which the mind may know a future event, except in reasoning scientifically, or judging from general principles, acquired in the analytical or abstracting operations of the human intellect. It is thus that a scientific mind (a subject already explained) is made to form a conscientious opinion,
nion, which serves as a principle for its judging upon other occasions. Therefore, morality is that science, with regard to happiness, in which a mind forms opinions from its former knowledge; and it is that system in which mind determines conscientiously its present action, in foreseeing future events, by which its happiness or misery is to be affected.

7. When we contemplate nature, not as subsisting in permanency, or as a thing inert, but as a series of events flowing in time, and proceeding in an order of design, from whence we are made to form the abstract conceptions of ends and means, of causes and effects, we then necessarily consider our will, of which we are conscious, as standing in the relation of cause to many things which happen. This view of nature and ourselves requires no high degree of science, such as is requisite in order to discover the general or first cause of will, and to understand the general or ultimate effect of willing. The particular motives of animal conduct, and the more immediate effects of will, are evident to every observer; but, when we come to generalise, and inquire into the cause of will in general, or that which must be found original and efficient in every will, here, though the subject may be plain, yet, being in a higher order of science and abstraction, it is impossible to bring it to the ordinary capacity of mankind, who, judging in the manner of common sense, have, in order to conduct themselves properly, neither occasion in their morals, nor principles in their science, to investigate the source of will, a subject which has occasioned so much argument among philosophers.

Being now about to enter into the most minute discussion of this subject, with a view to explain the morals of mankind, it will be necessary to proceed on principles which shall have been generalised to the ultimate according to the rules of science, or to that which is instinctive in our knowledge, as it is proposed to found our morals on the wisdom of nature, and not on the caprice of man.

But,
But, before entering upon the subject of moral principles, it may be proper to take a view of moral agents; to distinguish these as differing from another species of agent, with which they are connected; and to see the proper end or purpose of the science of morality.

**CHAP. II.**

*Concerning Free-Will and Moral Agents.*

1. The general opinion of mankind, concerning moral action, is founded upon a notion of free will; it is not upon necessity, which, on the other hand, is considered as the determiner of physical action. The action, for example, of light upon my mind, by which the sense of colour is made known, is a physical action, and exists or happens in necessity; but my will to open or shut my eyes, with the design of admitting or excluding the light, is not a physical action; for, if it be, then there is no other action besides what is physical. In that case, it would be absurd to make the distinction of physical and moral causes, of freedom and necessity; and then the decree of a Roman senate, which has generally been esteemed wise, would be as necessary and eventual as the ebbing and flowing of the tide, or the force and the direction of the mind. Now here, at least apparently, is an absurdity; and it requires to be explained, why the action of the senate is thought wise, while the change of the wind is only casual, or why the descent of heavy bodies is thought to be in necessity, while the opening and shutting of my eyes, to be from choice.

2. That this distinction is not frivolous will further appear by considering;
fidering; in the case now given, no doubt the action of opening
and shutting the eyes is physical; it also often proceeds from a phy-
sical cause, in which case, it is evident, the action happens from the
necessity of things; but, it does not always happen from this cause,
for it may either happen without the will having any part in the
transaction, or it may happen purely from the will as a motive.
The first time, for example, that the eye of the animal was opened
and received light, this action did not follow the same cause that
makes the soldier, in his tent, look out to see if day begins to dawn.
Now, when the cause is voluntary, it may be properly opposed, not
only in idea or in terms, to that which is physical or involuntary,
but also in fact the voluntary cause may be opposed by that which
is physical, in like manner as the physical or instinctive cause of ac-
tion may be and often is opposed and overcome by that which is al-
together voluntary, consequently in no way physical or instinctive,
an example of which has already been given. (Part II. Sect. XIII,
chap. 5.)

Now, if those two causes, distinguished as physical and moral or
as necessity and choice, may be properly opposed, they must be dif-
f erent, and cannot without a manifest absurdity in our reasoning, be
confounded. This difference, therefore, may be made the subject
of examination, in order to investigate the nature and understand the
distinction of those several things,—the laws of nature, and the will
of man,—the necessity of physical events, and the choice of volun-
tary agents.

3. Some define liberty, as being a power to act. Now doubtless,
liberty of action is a power to act: But, in like manner, liberty, in
relation to volition, must be a power to will. That we have such a
power, no body will dispute; or, if they do, this would be only in
sophistry to pervert the use of terms; for, no reasoning can affect
our conscientiousness, or persuade a person that he has not what he
knows
knows he has. I have, for example, a conscious will to move; neither will any body dispute that I have in certain circumstances a power to execute or effect that which, in so willing, I had intended. In this case, therefore, I am at liberty at least in that respect; and, if I cannot execute that intention, I am not then at liberty in acting, although I had the power or liberty to will.

4. Willing is therefore an action of the mind which is necessarily considered as coming to pass in time, and therefore placed in that general series of events in which scientific minds distinguish the relation of cause and that of effect. Hence a question may be formed with regard to our will, whether it should be considered as standing in one or other of these different relations. Now if, on the one hand, it shall be considered as a cause, and only as a cause, then, here is absolute free will and perfect liberty, without any thing that may be any way constructed as necessity; for, this cause, which actuates, is in the mind or being which is considered as willing. If, on the other hand, this will is considered merely as an effect, and as proceeding from a cause which is not in that person, but is foreign to the mind which will, then, here would be necessity without any thing that might be constructed as liberty in willing. Indeed neither the one nor the other of these two suppositions is true in fact; because, our will is an effect, in having followed a cause; and it is a cause, in determining an action which is only to follow upon that event. It is not therefore as being simply either a cause or an effect, that this question, with regard to the freedom or necessity of our will, is to be resolved; we must go higher in our inquiry, so as to discover the nature of that cause from which our will, as an effect, has flowed.

If this cause be extrinsic in relation to the mind that wills, and independent of that mind which has the power of forming conscious judgments, then, in being actuated by such a cause, the mind, as has already
already been observed, would will without the least pretence to freedom in its choice; and this would come to pass, like every physical event, purely in necessity. If again, the cause which we are now considering, instead of being extrinsic in relation to the thinking being, shall be supposed as flowing properly from the operations of the mind itself, then here would be a cause in which volition would not proceed from a physical necessity; and, however necessarily following these operations which are formed in thought, this volition would be of a different nature from those which depended more immediately upon a foreign cause.

Our will is not to be considered as an absolute or independent cause; therefore, we are to inquire after that action or event to which our will has followed as an effect. If this event be the immediate action of a foreign cause, then our will, being the necessary consequence of a physical event, would, in being the cause of another physical event, be properly considered as altogether in necessity; and the term freedom would then be improperly applied to this cause. But if, on the other hand, it can be shown, that the action or event, to which our will, in the case of moral action, follows immediately as an effect, is not a foreign action, but that of the mind itself, then, though that action be not original, or to be considered as the first cause from which that series of events descends, yet, being in the person or proper to the mind which wills, this mind cannot be considered as immediately controlled in its willing by any foreign power.

If this, therefore, shall be proved, as it is proposed, it will appear, that it cannot be said, either on the one hand, that a conscious being acting deliberately has not a free will, nor, on the other, that a subordinate mind can will without the influence of motives, which ultimately are derived from an overruling being or external cause.
Thus the subject will be properly discussed, in having the evidence of science, in which all dispute ends.

6. But, before we can reason properly with regard to things or thoughts, we should understand the terms employed. Liberty and necessity, when applied to abstract ideas, have not a meaning that is direct, having been borrowed from cases in life, where voluntary agents are either constrained to act and suffer against their inclination, or where they are under no such restraint. In this last case, they are said to be at liberty, as in the first they are said to be under a necessity. These terms therefore of liberty and necessity, when applied to beings which have will, mean nothing more than voluntary and involuntary, or the acting and suffering of those beings either with their will and inclination or without it.

7. Thus it will appear, that those terms liberty and necessity, cannot apply to the abstract idea of will, without being explained; for, what would be the meaning of a voluntary will, or a will that is involuntary? The terms liberty and necessity, in this case, are the same respectively as those of voluntary and involuntary. When therefore a question is formed concerning our will, whether it be in liberty or necessity, this question must regard the author of our will; for, it cannot with propriety be demanded, if our will be in liberty or necessity in relation to ourselves, that is, if we will our will. But such a question as that respecting the author of our will, would properly be inquiring concerning the nature of that cause by which our will had been produced or come to pass. Now, to inquire concerning the cause of our will is not supposing our will to be either in liberty or in necessity; it is only supposing that our will is not without a cause; and to inquire concerning the cause or nature of our will, belongs to a higher sphere in science than that of natural knowledge, and can only be resolved scientifically in that metaphysical in-
vestigation of our knowledge by which the nature or constitution of the mind is understood.

3. If therefore we have been successful in the metaphysical investigation already made, it will appear, that animal action, which has been distinguished as either instinctive on the one hand or as conscious on the other, must be considered as either involuntary or voluntary. Not as meaning by involuntary that the effect had been produced without the action of mind, for then it would not be animal action; nor that voluntary action implies the acting of mind without a cause; but that, in the one case, mind acts without knowing that it acts, and, in the other, that the mind, before it acts, knows that it is to act, or is conscious of an intention, which it is not in the case of involuntary action.

9. This being allowed, are we to say that in both those cases the agent has a will?—If, on the one hand, the agent which acts involuntary has a will, then here would be an absurdity in expression; for, why say that an agent acts involuntarily when it acts by will. Such an action, instead of being termed involuntary should be called unconscious; and, an agent which has on the contrary acted voluntarily, should be termed a conscious agent. Thus confusion would be avoided in our discourse, as well as disputation in our reasoning. But, on the other hand, if the involuntary agent shall be supposed to act without will, as will is not in this case necessary unless will and mind are terms synonymous, then, it may be made the subject of inquiry, how a mind, which may act and suffer without will, comes to acquire this will, which every animal must be considered as having been once without. This is now to be examined.

10. Mind is considered as a thing which knows, in sense. If, therefore, such a being, in consequence of this simple knowledge,
without any further operation proper to a mind, or proper to a mind knowing conscientiously as we do, shall be supposed as acting necessarily in a certain manner under that condition of sensation, here would be an action of mere necessity without any thing in it that might be constructed as liberty; particularly, it could not be termed voluntary as having proceeded in any manner or degree from will, although at the same time the action is supposed to be that of a sensitive being or a mind.

Now we may be assured in reason, although we cannot be conscious of such a transaction, that every finite mind has once acted in this very manner; for, sensation alone cannot form mind, which must act under these conditions; and action and passion are things in their nature perfectly different. The first time, therefore, that mind acts under such conditions, it must act in mere necessity.

But this Being is endued with memory, that is, instinctive memory which is essential to mind. (Part I. Sect. VII. Chap. 3.) Therefore when this mind acts in consequence of suffering a second time, it does not act under the same conditions, in all respects, as at first, when it could have no idea. Consequently, although this mind shall act necessarily in a certain manner, having nothing that may be considered as choice, yet, in the action of this mind, which has idea as well as sense, there is one condition which is not altogether external or foreign to itself. Therefore, this action is so far removed from mere necessity, which is considered as actuating material things, and which was supposed as only actuating the beginning mind.

It is not necessary to trace every step of mind, in order to conclude that a conscious being, such as man, must have proceeded from a state of mere necessity, to one in which it then acts from choice. For this purpose, it will be sufficient to have shown, first, that a mind may act, or must have acted, under conditions different from
from those of material things, or mere necessity, although it had not, at that time, any thing that may be termed voluntary in its action, or had not as yet attained the power of volition as a cause of action.

Secondly, it will be further required to shew, that such a mind may still make another step in proceeding towards will; where, although something may be acknowledged as a will, it is not a will acting in such freedom or conscious choice, as to entitle this being to responsibility for its conduct, or to the happiness and misery of a reflecting person who knows the relation of his motives and his conduct. This, therefore, now remains to be made out, in showing that there are not only such beings as those reflecting persons, which is a thing that requires no demonstration, but that there are also beings which act from will, without having arrived at such a perfection of mind, or progress of intellect, as may be termed a moral agent. It is in seeing this order of things intellectual, that we shall understand the nature of mind, a being which wills; a being which may either act consciously or unconsciously, and may reason either knowingly or instinctively; therefore, a being which may be considered as acting either in a voluntary or involuntary manner, these terms being then understood in knowing the things to which they are respectively applied.

12. When a mind acts so as to connect in thought knowledge which is naturally separate, or different events that have happened, and so to form an idea which shall afterwards influence its proper action or future conduct, here is a sentimental motive, instead of one that is physical, such as had first influenced the mind in procuring knowledge. The action, however, which proceeds from this secondary or sentimental feeling, when it happens, is not considered as a moral action; neither is it a physical action, such as, for example, the descent of a heavy body, or the effect of light upon our senses. Now, the want of a proper term for this species of action,
tion, would not imply that it is necessarily confounded, on the one hand, with physical, or, on the other, with moral action. But, in order to avoid this confusion, it might be called first an _intrinsic_ action, a term which denotes the proper action of a mind, and not of a material thing; and, secondly, an _intrinsic sentimental_ action, by which it will be discriminated from that which proceeds upon conscious sentiment leading to moral action.

But between those two extremes, of physical and moral action, there may be interposed many steps in mind, more perhaps than we are able to perceive; it will, however, be easy to distinguish some of them. For this purpose, let us divide the animal or unconscious actions into two sorts; first, those that are merely instinctive, and over which the ideas of the animal mind have but little power. Such are those actions of the mind which determine vital motions; these are but little affected by the imagination of the animal; whereas the voluntary animal actions, as they may be termed, such as the muscular action of their feet and wings, &c. though originally instinctive, are also subjected to the influence of the animal volition, which is again determined by the ideas of his mind, (Part I. Sect. VI.). Secondly, those that are sentimental, in not being immediately directed by the sense or passionate feeling of the animal, but secondarily, in having been associated with those which were directed by the immediate feeling of pain and pleasure. Now, under those two sorts will be included all the actions of animal mind which are not conscious, but instinctive.

13. Such instinctive actions the mind of the mere animal has; for, these animals know again an object which had before either pleased or offended them. Now, in this respect, the brute, who thus determines his conduct by his knowledge, may be said to have a will by which he is conducted, or by which his actions are immediately determined, on many occasions, when he is not under the immediate
immediate influence of pain or pleasure, the original cause of sentimental feelings.

14. But a moral action, besides the instinctive knowledge of the animal, requires that the mind should be conscious of its acting, and of having a foreknowledge of the end to which that action leads; here then is an action that is judged scientifically in relation to some abstract general principle, which had been formed in that mind, such as good and evil, right and wrong, true and false. Without this knowledge and scientific operation of the intellect, the term moral cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a mind which acts from that species of will considered as arising from its sentimental knowledge; for, no person is considered as capable of moral and immoral action who cannot judge thus scientifically from principle.

15. Thus it will appear, that the animal has a will which is not free in the same sense as that of moral agents, seeing the will of that animal had no conscious action in the forming of the motive by which it is determined afterwards in willing; that is to say, the mind had not acted consciously in forming that sentimental motive by which it is conducted in its voluntary action. But a conscious person, who voluntarily forms a principle, or knowingly receives one from another person, by which he is to judge and regulate his future will, such a mind acquires a will, which might be termed voluntary, were it not for the impropriety of speech, but which more properly is conscious and scientific in opposition to instinctive. This may be illustrated.

16. Suppose a person to be in a burning ship at sea, where he has no choice but either to be burned or drowned. In this case, there is properly no moral action; and, in such a situation, the greatest philosopher must be considered as acting from the natural motive of least pain, like any other animal; unless we consider him as reasoning...
ing scientifi\textit{cally}, and judging, on the one hand, that there may be a possibility of his escaping death by means of the sea; or that, on the other, having an opinion concerning the most easy of the two kinds of death, which he thinks is unavoidable, he makes a choice of that which he judges to be best. In those two cases, he would act morally. But if, like an animal, he stays until the pain of burning necessarily determines his choice or action, then this cannot be called a moral action, for it is altogether natural. Not as meaning that the distinction of moral action is to be unnatural; for, a moral action is natural, as necessarily following conscious intellect; but, as an action, it is more than natural, in having proceeded from reasoning upon scientific, general, or abstract speculations, as well as upon those that are not so, being only the knowledge natural to the animal.

17. Animals, which reason in relation to known things, act from motives which are called reasons, and therefore may be said to act voluntarily; but not with free will, so far as the motive is not properly their own. But, as those motives or reasons, by which animal action, or the will of natural agents, is determined, may be either particular, as being the effect of the present judgment, or general, as being a conclusion from a principle which had been formed in the mind, and then respected many things, it is only scientific minds, which abstract in idea, and generalise in reason, that are capable of forming general motives, principles, or reasons, for their conduct.

Now, it is only so far as those minds have formed such principles, and reasoned conscientiously in relation to their actions, that they are to be considered as properly responsible for their conduct, after willing. Because, not to will according to their own principles, whether formed by themselves, or only adopted, is to transgress a law which they have acknowledged; and, to transgress an acknowledged law, is an offence to knowledge, or to the constitution of mind which
which subsists in knowledge. Thus they have either, on the one hand, an approbation and happy reflection upon their conduct, in considering its motives and their principles which agree; or, on the other hand, a disapprobation and miserable reflection upon their conduct, as having transgressed their principles. This misery, or unfitness of mind, is underlaid by the term repentance.

No person, therefore, who forms a principle, or who receives a principle in acknowledging it, can transgress that principle knowingly, without feeling that he has done wrong, or, in not transgressing it, feeling that he has done right. Now, a will is only free, so far as it has proceeded upon that conscious rule as a motive for its action; and this action then is moral.

A free agent is not a person who governs himself independently of the system of intellectual things in which he is placed; but it is one who, in the progress of his intellect, has obtained the government of his animal affections, so as not to be determined by them in opposition to the dictates of his conscience, that is, of his moral principle. Now, so far as he governs himself by those rules, he acts in wisdom, or according to the intention of his author, who had formed him for being a moral agent; and, in that case, the actions of that person may be foreknown or predicted by intelligence, in like manner as the physical events which proceed from the inviolable laws of matter. But, so far as he is not wise enough to govern his actions or volitions by the moral principle which he has either formed or adopted, he so far acts upon another principle, which is either founded in folly, or directed merely by his animal affections. In this last case, his animal affections being in the order of the system, or in wisdom, the actions which spring from them may be known, or traced in the general order of events; but folly having no order, at least having only an order which is indefinite, conse-
quently not known to us, it is not always possible for us to trace the motives of a foolish action.

When, for example, a moral principle, and an animal motive, are in competition, a wise man knows how to value these respectively, consequently to act with propriety in choosing to follow the motive which should prevail; but, if that person be ignorant or foolish, it is impossible for a wise man to foretell his conduct, as he knows not the measure of that ignorance or folly by which the proper conduct of a moral agent would otherwise be determined as certainly as a heavy body is in falling by its weight.

This reasoning, it may be observed, is founded upon a truth, which will be made to appear in tracing the principles of the moral system, viz. that wisdom is a science, (which has been already shown), and that the principles of morality are strictly conform to wisdom. This is the very subject in the pursuit of which we are now engaged. Our present object is to see the nature of a free or moral agent, in distinguishing a person acting from that principle, and the animal, who, as he has not the capacity of forming a general principle or motive for this future conduct, cannot be considered as ever acting from free will, or from a moral principle.

18. Thus it may appear, that the will of man is free; not as being independent of a divine power or necessary conductor; but as having, in that natural order of things which is considered as the result of design, judged in relation to abstract thoughts, and formed scientific conclusions, as general principles in conscious or moral reasoning. His will is then determined by that conscious reasoning, and may in that case be said to be determined by himself. His will, therefore, is free or voluntary in the most perfect sense, a sense in which that term cannot properly apply in the will of brutes.
We are, indeed, apt to judge of brute animals from what we are conscious in ourselves, and thus to suppose that they have a conscious intention in what they do; and therefore, that they reason scientifically in forming such general principles, like mankind, from what has already happened, by which opinion the conscious intention of those animals in acting is directed. But nothing is more fallacious than those analogical suppositions; and though, in some cases, some animals show certain signs of consciousness and scientific reasoning, which may perhaps be difficult to explain from the theory of instinctive reasoning which has been laid down, this is only to say that the subject is not perfectly investigated. For it must be considered, that this only happens in some very particular cases, which are doubtful; and that there is the most evident distinction between the general conduct of brutes and that of men, the one determined immediately by their physical passions and their sentimental feelings or associated ideas, the other by their moral thoughts of right and wrong, good and evil, &c.; that is to say, by their scientific opinions, as well as by those motives which as animals they have in common with the brute.

19. The brute is blindly incited to action, or determined, by the motives of pain, pleasure, fear, and expectation. He has no choice in the part that he has to pursue,—not for want of sentimental motives, which he may have as well as man, but because he does not consider among those motives that one which he shall suffer to prevail; and, without this conscious deliberation, there can be no choice, at least not a choice that may be properly esteemed free.

Now, it is not the physical prevalence of the strongest motive which, in this case of conscious election, is to be considered as determining the action which is to follow, or the will of the moral agent. That indeed, is the case with the brute, who does not will from choice. But, in man, it is otherwise; he considers the several
several motives for his conduct,—not in order to know which is most pleasing, (for, this the brute does equally without deliberation), but to know which of these is best, i. e. will lead to what will be most pleasing in his future feeling; in him therefore it is an abstract general principle which here determines his choice; and, this principle must have been the creature of his mind. His will, therefore, being regulated by this principle, which was his own production, must be considered as his own, and not the will of any other being.

Is not this the light in which the subject is viewed by mankind?—A person is not blamed for his principle, if it was necessarily that the principle had been acquired. A young man, for example, is not blamed for the principle which he had acquired by means of the education given him by his parents; he is only blamed for not acting up to the principle which he had thus necessarily acquired. But in like manner, as he has a conscious or free will in relation to his necessary principle, a person arrived at wisdom, may have a conscious will, in approving of the principle; in which case he will be equally blamed for acting according to a wrong principle; that is to say, a man is not blamed for refusing to approve of a principle which he thinks wrong, but for transgressing a principle of which he has approved.

20. Hence the general opinion of mankind, judging in the manner of common sense with regard to the freedom of their will, is confirmed in the abstract reasoning of metaphysics, when the nature of that thing, or the subject of will is properly investigated. And thus, on the one hand, the absurdity of bringing necessity or predestination into a moral system may be easily exposed, while, on the other hand, the will of man considered physically, that is, as an event which comes to pass in a system of natural things, is evidently caused by something which is not itself. Therefore, in this last respect,
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respect, a will is to be considered as in necessity, as much as light is, in following its proper course.

But, with regard to moral agents, this necessity only respects the immediate cause of that person's will; and this is his knowledge or judgment, according to which he wills necessarily. This knowledge however, by which the will of man as a free agent is determined, must not be confounded with the knowledge of a brute mind, as is so frequently done; it is the proper scientific knowledge of that person man, which is always considered as his own; consequently, though, like all other events, the will is in necessity; yet, the immediate cause of that event being in or proper to a person's mind, it differs infinitely from a will which follows immediately from a cause which, being external, is not in the mind or proper to the agent who then wills.

21. A person's will therefore is not free as having existed of itself independent of any thing which had preceded it; but, it is free in having proceeded from a thought which had been formed by that person, who thus had an opinion which he considered as his own, independent of every other existence.

If, for example, I think that honesty is sound policy, then, if in acting I will according to that thought or principle, my will is free; because, I acted according to a principle that might have been formed otherwise; for, I might have thought that honesty was not sound policy. In being honest, therefore, or dishonest, I am a free agent; for, in thus acting, I am not under the immediate influence of any other being or existence, but under that of my own thought and conscious reflection; and this is free will in opposition to such volition as may have followed operations of mind of which a person is not conscious, and which he does not consider as motives of his own production. Thus, for example, when a person acts without
out thinking on what he is doing, such an action is not considered as following the will, because unattended with the consciousness which is absolutely necessary in a voluntary action; and it is only for a voluntary action that a person can be thought responsible, as being free to choose whether he shall either act according to that motive or another.

22. In this case of moral action, responsibility refers to either one or other or both of two things; these are wisdom and benevolence. In the one case, if the means are properly adapted to an end in view, the action is conceived in wisdom; but, if not, it is conceived in folly or without wisdom. In the other case, if the end conceived is not good, the action is said to be malevolent; and if, on the contrary, it is good, the action is said to be good, and the end conceived in benevolence. Hence responsibility necessarily implies the abstract general ideas of good and evil, wisdom and folly; and a mind that has not formed these ideas cannot be considered as responsible, and is not a fit subject for moral action.

23. It may be now observed, that as, in reasoning from the principles of one science in another science of a different kind, there arises either obscurity, inconsistency or confusion, it is the proper business of science to consider the various branches of our knowledge separate and distinct, in order to see the proper evidence of those several things. It is thus that the evidence of moral truths are no more to be found in the science of physics, than physical truths are to be found in the science of mathematics. Now, in philosophy, which is the ultimate reasoning or perfection of the human mind, the subjects of all the sciences, when reduced to principles, are to be taken in one general view; but then, it is not proper, in philosophy, to dispute the truths, or approved principles, of the several sciences. Thus it will appear, that no person, who is master of the different sciences, will introduce skepticism or absurdity into philosophy,
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I sophy, the purpose of which is not to investigate, but to employ those truths, which have been discovered in the different sciences, in order to promote wisdom and preserve benevolence.

We have thus examined the subject will; let us now consider that of action.

24. Act, motive, cause, have all at bottom the same or a similar meaning; they only differ in their modifications or relations in the order of event. There are also among causes, motives and actions, those that are more simple and immediate, others again that are secondary, dependent, and removed more or less from that which is primary, simple, absolute, and independent. But, to understand this, will require a more minute investigation of the subject.

In every thing there is action; for, without some species of action, nothing could exist or be made known. As there is action in every thing, every action must have motive; action without motive would be mere accident, and could not have an end or purpose; but, without an end or purpose, What would be action? an abstract term without a meaning in reality; for, in every conceived action there must be some end.

Thus, as every action has some end, every motive necessarily has a cause; for, motive of itself is nothing; it is only the abstract general expression for that which produces action; and it necessarily requires a substance from whence it may proceed.

Action must have motive, and motive must have cause; cause, therefore, must be first; and cause must have existence, in order that effect should actually come to pass.

Cause, therefore, is a substantial thing; and it is the only thing which, besides effect, must necessarily have a being or subsistence.

We
We are conscious of subsisting; we are also certain or assured of existing as a cause for a perceived effect; and we know, that we are not ourselves the cause of our existence. We are thus led to look for cause beyond the conscious exertion of our will, although our conscious will is the only cause of which we have the knowledge a priori. (Part II. Sect. VI.)

Cause is the first of things; next comes effect; and under this may be included every secondary thing. But, in secondary things, there is both effect and cause; therefore, besides second causes, there is one which pre-existed; and this is a first cause.

Cause must act, in order that effect should follow. Action, therefore, if not the same as cause, is immediately derived from it. But, motive is only another term for cause, when action is to be determined by thinking beings, who by reflecting act in consequence of what had gone before.

Now, that which is expressed by action, motive, cause, may be distinguished as consisting of three different kinds; first, material; secondly, animal; and lastly, intellectual. They will now be considered in their order.

Material being, action, motive, cause, is perfectly distinguished from every other thing, or rather from ourself; for, it is by comparison with our conscious principle that we form our notions of things, which then we term material. But, though this material cause be thus known negatively, as not being our conscious principle, it is not any otherwise known.

It may perhaps be said that it is known as a cause, although it be not known as a material cause; and this is in some measure true. But then it is not properly known as the cause; in this case, it is only
only the effect which we know; and the cause, which is unknown, is, in our reasoning, attributed or inferred; as are likewise action and motive, neither of which are immediately known.

We form the idea of magnitude and figure; and this idea or conception being necessarily connected with the primary or material cause in our sensation, we then erroneously attribute those qualities of our perception, to the cause of our knowledge.

We thus entertain the most absurd ideas of those material things; considering them, at the same time, as active, and as inert; as the cause of our knowledge, and as the subject on which our knowledge is exerted; as a dependent being, and as one which is at the same time independent; as a thing created, and as a thing existing in itself.

But it has been shewn, that material things are ultimately resolvable into power and energy. Consequently, there is nothing really external, besides cause and action; although we most erroneously imagine that there are things existing with magnitude and figure, besides the activity which we perceive as proceeding according to rules wisely conceived in the constitution of this world.

Material action, therefore, is all reduced to those general laws of efficiency which we comprehend in gravitation, in light, heat, &c. in elective attractions and repulsions. It is nowhere concerned with magnitude and figure, which are pure conceptions in our thought, and are produced by the action of our mind. Now, if this theory be just, the consequence of that action, which is conceived as being externally, and which is falsely considered as proceeding from a body, must be passion in an animated being which is to be affected by it.
But, if an animated being, such as we are, must be actuated in order to know, or to exist, something must act as a cause for its existence. Consequently, we should consider that action or cause, which is supposed to be external or material, and by which a sensitive being is made to know, as in truth being the first cause.

Having thus found, that what is termed material being, action, cause, is truly first in the order of things, and supreme in the order of wisdom or design, we may now consider that which is secondary, and more immediately derived from that first cause.

Animal action, being all founded on passion, which is again immediately derived from the action of material things, as has been explained, is now to be considered as of two kinds, according as it is either more immediately derived from the first cause, or less immediately, as having interposed another cause which is proper to itself. The first of these is termed instinctive; the other is, properly speaking, rational.

Instinctive action employs not reason; for, reason is not always. Reason is preceded by instinctive action in the animal, who must learn to discern; and who, before he begins to reason, must begin to act in consequence of passion.

Instinctive action, therefore, is first; and it exists in consequence of passion, or of knowing. But the effect of this action of the animal is the knowing farther, or by itself, independent of the cause by which it was first actuated.

When therefore an animal knows in order that he should will, he does more than to act instinctively, or necessarily in consequence of passion; he knows of himself, which is termed reason; and he acts from that motive which is termed voluntary, so far as it proceeds
ceeds not immediately from the necessity of things; although it is not absolutely voluntary, or so voluntary as it would be, were that animal, before willing, to know his own will and motives, and to determine in consequence of that knowledge. This last is termed free will, while the first is only voluntary comparatively with other actions which are so in a less degree.

An animal thinking as well as acting from his knowledge, becomes an intellectual being; which is a step, perhaps, infinitely removed from the mere animal, who reasons only in order to act. The intellectual being, therefore, reasons in order to know; his knowledge then is proper to himself; or it follows immediately from an action of his own; and, this knowledge may be the cause of animal action.

When an animal acts from reason or discernment, or when he reasons in order to act, he reasons necessarily, and he acts accordingly; therefore, he acts from no motive of his own, or he has no choice in his motive. But, an intellectual being, who in reasoning on his thoughts forms opinions for his motives, acts not from a motive of necessity, so far as he chooses, among those motives which he has formed, that by which his action is determined.

Here, therefore, is a being who may either act according to the natural motives, which actuate the animal on every occasion, or he may choose to follow a motive which he had formed, in his reasoning abstractly upon the subject. The one of these may be termed his animal, the other his intellectual motive.

If the animal and intellectual motives lead to the same end, that is to say, if the intellectual agent, who is supposed to be wise, approves of the animal motive, the action is determined both voluntarily and deliberately; and there can be no room for repentance in reflection.

But,
But, if the animal and intellectual motives lead to different ends, or if the intellect does not approve of the animal motive, here is a subject for deliberate judgment, and here are two separate interests in the same person, one or other of which must be preferred.

If this be so, that there are truly different interests in the same person, and if it be of importance to know which of those interfering interests is to be preferred, the science of morality must have for object to teach the rules by which we are to know how to decide on those occasions; and it must proceed in comparing the different motives of our conduct.

25. To sum up the doctrine: Sense is, in us, the immediate effect of the action of the first cause. By this operation of the external cause we are made to know, in order that we should act ourselves, and also in order that in thinking we should become reflecting beings. But being made, in the constitution of a thinking substance, to form design, and to reflect upon the motives of our voluntary actions, we then, from animal, become intellectual beings; from natural or instinctive, which they had been at first, our actions become moral, as having respect to a system of good and evil; and, instead of being directed solely by the motives pleasure and pain, for the simple purpose of our life, we are influenced by the motives of a conceived happiness or misery, and act for another purpose besides that of animal life, a purpose to which occasionally animal life itself is sacrificed.

Moral truths are discovered in the most valuable efforts of the human mind, arrived in its progress at a proper understanding, and reasoning in the system of society, which is the perfection of the human species. Now, though this perfection of the species be no doubt originally conducted by nature, and not by man, yet man is the very means employed by nature in the execution of that work; and man
is first blindly led by nature to do that which he, in afterwards understanding by reflection, thinks he does himself. But, in proceeding further, and learning to understand himself, man sees the order of his nature, and his dependence on the unerring conduct of a superior Being or first cause.

26. It is the fixed laws of this supreme Being that form the subject of philosophy, and comprehend the truths of science. The first principles of morality are now to be considered, as among those truths. Here it is that may appear, how great an influence the foresight of mankind has upon their will, and consequently upon their present conduct.

27. This foresight of mankind is properly wisdom, being a judgment with regard to an end, or event which is to happen, and is attained in reasoning from means which are the objects of the understanding. This then leads to moral action, which is voluntary, the will being free in judging what is best, and the mind being accountable for that judgment by which the will had been determined. Thus it will appear, that wisdom is necessary in a mind which has to learn moral action, and that the science of mind is required in order to understand the principles of morality.

C H A P. III.

Of the Principles of Moral Sentiments.

1. HAVING discussed the subject of free will, in which only moral agents are concerned, we now proceed to examine those principles of moral conduct which may be considered as actuating
ating man, when, in the wisdom of his acquired state, he freely wills, or voluntarily chooses what shall be his rule of action.

It is not enough to see upon what rule man proceeds in acting; a metaphysical treatise, such as this, should point out the way in which the rule is formed; and should not only give the principle on which the rule proceeds, but also analyse the subject, in tracing the transac-
tion up to the first principle, which must be some instinctive action, faculty, or affection, of our nature, in which no farther progress can be made by reasoning. This, then, is to be the subject of investigation.

2. Sensation is most distinctly the subject of our knowledge; for, we not only know absolutely in sensation, but we also understand this subject, so far as in reflection we clearly distinguish the different sensations; and, in each of these, we also know degree, which is then a subject of discernment. Hence the sensations, properly so called, including pleasure and pain, are truly principles in our scientific reasoning; or, these are the source and elements of our knowledge. For, as by analysis we may trace that knowledge to sensation, in which it is absolute, this is then the utmost limit of our discernment; and this is the first principle of our knowledge.

3. The passions, again, may all be considered as modifications of pain and pleasure; for, in all those passions, one or other of these prevails, however inconsiderable it may be. Perhaps we may not trace all those passions equally to the source of knowledge which is absolute and instinctive, or to that in which the mind is ultimately affected by the external cause, which is termed nature; nevertheless, we have no reason to doubt this origin of our passions in the sense. This external thing, which is not otherwise known, is the source of our knowledge and our passions; therefore, every thing or thought, when traced to that source, is then known as much as possible; and it
it becomes a principle, for the explanation of what has already happened, as well as for the knowledge of that which is to happen upon similar occasions.

4. The passions of sense are perfect; for, in these the mind has no action. During sensation the mind suffers purely, feels or knows absolutely, and has no proper activity, at least so far as we can trace, which is the same thing. But, after sensation is past, the mind has a power of producing something by which it is affected, though not in the same manner as in sensation, yet in a manner that is somewhat similar, and which in the understanding is considered as bearing a certain relation to the real or absolute knowledge. This species of sense, arising from the action of mind, is termed idea, or, as knowledge, is said to be ideal.

5. But, there are certain feelings or passions of the mind for which there is not any external sense, or organ of information to be distinguished; these passions being excited in consequence of ideas, which are suggested to the mind reasoning upon events that have been, or will be, and not in consequence of the immediate action of an external cause, or the simple information of sense. Such is the sense of joy and grief, &c. which are thus secondary sensations, and proper passions in the mind.

6. Pain and pleasure, although not proceeding from any particular organ which we can understand in any other manner than by the sense, are yet to be considered as primary sensations; for, in these passions there is nothing undergirded, being absolute knowledge, or simple affection of the mind. Those passions, then, are real, in contradistinction to ideal, which they may be also; for, we can recollect in some degree, or form an idea of a pain or a pleasure after it has happened, in like manner as we can form the idea of a sound, a colour, or a taste.

7. Besides
7. Besides the sensation of pleasure and pain, we have also the passions of joy and grief, of fear and shame, love and hatred, to which may be added resentment, which contains both anger, which is resentment for an injury, and gratitude, which is resentment of a favour. These may be termed sentimental passions, as being evidently removed a step from sense, and produced in the operations that are proper to mind, although we may not be able to investigate this operation further than seeing the principles, and knowing the effect in these passionate sentiments or sentimental passions, when either pleasure or pain are always to be found in some modification or degree.

8. That such is the nature of the passions, will appear by considering; the brute seems to have all those passions as well as man. Now, so far as the brute is only actuated by natural motives, without the art of conscious thought and scientific reflection, we shall herein find an argument in confirmation of this view of the passions.

9. But, though the passions are properly or originally instinctive, yet the intellect of man, which upon all occasions makes of his instinctive knowledge a subject of scientific reflection, proceeds in like manner with regard to those passions which man first suffers altogether like the brute. Pleasure and pain, for example, are passions of the mind connected immediately with sensation, and excited either the one or other according as the sensation is in moderation or carried to excess; in which case, as things, they are actually or absolutely, and, as knowledge, they are instinctive. Love and hatred, again, are pleasure and pain felt in the knowledge of something, or in some knowledge, in which either one or other of these absolute passions or sensations had been suffered or enjoyed. In this case, therefore, the pleasure or pain is not real, as it had been originally, but is ideal, at the same time that it may be natural; for in memory there is a necessary connection of ideas, whereby that which has happened
pened may influence the mind when the idea is excited; not in having the real feeling of the original pain or pleasure, but in having the associated knowledge again restored to the mind, unaccompanied with the original sense or passion, but with its idea.

10. Thus man, like any other animal, is made naturally to acquire prejudices, or passionate feelings, on all occasions: But, man scientifically distinguishes in his knowledge, and in the order of events; therefore, he, in reasoning, corrects those impulses of the animal nature which is affected by the association of ideas; although that order of things is contrived in perfect wisdom, for the economy of the animal system, in which man is comprehended more or less. Thus, man either loves or hates altogether like the brute, in feeling the influence of associated ideas, or he corrects the instinctive affection natural to the animal, in the superior judgment of his scientifical reflection.

11. Human intellect, therefore, proceeds not to destroy the effects of what has been termed sentimental passions, but to distinguish when those associations of things, from whence they are sprung, are either on the one hand proper, natural, and necessarily happening in the fixed order of things, in which case, the passion may be approved of; or, on the other, when they are accidental and improper; in which case the passion may be, in reason, despised or neglected. If, for example, in eating a particular fruit, an animal becomes sick, it is natural to associate with this painful feeling the concomitant ideas; and thus he entertains an aversion to this fruit when again presented, which is hatred. This however may be either in error or in truth; for, if the fruit truly is the cause of the sickness, it is naturally that the association of ideas or hatred is formed. But the sickness may be from another cause; and man inquires whether this be the case or not. Thus it is, that man corrects animal prejudices, in judging from his proper wisdom, which through science he attains.
An Indian hates the nation of the Esquimaux; but it is from prejudice, and not from nature, that this passion is acquired, that is to say, there is nothing in the Esquimaux which is necessarily noxious to the Indian; on the contrary, these two nations, in cultivating a friendly intercourse, might be mutually useful to each other. The hatred, therefore, of the Indian is not founded in truth; and if we shall suppose him becoming a philosopher in analyzing his passions and affections, and in considering, with the most extensive view of his own interest, what motives are to be approved, what condemned, there cannot be a doubt that he would lay aside his enmity to the harmless inhabitant of the sea and shore. He, would thus change his sentimental passion, which had been entertained in the error of his prejudice.

Affection and aversion are instinctive passions which properly belong to the animal mind, and are excited by nature like pleasure and pain, on which affection and aversion are ingrafted. Man becomes conscious of those passions in reflecting on what is past; he proceeds by first analytically abstracting in his knowledge things to be distinguished; and then by generalizing in his thought, those subjects of his knowledge. In this manner those passions of affection and aversion, which had been instinctive, that is to say, unconscious, become conscious passions, which are termed love and hatred. But, the brute, who cannot form the general idea of love and hatred, loves Nevertheless, and hates according to the appointed rules of nature. Thus animals which are gregarious herd together from love; they fight together from jealousy, anger, and revenge; in whatever manner, therefore, those passions are by mind acquired in the course of nature, this is a truth in the natural philosophy of mind, that such passions are, before they are understood; the understanding them being the conscious distinction, of those subjects of our instinctive knowledge, and the order of those various events.
12. If it is thus allowed us, to reason on our passions or sentimental feelings, then it may be laid down as a principle, that man is endowed with the passion of self love; and of this he is also conscious; but not without scientific reflection on the subject. The fruit of this love, is pleasure in idea, or happiness of mind. Whatever, therefore, contributes to make a person pleased with himself, increases that satisfaction of mind which is termed happiness.

13. But, is there no other source of happiness, besides self love? that is to say, is there no other instinctive love, but that of ourself? — Nothing is more evident than the love of man for man. Now, when this love of the species should not be found as proper to the animal, or common both to man and brute, it might nevertheless be acknowledged as existing in the human species, made for mutual love and support. But when we see animals, who have not wisdom, associating in the wisest manner for the ease and security of the individual, and for the best preservation of the whole, can we doubt that here is an instinctive principle, by which the individuals of a species are attracted, and a friendship established in a mutual bond of union. It must be acknowledged that this is the work of nature, and not proceeding from the wisdom of the animal. A hive of bees, for example, is not the fruit of wisdom in the animal, as a city, an army, or a fleet, is an economy contrived in the wisdom of the human species.

14. If there is thus, in the animal man, an instinctive principle of love, by which his species is made the object of his pleasure and affection, the particulars of his conduct may be traced from that principle, as well as from the instinctive principle of self-love, or the pleasure which he finds in providing for his proper ease and safety.

Man has pleasure or enjoyment in the reflection of himself, he has also pleasure in the contemplation of his species, he therefore is pleased when he sees his neighbours happy, and in like manner, he is grieved.
grieved or unhappy when he sees their misery. Not that he feels their pain, which is impossible; but because he feels uneasy in his mind, when he knows of their distresses. Thus, sympathy is founded in the instinctive love of man for man; and in proportion as his knowledge grows, so does his sympathetic feeling of their joys and griefs, their happiness and misery.

15. Dr Smith hath fully illustrated the sympathetic feeling of the human soul; and he has employed it most successfully as a principle in the formation of moral sentiments, a work that cannot be too much admired. But I doubt of it being a first principle; I think it is a rational progress of the human mind proceeding upon conscious principles. This makes no difference with regard to that beautiful moral treatise: But here, where we are treating of the principles of human understanding, I would wish to trace up every principle to those instinctive passions and actions which cannot be farther understood.

Sympathy, no doubt, is a principle, so far as it is a truth upon which we may be allowed to reason; for, no body will deny that there is such a thing. But, sympathy, although a matter of fact, is not an absolute principle, or instinctive knowledge in which we cannot proceed any farther by analysis. This the Dr must be considered as acknowledging, when he undertakes to explain sympathy; which, he says, arises from our placing ourselves in the situation of the person with whom we are to sympathise.

If this explanation of sympathy is to be admitted, it would be natural to inquire next for the cause or manner of our thus placing ourselves in the situation of another. Here one of two things must be true; this action must either, on the one hand, be necessary or instinctive, that is, it must happen without any process in our mind which may be traced in a conscious reflection; or, on the other
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hand, it must be acquired by a certain process, or in operations of mind which may be either transacted or neglected.

If it be in the first of those two ways that sympathy is produced, then man, the more he is in the natural state of an animal, the stronger would be his sympathetic feelings; and, on the contrary, the more he is in the artificial state, or that peculiar to man, the less he would have of this sympathising disposition. But the direct contrary to this is the general opinion of mankind; the very term humanity, which in general may be substituted for sympathy, evinces this conclusion.

Nothing is more evident to an observing mind, than that sympathy is highly improvable, in the humanity of a virtuous education. Here, therefore, sympathy, in part at least, is artificial; and thus it cannot be a first principle, that which may be effected by such means as are known or understood. Conversely, from the corruption of vice or the artificial selfishness, cultivated in the human education instead of disinterested benevolence, man becomes insensible to the feelings of humanity, and thus transgresses the law of sympathy which is natural. But, it surely cannot be a first principle, that which art may either make at pleasure, or unmake.

If upon any occasion the feeling of sympathy may be either exerted or withheld, then is sympathy a conditional and not an absolute principle; and, in that case, there must be some other action or passion of mind, by which the sympathetic feeling is to be accomplished. We may, therefore, endeavour to investigate what it is that a sympathising mind must do, or in what manner it is to be affected, in order that it may feel sympathetically in the pain or pleasure of another person.

16. I feel for my neighbour in his pain or in his grief; and, for this
this purpose it is necessary that I should fancy what he feels. But, when I fancy in order to feel for him in his distress, I certainly do not fancy that I feel with him in his pain or grief. On the contrary, in the height of my distress, I have full possession of my mind; my feeling is called forth, at the same time that I am conscious of being in a state of ease and happiness. Upon the stage, indeed, the well acted scene betrays my judgment or assists my imagination of the distress; and the imagination of this distress is absolutely necessary to my sympathetic feeling; but neither my judgment nor my imagination can explain the suffering of my mind in feeling for another's woe. My soul is touched with every object, and every action or passion which is perceived; and it is either pleased or displeased on every occasion, according as I have formed agreeable or disagreeable ideas connected with that scenery. But, while on these occasions I am in reflection conscious of feeling pleasure or pain, I am also conscious that I feel independently of any natural delusion of my mind; for, it does not in the least relieve my feeling for another person, that I am conscious I do not feel with him in his agony. Nor does it in the least impair the pleasure which I feel, in feeling, for example, the mutual happiness of a mother and a child, that I know I have no other participation of that joy, except what I may have either in rational reflection, or in the more simple observation of an agreeable object. When, on the other hand, I see an innocent person injured by a villainous transaction, my anger is excited, although I be no otherwise concerned in the case than in being a mere spectator. Here, I am conscious that I am not injured; perhaps I know that the injured person is insensible to the wrong which he has suffered; nevertheless, I feel resentment of the evil, and hate the person who has committed the offence.

That there is in man a sympathetic feeling is upon all hands acknowledged; the only question now to be made, concerns the nature of this feeling, whether or not it is instinctive. If it be instinc-
tive, it is then a first principle, from whence other things may be explained; and, in that case, to explain that principle would be as impossible as to tell how we feel pain when our body is hurt. But if this sympathetic principle be not instinctive, it may be explained in showing some other distinct principle on which it is founded. This is now to be attempted.

Every idea of pain and grief is disagreeable to a mind that thinks and reflects on what has happened, and on what may happen. For, as actual pain and grief are made by nature to us disagreeable, how is it possible that any pleasure could be felt in forming those ideas, unless the consequence of the idea should, in reflection, give us pleasure. The destruction of the floating batteries before Gibraltar, to an unconcerned spectator, would have given pain; but, to the besieged army, it gave pleasure. Not that any of the garrisons could with pleasure have been a cool spectator of the scene; but, in their situation, they could not be a cool spectator, until those batteries were subdued. Then, indeed, humanity assumed its natural influence in the heart; and that which the moment before had given them pleasure, the moment after, without any other change of circumstances, gave them pain.

In like manner, every idea of joy and pleasure is agreeable to the mind dispassionately contemplating those pictures of external happiness, or those emblems of what may be felt within. But we are not always dispassionate spectators; and it may be affirmed, that in every case of this kind, the reflected feeling of the joy and pleasure will be in proportion as the sympathizing person shall be well affected on the occasion.

Besides the natural or instinctive association of ideas, man, in reflection, has the power of associating and opposing abstract qualities and relations. He thus can form imaginations of that which never happened.
happened, and of that which will not happen, any otherwise than in his fancy. It is in this manner that man has it in his power either to please or to displease himself in thought, according as he is led to think in an agreeable or a disagreeable manner. But, though man be thus made to please himself with the fanciful speculations of agreeable objects, and to torment himself with imaginary evils, and the false representations of objects naturally disagreeable, it is unreasonably that he thus procures to himself unhappiness from the false representations of a diseased mind; and he is more reasonably, that is, more naturally led, in pursuing happiness, to represent every thing in its just light. Consequently, if nature be good, and if man be naturally led to wisdom in the prosecution of his intellect, he will be led by nature to make himself most happy on every occasion; although there are occasions in which he must necessarily feel pain, and others in which he is unnecessarily made miserable by the contingent error of his judgment, and the folly which is naturally in his constitution.

That one should feel for another, without having an idea of what that person suffers, is impossible; and therefore that we must imagine to ourselves certain things, in order that we may suffer in idea along with a person who is suffering in reality, is indispensable, but surely this capacity of the human mind, of fancying or imagining in idea, though necessary in the operation of sympathy, does not entirely form an explanation of that operation, no more than my fingers, which are truly employed in writing, would be sustained as a proper explanation of this operation.

17. Something more than the ideal capacity of man being thus required as a principle for our sympathetic feeling, where are we to seek for this principle? Must it not be in some of our instinctive passions? Man naturally sympathizes, that is, he feels pleasure in another's pleasure, and pain in another's pain; but, though he naturally
turally sympathises, he does not necessarily do so; for, naturally, man feels pain in the suffering of his friend, but he also feels pleasure in the same suffering of his enemy. Now, although mankind, arrived at true philosophy, or taught humanity by those who have attained that perfection of mind, learn to sympathise in the sufferings of their enemies, this cannot be considered as natural to man, farther than as it is natural for him to acquire sympathy in a certain progress of mind, which man has not originally. It is therefore the analysis of this progress of mind, in which a man comes to sympathise with his enemies, that must form the proper explanation of this species of sympathy. But, in order to explain the natural sympathy of man, some instinctive principle is required, on which it should be founded.

18. Thus we are led to examine our instinctive passions, in seeking for the principle of natural sympathy; and here occurs that instinctive love or affection of man for man, which is so natural to the species. Without ideal powers, the mind of man could not employ this instinctive passion, by which he is in pleasure naturally attached to his neighbour, for the purpose of sympathy, in feeling in kind, though not in degree, with that suffering or enjoyment of his neighbour; but, at the same time, without that natural passion of love, or that affection which is founded instinctively in pleasure, the ideal capacity of man would not lead him to suffer pain, when he could avoid that suffering.

There is in human nature a principle of goodness or benevolence; there is also a principle of evil, or of malevolence; and, if those two principles existed in a similar manner, here would be the absurdity of inconsistent principles. But there is no such inconsistency in nature, however man erroneously ascribes to nature the absurdities of his false reasoning. There is in the existence of those two principles a difference, by which they are removed from each other in
every manner and degree; and goodness or benevolence is no more necessarily confounded with evil or malevolence, than is black with white, pain with pleasure.

The principle of benevolence is in its nature absolute, as being unconditional in relation to the object of affection. The principle of malice, again, is not only relative in its nature, like the other, requiring an object of affection; it is also conditional, as requiring certain circumstances which are not necessarily, but only occasionally, in that object.

The principle of benevolence in man is absolute, as being neither voluntary nor occasional, but always or universal in relation to the object of its action or affection. The principle of malice in man is occasional; it depends either on anger, which is in man a passion; on envy, which is a sentiment; or on folly, which is the error of man's reasoning. Nature, therefore, has not given man an immediate principle of malice; this principle is remote from human nature, and exists only in the accident of nature, or in the nature of human folly; whereas, benevolence is immediately in human nature, as free from accident, and as uncorrupted by folly; it is absolutely in man, as existing in the wisdom of nature for the subsistence of man's happiness; and it is not like malice, which is contrived in the wisdom of nature, in order to provide a remedy against the accident or occasional circumstances of things.

Benevolence is founded immediately on love, malice in hatred. Love is absolute, as always existing betwixt the subject and the object; hatred is occasional, as requiring a condition foreign to the object by which it is excited. Had love and hatred, like pain and pleasure, been equally in man, or immediately in his nature, there would have been, in nature, apparent folly, or an inconsistency in principle; for, to love and hate the same object at the same time, is impossible;
impossible; that is to say, this is a thing only in human supposition, and not in nature.

19. Thus the instinctive sentiment of love, founded in the absolute knowledge or sense of pleasure, has been given as an efficient cause; in the production of the sympathy which appears not only in man, but also in the brute animal; but, as there is likewise an instinctive sentiment of hatred, founded on the sense of pain, it may be demanded, what is the proper effect of this sentiment, in relation to the sympathy of the mind.

20. The proper effect of love being a sympathetic feeling, the proper effect of hatred should be want of sympathy. Now, is not this the case? Hatred is thought to steel the heart against the feelings of humanity. This is certain, that, among the animals, who have only the instinctive sentiment of sympathy, those alone appear to be affected with the feelings of another, who have a love for them; and this sympathetic feeling appears to be proportioned to the love or pleasure they have in the suffering animal. The cries of distress from an infant animal, seem only to affect the mother's ear; and thus there would appear to be no sympathy where there is no love.

21. But in man, who has the power of increasing so much his ideal passions, by thinking consciently, or by means of his reflection, the case of his sympathetic feelings is vastly more complex, although proceeding from the same principles. The animal may be considered as having nothing but a natural love; but, man may be considered as having also an artificial love, of his own producing. Now, when one of these affections is strong, the other may be weak. Hence, love and sympathy may be produced with such an indefinite range in the intensity of the passion; for, by the frequent association of agreeable ideas along with that of a particular object,
the affection of a person for that object is increased. Here, therefore, we find in man two distinct species of love; one natural, and common to him with the brute; the other artificial, as being the production of his own thoughts.

But the same thing takes place in the human mind with respect to hatred, which is either natural or artificial in the man; and, as this operates in direct opposition to the effects of love, the sympathetic feelings of the man may be modified with an indefinite variety in its degree; especially when we consider, that the natural love and the artificial hatred, or the natural hatred and the artificial love, may both take place at the same time, in the mind of a person who, from the same object, may feel actual pleasure and ideal pain, or actual pain and ideal pleasure.

22. Man, who has so much the power of improving his ideal feelings or sentimental passions, in the operations of a conscious reflection, by associating together different ideas, far exceeds the mere animal in his affections and aversions, although the instinctive or original passions are equally bestowed upon the animal and the man. It is the business of the species, proceeding in science, and enlightened through the course of a long experience, to instruct the individual in artificial love, and educate the tender mind, capable of taking an impression, in the principles of a general humanity. But, vice with virtue must go hand in hand, and the hatred of mankind may be equally improved with the love. It is thus that the ideal operations of the human mind, proceeding in error and mistake, lead the affections of the man, naturally formed in love to his kind, into the extreme of hatred; so that, instead of sympathizing in his neighbour’s joy and grief, he often is carried, in the heat of passion and spirit of resentment, to grieve at his neighbour’s joy, and rejoice at his grief.
What a rooted enmity subsists betwixt the North American Indian and the Esquimaux! This hatred or aversion is not from nature; but it is necessary in those nations educated in the principles of that enmity and hatred. But, if this unsympathizing spirit, sprung of hatred, is in the Indian artificial, by means of his prejudice or education, so may be a greater portion of love and affection for a particular, whether individual or tribe, than what he had by nature for man in general. Consequently sympathy, if considered as the cause of virtue, may in some degree be artificial, in being produced by the wisdom of man procuring love, and curing the prejudice of aversion.

22. A mind may at the same time love and hate two different persons; a person may also at the same time love an object upon one account, and hate it on another; but, at the same time, to love and hate the same person, on the same account, is impossible; the proposition is contradictory, and cannot be conceived. Therefore, if man naturally loves his species, he cannot naturally hate any of the kind; and, when he occasionally hates an individual, this is not to be imputed to nature, which has made the species necessarily to be loved. Hence this remarkable distinction betwixt the passions of love and hatred; love is a passion immediately planted between man and man; whereas hatred is not immediate, but only is produced by the interposition of an injury, which nature does not necessarily produce. It is casually that hatred is produced, in pursuing a system where different principles, which may occasionally oppose each other, are employed to bring about an end; and this will be understood in seeing the proper order of those things.

23. Being thus to found the principles of virtue and morality on love, we must endeavour to form a proper idea of that love from whence, as a principle, we set out; otherwise, we might as well pretend to explain love from the principle of virtue, as to explain virtue from a principle of love.
CHAP. IV.

Analysis of Social Love, the first Principle of Moral Sentiment.

1. SELF-LOVE is a principle from whence ingenious men have endeavoured, unsuccessfully indeed, to deduce all moral action, that is, to explain the appearances of moral action from this selfish principle. It does not however follow, that this principle has been properly understood: It is much more probable that it has not; and, therefore, that this has been the cause of so much disagreement in the opinions of philosophers, concerning the principles of morals as a science.

To understand a principle, we should be able to distinguish every thing with regard to it, that is, we should distinguish this principle in relation to every other thing; for, until this be done, we cannot be said fully to understand it. Whether or not this has been already done in relation to this subject, must appear from comparing what authors have wrote upon self-love, with what is now to be offered in the further consideration of this passion.

2. The first principle of morality in human nature is to love oneself; this will need no other comment than a reference to the opinions of ingenious men, who have endeavoured to deduce all moral action from this principle, or explain those actions by means of that principle, of which every person who reflects is conscious.

3. The second principle is, that we love our neighbour. That this is a principle, and not to be deduced in reason from the first, will...
will be acknowledged, if it shall be found that this second principle is instinctive, that is to say, if this principle of action be natural, and not formed by conscious reasoning in relation to self-love. Now, it is equally natural for man to love man, as it is for an animal to love its food. In both cases we love the object for the pleasure that it gives; but it would be absurd to say, that we love our food because we love ourself. We love ourself in the first place, or, we love ourself for ourself; secondly, we take pleasure in our food and in our friend; this is properly termed loving these. Now, the question is not, If I love my friend because that object gives me pleasure or delight, but how that object comes to give me pleasure? and, if to this question it should be answered, that it is because I love him, then, here is the circle of absurdity.

4. The reason that I love my neighbour is the reason that I love myself; it is, because it is the will of God; that is to say, it is the actual constitution of things, or the law of nature; in other words, it is a simple matter of fact, and therefore is a principle both physical and moral; whereas, the loving of ourself is a principle of still higher research; for, it is properly metaphysical. But ingenious men, reasoning without the truth of metaphysical science, have confounded the instinctive self-love of the animal man, by which the individual is preserved and the species continued, with the conscious self-love of minds reflecting scientifically upon the motives of their conduct and the consequences of their will. Now, without making such necessary distinctions, How can any steady progress be made in the science of mind?

5. If we shall suppose man in the mere animal state, and as having presented to him man, there cannot be a doubt of these two animals being sympathetically attracted by each other; and that there would be thus established a natural affection purely upon this principle, that, of all the animals, this is the one that pleases him most, from
from form, from feature, and complexion, independent of every consideration of the animating soul. If this is so, then next we may suppose him, upon further acquaintance and proper examination, pleased with the actions of the man; and, in this respect, he would have his predilection confirmed, and his affection strengthened. This is properly animal love, which is instinctive; but there may be also rational love, when the conscious reflecting animal man finds pleasure in the sentiments of man, sentiments of which he is conscious in himself; he then loves him consciously and rationally for the pleasure that he has felt. Now, of these two is made up all the proper love that man has for man.

6. Man, thinking consciously in relation to himself, and scientifically in relation to his species, forms a desire of being loved by man, from the pleasure which he actually feels on that occasion; and he, in like manner, desires to avoid being hated by his species, from the uneasiness or unhappiness which he feels when they have shown aversion. This is general without exception; no man naturally loves to be hated, despised, or disapproved of by his species.

7. Hence this other principle, that man not only loves man, but also loves or desires that man should love him. He is happy in the love of man, and he is miserable in his aversion; that is to say, he feels himself pleased to find or think himself the object of another’s love and regard, and he feels himself displeased when it is otherwise. This is a general scientific idea, arising from the conscious love and esteem which he feels for others, and the happiness and misery which he has felt respectively in the approbation and disapprobation of others. But this is an idea that, so far as it is properly general and abstract, i.e. scientific, is peculiar to man, and does not belong to brutes, who cannot think or reason in that manner. This is the love of fame, said to be the universal passion.

8. We
8. We have thus mentioned certain principles of moral action, among which is that faculty, or instinct, by which man, as well as every other animal, is blindly conducted in pursuit of life and his particular good. This, though termed self-love, is certainly different from that conscious principle, by which a person, in reflecting on the proper motives of his conduct, loves himself, that is, applauds the motives of his action, and values himself on something which he has done. Now, this value which he has set upon himself does not arise from the pleasure which he has enjoyed in consequence of the action; for, this does not always happen. Perhaps he has, on the contrary, thereby fallen into the misery of poverty and pain—no matter, he still approves of the action, and therefore loves himself. Now, this principle, or this conscious thought from whence he forms a principle, is certainly different from that principle of action by which a polypus accepts his proper food and rejects his poison.

9. Thus mankind, in their reasoning, distinguish various kinds of love; there is the love of self, the love of society, the love of fame, the love of pleasure, the love of beauty, and the love of wisdom. Are these so many distinct principles for the explanation of moral truths, and which therefore cannot be themselves explained; or may we understand those several passions in having them all deduced from principles more general, and in which nothing further may be understood?—This is now to be the subject of examination; and, for this purpose, we are to observe the order of things in the natural progress of the human mind.

10. Man begins in self-love; for, he makes himself to grow, in attending without error, relaxation, or defect, to the instinctive feelings of pain and pleasure. But this is only figuratively termed love, in metaphysical refinement; it is properly nothing but the necessary succession of action and of passion: And we might just as well term the *vis infa} and *vis inertiae* of bodies, love of action and of ease, as...
to say that it is self-love makes an infant suck; although it is certainly the same principle, of avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure, which makes both the infant to suck, and the selfish man of pleasure to forfake the rules of virtue, and neglect his duty.

There is, in every mind, a principle of discernment; and, the acting from this principle, in avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure, is that which may be figuratively termed self-love. But then, we must be careful not with names to confound things. When we say, that an animal acts from self-love, we must understand this to be an instinctive principle, which, though conducted by discernment, (a thing essential to mind), has no degree of intelligence, by which is meant conscious and scientific reasoning, in distinguishing, not simply knowledge, but the principles of our knowledge.

II. An animal may be said to love another, when he feels pleasure in his company. These animals are then connected by a principle of affection, which, properly speaking, is not love, no more than is the magnetism by which the iron and the leadstone are attracted. Is it love, that by which the salmon, for example, is actuated in the sea, is made to prefs up the river to the shallow stream, there, among the gravel and the sand, in company with another of a different sex, to deposite the necessary conditions of his race? Here is natural affection, but it would be improperly termed love.

If this is love, at least, it is properly instinctive; and this is all that need be contended for. Words do not alter things; but terms are necessary; and, with this distinction of the term instinctive, we shall understand things naturally different. Whereas, without making such distinction, instead of advancing knowledge in the train of science, we would shut a door against the progress of mind from that animal confusion with which it is naturally involved; for, the assimilating of things which are truly different or dissimilar, is to reason
reason erroneously, and to introduce false principles into science. But, if error be thus contained in our science, it must be impossible that our philosophy, founded upon such science, should be just.

12. Love may be considered as desire. Now, if a mind shall desire without knowing either its own desiring or the object of that desire, could it be said that such a mind had formed the desire, as I do, for example, when I wish to make myself understood? If it does not, then, here is properly an action of mind which is instinctive, whatever be the term, whether love or desire. In this case, therefore, there must be another action of the same kind, which is not instinctive, but is conscious, and may be scientific either in a greater or a less degree; for, when I desire to know the distance of the star Syrius, or the proportion of the circle to the square in numbers, here is one that is purely scientific.

13. Thus love is properly conscious desire; and that there is also another species of desire which is instinctive, will appear by considering, that the mind of an infant, in making the mouth to suck, must act instinctively, in performing the same operation which afterwards it may consciously ordain, in consequence of desire. If, therefore, this last is only what is properly desire, then, the first must be instinct; but, as it is that instinctive action upon which had been founded the desire, it may be termed a desire which is instinctive. Thus the instinctive action of an animal, or infant mind, may be distinguished, in relation to the conscious action of desire; in like manner as this last may be distinguished, in relation to the scientific knowledge of the subject, which is now aimed at, and which perhaps is infinitely more than the conscious action, although both the conscious and instinctive actions may be considered as knowledge; for, action without knowledge, is not that of mind; and, every action of mind implies knowledge as its cause.
14. In this manner it will be found, that self-love may be considered as consisting of three different kinds, viz. instinctive, conscious, and scientific. But, properly speaking, self-love is only a figurative expression, taken from the term of love, which is more properly defined, as being the grateful sense, or conscious knowledge, of an agreeable object. In the rigour of science, therefore, self-love means no other than the approbation of a man's own mind; and, to hate one's self, is that disapprobation which he feels in thinking of his own conduct.

15. All this it is necessary to consider, in order to understand the love of man for man, which is properly conscious affection, and which I have termed social love. This therefore is not original, but is founded in the instinctive appetites and affections, which are from nature, and which are the principles, or originals, of our conscious love.

16. That man loves himself, and also necessarily loves his species, is a truth, and therefore may be questioned; neither can it be received in science for a truth, without examination. But if, upon inquiry, it is found, that there are instinctive appetites and affections upon which is naturally founded the love of man for man, we must then in science give our assent to a proposition, which originates in the common sense of mankind; and thus we may be allowed to lay down this principle, that man necessarily loves his species.

17. It being allowed that man naturally loves his species, and esteems himself, then, it may be made a question, Whether, in the natural order of things, it is first that man may be said to love the one or other of those objects, so as to make it properly the subject of his conscious affection? In order to see the evidence on which this question is to be decided, it may be asked, Was there ever a brute that esteemed himself? Or, Was there ever a man that concei-
ved a conscious affection for himself, before he had conceived affections and aversions to particulars of his species?

It must not be here alleged that there may be such a thing, although we cannot give an instance of it; and that, if there may be such a thing, not any number of examples of the contrary, can establish that truth so as to make of it a principle. This would be such an argument, in the philosophy of morals, as in physics to allege, that bodies do not gravitate, because they may be conceived to do otherwise.

The natural order of things must be here examined. Man of himself has not any knowledge, except in and through the mediation of external objects; he first knows, he first distinguishes, in sense, i.e. objects which he knows by means of sense; and it is not till after he has arrived at a competent degree of animal knowledge, that he begins consciously to reflect, and thus to know the knowledge, the appetites, and affections, which, without knowing, he had before.

18. Loving the species may be considered as a general abstract idea; but, the love or conscious affection for a particular, is so in like manner. When I am conscious of loving a particular, this is a general abstract idea; for, this does not simply mean that I feel particular pleasure and delight, but that I am, in general or always, pleased and delighted with a certain object. Here, no doubt, the object is a particular idea; but the love, that I bear that object, is an idea which is general and abstract.

19. If I am to form such a general idea, in relation to myself, I must have often made myself the object of my conscious reflection, and must have considered particular motives and actions, qualities and occasions, in which I had pleasure in the contemplation.
OF MORAL CAUSES.

If this is the case, how unreasonable would it be, to suppose man esteeming himself, before he knew himself? It cannot be alleged, that he knows himself before he knows external objects; for, it must be considered, that even his body is nothing but an external object, in relation to himself. It is also certain, that man, with his knowledge, imbibes affections and aversions to the objects of his knowledge. Hence, to suppose the mind of man skipping over all these affections and aversions, necessarily arising in the progress of his knowledge, and first making himself the subject of his conscious affection and aversion, would be as much out of nature, as to suppose the fruit to grow before the flower.

It is only after our love for an object has become a general abstract idea, that this idea may operate, as a conscious motive for our moral conduct. The natural affection, which a dog has for his master, is, no doubt, the cause or motive of his fidelity; but, the conduct of the dog is not actuated by a conscious motive; and, it is only a conscious motive, that is considered as the cause of moral action. If I am conscious that I love a person, I am naturally resolved to please or not to offend him. If, on the contrary, I am conscious that I hate a person, I am then naturally resolved to offend or not to please him. Thus it will appear, that the action which, in consequence of a resolution or conscious idea, a person performs, is considered as an action which is either moral or immoral.

I may be wrong, in having formed an erroneous principle; but I cannot be wrong, in acting from the principle which I have necessarily formed. I am not immoral, in forming principles which are erroneous, however I may be absurd in having formed inconsistent principles; but I am immoral, if, having formed a principle of conduct, I transgress that principle. Every action, therefore, which is conscientiously resolved upon, must be considered as either moral or immoral. If, without a cause, I act with ill will towards another whom naturally
naturally I love, or if, in having just cause for ill will, I exceed the bounds of passion which in justice is the proper rule of action, I then transgress the rule of moral conduct towards my neighbour, for whom I have a conscious principle of benevolence.

21. Thus we have arrived at a principle of moral action, which is conscious affection; and, that this is the first principle of morality, will appear by considering, that what is here proposed as a principle, in being a motive for our conduct or a general direction for our action, is not so general as it may become, when, proceeding in a similar manner by conscious reflection, we form a principle of conduct still more general, as respecting the species, or mankind in general, instead of the individual, or particulars, with which man first associates, and forms his ideas of moral connexion and conscious behaviour.

22. If indeed we should suppose that man has formed the general idea first, and from that deduces the particular, then here would be a stop to the science of metaphysics, and we might give up philosophical investigation. In physics let us see how it is with respect to a similar process of generalization. Before we knew the gravitation of the heavenly bodies in general, we saw the gravitation of the moon; but, before we had seen the gravitation of the moon, it was necessary that we should have known the general gravitation of heavy bodies on the earth; and, before we learned this general law, we necessarily knew particulars from whence that general idea had been formed. Thus we are not born with general ideas, for, we are not born with particular ideas; and, to conceive generals before particulars, is impossible.

23. Having thus established, as a principle of moral and immoral action, the love and hatred, or conscious affection and aversion, of man to man; the next step in this moral progress, is a second species
cies of love; a principle of action which, with much more justice, might be ascribed to the passion of self-love, than is the first principle, which is the social love of man; but still it is only by implication that this second principle, which is the love of man's affection, and the aversion to his hatred, may be considered as self-love; for self-love, in this second principle, is only instinctive. I love my neighbour, because I have conscious pleasure in him; and I desire that my neighbour may love me, because I have a conscious pleasure in that thought; but this is not loving myself, in the propriety of scientific thought, or philosophic language.

24. There is no question here concerning the preservation of the animal, or the natural provision for the race; we are examining moral principles, the result of conscious thought, and scientific reflection. Now, abstract and general ideas are the work of science; and, before a man can form the idea of his fame, which he may do even in an early period of his life, he must have abstracted and generalised much in his ideas, although he may be far from knowing this order of things in which he has proceeded; this being the science of his thoughts, or belonging to the philosophy of science, which is at present the subject of our contemplation.

If I loved or had esteem and admiration for another person, without having any desire that this person should love, esteem, or admire me, in that case, my conduct would perhaps be very different from that which would naturally follow in consequence of my desiring the love and esteem of that person, without loving or esteeming him. But, in both those cases, my conduct would certainly be directed by the general principle of benevolence: For, whether I loved him, or desired his love, it is impossible to conceive, that the least intention of malevolence could arise from the intellectual motive in supposition, if I proceed in wisdom. Now, which ever of those two different motives shall be the principle of my conscious acti
action or affection, it must give me pleasure or satisfaction to reflect upon the transaction: For, the pleasure is originally sentimental in its nature; and therefore the pleasure of this thought is not lost in reflection, as is the reflection of a sensual pleasure that is past, such as that of a taste or smell, at least not in the same degree. This may be understood by considering; the pleasures of sense may end in pain, and generally or naturally end in disgust; but, a sentimental pleasure, as it is founded in reason, so it does not pall upon the sense, or ever displease in thought.

25. Thus there is a source of happiness, or plesant reflection, in the conscious love and esteem that man has for man, and also in the conscious thought of being loved and esteemed by those for whom he has a love or an esteem. If, therefore, in reviewing consciously our thoughts and actions, we find a subject for pleasure and approbation, in reflecting on ourselves, then, here is, properly speaking, or in the rigour of scientific language, the passion of self-love; for, here is love and approbation, where self is the object of affection.

26. But, this is making, of self-love, a scientific principle, instead of an instinctive passion; the one is the operation of the human mind, proceeding to distinguish in conscious thought, and to reflect, in scientific order, on motives and affections; the other, again, is the work of nature, conducting mind to the end of its intention, and thus producing sentiments of affection and aversion, which, though the proper end of animal life, are but the means or the beginning of human intellect.

27. Thus it will appear, that, from the general assent of mankind, or from the reasoning of philosophers, who in their theory would ascribe to selfish principles all the motives of moral action, as well as from a more accurate analysis of mind, there is truly a principle of self-love, as the motive of moral action; but, it must also appear,
that those philosophers are greatly mistaken in their reasoning, when they either ascribe to self-love, as an effect, the love of others, which is founded in an instinctive principle, or when they impute a baser-ness, of the selfish kind, to a conscientious mind, when it loves itself for loving another.

28. That there are instinctive principles of pleasure and pain, by which an animal or discerning being preserves itself amidst surrounding destruction, and produces the kind from whence it sprung, with the solicitude of a provident wisdom, is evident; but, this natural agent does not know the principle by which it is actuated; and, to suppose this instinctive principle to be the love of self, would be evidently to depart from the truth of scientific distinction.

29. It must be in vain to look for any principle, or species of love, properly speaking, in the mind that is merely animal; for, though the animal has the principle of love in having pleasure and pain, it has not love as a principle; and, to lose sight of this distinction for a moment, must involve metaphysical reasoning in absolute confusion. It is only in man that principle is to be found; and there, we have now shown a principle of self-love which is pure or philosophical. But, there is also to be found a principle of self-love which is spurious; the one is properly self-love, the other selfishness, without the love. Both these are conscientious principles of action; and therefore man is responsible for what proceeds from them.

From self-love, in a person not depraved by false reasoning, it is impossible that any thing but what is laudable can proceed; for, if I love myself for doing right, it is impossible that I voluntarily should do wrong; so far, therefore, as I have formed just ideas of natural things, this pure, this natural, this philosophic principle of self-love, leads me to do that which must meet with general approbation.
But if, when I ought to love my neighbour, I am actuated by a selfishness, in preferring my own animal pleasure to my neighbour’s satisfaction or happiness,—a sensual satisfaction to the exalted pleasure of rejoicing a grateful heart, I am then selfish like a brute, who follows the instigation of his sensual appetites without the knowledge of a principle, a thing which is placed beyond the boundary of his mind. The brute, in acting selfishly, without knowing self, acts innocently, without the transgression of a law; whereas, the man who is selfish, in acting like a brute, and transgressing the law of natural benevolence written in his heart, justly forfeits the title of humanity, the highest to which he may perhaps aspire.

30. But, though man acts thus immorally from a selfish principle, he does not act then from a principle that may be said to be proper to human nature; for, this only happens in human nature emerging from the animal on which it is grafted, and reasoning in the occasional error of corrupted science, whereby man sinks apparently below the level of the brute, who is selfish, though without a fault, and who pursues the nature of his species, without a principle, without wisdom, virtue, love, and without benevolence, that is, without a conscious will, but not without both reason and sentimental passion.

Therefore, this principle of selfishness, considered as an immoral principle, is neither proper to the brute, who reflects not consciously on the motives of his action, nor to human nature enlightened with science, and reasoning philosophically from those principles that are acquired in conscious reflection.

It may indeed be alleged, that selfishness is natural to man, as well as virtue or a principle of disinterestedness; and this is so far true, as every thing which happens is certainly in nature. But it is not true that this happens in nature, as a term to which is then opposed art; for, man is naturally benevolent; and it is only artificially...
ally that he becomes selfish, in proceeding a step beyond nature, under the guidance of his proper reason, which is scientific. But, in this case, he proceeds without reasoning in the truth of science, by which that narrow minded selfishness is reprobated and corrected. Thus the nature of man, arrived at the perfection of this species of mind, is not to be selfish, but to love himself, in having a conscious esteem for his proper motives, and after having first, in the natural order of things, loved and esteemed his neighbour.

31. Thus, in having investigated the natural order of things in the progress of the human mind, we acquire principles for the explaining of moral action; in like manner as, in physics, it is by the investigation of facts, so as to see the order of those eventual things, that we acquire principles from whence, in reasoning, we explain appearances which are termed natural. Now, as, in forming general conclusions from our scientific or investigated physical principles, we arrive at a species of wisdom or philosophy which is termed natural, in like manner proceeding with regard to the principles of moral truth, we arrive at a wisdom, or philosophy, which is properly moral. But, if man is thus to acquire wisdom, and if he is to reflect upon those acquired talents, those conscious motives of his conduct, will he not take pleasure in the reflection? will he not love himself, or approve of his conduct the more on this account? Here is, therefore, a principle of self-love and esteem, a source of pleasure and happiness, to which man might arrive by means of science, even without the means of mankind, provided he might thus scientifically arrive at wisdom.

32. But man, who learns selfishness in the progress of his mind then knowing scientifically, does not, in the more simple views of science, attain that philosophical self-love in which he finds satisfaction, in valuing himself upon a more generous principle, viz. the disregarding his own personal interest, in order to consult or admi-
nifter to the happiness of others. This philosophical enjoyment arises from an intellectual pleasure, which, as it is by no means instinctive, but founded on scientific views or principles, is therefore far removed from the ideas of man in what may be called the first stage of science. It is in this first stage that he learns so well to provide for his immediate feelings, but does not learn to look beyond these, to those instinctive feelings which he has naturally also to his species. It is in the progress of his science, and the perfection of his wisdom, that he may behold his own interest in the happiness of his species; those with whom his joys are multiplied, and every pleasure animated or exalted;—those by whom the suffering of his pain is tempered with joy, and pleasure is infused into the bitterness of his grief.

33. In that first stage of intellect, or scientific knowledge, in which man sets a value upon himself, for the life and sense of pleasure which he is conscious of, man learns to pursue by means of wisdom, i.e. by distant means, that which will procure him the animal pleasure which he esteems, and to avoid what may, in any the most distant manner, contribute to his painful feeling or uneasiness. This then is, properly speaking, being selfish, as this must lead him to be even less benevolent than he is naturally, when in a state of mind more ignorant with regard to ends and means, that is, a state of less wisdom, but, at the same time, a state in which he is more affected with the instinctive love for the individuals of his species. Therefore, here is evidently an intermediate state, in the progress of mind to philosophy and perfect wisdom;—a state interposed betwixt the innocence of man in the natural state, who is easily irritated, but benevolently kind, and, on the other hand, the artificial virtue of man enlightened by wisdom, who is made benevolent upon a moral principle.

In this intermediate state, the man, in being wise, becomes selfish; but
but here he exceeds as much, in selfishness, the true bounds of reason or truth, as, in the knowledge of himself, he has fallen short of the perfection of his nature; he therefore has a wisdom which is still imperfect. But having, through this intermediate state of imperfect wisdom, arrived at the perfection of his nature, he then corrects that selfishness which had led him to pursue his animal pleasure at the expense of his intellectual enjoyment, which at that time he did not understand; and this opens his eyes to a new enjoyment, which is that of himself. Now, this he finds not in his proper animal pleasures, but in the enjoyment of others; not in satisfying his own immediate personal desires, but in sacrificing at least part of his proper and present satisfaction, to purchase a more durable enjoyment. Thus, instead of glutting his angry passion with a revenge which is in his power, he enjoys a purer pleasure in heaping a favour on the head of an inconfiderate enemy;—instead of indulging a brutal passion of love, towards a fair captive fallen into his power, he restores her to the arms of her lover or her spouse, and, from this virtuous action, enjoys a satisfaction which lasts during life.

34. Man, having conscious knowledge, does not impose upon himself, that is, he does not voluntarily deceive himself, although, in misunderstanding himself, he is deceived. It is thus that man is often led to do, in ignorance, that which, in more perfect knowledge, he would have avoided. Man, for example, in the progress of his mind, comes to understand the value of being esteemed by others, which, in the natural order of things, he does before understanding the value of esteeming himself. In this case, where man is happy in the esteem of others, and has not attained to the knowledge of his chief good, he may endeavour to obtain that esteem by deceiving others, in appearing to them what he is not in reality: But, this is not understanding his true interest; for, the moment he comes to understand that it is he alone must make himself happy, he then makes himself estimable to others, not only in order to be esteemed by
by them, but also for his own sake, that is, in order to esteem himself. In this case, where he is truly enlightened with regard to himself, he cannot attempt to deceive others; for, if there were only this alternative, he would choose rather to seem despicable to those who do not truly know him, than, by deceit, to make himself truly despicable in his own eyes.

35. Thus it is, that self-love is both the first principle of moral action, and the last. When it is the first, it is improperly termed self-love; it is only an instinctive or physical principle of action, in which the general interest of animal life is wisely consulted in the system of nature. When, again, it is the last, it is then a scientific principle; not out of nature, but in the wisdom of the intellectual system, contrived by the Author of nature for the happiness of man. In this manner are to be explained all the various appearances which are observed in the progress of mind, from its material origin to a more perfect state, in which it may be conceived to subsist independent of those means which had been wisely employed for the production of that intellectual existence. The application of these principles will form the subject of the next section.
SECTION VI.

Philosophy of Moral Conduct, or, a System of Morality in the wisdom of Voluntary Agents.

CHAP. I.

General View of Virtue and Morality.

1. VIRTUE and morality are often considered as terms that are synonymous; there may, however, be some distinction made, with regard to those two terms.

Morals are the rules formed by man, for his conduct in life. These rules of human conduct, therefore, may be conceived either in wisdom and benevolence, or in folly and malice; in the one case, they are virtuous, and, in the other, they are vicious.

Thus it will appear, that so far as the morals of man, which are of his own forming, shall be according to the laws of human nature, which is the intention of the First Cause, and which philosophy may discover, the virtue of man must consist in his pursuing the system of nature truly; and, so far as the intention of nature, in designing man to be a wise agent, is good, virtue must be considered as good morals,
morals, vice bad morals. A state of virtue should thus appear to be a state of human perfection; and, a state of vice must be the degeneracy of man from that state of perfection, for which he was designed by nature, and which he is made to attain in the light of science, commonly called human reason.

2. The conceiving of ends and means in truth, that is, the proper adapting of ends and means, constitutes simple wisdom; the conceiving these again in error, that is, the misapplication of ends and means, constitutes what is properly termed folly. Means are only conceived in order to attain an end; to consider means, therefore, independent of the end, could not serve any purpose in the speculation of a voluntary agent. But, by such an agent, an end may be considered independent of the means by which it is to be attained. For, as an end is naturally founded on a desire, it may be a subject of examination, how far an end is either in truth, i.e. properly conformed to a natural desire, or in error, i.e. not conformed to a natural desire, or not properly founded on it.

If a desire be natural, it is then a just desire, and cannot be wrong or unjust, unless we should suppose nature leading us astray; a supposition which man may agree to in his error, not his science. If, on the contrary, the desire be not natural, but artificial, or founded in human reason, then it may be erroneous; for man, though not misled by nature, is naturally subject to error in his scientific reasoning. If therefore man, in forming a desire, reasons from a false principle, or reasons falsely from a true one, he will form a false desire, that is, a desire not founded upon a natural principle, a desire not calculated for the good of his constitution, consequently, a desire conceived in error and not in truth; for, it is not consistent with his nature to desire evil, no more than to seek after pain.

Instead of supposing man to form a false or erroneous desire, we may
may suppose him forming a true or just desire, but conceiving means which should lead to a different end: Here man, who is acting the part of a wise person in adapting ends and means, would transgress his wisdom, and would conceive means in his folly, or his ignorance.

3. It will now appear, that a wise end properly adapted to its means, or wisely attained, constitutes wisdom of an higher order, than that of wisely adapting means to fulfil a natural desire. For here, in order to have the end conceived in wisdom, it must be considered in itself abstractively, and judged in relation to some general principle, such as those of good and evil, to see how far the end is just, as well as to judge how far the means are true or adequate.

4. The animal mind, without science or general knowledge, judges in truth, by adapting natural means, or such as have been occasionally presented, in order to attain an end, not consciously conceived from a general principle, but naturally directed by the instinctive action of desire. An intellectual mind, again, that judges in contemplating the truth or simple wisdom of ends and means, is a scientific mind, as having analysed its thoughts, and formed general principles by which these are judged. But, a mind that, besides judging scientifically in relation to ends and means, shall judge wisely also, in knowing what is best in ends and just in means, is a mind that has formed more than science; it is therefore more than simply wise; it has formed system in judging of its proper conduct, and it has judged of wisdom in considering its own design.

5. By generalising in relation to this operation of judging scientifically a design, man forms a principle, which, besides his brute pleasure and animal satisfaction, has in view an intellectual enjoyment, as an end or a design. Consequently, man, acting from this principle
principle conceived in truth, will find a happiness in the enjoyment of his wisdom: Whereas, in willing from this principle conceived in error, he must act in folly; he then will find a disappointment in his views; and instead of an intellectual satisfaction, he will suffer, in repenting of his design.

6. If man, in his reflection, may thus repent, here is the foundation of moral action, in which man finds himself accountable to his conscience for the wisdom or the folly of his intention; and here is the distinguishing character of man, who judges scientifically of his design, and conscientiously of his action or the determination of his will.

7. But, besides the wisdom of his intention, man has for contemplation also the goodness of his volition, or the benevolence of his design. Man, naturally, cannot will evil; for, directly from evil, there flows not any pleasure. In willing evil, man may find pleasure indirectly, as imagining that from such action he may reap some pleasure or relief; but then, this is reasoning from remote causes; it is a scientific speculation, and therefore should be conceived in truth, and not in error. If such an intention be conceived in truth, here would be wisdom, if in error, folly; if wisely ordered, that action may be attended with satisfaction, if foolishly resolved, it may be followed with repentance. This science, therefore, in which man judges with regard to the justness of his desires and the wisdom of his motives, constitutes morality, or the philosophy of conscience, that is, the wisdom of his will, as distinguished in relation to that order of things in which the wisdom of nature is observed.

8. Therefore, in treating of this subject, it is required to analyze man's thought, in order to arrive at the principle of action, and then to consider how far that principle shall be conform to nature, or conforment
ffent with the good or general satisfaction of the person who has willed. For, if there are, in relation to moral action, two different species, one which is always approved of in our reflection, and another which, though consciously willed, is afterwards disapproved of, and gives us pain in the reflection, it would highly interest man to make a science of his voluntary actions, as well as of those actions which are instinctive in their nature, or which are from necessity and not from choice.

9. In mind, there is both action and passion; for, it has been shown how knowledge is produced in those two different ways. There are also two different lights in which the action and passion of mind may be considered; for, human action is either on the one hand natural, or on the other moral. Natural action and passion of mind correspond to that which has already been treated of, under the term instinctive; whereas, moral action and passion may be considered as corresponding to what has been termed conscious, scientific, and artificial or philosophic.

10. With regard to natural action and passion of mind, it has been shown *, that pain is the passion which causes action, and that pleasure is properly the effect which follows that action when it is conducted in a certain manner. Therefore, in the natural course of things, animal pleasure is the end or general aim for action and passion, and pain only a mean employed in order to produce the end pleasure, which is then the final cause. Consequently, herein may be observed a system of benevolence, so far as the end is good; and a system of wisdom, so far as the means are properly adapted to the end.

11. Moral action and passion being now the subject of inquiry, if the same system of perfect benevolence is here to be looked for, in the

* Part I. Sect. VI, Chap. IV,
the analogy of things, we may expect to find, first, the passion of misery, as leading in science to moral action; secondly, the effect of moral action, as leading in a general enjoyment to a principle of virtue; and, lastly, virtuous principle, as leading in philosophy to self approbation and conscious happiness. If, after due examination, this shall be found actually the case, the systems of natural and moral philosophy will be made mutually to support each other; and a consistency will be observed, in nature, in knowledge, and philosophy, which may give satisfaction to a mind inquiring after the efficient and final causes of its conduct, the motives and consequences of its volition.

12. Thus it will appear, that we are to seek for the theory of virtue in conscious principle, and the principle of moral action in nature; not nature considered as different from the mind of man, but nature as comprehending man, and as having formed the constitution of the human mind. Now, unless we discover virtue as thus founded in something which is from nature, How shall we find a general, an universal, in that which man thinks right? But, by finding man actuated, in his virtuous principle, by that which is to be found in all men, we shall then arrive at the understanding of his moral principle, when he is virtuous; and we shall know this principle of virtue, as an universal. This, then, will form a view of the subject, which will be properly in philosophy.
Virtue Examined Analytically in order to see its Principles.

1. BY virtuous and vicious, which as terms are applied to the act of the will, is always implied, that such action was, in the first place, conscious, and, in the second place, that this conscious action was, either according to some principle, or in transgression of it; that is to say, this action either is, or is not, in conformity with some rule of conduct which the person, who had conscientiously ordained the action, knew. Thus it will be proper to inquire, what are those conscious rules of conduct, on which virtue may be founded.

2. Whatever is laid down as a rule of conduct, and approved of in a person's mind, is a principle of virtue. But, as that which is a rule of conduct in one mind, may be in opposition to that which is a rule of conduct in another, there must be some rule more general, or superior to every particular rule, if virtue is in its nature fixed and general; and, if it is not so, then no science can be made of virtue or of morals.

Thus, the rules of virtue may be considered as either on the one hand arbitrary, in which case they are not fixed and general, or, on the other, natural, which last, being fixed and general, may be investigated in the order of science. Hence, in the consideration of virtuous and vicious conduct, we are not to examine what may be esteemed such by particular persons, or even particular nations; but, we are to look for that which is general to mankind, and will always be esteemed virtuous and vicious by the species, independent of
of the opinion that may be occasionally entertained by particulars, either in an arbitrary manner, or in opposition to the general rules.

3. The fundamental rule of virtuous conduct, is good and evil; and these are general terms expressing approbation and disapprobation, agreeable and disagreeable ideas. Therefore, whatever pleases is a proper foundation for moral action, and, whatever displeases, for that which is immoral.

But, may not what is agreeable to one be disagreeable to another; and thus the general rule of virtue be altogether unsteady and precarious. Sweetness is agreeable to one, bitterness to another; to some, sourness is pleasing, while it displeases others; and, what happens in point of taste, may take place in the case of sentiment, these being founded originally in our feelings which are animal and instinctive.

To this it must be answered, that, in such apparent confusion, there is also rule to be observed, and, this rule will be found to conduct the moral sense. There is nothing perhaps in nature absolutely disagreeable; for, this depends upon circumstances or conditions, and degree: It may be also affirmed, that in similar circumstances or conditions, and in equal degrees, the same things are either agreeable or disagreeable to all minds of the same species. Therefore, it can be no objection, to good and evil, pleasing and displeasing, being general or fundamental in the rules of virtuous conduct or moral action, that the same thing may be agreeable and disagreeable to different minds at the same time; or, to the same mind at different times; for, an intelligent mind considers all this, when it judges of what is pleasing and displeasing. In cold weather, good manners gives a stranger the warmest place; but this, in hot weather, would be ill manners. Some people love wormwood in their drink; but he would be a very ill mannered landlord, who
who should give this to his guests without inquiring at them concerning their taste.

4. Hence, notwithstanding the differences that may take place in the taste of particular persons, or in their opinions, so far as formed in dissimilar and unequal circumstances or conditions, there are certain rules, by which the general sentiments of good and evil are formed in every mind of the human species; as well as, it is upon general principles, that natural feelings, tastes, and affections, are produced in every one, so far as equal circumstances will admit.

In every actual existence there is system, rule, or principle; which rule forms the basis of that thing: But, every rule of this kind admits of varieties, which, though they produce perpetual differences in things, never transgress the rule of which they only form a modification in the strictest order. Thus, in the solar system, for example, the appointed rules of motion are perpetually varying the visible effect; at the same time, the cause is never changed, nor the rule transgressed. Each planet describes a particular figure in its orbit, and no planet moves twice in the same path; nevertheless, they are all moved by the same principles, and they never transgress the fixed rules of their existence. This is the case in physical order, and it is the same in moral causes.

5. Virtue is not founded immediately upon sense; for, if virtue, like reason, flowed necessarily from or immediately succeeded sensation and perception, then, every animal which had sense might have also virtue, but it would be absurd to suppose virtue in a brute. Neither is virtue founded immediately on reason, or that faculty of mind in which knowledge is distinguished; for, the animal, who has no virtue, distinguishes those things that are agreeable or pleasant, and those that are not so, no less than man who is capable of virtue. Virtue therefore, must be founded upon some farther progress of the thinking power;
power; a progress not proper to the animal, who without thought acts wisely for the purpose of his life; but proper to man, who thinks wisely for the purpose of his moral conduct.

6. Moral action being founded in the opinion of good and evil, these, it is now to be observed, are abstract general ideas, the originals of which are to be found in the particular feelings of pleasure and pain, by which the instinctive action of the animal is excited. Now, when, in generalising our abstract ideas, we distinguish ourselves, first, as having the power either to act, or not to act; and secondly, as acting consciously either from this motive, or that, according as we think the one good, and the other evil, the one agreeable, the other disagreeable, or, as we approve of or like the one, and disapprove of or dislike the other, we then cease to act from instinctive knowledge, and conduct ourselves, properly speaking, in acting as people who think sensibly, that is, scientifically; for, this popular phrase of sense has no other meaning. It is then only, that ideas of virtue may be formed in such a mind, when the end or intention of that mind, considered as the motive of the action, is approved of in reflecting on the subject.

Hence, virtue requires conscious thought, the light of scientific reason, and the cool discernment of a mind that is not instinctively actuated by its passions, or blindly hurried on to its determination by a narrow though scientific view. A person of this sort must have in wisdom attained such a command over his will, as only to determine after considering the subject in its various circumstances, and having in view the consequences that may follow this transaction.

Thus virtue is an opinion, in a person’s mind, which is to determine his will, in future action. Hence, this opinion is to be formed; for, opinions are not born with man; nor are general opinions, such
such as are found in virtue, ever formed by animals incapable of
science.

As a virtuous opinion requires the knowledge of good and evil, a
virtuous action consists in the proper election of a mind acting in a
voluntary manner, and thus ordaining that which then seems best.
It is not necessary that this person, in order to act virtuously, should
know what is absolutely best in the particular case in which he is ac-
ting; it is enough, that such an agent shall know the general idea
of best on this occasion, shall then act according to that idea, and
shall not allow himself to transgress this general rule on a particular
occasion, when he might incline to do that which seemed to him
good, though not the best.

7. Virtue therefore, in an agent, though not requiring omniscience,
still requires knowledge; without a sufficient degree of which,
or without a proper species of which, virtue could not exist. Now
it may be inquired, what this knowledge is which virtue necessarily
requires.

The knowledge required for virtue is not that knowledge which is
absolute, primary, and instinctive; a knowledge upon which the fa-
culty of reason proceeds to operate for the production of our under-
fstanding, or for the progress of mind; but, it is a general intellectual
knowledge, founded on that which is particular and instinctive: The
instinctive knowledge of good and evil, or pain and pleasure, re-
quires not reason; for, it is one of the objects on which this facul-
ty of reason operates in discerning or judging identity or difference,
similarity or dissimilarity, equality or disparity; and it is in thus
judging in relation to good and evil, which are first instinctive and
particular, that we arrive at the ideas of good and evil, which are
scientific and more general.
Good and evil are thus founded upon our instinctive knowledge or original sentiment; and they are abstract general ideas. They are either, on the one hand, applicable to external action, when they are a passion in our mind, which is then a sense and not a sentiment, for example, pleasant and painful feelings; or, on the other hand, they are applicable to the action of mind, which is then the cause of its own suffering; in which case, the good or evil, following from that action, is not a sensation, but it is a sentiment in the mind which is then affected. Such as, for example, joy and grief, affection and aversion, anger or love.

When the knowledge of pleasure and pain, which is absolute and particular, is made the subject of human thought in reflection, it then, from instinctive knowledge, becomes a conscious idea in being known and distinguished. But this conscious idea, which is the first production of a reflecting mind, is far from being that general idea which may be considered as the universal. Nor is it even a scientific idea; for, it is not as yet supposed to be generalised, but simply to be known, which it must be before it is judged; and, to be understood, in being assimilated or generalised, it must be judged or distinguished. (Part I. Sect. IX. Chap. III.)

8. The conscious idea, which a mind forms in thought or reflection from the instinctive knowledge or sensation of pain and pleasure, may be conceived abstractedly from the other objects or knowledge which attend this feeling; and, in that case, there is formed an abstract idea which is properly scientific. This may be also general in assimilating the conscious knowledge or distinguished idea; but still, this is not the idea of good and evil.

Good and evil are not superfluous terms, which, if perfectly synonymous with those of pleasure and pain, they must be. They are expressive of something still more distant from the sense, the original
or absolute knowledge. Therefore, in a metaphysical investigation, it is proper to see how this generalization is brought about, or what are the steps to be observed in this progress, from the one extreme which is instinctive, to the other which is intellectual and scientific.

Before we can have the ideas of good and evil, we must know that pain and pleasure may be various in their degrees, as well as different in their kind. Pain is the term that expresses the general idea of our feelings, when we are, for example, burned, bruised, cut, &c.; or it includes the particulars of burning, bruising, cutting, suffocating, extreme hunger and extreme thirst, &c. But what is the general idea, which in all those cases expresses our knowledge, or comprehends every degree of pain, as well as pain of every kind? Is not this general idea expressed in the term evil? Good and evil, therefore, are the generals, which comprehend every degree of pleasure and pain; and these are indefinite, in like manner as pain and pleasure comprehend every species of this kind of knowledge. Thus things, that are pleasant, are pleasant more or less; and so are those that are painful: This is the conceiving those ideas of pain and pleasure, which are abstract and scientific, in connection with the scientific ideas of quantity or degree.

Hence, in generalizing every degree and every species of pleasure and pain, of sense and sentimental feeling, we form an universal, in relation to this species of our absolute knowledge; and this is termed good and evil. But what we suppose to be neither the one nor other of those, that is, the knowledge or sensation in which we distinguish neither pain nor pleasure, this we term indifferent. Thus, the ideas of good and evil are not only or simply scientific, they are scientific ideas highly generalized, so as, from particulars or absolute and instinctive knowledge, to be scientific ideas generalized to universals. It is then that they become principles, to be employed in philosophy
philosophy or the most general reasoning of the mind, and also form the most interesting subject of inquiry for the human intellect.

Man alone, of all the animal kind, is that species which seems capable of this inquiry after good and evil; and thus forms ideas of happiness and misery. These are particular states of mind in relation to the opinions of good and evil, as good and evil are general opinions of the mind in relation to things pleasant and painful.

Good and evil are abstract terms applied to ideas the most general perhaps of any in the human mind; for, What is there to which the term of either good or evil will not apply? Every thing and every thought, that enters the head or heart of man, must have one or other of those two terms applicable to it. A thing that is indifferent, indeed, is neither good nor evil; but, such a thing exists not, otherwise than in our ignorance or supposition. If thus a term or an idea is applicable to every thing, this must be the most general idea. More and less, great and small, are ideas that are very general, and those of quantity and quality extremely abstract ideas; but, the ideas of good and evil, if these are not more abstract, at least they are more general than any of those general ideas.

Good is the general; but, What is the particular?—The particular of good is that which pleases; for, whatever pleases is termed good; and, whatever displeases is termed evil. The abstract general idea, therefore, of good and evil is founded ultimately in our knowledge which is absolute, which is absolutely, and which cannot be doubted.

Pleasure and pain are, therefore, the original knowledge of which good and evil are the generals; but, How far, from the knowledge of good and evil, is the particular knowledge of pain and pleasure, which is here termed absolute, which is natural, and which is the instinctive
intrinsic conductor of every action that is properly animal! The investigation of this progress of the mind, from the particular in which we can have no further knowledge or understanding, to the general, which is the subject of intellect and object of philosophy, forms our understanding of this subject, and the explication of our knowledge on this occasion.

9. In those two cases, of either sensual or sentimental feelings, the general abstract ideas of good and evil are not only applicable simply, when on the one hand either pleasure and joy, or on the other pain and grief are felt, and thus judged to be absolutely either good or evil, but, those ideas are also considered relatively, in each being compared with itself, or similar ideas differing in degree; when, for example, one idea is compared with another idea of the same kind, and found to be either more or less of either of these qualities of good or evil.

It is thus that conscious agents not only determine from the absolute good or evil, which may be found connected with an event, but also from the relative good or evil, that is, the degrees that may be judged in these respectively, when compared with some other idea to which these may have a reference in our mind.

Salt and wine, as ingredients of our meal, are good; but, excess of either is certainly evil. In like manner, raillery in conversation is good and pleasant; but, it may be carried to excess, when it ceases to be good or agreeable. Punishment, in cases of offence, may be just and proper, consequently good; but, the pain inflicted may be carried to excess, in which case it becomes cruelty; and thus, that which was good, in one degree, is evil, in another.

10. Virtue requiring judgment in relation to good and evil, it may
be now considered, how far the mind is capable of forming a proper judgment on these occasions.

Good and evil, that are absolute and actual, cannot be mistaken, when in sufficient degree to form a judgment; and, when it is otherwise, it is of no importance the judging a thing to be indifferent, when the good or evil is only in an undistinguishable degree.

But, good and evil, though absolute as knowledge, may not be always actual, that is to say, the events to be judged may not be present, but are to be formed in idea, and then judged of without being felt immediately. The mind has also to judge, not only with regard to its own proper feelings, but also with regard to what is to be the feelings of another person. In all those cases, scientific reasoning, or the just formation of abstract general ideas, is required in order to judge of things which are not actually, but are to be in certain conceived cases and conditions; these conditions, therefore, are the data from whence the mind is then to judge in the proper manner of science.

Thus it will appear, that in proportion as the good and evil, to be judged of, are removed from being either absolute or actual, it requires the greater degree of knowledge, or natural science, in the person's mind who is to judge; and, on the contrary, the more actual and absolute the good and evil to be judged, the less scientific knowledge it requires, in order to be sensible of good and evil, or to determine according to those principles which may be either general and abstract, or particular and natural. In this last case, the brute is equally a judge as a philosopher; but, the brute does not judge scientifically, as a man does in judging from general principles, he judges naturally and instinctively; a term which we do not consider as properly belonging to man, because, he is in general far removed from
from the condition in which the brute only judges, although every person was in that condition when he first began to judge.

II. It is upon this knowledge of good and evil, that is founded virtue. The brute animal has all the sensations that we are endued with; he has also sentimental passions of love and anger, expectation and apprehension, affection and aversion, in like manner as man; but, the brute cannot be considered as having a sense of virtue. For, it requires, first, scientific knowledge of good and evil, as abstract general ideas; and, secondly, the exercise of reason, in judging upon what occasions those ideas are severally annexed to actions which are to be done, or to the will that ordains action; now this requires the nice distinction of certain general rules that are conceived.

The greater or the more immediate pleasure always determines the action or desire of the animal, who thus has no will that is free, being determined by a law which is not from that animal, but is from nature. But, the intelligent mind of man is actuated by another motive, different from this law of nature; the free will of man is always determined by the greater good in his estimation. This idea, therefore, of good being the proper operation of his own mind, and not a thing merely instinctive in its nature, as is the motive pain, or pleasure, his will is determined by himself, or by that which he had in his science determined before.

When, for example, I obey the natural motives of hunger and thirst, I act instinctively; although I may also act thus voluntarily, in approving of the natural motive. But, when I have formed to myself a certain law of abstinence, I then proceed scientifically in forming a rule by which my future will is to be determined; and, in conducting my actions according to this rule, I then voluntarily transgress the natural motive or instinctive rule of action. In this
case, therefore, my will is free, in having depended upon my rational faculty and scientific powers; and it is not necessary, as following the natural course or cause of animal action, but is artificial in relation to that nature, though natural in relation to man, who is made for morality in having the faculty of acquiring science.

It will now be evident, that the instinctive action of the animal cannot be in error, without nature being wrong, or not in perfect wisdom. Whereas, if in reasoning scientifically I have reasoned erroneously, and formed a false estimate in relation to the greater Good, then, in willing freely from my knowledge or my principle, and in acting unrestrainedly from my will, I may afterwards become sensible of my error; and I must then certainly repent of my determination, in finding I had been deceived, as not knowing the greater Good, or as having formed a mistaken estimate, with regard to several events which it was in my power by willing to produce. Now, it may be proper to shew, that this must follow, as a necessary consequence in the conscious reasoning of a scientific mind, which is thus led to form a judgment in relation to moral, i.e. scientific, good and evil.

The idea of good or evil, applied to an action, means that good or evil has followed in consequence of that action. This, however, does not bring the good or evil, which has happened, home as an action to the mind from whence it had proceeded, unless the action had been the necessary consequence of the will; in like manner as the good or evil, as a passion, had been the necessary consequence of the action from whence it had proceeded.

It is therefore only voluntary agents, who reflect upon their knowledge and ideas of good and evil, and also form ideas of what is to be the consequence of actions ordained in a voluntary manner, that may be affected conscientiously with the consequence of such ordained
dained action, so as, to be either pleased or displeased, to approve or disapprove, and thus feel either good or evil as an ultimate effect of the action which had proceeded from its proper will.

12. It is impossible that the mind can displease itself immediately; the mind can only act from the motive which prevails at the time, or which then pleases; although, upon reflection, we may be displeased with the action after it has come to pass, or disapprove of the motive which had before prevailed in determining the action. Thus we are made to regret our own will, as having been followed by an evil effect; but, we never can accuse ourselves of having willed evil to ourselves. When, therefore, we find the action of our mind to have been evil in its consequence, we cannot accuse ourselves of malevolence, but of folly, or want of wisdom sufficient to have known what was to have been the consequence of our will.

13. It is also to be concluded, that there is no immediate motive for a mind acting so as to displease another mind or person. All the instinctive action or natural affection of mind, leads directly to avoid pain and misery in every shape or idea, and to pursue pleasure and joy either immediately or sympathetically in reflection. It is only in the pursuit of this pleasure, which is the immediate object of action, that a mind, in its natural state, which is not that of anger, displeases occasionally; and thus does evil to another, not immediately, in seeking that end, but by means of an idea of its own good, which it then pursues.

It is thus that a mind which only acts instinctively (and not voluntarily, as forming conscious motives for its proper conduct, and considering the consequences of its will) does nothing but occasional evil; and, thus hurts another mind, in following its own pleasure; which pursuit is ordered in perfect wisdom, for the preservation of the individual, and continuation of the species. But, this is not
not the case with conscious beings, who, having formed principles for their proper conduct, have thus voluntary motives for action, in which there is a choice, and for which election that mind is afterwards answerable in reflection.

14. Though we cannot will evil to ourselves, yet, in acting, we often intend evil with regard to another person; in which case, our will is either approved or disapproved of afterwards in our reflection. If it is approved, then we have acted in wisdom, at the same time that we have ordained evil; if, on the contrary, it is afterwards disapproved of in our own mind, then, at the same time that we ordained evil, we acted without wisdom; and thus we have in repentance a regret that is aggravated with the conviction of our proper folly.

If, instead of intending evil, in acting with regard to another person, we shall ordain good, then, this action may in like manner be found to have been conceived either in wisdom, in which case the natural pleasure of doing good is increased with the sentiment of wisdom and self-approbation; or, it may be found to have been conceived without wisdom, when the natural pleasure of doing good will be either diminished or overcome with the sentiment of folly in our conduct, or with the disapprobation of our choice.

15. Thus every action that an intellectual mind ordains, that is to say, every motive which a reflecting and wise person should prefer, must be examined, first, in relation to good and evil, and, secondly, in relation to wisdom and folly.

But, besides our own approbation and disapprobation, which this examination leads to, there is another sentiment, which we feel from the approbation and disapprobation of others whether real or imagined. For, if an action, which we have ourselves disapproved of,
is thought to be also disapproved of by others, then, here is an ag-
gravation to our regret or misery; and in like manner, our satisfac-
tion may be increased by the approbation of others, which we either
have, or think to have, in consequence of anything we have done.

16. Now, as there is, in the satisfaction and remorse which is felt
in the mind independent of the opinion of others, a compound ra-
tio, according to the intrinsic good or evil, and wisdom or folly, be-
longing to the action; so, in taking into consideration the opinion
of others in relation to an action of ours, the case is rendered still
more complicated, in having the approbation or disapprobation of
others either to increase or diminish those of our own mind.

In this case, therefore, where an action and its motives are to be
viewed by two different minds*, there are two several motives, in-
fluencing the action; which two motives may either conspire toget-
er, or oppose each others influence, in determining the measure or
action which this reflecting mind is to pursue.

17. If Brutus, in killing Cæsar, has the approbation of his own
mind, but thinks he will have the disapprobation of his fellow citi-
zens, here are, in the mind of Brutus, two motives which oppose
each other, in relation to that action; and, in this case, the mind
will be determined only by the excess of the one of those motives,
after subtracting that part of the prevailing motive which is balanced
by the opposition of the other. But, the approbation of Brutus's
own mind, to this act, could only be obtained, after opposing the
natural humanity of the man, and the moral tie of friendship, by
the love of the commonwealth, which overbalanced the other two.

18. There-

* Different minds do not always see things in the same light, but commonly differ
with regard at least to quantity, if not quality, by which the nature of a motive and ac-
tion may be altered.
18. Therefore, as, in determining an action from a present motive, the mind may hesitate or balance from the consideration of what will be its own proper opinion in reflection after the turbulence of passion has subsided, it may, in like manner, be brought into the greatest hesitation, in considering its own approbation, or condemnation, contrasted respectively with the condemnation or approbation of others. It is upon these occasions that philosophy, which is the most general knowledge and reflection of the human intellect, comes properly to the relief of a distracted mind, in showing the preference of the most lasting enjoyment of approbation, to the transient pleasure of a present satisfaction; and by representing to the mind, that, while there is the greatest uncertainty in human affairs, the approbation of our own mind is the proper means of consolation in distress, and of happiness in prosperity. Here therefore rule within rule, or rule upon rule in an ascending series.

19. So far as virtue is founded on wisdom, virtue cannot be perfect in a mind that is not perfectly wise, no more than a mind can be perfectly wise without the perfection of knowledge. Thus it is impossible that man can act, upon all occasions, so as not to repent; for, his wisdom being imperfect, he may err frequently, or must err on some occasions. So far, therefore, as virtue consists in prudence, man, in acting, must deviate from the perfect rule: But this is not the case with virtue, so far as virtue is founded on benevolence. A conscious being has perfect knowledge of what passes in his mind, when he wills, or determines action; and if, upon this occasion, he cannot distinguish when he intends good and when he intends evil, such a person does not fall properly within the subject here considered.

Now, if a person knowingly intends good in an action, where he should, in perfect wisdom, have intended evil, that person may see the folly of his action in discovering his error; but, so far as he acted
acted upon a good principle, and according to his knowledge, he
cannot repent of his vice, however he may regret his ignorance.
But, so far as he acted upon a principle of benevolence, and ac-
cording to what he judged to be best, however he may afterwards re-
gret the action in acknowledging his ignorance, he cannot accuse
himself of either vice or crime.

But, a moral agent, in acting, may transgress his knowledge, in
following the dictates of his compassionate feeling, where, from his
sense of duty, he ought to have been severer; in that case, the action
may be attended with repentance, in disapproving of the prevailing
motive. Now, though here the rule of wisdom be transgressed,
which is properly vice or folly, the will cannot be accused of crime
in transgressing the rule of absolute benevolence; and though, in this
case, there be a fault, in having transgressed a rule which that moral
agent knew, yet this can only amount to folly, or defect of wisdom,
in not making a just estimate among different motives, which hap-
pen to be in opposition.

On the other hand, a person may have intended evil in an action,
where, in perfect wisdom, he should have intended good or not in-
tended evil; and, in this case, he may have either consciously acted
from a sense of duty, as considering the action proper; or, he may
have been conscious that he was acting wrong. In the one case,
that person may lament the misunderstanding of his knowledge, but
he cannot condemn himself as being in any degree criminal in his
intention. This, however, is not the case, when he has transgressed
his knowledge in acting from the motive of evil when he thought
he should in justice have done otherwise, but was tempted, by the
mercenary view of a temporary enjoyment, to sacrifice, not only his
sense of good, but his judgment of what is right; here, his repen-
tance must be attended with a remorse, in which conscience does not
fail to condemn the action in proportion to the light acquired, nor
to sting the criminal in proportion to the guilt. Here is what may be properly termed crime; being the violation of virtue, in knowingly transgressing the rules of wisdom and benevolence.

Hence it will appear, that from the constitution of mind in general, conducted in its action by the instinctive passion of pleasure and pain, and from that of intellect naturally directed in its choice by the knowledge of good and evil, there is no difficulty for the meaning understanding to form a general rule of virtue, or a rule of acting towards others from a general principle of benevolence. Every person therefore, capable of forming this general principle, is justly responsible (whether in the natural call of conscience, or the artificial summons of mankind) for his conduct upon those occasions, in which it must be either moral or immoral; if it is the first, he is acquitted; if the last, he is condemned.

20. Here is therefore a scientific idea of virtue, that is formed in the most extensive view of human nature, and is calculated for the conduct of a conscious being of intelligence, such as man. This idea is not rendered less just, in acknowledging that, on the one hand, the following this perfect rule of virtue rigidly on all occasions may be considered as difficult or impracticable, in creatures so strongly endowed with personal and particular feelings; for, on the other hand, there are perhaps few enlightened minds in which this philosophical idea of perfect virtue has not an evident influence in their general disposition; however their conduct may be occasionally warped, by the instinctive sense they have from that animal state in which they necessarily subsist, and which cannot be neglected in any considerable degree without the most glaring absurdity, in being exposed to personal evil and the ridicule of others.

But, on the one hand, this is considering virtue in the most abstract and general view, like the idea of lines, figures, and equalities
in mathematics; and, in both those cases, the general scientific view, or philosophical idea, serves in giving rules for the actual practice, which has thus a certain aim for a conduct determined in contemplation, though impossible in effect. If, on the other hand, we descend to nature, and connect this abstract idea of virtue with moral agents, then it may be observed, there is a double prospect through which virtue will be viewed, that is, in considering either ourselves or others as the objects of this quality. In this case, although the essence of virtue may not be changed in our idea, yet the constituent parts of that compound quality may be variously approved of or admitted in different degrees; for example, it is natural to admire an excess either of prudence on the one hand, or of benevolence on the other, according as the prospect through which virtue is viewed shall be turned either in the one direction or the other. The most just decree of an arbitrator is often found to displease the two contending parties.

21. This imperfect state of practical virtue is founded in the nature and constitution of man, who, as an individual, cannot arrive at that perfection, which may nevertheless be considered as proper to him or his species, and the object of his particular aim. The nature of man is good, or the goodness of man is perfect, so far as he arrives at the end for which he is intended. But, he is not created perfect, as he is made good; on the contrary, he has to proceed in knowledge, to improve his wisdom more and more, and to change his mind, which may become truly virtuous, and must do so as he becomes wise. In this respect, therefore, his wisdom differs from his goodness, which is originally perfect. He is therefore absolutely responsible for the transgressions of his goodness, but only conditionally for those of his wisdom, that is, in proportion as this is acquired.

But man, in judging of himself and others, is subject to mistake,
there not being in that case any means or perfect rule from whence to form impartial and just comparisons. For, on the one hand, every man is conscious of his own benevolence or malevolence in relation to others, while he is jealous with regard to his wisdom which he is conscious is imperfect. On the other hand, as we only judge the benevolence and malevolence of another person from his action, we often are deceived in ascribing to malevolence what is due to folly. Thus we naturally judge others to be more wise in general, and less benevolent than they truly are. With regard to ourselves again, the wiser man suspects his own wisdom most; fools, perhaps, never doubt their wisdom; and, with regard to goodness, it is only a person who is truly virtuous, that is, virtuous upon the truest principle, that ever questions his own benevolence. For, man, who is benevolent by nature, knows not naturally that he is benevolent; and man, who in the folly of his science is malevolent, does not think that this is wrong; but, when man knows that benevolence is the duty of his station, and the means of his enjoyment, he then regrets every occasion in which he has been made to depart from this perfect rule of virtue.

22. But, though the constitution of virtue may be thus variable with the circumstances in which it is practically viewed, yet, theoretically, or in the view of an unbiased spectator who were to look on human things, the nature of virtue would appear unalterable in its composition. A person would be considered as being virtuous in proportion as he were both prudent and benevolent, without suffering the one of these two motives to predominate or stifle the influence of the other. Now, this is precisely the difference betwixt the philosophical and the practical idea of virtue.

Thus the science of virtue is, like that of mathematics, perfect, at the same time that it is only ideal; whereas the practice of virtue is, like mechanics, real and actual, but not perfect, compared with the
ideal state of things, to which it is impossible it should attain. Nevertheless, philosophy does not therefore find any fault or imperfection in these systems of natural and moral things. For, as the mechanic, in working according to his scientifical ideas of lines and figures, brings his operations to all that perfection which the end requires, although his lines and circles are not right and true in the rigour of science, the virtuous minded person, having scientifical perfection in his view, shapes his conduct with a resolution that does honour to his species, although, at the same time, he must often perhaps regret that he cannot follow the perfect idea which he forms in contemplation for his rule of action.

23. Thus Cato, the virtuous patriot, lived only to serve his country; But, to what purpose was it that he died?—We cannot suppose in Cato the absurdity of killing himself for fear of being put to death. Shall we then suppose that Cato died, because he would not owe a life to Caesar? Here would be an evidence of pride, it is true, but not of patriotism. May we hence draw the conclusion, that, in Cato, patriotism was subservient to his personal pride? whereas, in a true philosopher, his personal pride should be subjected to his virtue.

It may be perhaps alleged, that it was the fashion among the Romans so to die; and that to do otherwise on such an occasion, would have been reckoned meanness. In another person, such a view of things might have justified the deed, as the deed itself proclaims the resolution of the man; but, that which in a vulgar man might have been reckoned greatness, in Cato, the philosopher, was surely a defect. The Roman moralist gives another picture of the great and virtuous man; “Si fœcitus illabatur orbis, impavidam sœriment ruinarum.” This is true greatness; for, here a man supports himself on principles;—he says, I have done right; I therefore have to fear no evil. This is a grand idea; but it is totally different from
from that of a man considering himself as independent, because he can escape from the general ruin, and 'make his quietus at any time with a bare bodkin.' The philosopher has a principle by which he fears no evil; But why should such a man as this commit an act, which the vain and foolish man, when disappointed in his hopes, performs ingloriously?

Our duty to ourself is not always incompatible with our duty to our country. When Ajax eats to please himself, he serves his country in feeding a citizen; but, Ajax must not kill himself; for, Ajax owes the state a soldier. Every man is in a great measure indebted to the state both for his existence and his happiness; for, without society, what is man? Had Ajax been possessed of public virtue, as he was of personal courage, he might have lived a happy life, and died in honour and old age; but he threw away his life in folly, or a fit of humour. It is not meant to compare the cases of Ajax and of Cato; they are rather too far distant in the scale of moral excellence to be immediately compared; they are, however, in some respects the same, so far as Ajax died a martyr to his pride, Cato to his ambition.

The ambition of Cato led him to preserve the state of the republic, that of Caesar to govern the empire. Misfortunely for the state, those two different objects, though both truly valuable in themselves, were incompatible. Had Cato pursued virtue for the sake of virtue, and not for the sake of personal greatness, or of popular applause; had he truly devoted himself to the interest of his country, he should not have considered the public good as at an end, because a wise man was to govern the senate and the people; he should not have deserted his post, because he thought the enemy was within the fortress.

Let us now compare the virtue of Cato with that of Cicero. Cato fell
fell a victim to his own ambition; Cicero to that of others. Cicero
would have lived, and would have served the state, perhaps in any
character consistent with his dignity as a man of virtue; Cato would
not survive the character which he had chiselled out for himself;
and, because he could no longer serve the state in his own way, he
would not be subservient to the state. The ambition of Cato was
in virtue; the virtue of Cato was illustrious; but, had the ambition
of Cato been less intemperate, his virtue had been perhaps more use-
ful to his country.

Dying in the field of battle is said to be the lying in the bed of
honour; and it is a saying that is just, for then a man has done his
duty to the last moment of his life. The virtue of Cato was great;
perhaps of patriots the most illustrious; but still that virtue was the
virtue of a man; it was not perfect so long as we may conceive
something in addition to its lustre. Such a virtue, indeed, is not to
be found actually in human things, but apparently it may; that is,
in judging from what appears, there may not be an imperfection to
be found. Such was the virtue of Socrates; it was therefore said to
be divine.

24. In order to understand this system of morality, which, like
that of things, is perfectly wise in effecting the proper end of its in-
tention, we must consider, that every individual loves himself, in
the first place, and his neighbour, in the second. Without loving
himself above every other thing, a person would betray the trust re-
posed in him by the Author of his being; but, without loving others
at the same time that he loves himself, man would not be the soci-
able animal which he truly is; he would not be the honourable
person, who risks his life to serve the associate of his pleasure; he
would not be the man of public virtue, who devotes the labour of
his mind for the benefit of others. Man, therefore, is by nature made
made a sociable being; and he is benevolent upon a principle similar to that by which he first consults his own good.

If man is thus actuated by two distinct principles, which are perhaps improperly termed love, here are the seeds of virtue sown in the constitution of the human mind, in like manner as it is also in the mind of every animal who preserves himself, and propagates his species. But this is not reckoned virtue, neither is it; for, as virtue, this is that of nature, and is not the property of man, in whom, as in the brute, it is instinctive. Man, in loving man, obeys nature without choice, as he does in hating pain. It is therefore only in the reflection of the mind upon those instinctive sentiments, those seeds of virtue, that virtue, as an attribute of a scientific mind or intellectual person, is produced. Thus, the moment that a man, in reasoning from reflection, is made to think, that is, to know scientifically, that he loves his neighbour, virtue is begun; for, here a principle of love is discovered, on which may be founded virtue, when the instinctive inclination of the animal yields to a nobler motive, and is made to give way to the conscious sentiment of the man. This may be illustrated in an example.

My neighbour, suppose, has in his folly angered me; but I recollect he is my neighbour whom I love. Shall I then foolishly indulge a passion which can do no good? and, because another person has transgressed the rules of moral duty, shall I forfeit my claim to the greatest possible possession, the possession of myself? I then forgive the offence, and find myself happy in being delivered from anger; and, I wish that I could forget the folly of my neighbour, which gives me pain. It is then that I love my neighbour virtuously from principle, when I am sorry that I cannot love him as I did before; for then I truly love my neighbour, and only hate him for his fault. But, if I am sorry that I cannot love him, and if I am wife, I will not do that which would naturally make him hate me;
but, on the contrary, I would do that which should make him see his error, in finding me worthy of his love; and thus, if he does not come to see his folly, at least he should not find reason for his fault in mine. Here is true wisdom, in making the best of evil; here is true virtue, in not transgressing the rule of natural benevolence.

25. Thus virtue grows from its instinctive principles, by the reasoning of conscious and reflecting minds sympathetically affected by each other's actions. When we observe the want of prudence in another person, this is the object of our pity and contempt. The want of benevolence, again, excites our indignation, and begets our hatred. So far, therefore, as the sentiments of one conscious mind is a motive in reflection for the conduct of another, the mutual connection of persons in society promotes that virtue which, in a solitary animal, could not be at all, or would be useless.

Want of prudence in ourselves is the cause of sorrow, and, in our reflection, becomes the object of repentance. Therefore, in experience, a reflecting mind learns, in becoming wise, to become more prudent; and, so far as the want of benevolence, in reflection, tends to give pain or misery, and make a person hate himself, the science or theory of virtue naturally grows in thinking; in like manner, as the practice of that science is promoted, in the conscious reflection on the motives of our conduct, and the consequences of our action. He that has once tasted the pleasure of relieving distress, will he not naturally seek to enjoy in like manner when another occasion offers for the exertion of his humanity?

26. It is not that we truly want benevolence, for such a supposition would destroy the principles of virtue; but we have by nature those sentimental passions of resentment, and of envy, which, in reflecting minds, are to lead to justice, and to glorious emulation. Now, it is the foolish or inconsiderate excess of those natural passions,
fions, unrestrained by the motives of wisdom in a rational reflection, that makes a mind appear malevolent in pursuing motives that are naturally good. Thus, for example, if, instead of cultivating my field, as well as that of my neighbour, whom I envy on this occasion, I should conceive the intention of destroying that field of corn which is the cause of sorrow and uneasiness when I see it, here would be base malevolence, arising not from the natural constitution of my mind, but from the unnatural or perverted use of talents and capacities which properly tend to good. For, upon reflection, I must find that the fertility of my neighbour’s field, instead of giving me uneasiness, would naturally give me joy, unless for the reproach that arises to me from my negligence. Now, as this is no immoral action in my neighbour, it is impossible that in cool reflection, or in wise deliberation, I can resent that as an injury which is truly none.

27. To see the operation of nature, teaching a person to improve his morals, as well as to preserve himself, let us take a view of man in his natural state, before science has enlightened him, or much education formed his morals; when philosophy appears in no degree, and wisdom has hardly yet begun to dawn: Such a state as this we may find in the infancy of man. Here, let us view the operation of these minds of future men, conducted by nature without art or science. If, in this state, we find the seeds of virtue, and the means of wisdom, then, in seeing the end to which man actually arrives, we will not hesitate to consider these as being in the proper relation of cause and effect, and to acknowledge an operation where, as in all other cases, we only see the means, and know the end.

The minds, here to be taken into view, are spotless, innocent, and without any malice or ill will; they are kind and gentle, good-natured or benevolent. But they have a will; and they have formed no principle, of sacrificing this will to the satisfaction of another person
person whom they love. What is the consequence? they meet in fondness, and they begin to play in innocence. They are incapable of guilt; for, how can they have guilt who have no conscience? They are conscious of themselves; for, they are human creatures on the road to science: But, how can they be conscious of vice, who know not virtue?

In the course of pleasure, and the natural entertainment of those two happy and contented minds, their wills happen to be in opposition; these cannot both at once be gratified; and, they have not learned to know, that yielding their inclination is the best way to attain the end at which they aim, that is, pleasure and enjoyment. The strongest must prevail; this is the law of nature. What follows? anger and resentment. But, nature is not to blame. Hostilities commence. Both parties now are equally injured and injuring, and, at the same time, virtue not transgressed.

But, whereto are we come? and, what are we describing? Is it the infancy of wisdom, or only the infant state of man? Is it the folly of the ignorant and feeble, or that of the skilful and the strong? They are almost the same. The one, beginning in anger, ends in shedding tears. The other, beginning in folly, often ends in tears; but it is after passion is assuaged in shedding blood.

Here is a case in which there is certainly evil; but there is not necessarily vice. Vice is the doing knowingly what is wrong; and here, we either think that we are doing right, or do not think upon the subject. Now if, for want of wisdom or forethought, inconsiderate action leads to suffer pain and misery, freely by experience there comes knowledge; and, to an intellectual being employing reason upon all occasions, knowledge is the proper means of wisdom. Therefore, in the wars of children, and the wars of men, what is it that in experience is learnt? What is the good which is here the
natural effect of evil? To answer this, let it be asked, What have they gained in the dispute?—Nothing. What have they lost?—peace and happiness. In this case, therefore, Must not reasoning beings learn, in experience, to keep the peace, which is a blessing, or which conduces to their happiness? and, in learning to be wise, Must they not form the rules of virtue for their future conduct?

28. Benevolence is a principle in the constitution of human nature; therefore, benevolence, in man, is a cause of virtue. But, benevolence alone, without wisdom, would not form virtue. A man must first consider what is for his good, in knowing generals, before he can be morally wise; and, he must wisely choose, for the principle or rule of his conduct, that which is best for him, before he can be virtuous.

Men may be formed to practise virtue, or to observe its rules, without being virtuous; in like manner as brute animals may be trained to obey man, without having in them any rule or principle of obedience. In the one case, the animal is made obedient to man, without having in him any principle of obedience, or without having such a principle as the child has who has learned to obey his parent, or as the soldier who has taken the oath of obedience to his sovereign. In the other, man is made virtuous to the state, or to act according to a virtuous regulation, without approving of that rule, or thus having virtue in his principle.

As practice alone, without principle, cannot constitute what is properly virtue, man is not naturally virtuous, because, naturally, he has no principle. Man cannot have a principle before he has arrived at science; and, though it be natural for man to acquire science, yet man, arrived at the least degree of science, is more than what he was by nature. Consequently, the forming of a principle in man is the work of human art; and that, which is properly termed virtue,
is the effect of man having formed principle, or having conscious rule.

29. Science being generally thought to be a great proficiency among mankind, it may be perhaps imagined, that there should be found people in the world without any principle of virtue. If this is the case, we should look for this example in the savage nations. But, if the theory here endeavoured to be established is just, we should look in vain for such a thing in any nation.

Man is never without science while he has art; and, the most savage nations have both art and the marks of ingenuity in their contrivance. What nation more ignorant or savage than those upon the river Amazon? yet there they have the ingenuity to catch their prey by means of a poisonous preparation, of which even we are ignorant. It is not here maintained, that, among those savage nations, there is much principle to be found; yet, there is always some rule of conduct, which is principle; for, without this moral rule, which holds of virtue, they could not subsist as a nation linked together by a common interest, they could not keep faith in certain particulars, or have a sense of duty to their nation.

But, as among all savages there is actually such a national constitution, there is necessarily such a thing as public virtue, even among savages. This public virtue of the savage is indeed a little thing, compared with what was found in ancient Rome; it is still, however, public virtue. But here are two things to be distinguished, the virtue, and the principle. The one of these may be in great perfection, while the other is in great defect; thus their principle of public virtue may be extremely small, but, so far as they have this principle, they may not transgress it; and thus, they may be much more virtuous than many subjects in a polished kingdom, who are corrupted in their morals. Here, in such a polished state, every man has
has formed a principle of public virtue; but, how few sacrifice their personal interest for their principle of public good! There, again, man has hardly formed that principle of public good; but, Who can accuse the savage of being corrupted in his morals? His morals are indeed deficient, in wanting principle; but, the savage acts up to his principle, and thus shines in his virtue, like a Regulus.

These savages educate their children, knowing how necessary that education is to their subsistence; and these children piously respect their parents, to whom they conscientiously owe their education, not their life. Here is private virtue. The parent forfeits ease and pleasure to maintain and educate the child; the child, when come to man's estate, undergoes restraint, and cheerfully submits to fatigue, in maintaining and carrying his aged parent. This is reckoned virtue in civilized nations; Can it be less virtue among savages, who have no law to constrain them in the performance of their social duties? or, Is it less virtue, in that this law of natural duty is less transgressed, where the man is free, than where he is constrained to his duty by the influence of artificial law? Suppose we hear the aged savage saying, 'My son, I am weary of my life, because I see it gives thee so much labour and constraint; come, put an end to that which is no longer pleasant.' 'Father,' replies the son, 'I grudge no pains that may procure you pleasure; live, while life is agreeable; and when you cannot live with pleasure, I will give you cafe.'—This is not the work of human artifice; it is the natural operation of the human mind, abounding in gratitude, and feeling in the plenitude of natural affection. But it is not less the voice of science, in that it is the voice of nature. A thing cannot be expressed that is not known in reflection; but, if this, which has been here expressed, be a conscious principle, it must be in virtue.

30. But, though man, or the species, thus naturally arrives at virtue, the individual or particular does not always equally arrive at
this end, or by equal means. Man naturally learns virtue, as he likewise does geometry; but he does not always learn this of himself, he may be also taught. But if man, in his scientifical capacity, be fitted for taking an example in the practice of virtue, which is a thing no other animal can do, it may be inquired, Who was it set the first example? The question is not, Who made man virtuous? He made him virtuous who made him wife. The present subject is to inquire, Who made man virtuous, in giving rules of virtue,—rules which are not found in nature, but in man? To solve this question, the following consideration must be made: In order to receive a rule which may be given, man must be a scientifical person, i.e. one understanding rule; but, in order to give a rule of virtue or of wisdom, a person must be more than simply scientifical, he must understand that virtue or that wisdom of which he gives a rule. Now, this is a philosopher, who, after studying wisdom, gives its rules. Here, therefore, is first science, which makes man capable of virtue, without being virtuous; and then a further progress of that scientifical faculty, by which the human intellect is improved, and man made truly virtuous, that is to say, made virtuous in his principles.

It is philosophy that trains man to virtue, by establishing order in their manners, morals in their sentiments, and a system of rewards and punishments for the preservation of those morals in society. Thus the political system of government may be considered as the cause of virtue among men in general, who thus are led to imitate the morals that are set before their understandings, as birds are led to imitate the sounds or language which they hear.

We have now seen, that two things are required, for this production of virtuous men. First, there is required conscious, scientific reasoning, in a person who is by imitation to acquire a sense of moral duty. Secondly, before a pattern of morality can be set before his eyes, there must be virtue actually in the principles of man;
who is the only being that can give example. Now, man is not born with principle. In order, therefore, to form a principle without error, a principle which shall be in consistence with his nature, or the Supreme design, man must scientifically know himself, and have studied nature or the generality of things; and this is philosophy.

A man may be virtuous without being a philosopher, of which we have just now seen the example in a savage. But when, in the science of morality, man considers wisely what will be conducive to the virtue of others, here is a philosopher, who is voluntarily or scientifically the cause of virtue in other people, as nature and science had been the cause of virtue in himself.

31. Thus it will appear, that the constitution of the human mind is made for virtue, although this quality must be found, or actually take place, in variable and indefinite degrees; in like manner as, in physical things, the laws of motion are absolute and fixed, although the actual velocities and directions of moving things are variable, and indefinite, in the changing circumstances of the material system. Thus there is, in the intellectual system, opened to our view, an order and oeconomy of nature, always operating in wisdom for a certain purpose. It will thus appear, that the production of a strong and active animal body is no more the object of nature, than that of a virtuous intellectual mind. This may be illustrated in an example.

Such is the natural desire of pleasure and aversion to pain, which are contrived in perfect wisdom for the animal purpose, that, to oppose with efficacy the infliction of either one or other of these motives to action, it would require the strongest sense of our future repentance of that action. But when, to the influence of this consideration of future sentiment in ourselves, there is added the opinion of mankind, that is, their approbation on the one hand and their disapprobation
approbation on the other, in corroborative of our proper sentiment, then, the natural imbecility of man is, in the rational and reflecting person, that is, the intellectual mind, supported with a resolution thus borrowed from the opinion of others; and, in a transaction of magnitude and notoriety, where the public is concerned, a mind becomes inflexible to the allurements of pleasure, and impregnable to the apprehensions of the direst pain. Such was the case with Regulus.

But he had even still something, in addition to these circumstances, by which his brilliant virtue was fortified beyond the measure of other men. This was a present state of actual repentance; as he then lay under a sense of disgrace, which must have conspired, in its operation, with the desire of self approbation, and of future fame. Without the effacing of past error, by wisdom proclaimed in some splendid deed, life to him was as insupportable, as death was in that case indifferent. Therefore, in his virtuous, his ambitious mind, the conscious duty which he owed his country, and the manly love which Regulus bore himself, that is his character or fame, outbalanced all other fear of suffering, and charmed his soul into that act of virtue in extreme, which has justly been the admiration of mankind.

CHAP. III.

Virtue considered synthetically, in order to see its purpose.

1. VIRTUE, having been analysed or traced to its principles, may be considered as underwater, or known in science; but still the purpose of this order of things may not, in like manner, have been made the subject of our understanding. This, therefore, is to be
be the object of inquiry; and now it may be considered, how science is to proceed with this intention. Must it not be synthetically that the end of virtue is to be demonstrated, in reasoning from its efficient cause? and, is it not by considering the consequences, of that disposition of mind in which the rules of virtue are approved of and observed? for, in generalising every effect of virtue, as well as having distinguished the cause, we shall in reasoning be led to the most general. Now, the most general effect is the final cause, and thus, the final cause of virtue will be its purpose or intention.

Here is a subject which it imports mankind to examine; because, this intention may be either good or bad. Therefore, so far as the voluntary agent, man, has it in his power to choose how he shall act himself, and also whether to educate, or not, his offspring in the rules of virtue, it behoves him, as a wise intelligent person, to understand upon well examined principle, and not prejudice or superstition, the end and intention of that moral system.

Having thus in view to generalise the effects of virtue, every different species of virtue must be considered; and thus, there will be required much distinction, as well as generalisation. It is not that the effect of every particular virtuous action is to be considered, which would be endless, and therefore in science useless or inconclusive. But, every principle, from whence virtuous action may proceed, should be examined, in order to see the general tendency of that which is called virtue. Thus we should know whether virtuous principles, upon the whole, and in all respects, are good, and may be approved of in a mind enlightened with the power of knowledge and reflection; or whether on the whole, or in any respect they are bad, and should be upon mature deliberation disapproved of and rejected; that is to say, whether a virtuous conduct leads necessarily to happiness, or to misery. Now, if it is natural for man to desire above all things happiness, and if virtue naturally leads to happiness,
pinefs, as vice in like manner to misery, then, to see this in all the light of science, must be the most interesting subject of inquiry.

2. Virtue, in the science of morality, is, like the term gravitation in physics, a general abstract idea, comprehending many thoughts. This idea of virtue is founded on moral action, or that which is voluntary; and, neither on that which is material or external, wherein the mind is passive, nor, on that action of mind which, being more immediately dependent on or deduced from the external cause, has been considered as instinctive.

Moral action signifies that conduct which proceeds from a council, or conscious design. It is also virtuous when this council will not be afterwards repented of, and when the mind, in reflection seeing its own thoughts in every possible light, and judging of its ideas without error or perversion, still continues to approve of that which it had willed. But this virtuous resolution may respect different subjects, which may be now considered.

3. Moral action may be considered as consisting in a sense of good and evil arising from our experience; and this relates immediately to our own feelings. Thus, for example, we find that, in consequence of eating and drinking more than what is proper, we suffer afterwards; therefore, we form a rule in wisdom, not to push our abilities to such excess, in order that we may not have reason to repent of what we had voluntary performed. This is the first order of moral principle; which has for object happiness, regards ourselves immediately, and only regards others indirectly, in consequence of our being first affected by the moral or immoral action.

4. The second order of moral action, respects others immediately, and ourselves indirectly, or mediately, in consequence of the manner that others are affected by our proper action. If, for example, I take
take from another person what properly belongs to him, he is immediately affected by this action of mine; and, in consequence thereof, wills evil to me, who am by this means affected, in a more remote manner, by my proper action. Therefore, in reflection, I find this action to be immoral, or leading to evil instead of good. In this case, a wise person forms a rule, in his morals, not to hurt a sensitive being, in order that he may not himself suffer from the natural resentment of another person, who is injured by that action of his, which is thus immoral in the second order; and in like manner he forms a rule of doing good to another, in order that he may be requited.

5. In those two cases of moral conduct now considered, there is properly no virtue in the action; or, the virtue of those morals flows all from wisdom, without the operation of that principle of benevolence which flows from social love, or natural affection to the species. The feeling also on which the rule of conduct must depend, in those two cases of moral action, is an actual feeling, and is not purely ideal, that is to say, our animal interest is the object in those feelings, and not our intellectual concern.

But, besides those real feelings, which are in the animal constitution of our mind, we have ideal feelings, which do not affect the animal, but the man. Now the wise consideration of those feelings, so as not to suffer but enjoy, affects our rules of moral conduct, and may either conspire with the rules we form from our actual feelings, or they may oppose the operation of those rules. It is therefore of importance to examine the nature of those ideal feelings.

Rules of conduct are formed, in human wisdom, respecting our actual feelings or real suffering; and this is done without any ideal or sympathetic feeling, by which our mind may be also affected, in consequence of what we know. But, from things actual, the mind...
has the power of forming ideal feelings, by which we are again affected in some degree as if these were real feelings, and actual knowledge derived from external information.

It requires but little reflection to be convinced of this. Every person must be acquainted with the pleasures and the pains of his own imaginations. How agreeable, for example, it is to think upon a subject which has given pleasure, and how disagreeable again to think on one which has in reality given pain! Consequently, we have the power of forming ideas which affect our feeling more or less, in giving us, not real pleasure and pain, but happiness and misery. When, for example, a man has had the good fortune to relieve a favourite or worthy person from distress and make him happy, What a pleasure does he not feel when he thinks of that transaction! or if, in consequence of inconsiderate passion, I should kill a person who had happened to offend me, what repentance should I not afterwards have in cool reflection! I should thus be miserable in idea, so often as I should recollect my rashness. This is the natural order of things, or the proper constitution of our mind, acting and suffering by turns. To inquire how this happens, that is, how we act and how we suffer, would be fruitless; and, to doubt the fact, is not to have found it to be false, it is only not to have properly examined mind.

Here is therefore a third order of morals, which is founded upon no real feeling in ourselves, as the first and second orders are supposed to be ultimately; but, it is founded on an ideal feeling in ourselves; which ideal feeling, again, has for object the real or the ideal feeling of another person.

6. We may thus perceive three successive steps in the operations of mind, forming motives in its morals. In the first, both the action and effect respect ourselves immediately. In the second, the action has
has an immediate effect upon another person, and only affects ourselves through the medium of another action, which the suffering person wills. In the third, again, I am affected by the suffering of another person, without the mediation of any action of his. The motive, therefore, by which, in this last case, I am affected, is ideal, in contradistinction to the actual motives by which I am affected in the others; for, in this last case, I have to form an idea of what that person suffers or enjoys, before that idea can operate as a motive to my feeling either pleasure or displeasure.

7. The actual feelings, on which the motives of morality proceed, are in our nature, or are from necessity; we have no choice in forming them. Whereas it may be thought that our ideal feelings are in their nature arbitrary, as being formed by the operation of our mind. This however would be a most erroneous opinion; for, these ideal operations are founded on actual things, as well as those which respect our animal feelings; and, they are no less certain, in their natural origin, than are those motives of animal action which may in effect be overcome by the ideal.

The basis of our actual feelings is in the laws of nature, by which there is given us a sensual suffering and enjoyment, in order to conduct our animal action. The basis of our ideal feelings is also in those laws of nature according to which there is implanted in-man, as well as in other animals, an instinctive affection for his species; and, it is on this actual, this necessary principle, that man naturally forms a love, or scientific affection for his neighbour. A moral conduct therefore, founded on this affection which produces love, is natural to man; and is not arbitrary in its nature, although the nature of it be ideal, in contradistinction to sensual, which that of the other motives is.

8. But though this operation of the mind, by which it forms
ideal feelings as the cause of either happiness or misery, be natural to conscious and reflecting beings, it is nevertheless improved by habit, like every other operation, for, it is not like the operation of sense, wherein the mind is altogether passive, and in which there is the immediate action of an external or a foreign cause. In sensation, the mind feels or knows, the first moment or instance of this operation, equally as the last; but this is not the case, in operations where the mind is active, as it is in that now considered; therefore, a mind does not perform this operation equally at the first essay, as when habituated in the practice. But, the mind being now supposed as having attained this habit of forming ideal feelings, we may consider, what is to be the effect of this operation with regard to moral action.

9. If I feel pleasure when I know that another person is pleased or enjoys; and if I, in like manner, suffer when I know he is in pain, this feeling of mine must be a motive for my conduct, in either pleasing or displeasing my neighbour, independent of the opinion of my neighbour with respect to me.

Here is then a principle of moral conduct which must be in virtue, so far as from this no evil can arise, but good.

If, again, we feel for another, in any measure, that which we think they suffer or enjoy, we, in like manner, suffer or enjoy ourselves, according to the opinion which we think they form in relation to us. If, for example, I have served a friend, or injured him, without his knowing, I only can have the satisfaction or remorse arising from my own approbation or disapprobation; but, the moment I think he knows it, I feel his gratitude or resentment in idea; and thus I not only feel for another when he is suffering or enjoying, but I feel for myself, according to what I think another person is feeling for me. Therefore when, instead of attending to my proper feelings in relation to my neighbour, I consider what may be
be his feelings with regard to me, I then form another ideal motive for my conduct, so far as I have a desire that this person should entertain of me either a good or bad opinion.

Man, considered by himself, independent of any other intellectual being, could not, in the progress of his science, attain to any thing besides wisdom. He would thus form rules of morality for himself, or rules of conduct for his happiness; but he could not form any rule of virtue, such as are those rules of moral conduct which man forms in relation to his species. What an inferior being would then be man, actuated only by this single principle of conduct in relation to his own immediate suffering and enjoyment! What an animal would be man, without an idea of virtue, which is the acting from a principle in opposition to that proper to him as a selfish being!

If morality shall be considered as the application of wisdom to our good, or our immediate sensuous enjoyment, then virtue, which is more than morals, must be considered as the wise attention to our mediate or ideal good, and to the lasting happiness of a pleasant reflection; it being in reflection that the mind of man properly exists.

It must not be thought that this doctrine leads to the neglecting of our real good; it only leads to the cultivating of our ideal happiness, upon the best foundation, or in real wisdom. If man neglects his sensuous satisfaction, or animal enjoyment, while he attends to his ideal pleasure, he suffers not afterwards in reflection, so far as his sensuous satisfaction is in its nature temporary, and is not calculated to give a lasting pleasure in reflection. So far therefore as man exchanges a sensuous for an intellectual enjoyment, he acts wisely, and will not repent. Whereas, by sacrificing an intellectual for a sensuous enjoyment, he would not act wisely, and would certainly repent in his reflection.
But, the principle of social benevolence, in opposition to that of sensual pleasure, leads necessarily to intellectual enjoyment; and, the attention to this principle, in our conduct, forms what, in strict propriety, may be termed virtue.

10. Virtue, therefore, arises from our consulting the feelings of another person, in order either that we may not suffer ourselves, or that we may thereby actually enjoy some benefit, whether real or ideal.

In this virtue or principle of action, there may be discriminated two several species; so far as one may be distinguished in being the virtue of wisdom, the other as being the wisdom of virtue: The first is as to wisdom positive, but as to virtue it is not absolute, it is only comparative. The second again, while in relation to wisdom this principle is like the other absolute or positive, it is, in relation to virtue, not simple but superlative.

The comparative or simple species, which may be also termed vulgar virtue, consists in a conscious mind avoiding to give offence, or in doing nothing by which another person may be hurt. The superlative species, which may be also termed philosophic, goes farther, for it consists in a person voluntarily hurting himself, in order to serve another. The one is founded on a sense of future misery or repentance; the other is founded on a sense of future happiness or approbation, in having consulted the feeling of another in opposition to a selfish motive, and in having preferred the present pleasure of another to his own. In the one case, we suffer in order that we may not suffer more, either actually from the will of another person, or in idea from what another person suffers in consequence of our malevolence. In the other case, we suffer in order that we may enjoy, either actually in the gratitude of another, or in idea from
from the enjoyment which we think another person is to have in consequence of our benevolence.

In all those cases, it is scientifically that the subject is considered; and it is in wisdom that the mind or will of such a person is determined; for, here is a prudent reflection, concerning that which is, and what will be; and, there is a proper deliberation, in comparing several sufferings and enjoyments, with a view to prefer that which upon the whole is best.

11. Thus it will appear, that there is a species of ideal virtue; and that this may be considered as superior to the virtue which flows from common sense, and which is the actual virtue vulgarly practiced by mankind, whether in order to avoid evil, or to arrive at good.

This must be evident in considering, that the practice of the first species or vulgar virtue, is necessarily comprehended in the virtuous idea or philosophic species; at the same time the most important benefits flow from this last species which belong not to the other. Those benefits indeed are in idea, but they are not for that reason in any degree uncertain or fallacious; and, though thus limited to the ideal feelings of the mind from whence they flow, they are for that very reason the more important to a mind or person, who has arrived at such a state of intellect, as to form ideas, not only of good and evil, and the various relations of thoughts and things, but also to form an understanding of good and evil in relation to his proper thoughts. He thus inquires for the best, or, most perfect means of happiness, which can only be enjoyed in idea, as pain and pleasure are suffered in sense.

We have been investigating virtue as founded in the instinctive feelings of the animal, and as produced by reasoning scientifically upon
upon our knowledge; and this leads to all the happiness or good that is attained in moral action. Here is therefore virtue in the human mind, or moral action in conscious animals arising from motives that are natural. The person who thus arrives at the practice of virtue must be wise in foreseeing events and adapting means to an end in view; and he thus avoids that misery which the blind or inconsiderate pursuit of pleasure, as well as the impatient suffering under a present uneasiness, naturally leads the human species into, when acting without wisdom sufficient to moderate the passions that are present, in comparing them with future events which must follow. Thus man may be said to be made happy by virtue, in the avoiding of real misery, and in the actual enjoyment of the natural pleasures of animal life.

But man, who is made for a higher state of being, is susceptible of intellectual happiness in the conscious perfection of his nature, and of ideal misery in the conscious imperfection of his mind, aspiring at a felicity which he has not found the means to attain. On the one hand, he finds himself happy in the enjoyment of himself, that is, of his thoughts; and on the other hand, he finds himself miserable when left to his proper reflection.

12. Thus man, who has in him, at the same time, both the inferior state of the animal and the superior state of the intellectual being, may enjoy the happiness or suffer the misery that belongs to those states respectively; and, while he is enjoying in the one state, he may be suffering in the other, as well as he may suffer or enjoy in both. As an animal, he may be either in pleasure or in pain, in expectation or in apprehension; or as a person of intelligence, he may be either happy or miserable in self-approbation or in discontentment and repentance; and, while he is happy as an animal, he may be miserable as a man; or, vice versa, he may, as an animal,
be in misery, while, at the same time, as a man, he may be happy, in the enjoyment of every consolation that his thought can give.

13. Such is the composition of man, who is at the same time both an animal and a being of intelligence, and thus holds his happiness from two sources which are extremely different. The satisfaction of the animal, at its best, is but a limited thing; there is only a certain quantity of pleasure that fills the measure of this enjoyment, and the excess or pursuit of those means beyond the proper measure leads to pain. Whereas the enjoyment of the man leads to nothing but happiness, satisfaction, or contentment; and, it is limited by nothing but the frailties of animal life, to which human nature is necessarily subjected.

As science leads to wisdom in the knowledge of end and means, wisdom leads to happiness, in knowing the best end to pursue, and in perceiving the most effectual means for the attaining of that end. But mankind, in pursuing happiness, are subject to error, or to mistake their end and aim; they thus fail, in not making themselves so happy as they might in being more wise.

Every wise man is selfish, so far as he provides for his own happiness. But, the term selfish is commonly applied to a person who is so much attached to his own interest as to give himself no concern about the interest of another. Is such a person as this wise in his selfishness? The answer is plain. If there is in mankind a source of social happiness, in the enjoyment of each others satisfaction, the selfishness of man must cut off this source of happiness; and then he would be reduced to that enjoyment which man as a solitary animal might attain.

It must be observed, that the self-enjoyment of a person, who has acted virtuously and disinterestedly in relation to his species, differs

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as
as much from that solitary self-enjoyment of the animal man as the
man of virtue differs from the animal who has no other than a sen-
sual enjoyment; consequently, it is not the providing for a person's
happiness that makes him what is commonly termed selfish, but it
is the neglecting to provide for his proper happiness, by means the
most effectual, i.e. by virtuously conducing to the happiness of o-
thers.

A wise man is therefore selfish, in providing a source of self-en-
joyment, from his disinterested conduct in relation to his species.
But a man who is selfish, in neglecting this source of happiness,
from his interested conduct in pursuing nothing but his little per
sonal pleasures, is as far from being really wise, as he is from being
truly happy.

A man, who should pursue nothing but his own personal pleasure,
would be a solitary person, out of society, and reduced to little more
than a simple brute. On the other hand, a man who should pursue
nothing but the pleasure and enjoyment of others, would be a per
son capable of the greatest share of happiness; for, the brute en-
joyment of pleasure is soon lost in the satisfaction; whereas the intel-
lectual taste of pleasure is never sated in the enjoyment, and is as unli-
mited as the happiness of mankind. There is not truly such a person
upon the earth as that absolutely selfish being who enjoys no other
persons pleasure; neither is there any person who pursues no other
pleasure besides the happiness of others. But, so far as a man, in
ordid selfishness, neglects another person's pleasure, he is vicious in
relation to society, and unwife in relation to his own happiness;
whereas, so far as a man, in his disinterested conduct, promotes the
pleasure of another, he is virtuous in relation to society, and is ex-
tremely wise in procuring a source of happiness of which he cannot
be deprived.
14. Man the individual taught morals by the wisdom of the species, may practice, for his good, virtue which is not properly his own. But, he may also scientifically teach himself to understand the rules of virtue; and, being conscious of the natural connection of the rules of virtue with his happiness or general good, he thus becomes virtuous upon principle, or acquires the principle as well as the practice of moral action, at the same time, he may not understand the nature of that principle, and may be ignorant of the efficient and final cause of virtue.

Man therefore, in the progress of intellect, may advance in seeing the order of natural things, so far as respects material and intellectual agents, without seeing the order of that thought or wisdom of that design, wherein virtue is calculated as the means of happiness, and rational happiness as the end of intellect, for this, as a thought, is deeper in the reflecting operations of mind, and, as a truth, it is more general in its nature.

15. But, man no sooner sees himself in this intellectual system, to which material things are temporary and subordinate, than, instead of virtue being considered merely as the means of avoiding evil, it appears to be the proper way of arriving at supreme good. The animal pleasures which he has in common with the brute, though admirable or perfect for the purpose to which they are adapted, are despicable when opposed to the pleasures of a rational reflection, or the happiness of that self-approbation which does not change. Practical virtue, therefore, which on all occasions consults the animal good, of the person who thus acts wisely in virtue, and naturally in benevolence, must be distinguished from that theoretical virtue, which leads superior minds to despise their animal good, in consulting their intellectual enjoyment.

It is in this view of conscious minds, that the selfishness of the animal is diminished or made to cease, in the little comparative value,
or secondary esteem, that is placed upon those temporary motives which only interfere with virtue: And, it is here that the benevolence of the man, which is originally instinctive, begins from principle. For, where a person prefers the pleasure of another to his own, this person must will from another principle than his immediate pleasure. Now, the pleasure of pleasing another person is in perfect virtue; it cannot flow from any other motive. But, this perfect virtue may be either on the one hand instinctive, when it is the virtue properly of nature; or, on the other hand, it may be conscious, scientific, or from principle. In this case, it is virtue proper to the rational person, who can only thus arrive at this degree of virtue, wherein public good may be preferred to that which is personal, and personal evil suffered voluntarily for the sake of others. For, it is only by undervaluing our proper animal desires in a rational reflection, and inflaming our sympathetic feelings with all the power of virtuous contemplation, that a mind can be brought to suffer itself in order that others should enjoy or should not suffer. Here, the godlike desire of being the author of good, overcomes the apprehension of a temporary evil, and leads the will to an action, as far above the selfish abstinence from vice, for fear of future punishment, as that moral duty, which we truly owe ourselves, is superior to the ignorance of rules by which our own good is properly consulted.

Here is the virtue of philosophy, as distinguished from the virtue of wisdom. The virtue of wisdom leads to the preference of a lesser to a greater evil; whereas the virtue of philosophy, in learning a person to consider every thing as good, and not to apprehend evil of a transitory nature, leads to the preference of a greater to a lesser good. Instead then of being actuated by the instinctive or blind passions of hatred, anger, and revenge, he acts from motives of wisdom, tempered with a rational benevolence; thus, while in justice he is constrained to check vice, and condemn crime to punishment,
he at the same time indulges every tenderness of the man, consistent with the duty of the judge; or, in war, he temperates the savage cruelty of the enemy, with the friendship and hospitality of the man.

Hence the distinction of selfish wisdom, which is founded upon the mere animal enjoyment, and disinterested virtue, which is philosophical, and founded upon the intellectual enjoyment of a person's thought or proper idea. A person may be virtuous upon principle, that is,consciously reasoning from a general rule, although that principle should lead to nothing but personal or animal enjoyment. But, when this principle of mine leads to the enjoyment of another person immediately, and only remotely, to my own satisfaction in idea, it is then that this virtuous principle is pure, being founded in benevolence, and affecting the intellectual part, that which is properly man, and not the animal, on which, however, the intellectual is originally ingrafted.

It will be evident, that a man must have this refined virtue, which is founded on that intellectual sense of happiness and misery, before he can consult those ideal, or tender, feelings of another person; and this is often to be found in persons properly educated, who have a proper sense of happiness and misery, and who not only benevolently with common happiness to mankind, but to those with whom they are concerned, as to attend to the remotest feelings of a delicate mind, of which they are then conscious in themselves. But, this they may do, without understanding that which they thus practice; for, this understanding consists in having scientifically distinguished, in the motives of their proper conduct, the principles which have concurred to that end. Thus man, in every thing, is made to know and do, before he learns to understand that which he does and knows.
16. But still there is a further view or understanding of this pure principle of virtue, by considering the efficient and final cause of this constitution of things. Here the intellectual system, or design of virtue, is made the object of the mind's contemplation; and no sooner is a man arrived at this state of mind, in which the benevolent intention of his Author is become the object of his love and admiration; no sooner does he see the natural constitution of things, wherein it is so ordered that virtue, which man is naturally led to in knowledge, should necessarily make him happy, and that vice, which man naturally follows in pursuing pleasure with imperfect wisdom, should also necessarily make him miserable, than he begins to love virtue for itself, in considering it as the cause of happiness in man, and to hate vice only for the temporary or occasional evil of which it is productive. Thus our ideal enjoyment, or rational happiness, is increased upon all occasions where benevolence is concerned; and, where malevolence appears, our misery, or intellectual suffering, is diminished, in having the most liberal view of evil.

The difference between this philosophic virtue, or this scientific knowledge of good and evil, and that which is common to mankind, consists in this, that whereas, according to the common sense of mankind, vice is absolutely hated, and the vicious person is detested, in this philosophic view, again, vice is disapproved of, without being absolutely hated; and a vicious action, in reflection, moves a philosophic mind to pity, not to anger. It is for this reason, that, though he cannot approve of any degree of vice, such a virtuous person may love the man who has committed a vicious action; for, finding in that vicious person something that is good or virtuous, he loves man so far as he is virtuous, and pities him so far as he is vicious; that is to say, this philosophic view leads a mind to universal benevolence, in loving the species for their virtue, whether natural or acquired, and pitying them for vice, which he considers as the source of misery. Happiness being the proper object
object of esteem, this science of morals leads the philosophic mind to love virtue in others, as the means of making happy; and, to regret vice, as leading to unhappiness, without finding vice absolutely evil in the general system of things.

The true philosopher, that is, he who has the most general view of virtue, having thus found the wise and benevolent intention of his proper passions, governs them in reason, that is, he subjects them to the end of their intention, and does not, like the common man, make of them an end or object for his will. He thus overlooks his passion, not from any degree of insensibility of mind, or neglect of this particular duty in nature committed to his charge, but as having from nature obtained a superior command, in which duties of a subordinate kind may be dispensed with, in pursuing those of a superior intention.

Having thus knowledge of himself, that is, of the constitution of his own mind; and, knowing the intention of his Author, who has ordained evil as the means to lead reasoning beings to their good, and has bestowed the gift of intellectual knowledge on man as the means of a superior happiness, he is disposed to find himself happy on every occasion, so far as his present nature will admit; and thus delights in seeing the power, admiring the wisdom, and confiding in the benevolence of the first cause. In short, finding himself in a system of intellectual agents, where every thing is absolutely good, and where evil is relative, being only good in an inferior degree, he endeavours always to make evil less, as the most infallible method of increasing good, and to multiply and diffuse good by every means in his power, even in suffering evil, which is in its nature transitory, and a mean appointed in divine wisdom for the general good.

Here, therefore, is happiness purely intellectual,—happiness the necessary result of conscious reflection,—and happiness as a proper end
end intended for the intellectual perfection of the species, or for what may be termed the moral sense of man. Hence, as there are certain motives for moral action, which are first in the order of human thought, there are also motives of a higher species in the order of intellect; consequently, by those motives, virtue of a higher species in the esteem of man may be produced.

It is impossible that a person can value himself upon the simple enjoyment of mere sensual pleasure or gratification of a brutish appetite; for then, there would be no distinction in the ranks of being, a proposition which insults the common understanding of mankind. Therefore, every person who has a sense of truth, and reasons justly, must value himself only for what is estimable in the eyes of men. It is not that mankind are always just enough to see things in the proper light, nor happy enough to consult their true interest; but, it is for this very reason, that they are so much interested in learning to be wise, and in choosing that which should promote their true happiness.

17. The practical virtue already considered has appeared to flow from motives that are natural; and, the consequence of this is moral action, wherein misery of every mind is avoided, and the virtuous agent thus left to the unimpaired enjoyment of every species of instinctive or animal pleasure, that is, to enjoy the pleasures of life without repentance or remorse. But, the motives of philosophic virtue, now considered, may be called intellectual, as requiring deeper thought, and more extensive knowledge, than those by which the rules of moral action are attained. Now, as the cause of that moral action is virtue, naturally acquired in the wisdom of man, this wisdom of man, again scientifically distinguished in the further progress of a reflecting mind, and generalised in reasoning abstractedly with regard to the motives of its conduct, (by which misery is avoided, and
and happiness pursued), leads to opinions which, instead of being moral, are properly philosophic.

These opinions do not immediately conduct to moral action, or the virtue of wisdom; for, they are properly derived from it. But, though they do not thus immediately conduct to virtue, or to moral good, they do more: For, as by generalising our scientific opinions, which lead immediately to the virtue of wisdom, these philosophic opinions increase or enforce that wisdom, so, the virtue which proceeds from those generalised opinions, is not only powerful in commanding our assent or approbation, but is superior in the order of intellect, by leading to a happiness which is most esteemed. In like manner as, in physics, the knowledge of light and vision which is found in a philosophic mind, though not so useful to the animal as that by which his steps are immediately conducted, is superior, in the general order of things, to that knowledge on which the other is necessarily founded.

Here is therefore a virtue, which may be distinguished, in the accuracy of science, from that which is commonly considered as moral virtue. For, this virtue, besides being properly, or in the order of things, the effect of moral action, or the virtue of wisdom, is also the cause of moral virtue in a reflecting mind, which thus attains superior wisdom in and through virtue, as common virtue is attained in and through wisdom. Now, the cause of moral action is properly moral virtue, and this is scientific in opposition to instinctive; therefore, whatever is, or may be, a cause for moral virtue, should be distinguished as more than simply scientific; it is therefore philosophic.

This philosophic virtue may be distinguished from that which is natural to man as a scientific animal, in this, that it is properly artificial, in being altogether human, or not immediately conducted by any
any instinctive principle whatever; for, on the contrary, it leads to virtuous conduct, without any consideration of animal misery and enjoyment; and often, perhaps always, in opposition to the instinctive principles in which pain or misery is avoided, and pleasure or animal enjoyment is pursued. This virtue, therefore, which we have here called philosophic, is disinterested, so far as, by the conduct of this principle, neither the instinctive animal desires, nor the immediate conscious feelings of the virtuous person, are to be gratified, but his ideal and sympathetic feelings, in the remote enjoyment of other people’s happiness.

Here is, therefore, an extensive source of happiness appointed in the constitution of sensitive, sympathetic, and intellectual beings; and here is a principle of conduct removed more than one step from the instinctive motives of animal life. Here, then, we see a benevolent system of the intellectual mind; a system in which, without prejudice to the animal or the simple man, the field of human enjoyment is enlarged, with the progress of that knowledge which is properly scientific. Now, this degree of knowledge is far above the reach of the mind which is only in its nature animal; for, in this intellectual enjoyment, we not only feel the pleasures of the animal, and the rational consciousness of the fruits of wisdom, to which the system of things naturally leads, but, we consciously enjoy the happiness, which, without thus knowing, is in the natural constitution of our mind. It is therefore an intellectual knowledge of our proper happiness, as founded in the enjoyment of another, and not in the immediate feelings, or absolute knowledge, of our own mind.

It is thus that the motive for moral action, which in natural virtue is simply known, without being understood, is, in a further progress of the intellectual faculty, understood scientifically, as being the proper means for happiness, then considered as the end. Here is, therefore, a similar progress in moral as in natural knowledge, by the
the successive application of the intellectual faculties, and the formation of general scientific principles for our further reasoning. Let us now take a view of this progress, by which mankind are led to the summit of their happiness, and to the proper end for which they are intended.

In becoming wise and virtuous, which man naturally does, he learns that in which his particular interest is concerned. But man, having arrived at all the happiness which this simple wisdom and virtue can produce, is not then content, but has an object still farther to pursue; for, there is more to be attained in the scientific application of the intellectual powers. It is not enough for man to have acted properly in distinguishing good and evil; he must also know, that he has thus acted well; for, the mind of man, not made for brutish rest in the satisfaction of his animal desires, is naturally impatient of inactivity, and thus employs itself in reflection concerning what is past, and conceiving ideas with regard to that which is to come. It is here that his voluntary actions come to be reviewed in his thought; and the motives of those volitions are made the subject of his reasoning, as well as the consequences of that conduct. It is here that happiness and misery, distinct from pleasure and pain, are truly felt; that is to say, it is here that true happiness or misery, such as is proper to man, is actually produced by the operations of the mind itself, reasoning with regard to what has been and what will be.

18. The brute animal, who distinguishes the things that please him and those that are unpleasing, may be said to know good and evil, without understanding that knowledge, that is, without abstracting and generalising his idea or the subject of his knowledge in thought or reflection; therefore, he cannot form a general rule in his mind, respecting conscious action, and good and evil. Hence, it is impossible that the animal should have, what may be called, the moral...
moral sense, or a knowledge of duty; which is a species of scientific understanding above the reach of his limited mind. But, every person who deserves the name of man has such a scientific understanding, in having acquired the moral sense or conscientiousness of duty; and this he does by means of abstracting and generalising. But, mankind in general, though they reason in science by abstracting and generalising in thought, and thus go a step beyond the mere animal, do not proceed to the perfection of this operation, in neither forming the most general ideas, nor knowing truth by observing every step in a complex chain of evidence. Consequently, though they reason in science, they do not reason scientifically, so as to lead them to philosophy. This will require some illustration.

All mankind know weight as a general quality of bodies, which is reasoning in science, and such reasoning as the brute animal does not attain; but, in the vulgar, the knowledge of weight, though a scientific idea on which natural philosophy is founded, is far from being either an idea sufficiently general, or a truth sufficiently distinct. On the one hand, they do not know it is to the center of the earth that bodies gravitate, although they know that those bodies are heavy; and, on the other hand, they do not know that bodies, which fail to the earth, also gravitate to the moon. Here is therefore a more general idea of gravitation which may be acquired; but still, this scientific idea, as a truth, would be imperfect, or not actual knowledge, unless every step is known by which the general conclusion has been formed. In human science, therefore, here are two different species, the one perfect, the other imperfect, though not false: The one, science properly so called, as being perfect as well as true; the other, termed common sense, as being true although not perfect.

This analysis of the human mind may now be applied to the science of morality; where reasoning may be employed as well as in that of physics. It is by common sense that mankind know their duty,
duty, on most occasions that occur in life; and, it is by instruction that the precepts of morality are inculcated by men of science, and believed by the vulgar, although the ultimate principles are not known by having investigated every step in human thought. All virtue is at first particular; and, it is always from particulars that the scientific mind arrives at generals, in reflecting on what has been, and forming conclusions concerning what may be. Now, philosophy being the most general contemplation of the mind, this may be employed in relation to morality, or those opinions of the mind by which our will, in moral action, is determined. It is here that virtue will be considered in its final cause, as well as in that which is efficient; and, here it is that man, who as an individual has been taught by the species to be both happy and miserable in idea, learns scientifically the art of making himself thus happy, in knowing the true source of happiness and misery.

19. It is not necessary that man should have this perfect science, or this philosophic knowledge, in order to be happy; for, without knowing the principles on which is founded the art of making himself happy, he may have attained the end, in having from others learned the art. This, however, requires both a proper system of education, for minds which are to believe scientific truths without seeing evidence; and also the absence of every reasoning that may fill those minds with doubts, and shake the faith of truths thus acquired in superstition. The virtue of such a person, as it is properly without a perfect principle in his mind, so is it to be considered as precarious in his practice. But, in knowing the principles of virtue and happiness, the practice of man is no longer precarious; he then necessarily makes himself happy, in thinking justly on all occasions; and, in being happy by means of philosophic virtue, he virtuously communicates the art to others, who have not the scientific principle, and who are not capable of making themselves so happy as the Author of their being has intended.

20. Thus
20. Thus it will appear, that, though the happiness of the individual is not always in proportion to his knowledge, or may be more than in proportion to his science, yet, the happiness of the whole will be always in some measure proportionate to the knowledge and wisdom of the species. Such is the wise constitution of mind, that, from the pleasure of animal life to the highest intellectual enjoyment, there is what may be considered as a gradation of happiness, or an accumulation of pleasure, in the person of him who is both animal and man. Every thing thus naturally conduces to happiness, in this benevolent system of mind; and nothing leads to pain or misery, except occasionally, or as the means ordained for leading to happiness the proper end. It is thus that philosophy and happiness may be considered as being the end or ultimate intention of the conscious mind, and not folly, error, or misery, into which, however, a mind occasionally falls, more or less, in pursuing the means by which it has to attain its proper end.

Thus, we find an admirable beauty in the order of nature. First, animal action is conducted by the unerring principles of nature, or instinctive motives of pain and pleasure, by which sensitive beings are led involuntarily to preserve the individual, and to continue the race. Secondly, conscious man is led to conduct himself, voluntarily in thought and reflection, to that which is best for his general good, so far as relates to his animal enjoyment, which is still dependent on external things. Lastly, man, in the course of nature arrived at perfect wisdom, views the whole of things, and, in comparing the various means of enjoyment, finds it his true interest to cultivate intellectual pleasure as his independent happiness.

It is here that man may be considered as ceasing to be of the animal nature, in aspiring at that which is properly divine; for, instead of acting in the subordinate manner of created beings, he himself creates;—from being pleased and made happy with the action of external
external things and regulated events, which is nature, he acts, in pleasing himself, and in forming a rule of happiness, which he then enjoys; and, he provides, in his proper wisdom, for a general state of happiness, which he then communicates to his species. Now, this happiness he enjoys, not only in animal sympathy, by which he had been in his natural state conducted, but in pure reflection, that faculty in which he may be conceived to exist, when he shall cease to know by means of sense *

21. Philosophy, by showing the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator, in the general system of things, where pain and misery is, like temporary pleasure and enjoyment, intended for a general conductor to our actions, naturally leads the mind, in admiration of this wisdom and benevolence, to love and to approve of wisdom and goodness, or justice and rectitude of mind, for its own sake, as well as to avoid and resist folly and pravity, in a general view, abstracting from every particular and personal consideration.

Now, as the lowest degree of merit, arising from pursuing a motive that is good, consists in the acting from our sense of good which is instinctive, immediate, or animal, the highest degree of merit that can be attributed to an action, is to proceed from no personal motive, but from the idea of general good, or the order and wisdom observed in the system. This is no other than acting according to the will of God; that is, by forming ideas of that which is upon all occasions best and most perfect in the nature of things, and by acting inflexibly according to this rule, without any regard to our dearest personal concerns, or those feelings of the man which belong properly to the animal. Man is thus led to prefer the highest motive of reason to the lowest motive of sense; not that sense is either fallacious or mean, but because the information of reason is no less certain, and has no less a divine origin, than that of sense; and, by

* Sect. IV. Chap. II. and III.
this faculty of reason, in generalising knowledge, we are necessarily
led to prefer the idea of good to that of evil.

When, therefore, I conceive an opinion, for example, to be best
in the nature of things, and consequently to be according to the will
of God, I cannot then but approve; for, it is in consequence of my
approbation that I think it best. Now, if I act inconsistently with
this opinion, I necessarily expose myself to the misery of a future
repentance.

This, however, it may be observed, is very different from the con-
ceiving an opinion, that acting in a certain way is according to the
will of God, therefore best in the nature of things. For, as we only
know the will of God from the general view of all that happens, the
imagining the will of God in any other way can be no rule of vir-
tue for a philosophic mind.

Thus, in the perfection of man the intellectual being, virtue is
known to be the establishment of our divine Author as the means
of happiness. And thus, it is impossible not to be happy in this
contemplation of the Divine will.

22. The will of God and that of man are sometimes contrasted,
when the one of these is considered as being in opposition to the
other: But this is a vulgar idea or opinion which is extremely unas-
philosophical. It is impossible that the will of the Deity can ever be
in opposition to any part of that system of things which his perfect
wisdom has ordained. Here is a principle or maxim founded in the
constitution of our mind, for, it is impossible that we can conceive
it to be otherwise. We indeed impose upon ourselves, in reasoning
with regard to the will of the Deity, as if it were like that which is
found in ourselves. Now, though the supreme Mind is not to be
considered as differing in all respects from the mind of man, for then
it would not be mind; yet, it differs *into coelo*, that is, in every degree. The human mind, where wisdom is not absolute or perfect, has at one time a will, which at another time is in opposition to itself, and thus it is that man repents. But, to suppose this in the Deity, would be absurd; for, in our idea of the divine Author, wisdom and power are perfect.

Thus it will appear, that there can be no such thing as an opposition, in the will of man, to the will of God; and that it only requires man should know the will of God, in order to obey, that is, to enjoy it. For, the will of God, being in almighty power and perfect benevolence, must give pleasure and acquiescence to the mind of man, as necessarily as the sun gives light; which is the same as to say, that truth gives pleasure to the mind of man.

Now the only way to arrive at the knowledge of the will of God, is by an investigation of the truths of nature; and, these may be properly considered as the word of God. But, the natural blindness of the animal from which man must emerge, and the misinterpretation of the truths of nature which are given us to read, are not always so effectually surmounted, as to procure that happiness which is the natural result, or proper intention of the system. It is thus that gloomy views are often taken, and unjust suspicions entertained, with regard to the wisdom and benevolence of the general design. Much pains therefore are required to put this subject in a proper light; nor can men of science be convinced of those important truths, except by the most careful examination of every principle employed.

23. In the system of intellect, there are various motives, contrived to influence the discerning and reflecting mind of man; who, from an animal perfectly blind to truth and falsehood, is to be instructed; not to judge scientifically, and so become wise, without error;
error; no more than to enjoy continual pleasure, without the intervention of directing pain; but, to conceive the nature of truth, in knowing what is not true,—to learn to do right, in discerning what is wrong,—and to arrive at happiness, in discovering the will of his Creator, that is to say, in attaining, through the appointed means, to the perfection of his nature. It is in following this course, that he is often led to suffer temporary or occasional evil; not as the proper end of his existence, but as the means appointed in order that he may enjoy.

If this be the state of man, can he properly accuse that system of either malice or folly? What reason to limit the power of the Creator? What reason to distrust the benevolence or the wisdom of his design? Is it for a creature, who in reasoning scientifically must err occasionally, to form such a judgment of what he does not fully comprehend? Or, is it for man, who by means of the sense of misery has been made capable of enjoying so much,—is it for him to complain, that he has not been made to enjoy without that sense of misery, by which he is, in the wisdom of nature, properly conducted? This would be no less than to demand, an end to be effectual without employing the means. Such a request, therefore, could not be made in reason; and such a species of reason must be considered as absurd.

Without knowledge, how should a judging being proceed in reason? Without a sense of misery, how should an intellectual agent be led to a state of happiness, in the proper reflection of his mind? Had nature indeed bestowed on man the conscious sense of misery, or on the animal the instinctive sense of pain, without having, in this general law, an end or intention conceived in pure benevolence, he might then perhaps have found reason to complain. But, to find fault with general evil, when this is only employed as the means of general
general good, would be most unreasonable; and, to allow of general evil, without admitting that which is particular, would be absurd.

24. If it is thus allowed us to infer benevolence in our Author, notwithstanding of evil, appointed as the necessary means of directing intellect to what is right, then, from the justice of the Supreme Being, and from the virtuous suffering of individual or particular men for the sake of general good, it may perhaps be thought, that an argument should be heretofore founded, in favour of a future state of felicity after life, as a reward for conscious merit in a virtuous sufferer. But, this would only be to reason in sophistry, and not in true philosophy, so far as, in this case, it is necessary to suppose, that the virtuous person had suffered in consequence of his virtue, and that a vicious person enjoys in consequence of his vice. Here is a supposition which cannot be admitted, in reasoning strictly according to the truth of things. Virtuous men may suffer, and vicious men enjoy, but it is here denied, that ever a virtuous being suffered in consequence of his virtue, or that ever a criminal enjoyed in consequence of his guilt. A man, who necessarily enjoys in consequence of his virtue, may suffer in the accident of natural things; as a criminal, who suffers in his conscience, may also enjoy in the feelings of an animal. But, for vice to produce pleasure, or virtue pain, is equally impossible, as it is for fire to produce the feeling of cold, or snow that of heat.

We must not here allow ourselves to think with the vulgar, that the enjoyment (for example, of wealth procured in the successful commission of crime), is to be attributed to vice, as the proper cause of that effect; or that the misery, into which a man may fall in consequence of doing his duty, is then to be considered as the wages of virtue. The bread that a man eats, and the wine that he drinks, must have the natural tendency to nourish and to cheer him, in whatever manner these may have been procured; and, in like manner,
ner, hunger and thirst, burning and drowning, must give pain and
affect the animal, in whatever manner this misfortune of state may
have been brought about. But, what has this to do with guilt, and
with conscious virtue? guilt and animal enjoyment, pain and con-
scious virtue, may be occasionally connected, but must not therefore
be thought properly related. The necessary consequence, of the one,
is misery and repentance, of the other again, it is happiness and sa-
tisfaction. This order of things is fixed in the laws of nature.
Therefore, however animal pleasure may be sometimes purchased at
the expense of intellectual enjoyment, he must be very ignorant, in-
deed, who is not sensible, that this is but a miserable bargain.

The benevolent author of our being, has so ordered, that virtue is
necessarily its own reward, and vice its proper punishment. Hence
perfect equity, or justice, in the will of God. But, from this to
deny the future state, or existence, of that which had been in so
much wisdom and benevolence produced, would be a species of ar-
gument inconsistent with the rules of reasoning; and would be
equally inconclusive as the opposite, which is, that there must be a
future state, in order to reward virtue and punish vice.

In reasoning, therefore, with regard to the will of God, we must
learn to think in a different manner from the vulgar, who always
confound, or never properly distinguish, the truth and the apparen
ty of things. In their view, the injured Socrates was unfortunate,
the injuring Nero, happy; but, who is it does not wish to be the
one, as much as they detest the other? in wishing however to be a
Socrates, or a Regulus, a person may desire their virtue, but not the
proof in which their virtue had been tried; and, in hating the
misery of a criminal mind, it is not necessary to renounce the plea-
sures which a criminal person may, as a man, enjoy. It is enough
to avoid vice, in order to enjoy in virtue, or to have pleasure with-
out alloy; but, who can learn a conscious mind to avoid the dread-
ful
ful scourge of guilt? this relief is only to be found, in forgetting what is past; for, it is not in the power of nature, acting according to rules fixed in perfect wisdom, to make the mind of man feel easy under the consciousness of guilt.

25. Man, who is affected with sympathetic as well as with immediate feelings, being educated in society, forms his notions of virtue and vice from that approbation and disapprobation of others which he meets with in pursuing his own inclination. Thus it will appear, that man first learns virtue instinctively, that is to say, he knows virtue first before he understands it. The understanding of virtue is the science of morals; and properly belongs to philosophy, which is the most general reasoning of a scientific mind.

Thus mankind must always agree with regard to general principles of virtue, while the particulars of each system will be constantly altering, in different times and places. The motives also, in the human mind, for the observance of these general rules, which oppose the will of the particular, proceed all from two original and actual principles, which may be variously modified; these are love and fear. That there is an instinctive love and friendship between man and man, no body, that knows mankind, will deny. This social affection, however, is constantly interrupted with the apparent opposition

* This last proposition, it may be alleged, is only a literal translation of the terms conscious guilt, or an explanation of these terms, which being only assumed principles, here is no science, or science without evidence. In answer to this, it must be acknowledged, that the proposition is implied in the terms; but it is denied, that the terms are principles assumed without evidence; for, it is no more evident that the radii of a circle are equal, or no more true that fire burns, than it is certain that conscious guilt gives misery. Here is an actual truth, and no supposition. The only question therefore, in this case, that may be disputed, is in relation to the universality of this truth; and this is seen in acknowledging the principle as being a rule of nature, all whose laws are fixed unalterably in an order, which, so far as we see, is perfect.
position of self-interested views. But, these views are never just, except in cases of necessity; it requires however the height of philosophy, to see that fallacy on all occasions. The conduct, that arises from this motive of love, is truly virtuous; but, a similar conduct may proceed from a different motive. For, to abate from the gratification of a present desire, which is in one's power, it equally suffices, as a motive, the expectation of a greater good, or the apprehension of a greater evil; the one compared with the gratification, the other with the abstinence.

Virtuous conduct thus depending upon a reasoning of the mind, in relation to things compared, where the evil is at a distance and the good at hand, the cause of virtue must often suffer in this unequal contest, without the aid of human wisdom. It is here, therefore, that the experience and wisdom of the species, operates so powerfully in the perfecting of the individual. The careful parent learns the child to forego the present desire, in the expectation of a future good: The toward disciple being thus habituated with the command of reason over the instigation of the present passion, is fitted for the practice of virtue, in the ripening of his wisdom.

Thus true virtue, which is founded on the principle of love alone, and may be said to be divine, is made effectual, either in philosophy, which shows the general interest of mankind on every occasion, or in the habits of a virtuous education, in which benevolence is made the object of our love, and malevolence that of our detestation. Now, this education, which leads to virtue, is the proper result of philosophy.

False virtue, again, which originates from fear alone, proceeds either immediately, by the proper foresight of the person's mind, or mediately, by such a person being made to believe in superition that
that which otherwise he could not have foreseen; and this co-operates with the former, in determining the wills of men.

But, the wisdom of mankind, acting in a general view, where the selfish interest of the particular is opposed to the general interest of the whole, has followed the example of nature, in giving energy to general rules. It is thus that, in the best regulated state of civil society, the virtuous actions of individuals, when sacrificing their interest for the public good, are on the one hand rewarded with praise, with honour, and with power; while on the other hand, in order to corroborate the motives of a virtuous conduct, sound policy has added those of punishment where evil is inflicted for the general good. Thus pain, contempt, shame, and degradation, await the transgressions of those rules, which it is the interest of man to observe. Human wisdom thus trains man like brutes to act from motives which though in morals are not in virtue.

A composition of those motives, in proportions which are indefinite, determines the character of each man with regard to virtue. Few perhaps practise virtue from the purest motives, and few perhaps from those that are altogether base. But, it is impossible to distinguish every step of indefinite gradations; and, it is only the man that lives alone, and never knew society, who may be said to have no virtue. Thus it will appear, that it is only he who has no virtue who may be truly said to have no vice; those relative conceptions, virtue and vice, being also always actually comparative, in having more or less. For, as it is only a being who is possessed of perfect wisdom that may be said to be absolutely virtuous, a being possessed of absolute vice, is an idea inconsistent with our knowledge of human nature; such a thing would be no other than a negative idea, containing virtue in no degree.

26. Here is then a moral system, founded in the instinctive feelings
ings of the animal, and the intellectual knowledge of the human species. This system of virtue, being perfect in its natural constitution, like that of matter, affords a subject of pleasing contemplation for the mind of man, who inquires into the moral as well as natural constitution of things. And thus the wisdom of nature, or laws of God, will never cease to excite the admiration, and reward the indulgent application of the human mind. For, we are led to the contemplation of design, [which is marked with perfect wisdom, as well as with absolute power,] in the universe, where man conceives himself as placed. We are also led to the contemplation of benevolence, in the system of intellect; which is so contrived, as to reward with pleasure, the proper use of those faculties by means of which we are conducted to happiness. But, the neglecting of those talents which are given us, is attended with uneasiness; and their misapplication, with misery. Not as a punishment, inflicted by an avenging being, creating knowledge in order to produce misery, and implanting appetites with a view to betray innocence; but as the means of conducting mind, in the intellectual system, to a future state. This state, although unknown, is not properly an object of fear and apprehension, but of expectation and desire, according to the different periods of life at which this subject may be the contemplation of a mind; for, what is only expected at one time, may be desired at another.

27. It is from such a theory as this, that may proceed the idea of a philosophic practice, absolutely good; as being calculated upon the general principle of happiness, which is thus certainly attainable in wisdom, and in no other manner. It is not inconsistent with this theory, that the practice of virtue may be founded in superstition; for, superstition, although not admitted in philosophy, may be employed by it, in order to promote the general happiness of mind. And, such is the wise constitution of a benevolent system, that, where the happiness of reflecting minds is not necessary or instinctive,
tive, every thing naturally leads or conducts to it. But, not every
thing with equal effect; for, in this system of moral action, and in
this progress of intellect, happiness is the aim or end pursued, and
misery the means, employed in wisdom, for conducting to that end,
ordained in benevolence.

It is in the contemplation of nature that human wisdom is acquisi-
ted by the species; although the individual is also artificially instruc-
ted. It is by examining nature, that we find in the system of this
world an order of thought, in which there may appear perfect wis-
dom. It is in this view of things, that the pain, misery, and evil of
life, when properly contemplated in the eye of philosophy, will ap-
pear, as well as pleasure, happiness, and good, to be a beautiful con-
stitution of human nature, and an ordination of knowledge, contri-
ved in perfect wisdom for the purpose of the intellectual system. It
is in this system of mind, that we may admire the goodness, as well
as the wisdom of the supreme Author; at the same time that we
must be more and more convinced of our inability for penetrating
the end, or ultimate intention of the general design.

In this view of human nature, where the material part is con-
dered as instrumental in the production of a rational substance, ca-
pable of proceeding in a voluntary manner to increase knowledge,
which is then intellectual, and in which the nature of that thinking
being then consists, there is a tendency to raise the mind of man,
above the temporary satisfactions of the animal, to those that gratify
his thinking substance, and fill his reflections with a lasting pleasure.
But, though thus in reason preferring one species of enjoyment to
another, man is not therefore authorised to despise or to neglect those
sensual enjoyments, which may be considered as the natural duties
of life; no more than he can be justified in the indulging of those
pleasures, which are properly animal, beyond the measure of that

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purpose, for which they have been intended with a wisdom that is perfect.

It is thus that wisdom, which is acquired in science, has the power of increasing what is called the pleasures of life, in promoting every enjoyment to its full completion, and no farther; as well as of insuring the happiness of a rational reflection, in which the remembrance of events that are past has the greatest influence over the enjoyment of the present moment. Thus, with the utmost propriety, the reasoning of an intellectual being may be considered as rewarding wisdom with a conscious happiness, and punishing conscious folly with a misery, that is no less unavoidable than just. Hence is explained, on the one hand, the slings of conscience, that torment a mind which, in pursuing a fallacious pleasure, has departed from the path of wisdom, or transgressed those rules of morality which it had formed; and, on the other, the powerful incitement to virtuous action, of self approbation, and the merited applause of men.

If this system of morality, in which the general good of intellectual beings is consulted, and not the temporary pleasure only of an action, shall, after full examination, be found as fixed in its order as is our idea of the planetary system, then, it cannot be conceived that this is the operation of a transient and fruitless thought, but it must in reason be concluded as having been ordered in a design, which, in relation to the system of material things, is final, and, in relation to our mind in which it is conceived, as supreme. Hence, the laws of nature, by which the moral system is conducted, must afford the most interesting subject of investigation for a philosopher, and the most pleasing contemplation for the human thought, as containing the most important truths, and as leading to our true happiness.

C H A P.
CHAP. IV.

The Theory of Virtue illustrated, in the examination of Vice and Crime.

INTRODUCTION.

1. VIRTUE has been now considered theoretically, in being examined with regard to its efficient and final causes, and in reasoning a priori from principles acquired in the science of mind. But virtue may be also examined practically, in reasoning a posteriori, or from principles acquired in the experience of mankind. Here, the various departure of a moral agent from the principles of virtue, or the transgressions of the moral law, will be the subject of inquiry; and thus will be understood the nature of vice and crime.

Having considered virtue as a thing unalterably fixed in its principles, which are in human nature, we are to examine those steps of human conduct, wherein man departs from that perfect course which is virtually implanted in his constitution as a free or moral agent, and which is actually produced with the enlargement of his intellect. We shall thus be enabled to reason a posteriori upon the subject, or to form a judgment with regard to the effects of virtue and vice upon the happiness and misery of mankind, by referring to that which is general in the feelings and opinions of men.

2. We have found, that there are two distinct principles on which moral action may proceed; one of these is scientific, being the wisdom of man seeing his proper interest; the other is instinctive, being that natural affection which man has towards his species. These are the principles of common morals; but, virtuous or superior morals require,
require, that man should not only see his immediate interest in his moral conduct, and be influenced instinctively by love or good will to his neighbour, but also see his interest in the most distant relations of things; and, he must have scientifically considered the instinctive principle of benevolence, as a conscious motive for his conduct, in the character of a moral agent whose will is free. It is then that human nature has come to its perfection, in man the accomplished being, who thus may lead his species, whether in science or superstition, to that which in morals is amiable and right.

3. The principles of morality being wisdom and benevolence, we may reason, from those principles of human conduct, in the science of morality, as well as, in that of physics, we form theories upon the principle of gravitation, or any other law of nature. For, wisdom is a law of nature, which man cannot transgress without suffering, that is to say, if a man shall form a design in folly, he must abide the consequence, whether in passion or reflection. In like manner, benevolence is a law of nature which man may not transgress without remorse; that is to say, a man, who thinks upon his conduct, must feel remorse for having transgressed a law of nature, in which his happiness is concerned; and, if he does not think, he cannot be considered as a man, being no better than an animal.

Hence, having those two principles for the conduct of a rational person, who, it has been shown, is necessarily endowed with a scientific mind, we may now examine the general opinions of mankind, so far as containing approbation and disapprobation of moral action, that is, of the conscious motives of their conduct. For, every action that is disapproved of, or condemned by the general voice of mankind, must be considered as an immoral action, whether we understand the reason of this or not. But, in order to bring that natural morality into true science, we must explain this general opinion of man, in showing the natural principles on which it is founded.
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These principles have been already explained. It therefore remains to apply those principles to the actual cases, or to the natural morality of man, in showing that his disapprobation and condemnation always proceed upon those principles, which have been given as the laws of nature, and foundation of morality.

In treating of this extensive subject, it will be necessary to divide it into different parts, that so each of these may be considered distinctly by itself, as is the business of science in every subject.

PART I.—Distinction of Vice and Crime.

1. Vice and crime, innocence and virtue, are terms employed in the philosophy of morals; therefore, should be properly distinguished.

2. Vice is the error of a scientific mind, not inquiring after truth, but pursuing the general principle of pleasure, without attending to every circumstance and condition necessary to render effectual the just and laudable intention. Vice, therefore, is the occasional effect of human sagacity, reasoning in relation to a philosophic subject, happiness, but reasoning without sufficient wisdom in conceiving ends and means. Vice is thus founded in ignorance: But, it is more than ignorance; for, it is properly the transgression of a principle of conduct, a rule devised for a person’s happiness or pleasure. Therefore, without the consciousness of such a principle, a man could not be vicious; however, in acting blindly from his passions, he might be inconsiderate and unfortunate.

3. Crime, again, is not the simple effect of folly, or defect of wisdom; for, in crime, there is a double transgression of the rules of virtue. First, in a person seeking a gratification from which, in wisdom,
dom, or in virtue, he ought to have abstained; and, secondly, in
doing wilful evil, without a proper cause, that is, in wilfully tran-
gressing the conscious principle of humanity or benevolence.

Vice or folly may respect ourselves alone, without the intercourfe
or connection with any other animal or intellectual agent. This is
not the case with crime; for, in order to have crime, there must be
a mind, a sensitive being, in relation to which the crime is then to
be committed.

4. Virtue is a term that applies to an absolute thing; and it im-
plies an active principle, in the mind of a person who has proceeded
in a regular train of thought. This is also the case with vice, where-
in the rule of virtue is transgressed. But, innocence is only a nega-
tive term, implying the want of that activity in which vice or crime
is committed. The being simply innocent, therefore, is a different
thing from the being virtuous, although not properly opposed to the
being vicious; and, the being virtuous is a great deal more than be-
ing innocent; in the one, there is merit; in the other, there is none.

5. But, though innocence is not properly opposed to vice, it is so
to crime. Thus it is necessarily, that we consider the being innocent
as in opposition to the being criminal. This is also explained in the
nature of crime, as being a double transgression of the rules of vir-
tue; first, in ordaining evil; and, secondly, in doing this with a
vicious motive or intention. For, a person may commit the first
part without the second; in which case, thoug active in relation to
the rules of morality, he is not properly guilty of crime; and there-
fore he is properly innocent, in one respect, although not necessarily
virtuous; whereas, the refusing to ordain evil to another, notwithstanding
the temptation of some temporary enjoyment, or personal
advantage, is not only being simply innocent of crime, as not caus-
ing evil, but it is being actually virtuous; and that in the ratio of the
temptation
temptation which has been withstood, directly, and in that of the evil, inversely.

6. In order to understand this, it is to be recollected, that naturally evil does not give pleasure; but, on the contrary, that naturally it is painful to ordain evil to another, this arising from a principle which is instinctive. Therefore, if, for example, I am to reap a personal advantage, or benefit, from the evil which it is in my power to do my neighbour, the less proportion that this evil bears, in relation to the benefit which I have in view, the more I am naturally infligted to commit the crime; and conversely, the more of evil that I see necessary in the compassing that end, the more is my inclination checked from being guilty in attaining my desire; consequently, the greater the evil, the less virtue it requires, ceteris paribus, to resist the temptation; and, the less the evil, ceteris paribus, the greater virtue is necessary to produce the same effect.

7. Crime, independent of the laws of man, is the transgression of a law of nature. I do not put myself to pain without a motive of benevolence; therefore, so far as I reflect, I must know that it is wrong to put another person to pain, unless in compliance with a law more cogent. But, are not men, without the imputation of crime, daily putting animals to pain?

In order to understand the nature of crime, which is the doing of evil, it must be considered, that doing evil simply does not constitute crime; the evil must be done consciously. Neither is it sufficient to do evil consciously, unless the evil is also unnecessary; but what should prompt a man to commit unnecessary evil? It is evident that this must arise from some false view of things. So far as mankind do not take pleasure in the pain of another creature naturally, that is, instinctively, but, on the contrary, take pleasure sympathetically in another's pleasure, and pain in the pain that they judge another
another creature to be suffering, man must have some motive, different from immediate pleasure, in giving pain to another animal.

8. Thus it will appear, that crime, which is doing evil to another, must be founded in some other thing, and not in the pleasure arising immediately from doing evil, seeing that there is not naturally such a passion; although, in common observation, without philosophical distinction, this may sometimes be concluded. In examining, however, more strictly into the nature of the motives for man's conduct, it will be found, that he does not evil naturally, for the sake of evil, but in consequence of a system which he has formed. Now, this system may be either according to the rules of virtue, which is from nature, in reasoning justly; or in vice, that is, in the transgression of those rules; and this is only occasional, or from accident, in reasoning erroneously; therefore it will appear, that crime originates in vice, as vice originates in folly, and as folly originates in error. Hence, in order to understand crime, we must first consider vice.

PART II.—Of Vice in general.

1. The principles of virtue have been already examined, from whence it would appear, that the natural tendency of the human mind, improving itself by reasoning in science, and by acting in wisdom, is to arrive at virtue. Virtue, therefore, though it is not always, or in the same degree, is nevertheless to be considered as natural to man; and it is necessary in the course of intellectual things, seeing that it has an absolute cause, from whence it always follows, although not equally in every person, or always in the same degree.

2. How then is it that mankind arrive at vice? and, are there also, in the moral system, principles by which man is conducted to vice
vice necessarily as he is to virtue? If this should appear, then, the doctrine being inconsistent, in having absolute and necessary principles for vice and virtue, must be deemed erroneous. It is therefore of some importance to examine this subject, and to inquire how far there may be, in the order of nature and constitution of things, principles of vice, as there are of virtue; or, if there may be cause to conclude, in reasoning with all the light of science, that a vicious resolution should, in wisdom, be preferred to a virtuous principle.

3. The question to be now considered is this: In reasoning philosophically, that is, from the most general and comprehensive view of things, and the most accurate examination of every step in our reasoning, in order to avoid error, is there, on the one hand, to be found a principle which should lead an understanding mind, in deliberate judgment, to prefer a vicious to a virtuous motive? or, on the other hand, is it only in reasoning superficially, inconsiderately, or from erroneous principles, that ever a vicious motive is preferred to one that is virtuous? If the first were true, then there would be no science in morality, or no system of virtue in nature. If, on the contrary, the last shall be confirmed, then there being in nature a fixed principle or system of virtue, this may be a subject for investigation, and lead to a just philosophy of morals. Let us therefore examine what is vice, and what it leads to.

4. Vice is the inordinate pursuit of pleasure in the path of folly; that is to say, where more perfect wisdom pursues a certain and a lasting happiness, in valuing the effects of pleasure and pain, and by comparing more immediate and more distant events, folly, on the contrary, either neglects this calculation, or forms erroneous estimates. Therefore, though perfect wisdom is exempt from vice, in having actual virtue; and, though the ignorance of the mere animal, in a philosophic view, allows of nothing but a passive innocence, the defective or imperfect wisdom of a scientific mind, pursuing that
pleasure or happiness which leads to misery, is imputed to a person as a fault, when a more immediate but inferior good is, in folly, preferred to one more distant, but superior in the enjoyment; or when a present evil, of an inferior degree, is in folly exchanged for a future evil, which will be greater, whether in respect of quantity or quality, or both.

5. Hence, the principle of virtue, or rule by which man in reasoning attains virtue, is wisdom; and, in that case, the principle of vice must be folly. But, virtue is an absolute thing; and, as a principle, it is positive; whereas, the cause of vice is not absolute, it is only a negative in relation to the positive principle, wisdom; and, though a mind, in the natural course of things, does not become wise without being subject to folly, more or less, yet, folly is but an accident, and wisdom is the proper end or intention of nature. Hence, virtue is natural, i.e. necessary in the natural order of things; vice, again, is not natural, i.e. not necessary, in the natural order of things, but only occasional.

6. Vice in a person is the doing of that which will hurt either himself or his neighbour, without intention; for, if there is intentional evil, then there is more than vice. A man cannot hurt himself intentionally, but he may hurt himself effectually; and there are two species of hurt that a man may thus receive; the one is personal or real, the other is ideal or imaginary; the one being properly pain, the other misery. In the one case, he suffers in his body, and thus has actual or real pain and uneasiness; in the other, he suffers in his mind, and has thus ideal pain, which is grief or regret. It must be evident, that, in both those cases, so far as a man does not will evil to himself, vice only comes from the defect of wisdom. This species of vice is therefore properly termed folly.

7. Vice, therefore, properly speaking, is the doing from folly, and
not malevolence, what will in its consequences hurt another person. If the pain and uneasiness of another person could give me any immediate pleasure and satisfaction, then there would be certainly in human nature a principle of vice. But it is otherwise; for, naturally, I am pleased with my species; and then, their displeasure gives me uneasiness: It is only when I am displeased with a person, that his uneasiness gives me pleasure.

This, however, is not a principle of vice; for, when I am displeased, this arises either from the injury which I have received from another person, or it arises from my proper folly. If, on the one hand, I am provoked, without a proper cause, to wish evil to, or enjoy the uneasiness of another person, then here is a principle, or a cause of vice, that is founded in a principle of folly, because nothing but my folly would make me displeased without cause, as this is forming to myself a cause for my displeasure. No doubt that this is often done; no doubt that this is done in reasoning scientifically; but, there is as little doubt, that this is done in reasoning erroneously, or without knowledge sufficient to render that person wise enough not to repent his folly. If, on the other hand, I am provoked justly to will evil to another person, then here is a cause of evil which is not properly in me; and this must be a principle of folly in that person who acts so as to make me will him evil. It is not meant that there is a positive principle of folly; for this, if such a thing exists, is only a principle of ignorance, which has not a proper meaning; but this principle of folly is only negative, and respects wisdom, which a person, who makes me will him evil, has not in sufficient degree.

8. This doctrine may be further illustrated by considering. If, in pleasing myself, I do that which displeases another person, then one or other of us must be wrong; either I in foolishly giving offence, or my neighbour in taking improperly offence at what I have done.
But, if I have formed or approved of this moral principle, That, upon no account, I should offend my neighbour, if it can be avoided; then, if I think that he is to be offended at what I am inclined to do, I will restrain my inclination; for, why should I willfully offend a person whose pleasure gives me pleasure, and whose approbation of my conduct contributes so much to my happiness? If I transgress this principle, which is as evident as the day, I must have some temptation. Now, if this temptation is the gratification of some animal desire, a wise man knows that an animal desire, once satisfied, is as nothing; the pleasure sought for vanishes, and the offence remains. Whether, therefore, is it in wisdom or in folly that I should thus offend my neighbour? If, again, it is ideal pleasure or happiness of mind that I pursue, then, whether this consists in the esteem of others, or the approbation of my own mind, it is not thus to be attained; for, How can I approve of my transgressing the rules of wisdom? and, How can my neighbour approve of that by which he is offended?

It may indeed be supposed, that I offend my neighbour from the motive of pleasing other people.—If by other people, in this case, is meant the general approbation or opinion of mankind, then, in offending my neighbour, I act virtuously; for, in that case, it is from a general principle of benevolence that I violate my natural inclination, which is to please my neighbour. If, on the contrary, I endeavour to please some particular person, in acting contrary to the general opinion, I then transgress wisdom in offending my neighbour; and, in this case, to suppose me in any degree innocent, is to make me ignorant and deluded.

Thus it will appear, that the doing of my duty, or acting up to the principle which I approve, is to me of far greater importance than the enjoyment of an occasional satisfaction, which, however exquisite for the moment, cannot bear a comparison, in all respects, with
with the pure, durable enjoyment, of preserving my virtue inviolate;—of thus acquiring the admiration and esteem of men, instead of being hated and disgraced;—and of attaining the pleasure of self-esteem and the approbation of my own mind, instead of repenting an act which cannot be recalled.

But if, instead of approving of that moral rule of not offending my neighbour, I shall form a contrary rule, of disregarding my neighbour’s feelings and opinions in relation to my transactions, and of indulging my inclinations, though disagreeable to others, here would be truly a principle of vice or immorality, which, in order to its being established, would require a perversion of human nature, or of our natural feelings, seldom to be met with; at the same time, it is not out of human nature, for persons, acting in superstition without philosophy, to think that they are right when they transgress virtue, or for philosophizing men, reasoning from supposed and erroneous principles, to conclude that such may be the nature of man.

In this case of a supposed principle of vice, no person endowed with human wisdom could act from that principle; for, if I indulge my own desire at the expence of other people’s feeling, and purchase pleasure at the expence of other people’s pain, I soon must have the natural resentment of mankind exerted in offending me; and, it is only when the suffering of another person, incurred by my conduct, does not exceed the trouble natural to vengeance, that I may escape the effects of a necessary resentment. But, if the offence given to my neighbour in consequence of pursuing my desire, be such as he will bear without retaliation, or immediate resentment, this must arise from one or other of two things, either his goodness in forgiving, or his pride in despising the offence. But, how is happiness to be purchased at that rate?

If I am to be gratified in my pleasure by the goodness of another person
person suffering for my sake, is he natural, the man who in that case would not have a grateful sense of the actual obligation? and, Can I wilfully offend the person whom I love? If, on the other hand, I am to purchase pleasure at the expence of the contempt of mankind, in that case, not to be miserable in reflection, I must have the consolation of thinking that I have done right, and that, in being an object of contempt, others have injured me. But, if a person cannot distinguish right and wrong, justice and injustice, he is not a proper subject of the moral law.

9. Thus it will appear, that, in a general or scientific reasoning, a vicious principle cannot be formed, however folly might imagine such a thing; and that, in reasoning morally or from human nature, i.e. the general actions, passions, and opinions of men, we shall be led to nothing but a principle of virtue, in consulting the feelings of our neighbour before we indulge our own desire. Now, this holds equally with regard to the highest degree of moral action, and the most common occurrence of good manners.

10. There being thus no principle of vice for the conduct of human action, From whence, then, spring those actions which are certainly immoral?—This cannot arise from the natural incapacity of man to form or understand a virtuous principle; for, such as are unfortunately in this situation, are by men considered in the light of animals, incapable of vice, as they are of virtue. Upon inquiry, it will be found, that vice is not an absolute want of virtue, but properly a defect of judging to the extent of moral principles, or in misjudging of quantity or degree in motive and in action, where either excess or deficiency changes the moral nature of the subject. It is in this manner that unwise and unwary minds, although not actuated by any other than a virtuous principle, are led insensibly to vice, as may be illustrated in the particulars which are now to be considered.
PART III.—Of Vice in particular.

1. If man were a solitary animal, his vices would be abridged, in proportion as, from defect of science, his capability for virtue was diminished. But, man is educated in society, where science naturally grows. He thus learns to be wise, in knowing vice, no otherwise, than the truth or perfection of science is attained, in discovering error.

2. Man, left to himself, could have no other vice besides intemperance; and, without that art of human wisdom which is only attained by the species, the intemperance of the man would perhaps but little exceed that of the brute. In order, therefore, to understand the vice of human intemperance, let us consider how far the mere animal, who may commit excess, can be considered as capable of intemperance.

3. The animal eats and drinks only from the instinctive appetite of hunger and thirst, which are from nature; and which, therefore, cannot be wrong. But, in following the dictates of nature, may not the animal exceed the just measure of the wise intention, or the necessary demand of life?—Nature, in the repletion of the animal, has appointed means for preventing, not excess, but fatal or pernicious excess, in the pursuit of her desires. Thus in proportion as the just demands of hunger and thirst are satisfied, the pain by which the animal was instigated to action, and the pleasure by which that action was properly conducted, both diminish, pari passu. But, as the idea of pleasure and pain may continue to influence the mind after the real knowledge or external information ceases, the animal, in eating, may be considered as exceeding the just measure of necessity, or the demand of nature. In this case however the animal machine is guarded from destruction, first, by the pain of excessive repletion.
pletion, or the fatigue of feeding exceeding the pleasure of the re-
paft; and, secondly, by the nauseae of over saturation. Now, this 
is a diseafe wisely ordered by nature, for the abstinence of the ani-
mal after being gorged with food, or having been in a successive 
course of over-eating. It is thus that the animal, in the midst of 
plenty, is preserved without wisdom, or by the wisdom of nature. 
Not in perfect health; but in a vicissitude of health and disease, al-
ternately succeeding. At one time he becomes fat, in consequence 
of full feeding; at another, he becomes lean, through defect of nu-
triment; and, this is a most wise contrivance, in the natural con-
stitution of this world, for the preservation of animal life: But, be-
twixt those two extremes, perfect health lies in the middle.* 

4. Man is no otherwise subjected to the law of nature, respecting 
health and occasional disease, than is the brute. But, man has wis-
dom, by which the laws of nature may be supplanted, or occasion-
ally set aside; it is thus, for example, that man naturally confined 
by the sea, has found the means of traversing the ocean even where 
it is most unbounded. In like manner, man has found the means 

* Animals which live in climates that have a vicissitude of plenty and penury of ve-
getable food, and which, being confined to the place in the time of scarcity without the 
faculty of storing provision for their winter use, must either run the risk of perishing, 
or have in their constitution some contrivance by which the natural defect of food may 
be supplied. This also is found to be actually the case. The fat, which is soon stored 
in the bodies of certain animals when full fed, serves, in the time of penury, to prolong 
life in braving the hardships of a rigorous winter. Here is wisdom in the constitution 
of the animal body, which may become alternately diseased with inanition and repletion, 
without the necessary destruction of the animal.

But man seems to have a body the least contrived for this purpose of necessity; and 
extreme fatness, in man, seems to be the effect of casual disease in the constitution, ra-
ther than the natural constitution of his body. This also will appear to be in wisdom; 
for, as his body is naturally associated to an intelligent mind, so, it would appear to have 
been more particularly calculated for temperance in the plenty of his artificial provision, 
and for continued sustenance, even in the long winter of a polar region.
of making every thing subservient to his use. The oil, so plentifully stored in the coat of whales, was not naturally made for man; but, in the wisdom of the species, man has found means to feed upon that aliment. What is most to the present purpose is this, man finds the means of correcting that disease or loathing which naturally attends the super-saturation with one species of food, in supplying another; and, by the culinary art, things naturally unpalatable, are rendered pleasant.

But as, with science, error naturally comes into a mind, so, among the individuals of the human species, where wisdom is imperfect, folly is found in various proportions. Therefore so far as, by the wisdom of man, he is enabled to convert unwholesome things to wholesome, unpleasing things to pleasing, and in variety to correct the nausea of a natural surfeit, he also, through defect of wisdom, in using improperly the means, falls into an evil, which is not of nature, nor is natural to the brute who has not wisdom.

5. Man, who scientifically considers eating as the means of pleasure, and the pleasure of the feast as the means of happiness, reasons justly in his science, but falsely in his philosophy. For, the pleasure of eating is not the immediate cause of happiness; although eating, to a hungry animal, is the immediate cause of pleasure. The pleasure of eating is only a mean of happiness in and through health, which philosophically is considered as the proper end of eating, and a cause for happiness. But man, reasoning erroneously on philosophic subjects, actually defeats the very purpose which he had in view.

It is thus that the pleasure of feasting, being considered as in proportion to the palatable food devoured, and as the immediate cause of happiness, the consequence of this partial view, and inaccurate reasoning of man, is the prolongation of the repast beyond the measure.

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fure of animal good. Now as, for want of just reasoning in philosophy, he has thus committed one false step in morals, so the more plentifully the species have provided in their wisdom for the demands of nature, and in their ingenuity against the paling of their food, the individual, in his folly hurts himself, in using the means intended by nature for his good.

Excess is natural to man; not as an animal, but as a person reasoning upon general principles, whether those of pleasure and pain, agreeable and disagreeable, good and evil, beautiful and deform. Man, reasoning upon his ideas, always either exaggerates or diminishes; and this he does naturally, when reasoning in this career, until he reasons in the rigour of science, which is the accurate distinction of every contained idea, the nice attention to every circumstance, and the observation of every possible relation and degree.

Hence, man differs from the brute, in being made to reason erroneously, in order that he may find a rule of direction for his future conduct; whereas the brute, who is not conducted by his proper wisdom, is not made to err, in reasoning from general principles, and does not become wise, in finding absurdity or inconsistency in his reasoning. In proportion, therefore, as man reasons upon general principles, in forming rules for his conduct, without reasoning in the accuracy of science which produces wisdom, and in the wisdom of science which produces happiness, he necessarily errs in his judgment, and commits excess in his proper folly. But, in thus suffering for his folly, he has the means of learning to become more wise.

6. Thus man commits intemperance by his continuing the feast, not from the instinctive pleasure of natural appetite, but from a principle of pleasure, as a motive for his conduct; and this is what the animal cannot form. Therefore, it is only man, who reasons from
abstract general ideas, that may commit this error, in acting from a principle of pleasure, when it truly gives him pain. Have not mankind even died at the social board of pleasure, in using the means of health or necessaries of life? Now, it is impossible for this to happen to the animal, who cannot form a principle to direct his conduct, but who is wisely guided by nature, in following implicitly the instinctive passion of pleasure, and blindly avoiding that which gives him pain*; neither is it possible that man can kill himself by over-eating, without actually enduring bodily or real pain, in the seeking for or pursuit of ideal pleasure.

Here is therefore the transgression of the rules of wisdom, and this properly constitutes folly. Folly will thus appear to be more than the simple want of wisdom which ignorance implies; for, in this case, there is formed a general idea as a motive of action; and, this is not a natural capacity of mind, neither does it belong to the brute animal, who cannot acquire wisdom in conceiving ends and means, nor be accounted foolish in pursuing means which lead to a different end from that intended. Now, this instance of human folly is the acting from a principle not wisely calculated to answer the intention; it is therefore the transgression of wisdom, in an animal capable of judging wisely. Hence, when this folly is the conductor of man’s actions, which in general are wise, these may be properly considered as immoral. For, in this case, where action proceeds from a conscious motive, and this motive is formed upon a general idea which is that of happiness, unless the end is attained in the employment of the means, the rule or the order of wisdom, is then transgressed,

* The well known accident of the burting of a cow in clover may perhaps be considered as vicious gluttony from which according to the theory the brute should be exempted. But this would be a total misunderstanding of the case. A hungry cow set into a cultivated field of rank clover, forms a case which is only found in art and not in nature; and it is only the particularity of this artificial case that proves hurtful to the animal, who never dies, like man, of eating.
transgressed, and folly is then properly imputed to that mind. This conduct therefore may be considered as immoral, or as being reprobated in the general sense of mankind.

The vice of intemperance is nothing but pure folly; and, no mixture of malevolence enters the intention. The intemperate man pursues pleasure; and, could he attain that end, he would be wise and happy. But, though he sets out with the intention of pursuing pleasure, he actually ends in overtaking pain. To be convinced of this, we have but to consider wherein lies the pleasure of eating and drinking. Whether are these most pleasant to the hungry and the thirsty, or, to the person who is fati·te with meat and drink? If the true enjoyment of meat and drink depends upon the natural demand, and if eating and drinking give satisfaction to the demand of nature,—What folly must it be to eat and drink beyond the measure of our satisfaction! for, hereby so much future pleasure is destroyed.

Hence intemperance, as immorality, is proper to man alone, and not to the beast conducted, by nature, without science, but in perfect wisdom; and hence, the wisdom of temperance is discovered in philosophy, and not in science.

Thus as far as the man, in his proper wisdom, transcends the most fagacious animal, in providing means of preserving the individual and continuing the race, he, in his proper folly, exceeds the brute, in the pernicious excess of those appetites and capacities, which are contrived by nature in perfect wisdom, in order to answer the general state of the system, and not every particular case that may occur. Thus animals, for example, who are naturally subjected to excessive fasts, must have the capacity of gorging themselves at times, when the means occur*. Now, though each of those opposite excesses is pernicious,

* Animals who have not wisdom or provident design, and therefore are subjected to
pernicious, compared with a regular supply and moderate satisfaction, yet, the evil necessarily arising from each excess, is naturally corrected by the other. But, nothing can correct the pernicious effects of the intemperate luxury of man, except wisdom, which in those cases often comes too late.

7. Man, so far as an animal, is subject, like the brute, to the laws of nature, and to the same rules of instinct or necessity. But man has wisdom, by which even nature may be controuled in degree. It is thus that he eats and drinks of what, and where, he pleases; that which is produced in the east of Asia, is consumed in the west of Europe; that which grows upon the Rhine, is enjoyed upon the borders of the Ganges; and the bread, which the wisdom of the Ancient World had procured, was lately interchanged with that of the New. Man, in his wisdom, may be said to make himself a God; but, in his presumption, he departs from the wisdom of the animal, and becomes a fool.

It is thus that man as much exceeds the brute animal, in his capacity for temperance and intemperance, as the animal exceeds the plant, which is limited to act in necessity, without the use of reason. The animal proceeds, in his instinctive reason, from the rage of appetite to the satiety of natural inclination. Were man a mere brute, he would proceed, in satisfying the demand of nature, to the extreme of saturation, where this ends in disease; and, in like manner, he would proceed in the opposite direction, through the gradations of health, to the disease of appetite. He would thus continually move, not providently, through the right line of temperance, but inconsiderately or instinctively through the indefinitely variable curve of a certain oscillation.

But the necessities of nature, must in the season of plenty, by feeding to fatness, lay up store, in their bodies, for the season of dearth which necessarily succeeds.
But man, in having wisdom, by which he is capable to direct the
laws of nature, is a superior being; and, having folly, (by which he
misleads himself with regard to his proper intention) even herein
manifests the superiority of his nature, in comparison with that of
the brute species, which is conducted by the wisdom of nature. In
following the laws of nature or animal necessity, man has a latitude
in his voluntary conduct, so far as he may either, on the one hand,
improve the general law of nature, in his wisdom prescribing to his
natural appetites a rule of rigid temperance, in place of animal satu-
ration or disgust, and thus preserving health at all times more distant
from disease; or, on the other, he may in his folly neglect even the
rule of nature, contrived for the animal who acts without science;
he may thus hurt his health, or animal constitution, in the blind pur-
fuit of ideal happiness. In the one case, departing from the rule or
law of nature, farther towards the extreme or beyond the rule of
animal action, he hurts himself in the intemperate exertion of his
actual capacities; in the other, walking by the light of rational re-
fection, he forms a rule, never to provoke his appetite in quest of
pleasure, nor, in the satisfaction of his inconsiderate desires, to carry
satisfaction beyond that point where physical disgust begins to operate.
Hence, man is temperate, in proportion as philosophy restrains per-
nicious habits, which originate in folly; and, he becomes intempe-
rate, not without science in his conduct, but through defect of wis-
dom in his science.

8. Temperance, so far as it serves the animal part of man alone,
or so far as confined to himself, is not to be accounted virtue, being
properly wisdom in his moral conduct: It is then that intemperance
is folly, in defeating the proper intention of his scientific view. But
when, in the train of philosophical reflection, he takes a more ex-
tensive compass to his scientific views, and comprehends his various
relations to social beings and congenial minds, he then begins to have
a virtuous as well as a moral view of things; and here the virtue of
temperance,
temperance, in its origin founded on a principle which is absolute and particular, becomes, in its production, more and more relative and general. For, whereas this rule of action was first limited to his sensual passion, it may in generalisation be extended to every sentimental suffering and enjoyment.

Man, being composed of instinct and of intellect, is only to be understood, on all occasions, in knowing the different principles in his natural constitution. Being a scientific animal, who in his wisdom forms rules of conduct for his happiness, and in his folly transgresses those rules of conduct which in his wisdom he has formed, or of which in his understanding he had approved, he often acts by rules which in his serious reflection he finds inconsistent. This intellectual being then corrects those rules of conduct, in thinking wisely, or by reflecting on his ends and means, his actions and his motives, his sufferings and enjoyments.

It is thus that he has formed rules of temperance, never to exceed a certain limited gratification of his wishes; in which extended view, considering his relations to the animate and inanimate creation, to the material and intellectual systems, he prescribes a voluntary temperance even to his nature, which it did not know. Thus, to the necessities of his constitution, to the sensual and sentimental passions of his mind, to every pleasure, and to pain of every sort, he extends the jurisdiction of his nobler intellect, in changing the animal, which he was born, and in which without science he might have continued, for that image of the divine nature which he forms in becoming man; an actual, an intellectual existence, distinctly different from the reasoning animal, from whence, as from a proper soil, it springs. It is then that man wisely forms a general, an universal rule of temperance; that is, considerately forms a rule to suffer wisely, so as to enjoy; and, temperately to enjoy, so as not to suffer.

9. Intemperance
9. Intemperance has now been considered as a vice which hurts the vicious person only. Injustice, on the other hand, may be considered as hurting the innocent, while it benefits the guilty. Injustice, therefore, actuates the natural resentment even of the animal. But it is only man (who in science understands the right of property and the liberty of nature) that may understand the wrong of oppression, theft, or the betraying of his trust. The brute, therefore, who in pursuance his own good injures another, does not know injustice, no more than intemperance, which is the transgression of a rule in wisdom.

Justice is an idea which man acquires scientifically, in supposing himself in the place of the person whose property he would violate, and then consulting what he should feel, were another person so to act, as he desires to do in relation to another; or considering what he should feel, were equal violation of property committed in relation to himself. He thus learns to form a rule of equity, in equal circumstances or conditions, and to make allowance in proportion as these are not equal.

10. Thus, justice is a moral duty that we owe another person or the public, as temperance is a duty that we owe ourselves. But, injustice is not crime, properly speaking, so far as, in seeking our own benefit, no evil is intended to our neighbour who is thereby injured. Therefore, naturally, independent of the opinions that may be artificially formed by men, the guilt of injustice is aggravated with the evil that is done, and alleviated with the good. But, as the sense of honour, which is purely philosophical, comes to affect the mind, the guilt of injustice degrades the person who commits it, in proportion, not to the loss or evil sustained by the injured, but to the selfishness discovered in the motive of the action.

To understand this, we must consider, that honour among mankind
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Kind is no other than a high opinion of some species of virtue, while another species, perhaps equally valuable or useful, may be then neglected. Honour, therefore, is purely philosophical, although it is not perfectly so. Among us, honour is the philosophic view of virtue, in doing the duty committed to our trust, in opposition to every degree of selfishness. By the term selfish, here employed, is not meant the proper attention to self which is instinctively the province of the animal, and conscientiously the duty of the man guided by what is termed common sense, but more properly by his reasoning in science. This selfishness, which is a reproach, implies the base or mercenary neglect of that attention which, as a moral duty, a man owes to his neighbour, to the state, or to his sovereign.

11. Man by himself, independent of society, might commit intemperance, so far as he had the means of sensual pleasure, and the general view of making himself thus happy; but in this solitary situation he cannot commit injustice; for, so far as he has the virtue of temperance, he may indulge his pleasure in following his will, without any danger of the consequence as leading to repentance. This, however, is not the natural state of man, who is to pursue pleasure and pain also of the intellectual kind, as being derived from the opinion which he conceives the individuals of his species entertain of him. Is it not thus that almost all mankind are continually struggling for more than the necessaries of life, with the sole purpose or intention of purchasing from others that good opinion which they feel to be so necessary for their happiness? What is it, then, that I can take injuriously from another person which shall be equal to his love or his good will? and, What can I receive, by means of injury, from my neighbour, which will give me so much pleasure as his good opinion and esteem? Sensual pleasure I may enjoy, without any interference with the interest of my neighbour; but, this alone cannot satisfy the soul of man, made for social enjoyment; and, he is a brutish sensualist, indeed, that does not feel amidst his pleasure the
the bitterness of social reproach, whether founded in his conscious
demerit, or in the misapprehension of another. But, How unwisely
does the ignorant often set about obtaining the gratification of that
universal passion of the species! No argument, however, can be ta-
taken from thence, in order to justify the means which truly are in
folly.

Injustice, in a person of intelligence, is to transgress the rules of
wisdom; this vice, therefore, must originate in folly. In order
to make this appear, it must be considered, a person cannot commit
injustice to his neighbour without offending him, although he may
trust, in folly, to his not being detected; but, if I am in wisdom to
offend my neighbour, there must be some good to be attained, a good
of greater value, so as more than to compensate the evil that is thus
created, for, in order to be good, the benefit must balance all the
evil, and have an overplus. Now, in the estimation of a citizen,
What is there of greater value than the good opinion of his fellows?
What greater evil than their hatred and contempt? for, after the ne-
cessaries of life have been procured, the next thought of man is how
to acquire the esteem of those with whom he dwells. It is true, in-
deed, that often, in order to attain that end, unjust means are used.
But, is it not evident, that here is folly?—With a view to seek the
precarious esteem of some, or to court the admiration of a mob, a
person makes himself truly contemptible and detestable; Now, Is
there any wisdom to be acknowledged in that design?

But even suppose, that the unjust person should be successful in
his narrow views, and should escape that detection of which no wise
man would run the risk, yet in order to make himself be thought happy,
generous, or great, he must necessarily make himself miserable,
in knowing himself to be little and unjust. Thus he loses the benefit
arising from the good opinion of others, in forfeiting the esteem of
him from whom he cannot separate, of one who is all the world to
him,
him, and of one who will not be deceived; and, he exchanges, for
a precarious hope, for an imaginary pleasure, that by which alone
he is made truly happy. This, even, is not all; for, must not my
misery be aggravated, in hearing others call me generous and just,
when conscience tells me that I am unjust and ungenerous? To sum
up the argument, so far as the object of a man's desire is to be
esteemed or admired by his neighbour, it is in nature and in virtue;
but, to take pains to obtain the good opinion of my neighbour, and
at the same time to employ means that must make me hated and dis-
pised, is absurd, and betrays my folly.

If a man commits injustice to another in order to relieve his own
necessity, he is to be pitied; but if a man commits injustice in order
to be reckoned just, or great, or good, and if, in order to avoid ideal
shame, he makes himself really shameful, whether is such a one to
be most pitied or despised? Nothing so common as for selfish men,
of little understanding, to be unjust without being conscious of their
vice; but this is only laying, that the vice of injustice is, like every
other, the child of ignorance and folly. To desire the applause of
men, and not to purchase it with what is in our power, that is, to
be just and good, is surely a glaring folly; but it is only to those,
who have attained the happiness of valuing themselves upon the best
principle, that the truth of this proposition may appear on all occa-
sions: How happy must be the person, who never was disgraced!
but, how much happier must be the mind, that never disgraced its-
self! As the virtue of justice, therefore, springs from the scientific
understanding of one's self, the vice of injustice must be considered as
a mark either of brutish incapacity to intellectual enjoyment, or of
morals corrupted in the erroneous reasoning of a narrow view.

12. Temperance, considered as doing no more than to satisfy the
natural desires or animal demands, and justice, as seeking nothing
but what properly belongs to us, are not virtuous in a philosophic
view. But when we form a general rule, not to do any thing that may give offence to ourself or to another, then, there is virtue in the observance of that rule in temperance and in justice; and the degree of this virtue is in proportion to the temptation of pleasure, which on these occasions solict our neglecting or transgressing of the virtuous rule. Hence the distinction, of wisdom which is founded upon our own, and virtue upon the interest of another. This however does not hinder our own and our neighbour's interest to be both concerned in the same action; and, in that case, the transgression of the rule would be at the same time vice and folly.

13. This is not the case with avarice and prodigality, two vices which, in strict reasoning, may be considered as amounting to no more than folly; for, so far as a person has no other duty to which he has to attend, the avaricious hoarding, or prodigal squandering, of his wealth, is purely optional; and, it is only in the prudent avoiding of either of these extremes, that is to be found the virtue of frugality, which is purely wisdom. But, the duty which a man owes to his family and friends is a motive against prodigality; and, the duty which a man owes to himself, or his proper character, is a motive against avarice; both which are founded in virtue; for, thus, at the same time that a man conducts himself in wisdom, he has either the good, or the esteem, or both, of others in his view.

14. The vices of intemperance and injustice correspond to two of the four virtues which are termed cardinal; and those two virtues, which are founded in wisdom, are extremely comprehensive with regard to moral conduct; but there is still a principle of conduct, which is not contained in these two; this natural principle is benevolence, and the corresponding vice malevolence: The transgressions therefore of this virtue, and that of prudence, remain to be considered.

15. Prudence
15. Prudence and benevolence are the two capital virtues of man in the social state, which is natural to the species; for, from these, as principles, all the rest may spring; and, from either excess or defect in these, perhaps every vice may arise.

Prudence and benevolence, though commonly contrasted, and scientifically to be distinguished, are not necessarily opposed or incompatible; although, apparently, they may be often so, to the narrow views of the vulgar, and to the erroneous reasoning of the learned. For, being each founded upon instinctive principles which may be naturally opposed, it may be considered as impossible to conduct those virtues upon all occasions, so as they shall not interfere. But, if prudence and benevolence are things perfectly different, though not opposite in their nature, a voluntary or moral agent may, in cases where these interfere, act from a composition of those two distinct principles; and thus be determined in his conduct by a double motive, in like manner as a projectile is actuated in its path by a double cause.

Prudence is that species of wisdom which, as an end, has in view the immediate enjoyment of a man or of a person’s self. Benevolence again has for object the enjoyment which is not immediate, but reflected from the enjoyment of another; and this is by means of the sympathetic faculty of the mind, which is natural to man, although it may be also made scientific in being properly understood. If prudence and benevolence are virtues, imprudence and malevolence must be vices; let us therefore examine how far this may be made to appear, in consistency with the theory already given.

16. Immediate personal enjoyment being the object of prudence, it must be evident that this is only a virtue, so far as pursued consistently with every moral duty of the man, as well as with the instinctive motives of the animal. For if, in procuring my immediate personal
personal enjoyment, I shall forfeit that mediately but no less actually or
real enjoyment, which I feel in the pleasure and satisfaction of
another person, I may be extremely unwise, in sacrificing a greater
to a lesser enjoyment; and, therefore, the pursuit of my immediate
enjoyment, in order to be wise, must be consistent with every other
enjoyment.

Hence, the object of prudence being pursued without wisdom,
this may degenerate into a vicious desire. But, in that case, the vice
which arises from this inordinate degree of prudence, cannot with
propriety be termed imprudence, for it is not the deficiency of the
virtue, but its excess. Prudence, therefore, carried to excess, changes
its nature, and becomes the vice of selfishness, which is in opposition
to benevolence. Whereas prudence, in falling short of that
just degree which is virtue, must either arise from ignorance, indolence,
or erroneous reasoning, if it is not from the excess of some
other active cause or motive, which is then properly opposed to the
principle of a rational selfishness, or that which is termed prudence
in being considered as a virtue. This opposing motive now remains
to be examined.

The enjoyment of benevolence, not being immediate, but reflected
from the enjoyment of another person, can never be in any degree selfish. But, the pursuit of this object should also be consistent
with every other moral duty. Therefore, as having a proper regard
for his own personal interest, is considered as the duty in general of
man, so, in pursuing inordinately the enjoyment of benevolence, a
man may unwisely sacrifice his own immediate interest, in suffering
afterwards from that action of his by which the present enjoyment
of another was promoted. In this case it is impossible that a person
could accuse himself of vice; because, he acted from the virtuous
motive of benevolence. But, in understanding the proper order of
things, he may see his folly, in pursuing one object blindly or in-
ordinately,
ordinately, and without having that respect to all other objects, which is in wisdom for our general happiness.

Here is therefore an excess of benevolence, or a virtue in extreme, which is properly opposed to that excess of prudence, which has been in selfishness considered as vice. It will now appear, that this excess of benevolence, which is not properly vice but folly, may be the cause of a deficiency of prudence, in like manner as an excess of prudence, when selfishness improperly prevails, may be the cause of malevolence or the deficiency of benevolence, which would be then a vice.

This vice, which is here attributed to selfishness as a cause, is properly that which is termed malice. It arises, either naturally from a real, or artificially from an imagined, injury. In the first case, where the malice is from nature, it is only in judging falsely of degree that may constitute the malice of a sentiment; whereas in the other, where malice is from fallacious imagination, no degree of malvolence can be entertained which is not in vice. This may be illustrated by considering: So great is the power of human imagination when not corrected in true science, that even the most innocent success of another person, contrasted with our own ideal misfortune, creates a species of injury and resentment, which, in the inordinate sentiment of envy, leads to malice an unwary mind.

Thus it will appear, that malevolence is no natural vice, consistently with the theory in which there is acknowledged an instinctive principle of benevolence. But the vice, which is founded upon the excess of selfishness, is occasional; and, the folly of imprudence is natural, so far as the wisdom of man is occasionally defective and necessarily imperfect.

17. That
17. That character of man which is perfectly estimable, altogether amiable, and truly virtuous, does not arise from action founded upon one principle of conduct only, but requires a conduct founded upon two different principles, which do not always, or not necessarily, interfere in opposing each other’s purpose. Man has to follow his own immediate pleasure and satisfaction—conditionally; and he is, in like manner, to avoid pain and unease. Now, these motives of action are implicitly pursued by the animal, who judges only of what is immediately either agreeable or disagreeable, in preferring the first, and avoiding the last. But man, who forms more abstract and general ideas, and has, besides pleasure and pain, sources of happiness and misery, reasons also more profoundly, in seeing much farther into the relations of distant things; he thus becomes wise, and forms a compound estimate of his desires, in comparing the idea of a present pleasure with that of a future satisfaction, and the idea of a present uneasiness with that of a future enjoyment; a compound estimate, in which he values all the advantages and disadvantages, both on the one hand and the other.

It is in this manner that man is enabled to act from the two distinct principles, of consulting either his more immediate or primary pleasure and satisfaction, or the mediate and secondary pleasure and satisfaction of enjoying his neighbour’s happiness, and relieving his neighbour’s misery. It is only when these two motives of action happen to be incompatible with each other, that man has occasion for what is called virtue to direct his conduct; whether to sacrifice his mediate or immediate satisfaction; whether to prefer the one or other of those two species of enjoyment; and thus to form to himself a principle of conduct which may be in habit or in practice properly confirmed, and which may be considered as either, on the one hand, selfish and interested, or, on the other, as disinterested and generous.
So far as man has in charge from nature, both wisely to pursue his own pleasure, and to receive enjoyment from the satisfaction and pleasure of his fellow creature, he must form the general principle, (in case of necessity, or the opposition of those two motives of action), to prefer that which he most esteems. Now, this esteem is either, on the one hand, natural, when it is instinctive, or, on the other, ideal, when it is from the proper operation of the mind affecting itself. When it is natural, it is then only animal, and can hardly be considered as human, or proper to man, although it is upon this that is naturally founded the other, which is now to be considered.

Man reasoning conscientiously, and reflecting on his passions and affections, feels ideal pleasure and satisfaction, which is then formed into conscious motives for his future conduct. In this train of thinking, he is led to consider all his particular pleasures or enjoyments as being doubled, with the participation and happiness of his friend or fellow creature; consequently, here is a source of social felicity, which cannot be sacrificed for that which is animal or particular; because, the transgression of this rule of conduct, that is, the sacrificing his neighbour’s satisfaction to his own, must then imitate all his ideal enjoyment; whereas, the sacrificing of his animal pleasure, for the social, only serves to increase the satisfaction of that social enjoyment, and of every other pleasure which he, either as an animal or as a man, enjoys. Hence, of these two species of pleasure, the animal and the ideal, if otherwise equal, a man, who thinks justly, cannot prefer that which is animal and immediate, to that which is mediate and ideal. But, we at present suppose, that one or other of these two laws of action, or rules of conduct, which are both natural and virtuous, must be transgressed; and now, it is to be observed, these laws will be found to refer respectively to prudence and benevolence.
In order to understand this difference, with regard to the transgression of those virtues of prudence and benevolence, it must be considered, that when I transgress the first, it is my immediate feelings that are violated, and not my ideal feelings; for, prudence has the actual interest of myself in view. Whatever, therefore, of this feeling I can allow myself to sacrifice, I need have no apprehension of repentance; for, repentance is a change of opinion, in finding we had misjudged our intention, and therefore been unwise. Now, after sacrificing my personal interest for my ideal pleasure, I cannot repent, so far as I have not misjudged things; but must more and more approve of my conduct, so far as I have received a satisfaction, in compensation for the enjoyment which I sacrificed. Now, let us see how far this will hold equally in relation to the other virtue.

When I transgress the virtue of benevolence, in sacrificing, for my own immediate enjoyment, the pleasure that I should have in satisfying another person, I then prefer a species of happiness which decreases from the moment of enjoying; and, this may be even soon annihiliated, in the natural succession of indifference or disgust. Whereas, the happiness which I have sacrificed on this occasion, is a species of enjoyment which, instead of diminishing, may increase; and, instead of being annihiliated, will continue to please, in the idea, so long as it remains. Who then, that knows how to value things, in considering future as well as present time, and estimating the quantity and quality of enjoyment,—who, that is wise, will sacrifice a greater for a lesser good?

Hence, of two motives which present themselves for action, a wise person considers not only which of the two will give most immediate enjoyment, but which will give most happiness upon the whole; and therefore he examines which of these, in being obeyed, may give repentance, and which perpetual or continued satisfaction. He, therefore, who has wisdom enough to know futurity, and fore-
see repentance, may have virtue enough to resist the solicitation of the more immediate enjoyment; and thus he will be led to prefer the distant pleasure, that which upon reflection will increase, rather than enjoy a momentary pleasure, however exquisite. He will thus even submit, with cheerfulness, to present pain and danger, as the price of future joy and satisfaction.

Thus it will appear, that the extreme of prudence, which is a scientific motive, so far as it leads to the transgression of a virtue, becomes a vice; but the extreme of benevolence, considered also as a scientific motive, so far as in self-denial it does not transgress any virtue, but paves the way to future enjoyment, it never leads to vice, and seldom to repentance.

18. No virtue has been misunderstood perhaps so much as that of charity; therefore, the vice which is opposed to that virtue, cannot be properly understood without a more accurate examination of the subject.

The want of sympathetic feeling, in man, would be no less than a defect in his natural constitution; this is not to be supposed. But, when man stifles his natural feelings, and feels his heart against the sympathetic feeling for another, there must be some motive for that action; and, according to the nature of that motive, the action will be considered either as in virtue, or in vice. Now charity, as a virtue, is not the having that tenderness of disposition which cannot see human nature suffering, without sympathetically feeling and endeavouring to relieve it; for, it is not always proper to relieve man in his suffering; nor is it always the true virtue of charity, when a person relieves an object that is suffering. If, to please myself, I remove a nuisance from my sight, I then act, not from a principle of virtue, but of pleasure. But if, when I am displeased with my neighbour,
neighbour, upon some disagreement in our sentiments, I consider
that this may not be owing to his fault, but to his misfortune; and
when, in consequence of reflection, I cure myself of prejudice
against any of the kind, I then am truly charitable, in not judging
harshly of another.

But, in judging charitably, we must not fall into the imprudence
of judging unjustly; in curing prejudice, we are not to fall into a
state of foolish blindness; and, though acts of benevolence be al-
ways agreeable, we are in justice to abstain from such actions as on-
ly give immediate pleasure, and have an evil consequence, in pro-
moting vice.

Man, in society, is answerable for pursuing many motives, which,
as a wandering savage, he might freely indulge in. To relieve a
fellow creature is a great enjoyment, where prudential considera-
tions lead not to the refusing such a satisfaction to ourself; but, to relieve
the worthlessness of that distress which their vice hath brought upon
them, is, on many occasions, to encourage unworthiness and vice.
Perhaps there is not a human weakness so baneful to political socie-
ty, as this of undistinguishing benevolence. In every society, there
is a limited quantity of charity to be bestowed for the relief of those
who want; but, in the misapplication of that bountiful provision,
the happiness of relieving the worthy is so far frustrated, and a sure
foundation is laid for future evil. Let not, therefore, the blind in-
dulgence of humanity, or natural benevolence, be considered as that
virtuous principle of charity which disposes to think well of others,
and which is at pains to inquire into the merits of the unfortunate,
in order to have an opportunity of relieving the worthy.

The vice of uncharitableness, therefore, is the entertaining a bad
opinion of our neighbour without sufficient reason, and the selfish
hardening of our heart against the feeling for the worthy who are
suffering.
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suffering. But, true wisdom lies in judging justly; and, it is a person's best interest to seek occasion to procure pleasure, in relieving the sufferings of the well deserving; because, in so doing, he must procure a satisfaction, which will continue to be approved of; whereas, in bestowing charity on a person who is not deserving, merely to remove a disagreeable object, though truly an act of natural benevolence, is not that virtue of charity which should be also founded on wisdom, or should be tempered with prudence.

19. Heroic virtue is founded in philosophy; it is the sacrificing of personal interest for the public benefit, that is, the preference of a greater to a lesser good. But, in what eye is this greater good to be discerned? and, in what mind is a personal interest to be undervalued, in comparison with that which is frequently so far removed from it? The vice that is in opposition to heroic virtue is a pusillanimous selfishness; the one considers the summum bonum as confined to his narrow sphere of action, the other extends his action and enjoyment—to his parish—to his kingdom—to the world. It is only a mind which has learned to generalize, that is able to comprehend so much in his ideas; it is only a person who has become most wise, that may draw happiness from so wide a sphere; and, it is only to a person who has attained the power of enjoying his own approbation above that of all the world, to whom the world, natural and moral, may not be indifferent. Such a person is rewarded in his own mind with the true enjoyment of the world, and of all things, present, past, and future.

There is another species of virtue resembling that now considered; it is known by the name of romantic virtue. But this last is not founded immediately in philosophy; it only has for basis a superfluous admiration of heroic operations, without the principles which naturally conduct a wise person to that general view of things, in which
which the greatest good is seen with all its power and beauty. It will thus appear, that heroic virtue cannot be attained without wisdom in a high degree; but that romantic virtue may subsist with a great degree of folly. Here is a case in which virtue and vice may seem to be confounded; but, in distinguishing principles, it will not be difficult to discriminate those two things.

It is only folly that may be a subject of ridicule, and not benevolence. When wit, therefore, would ridicule benevolence, there is always supposed to be folly in the intention, and that either respecting the end or the means. A foolish end, however successful or effectual may be the means, is ridiculous; on the other hand, a benevolent intention, when pursued by means which cannot effectuate the end, may be represented as a piece of folly. Nevertheless, it is only the folly of misconceiving means, which, in this case, is to be ridiculed; and benevolence, separated from folly, cannot be made the subject of derision.

Thus heroic virtue is naturally a subject of admiration to mankind, and cannot be despised when understood, so far as it is genuine, in proceeding upon wisdom and benevolence. Without misrepresentation, therefore, heroic virtue cannot be ridiculed. This, however, is not the case with romantic virtue, which, so far as associated with folly, must be naturally an object of ridicule to mankind. At the same time, it may be observed, romantic virtue, however naturally exposed to derision, cannot be made a proper subject for satire; for, as folly only is the subject of ridicule, vice alone can be made the object of just satire. In the one case, the laugh of mankind is excited against the folly of a person, who may be at the same time amiable in our eyes; in the other, again, at the same time that the folly of the vice is ridiculed, there is excited some degree of indignation, when by satire vice is lashed.
20. To sacrifice our own interest for another's good, is virtue of the purest kind; at the same time, in such a virtuous person, there may be but little wisdom or discernment, in choosing a proper subject or mode of his benevolence. But, when a person willfully neglects an opportunity which offers, to make return for a favour which he had received of another, no consideration of prudence can then excuse this transgression of the rule of virtue: Therefore, ingratitude is the purest species of vice.

Such is the constitution of the animal mind, or common understanding of the brute, that good offices excite the sense of gratitude, in like manner as evil offices excite resentment. But these are sentiments, in the brute, of which he cannot form a principle or motive for his conduct. Man, as well as beast, has the sentimental feeling of a kindness from another; but, besides enjoying the feeling for a favour, and the pleasure of a favourite, man admires the motive of an action which is generous; and this is estimated, in taking into consideration the various relations of the actor. Thus, an action, which I should think indifferent, if from a friend, I should esteem and value as a favour, if coming from an enemy. Man has thus the power of valuing the intentions of another, and of esteeming favours in proportion to the judged benevolence of an agent. This is pleasing to the soul of man; and this scientific sentiment is called gratitude. Hence it is impossible not to be grateful; although it is not unusual, among men, sometimes to mistake a favour for an injury; but a heart that does not feel a favour, which has been conscientiously received, is not human.

Of all the histories that please in the recital, none gives more emotion to the soul of sensibility than a generous action meeting with a grateful return. But, if this thing gives pleasure always, when only in idea, the mind of man must have been made by nature
ture sensible to this pleasure of conferring favours, and, a fortiori, of returning kindness.

If man, from the natural constitution of his mind, be led to gratitude, as well as to benevolence, by means of the pleasure felt on those occasions, he must be certainly deluded in not pursuing that from whence he is to reap the most permanent satisfaction.

Therefore, there is not, in the rational soul of man, an absolute principle of vice, no more than of error and of folly; these are all occasional; and they are not, in nature, any final cause. Thus, when an infirmity of ingratitude occurs, there is then only the prevalence of the little minded selfishness over the human sentiment; and, a man makes himself a brute, not when he is insensible to kindness, which is a disposition not in nature, but when he acts as if he were insensible. Now this must have a cause, which is, the want of virtue or wisdom sufficient, first, to overcome the erroneous or fallacious formed principle of self-interest, which man has not in brutish ignorance; and, secondly, to make him prefer the love of self-esteem which is both rational and refined.

Now, as even imprudence, in a boundless disinterestedness, exalts a common person to the rank of noble minds, interested prudence sinks the most exalted person to the level of a common mind. That is to say, common virtue, which is practical, is always more or less imperfect, but philosophic virtue, which is in its nature perfect, can not bear a flaw. He, therefore, who in having honour pretends to philosophic virtue, is degraded in the least transgression of that which he professes.

It is for this reason that the vice of ingratitude, in showing no spark of honour, or philosophy, which is the prerogative of man, degrades a person of the human species below the level of the brute.
who is instinctively benevolent to those who give him pleasure. The
neglect of benefactors, therefore, is considered as pure vice without
alloy; that is to say, the very animal nature of the man has been
corrupted in his science, and he has become wise only to become
more selfish. No wonder, therefore, that this should degrade so
much, a vice which shows how little proficiency in morals a person
has arrived at, or how far he has receded, in his folly, from that path
which nature has pointed out for man to tread.

21. Meanness, or baseness, is a vice to which the co-relative or
corresponding virtue is magnanimity, or dignity of soul. There is
no vice or virtue that will better exemplify the nature of that con-
scious and scientific sentiment, which is peculiar to man.

Intemperance, injustice, and inhumanity, may be attributed to the
brute species by mankind, reasoning from the imperfect views of
common sense, without the more perfect information of philosophy;
but he would be a very shallow observer, indeed, who should attrib-
ute the distinction of magnanimity and baseness to the brute, whose
character is chalked out for him by nature, and followed implicitly,
without admitting of any such distinction.

But man, who has the power of taking a general or scientific view
of things, in reflecting abstractly upon sentiments and opinions,
forms an idea of propriety; which is a sentiment arising not proper-
ly from action, but from measure and degree of action, where either
more or less makes the distinction of good, bad, or indifferent.

Among mankind, where the state and conditions of men are so
unequal, all actions are not equally related to good and evil in all
men. Therefore, though nobody may transgress the rules of virtue
without censure or suffering, one person may do, with approbation,
what another may not, without offence to the feelings of mankind. A person of high degree in the ranks of men may do, with approbation in the esteem of mankind, that which a person of low degree could not attempt to do without the greatest ridicule; and, a person in a low degree may do, with approbation, what another person, of an exalted station, may not do, without baseness being imputed to his motive.

So far as mankind are not ranked according to their brute force or animal accomplishments, but according to wisdom, virtue, and intellectual acquirements, there is necessarily expected more of moral excellence in a person of high rank, than in one of low degree. Therefore, so far as propriety consists in a just measure of things, and judgment of degree in action, a person of distinction should always from the most perfect principle of virtue, order, and beauty; while all that is required in the vulgar man, after consulting his convenience, is to comply with such rules as are necessarily required for the well being of a state, and the peaceable subsistence of society in which he dwells.

But men are not always ranked according to their intellectual excellence, whether moral or political; those talents, however, have almost always contributed in the elevation of men; and the children of people in elevated stations have almost always the best example and instruction. Hence, from this constitution of society, there naturally arises a superior species of men, compared with the vulgar, who neither can have the most liberal education nor the best example.

But when, in consequence of power and wealth, there is an easy possession of desire, or the command of much sensual pleasure, then, to minds which are not perfect, there is introduced a corruption of morals among the people of high rank; and then, the moral and po-
litical excellence, peculiar to this station, is again debased, sometimes even below the level of vulgar men. Nevertheless, the improving powers of education and example still operate in this station; and thus we find two opposite powers, variously acting, and influencing the morals, or determining the characters in this rank of men.

This is the reason that here we find a peculiar system of morals corresponding to its cause; an artificial composition of character, wherein may be united rigid virtue and dissolute principles. This system, of imperfect virtue and refined morals, comprehends the sentiment of honour, and the practice of good manners. The first is a philosophic principle in a vulgar understanding; the second is the manners of a man with the intellect of a child. It is not meant, that every man of honour has no philosophic understanding, no more than that every person of good manners may not in wisdom exceed the bounds of infantine capacity, but only, that commonly honour and good manners are taught to certain people, who follow those rules of moral conduct, without knowing the principle on which depends the utility of such a practice.

22. These artificial virtues, of fashionable honour and good breeding, bear the ensigns of the noble family from whence they are sprung. Therefore, to those who seek no deeper in the genealogy of mind, here appears the excellence of human nature; of which, indeed, it is the faithful portrait. At the same time, this is a deception; for, it is nothing but the excellence of human art. Therefore, though we cannot be deceived in the appearance of the virtue, we may be deceived in the character of the man; and, the individual, who is thus brought to the apparent perfection of mankind, is not necessarily that person whose character is then ascribed. For, it is only in the wisdom of the species that this semblance of virtue and benevolence is produced, in order to supply their place in the defect

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of science, and philosophic principle, which alone can make of these
true virtue.

Honour is an artificial species of virtue, which is founded on phi-
losophy; and, it is in its principle superior to common virtue. Com-
mon virtue says, be just to others, that others may be just to you;
be true to others, that others may be true to you. The principle of
honour says, be just, be true, that you may be admired for your dif-
interested conduct, even by those who are neither just nor true.
Thus honour, like philosophy, forms a source of happiness, not from
frenzied pleasure, but from that which in the mind of man is intellec-
tual. Vulgar virtue consults only the personal interest of the man,
in disregarding his ideal interest; the virtue on which is founded
honour, again, disregards the personal interest, and consults the ideal
feelings; those feelings which are always active in a person's
thought; and which form his conscience, his misery or his happi-
ness, when, as an animal, he is in a state of mere indifference. Vul-
gar virtue leads to happiness, in the enjoyment of the blessings of
life. But the supreme virtue, on which is founded honour, leads to
happiness, in the enjoyment of one's self, and in despising life with all
its blessings, when these are in competition with that which makes
one always happy, and when the preservation of these necessarily in-
volves a misery, intolerable to a mind which knows the enjoyment
of its virtue.

But, the distinguishing mark of honour, by which it is to be dis-
criminated in relation to common virtue, is this. Common virtue
is constrained, so far as in obeying its laws a person has a fear of
evil; honour again is voluntary, and ceases to be honour if founded
upon any other fear but that of disgrace. Honour is thus different
from vulgar virtue, in being superior in its principle; but it is infe-
rior to that pure principle of rectitude from whence it springs. This
difference, between honour and philosophy, consists in honour being

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vitu founded upon the approbation and disapprobation of others; whereas philosophy, despising popular applause, seeks that approbation which, being founded on scientific principle, cannot change. Honour makes the approbation and disapprobation of others the standard or measure of its conscience; whereas philosophy, having studied every rule and measure of conduct, forms a conscious principle in self-approbation, which leads to permanent and unprecari-ous happiness.

If honour be thus sprung of the purest principle of virtue, and yet possessed by people who have not in science reached this exalted principle, it will appear, that as, without scientific evidence, men believe, in superstition, what by prejudice they are taught to think, so, without the principles of wisdom and a general benevolence, men are habituated to imitate perfection, without knowing that perfection which they imitate. Thus, like mere animals, they are trained to the observance of this shining substitute of social virtue and sublime philosophy, without arriving at the knowledge of the principal.

True magnanimity and conscious propriety of manners can only arise from the knowledge of man, and from the consciousness of virtue; but, an artificial elevation of thought, and arrangement of agreeable manners may be formed in man; and then, this in general supplies the place of that which is most amiable and most perfect. Therefore, magnanimity or true greatness, is not always to be found, on trial, where from appearances, it should be most expected; and, real elevation of mind, without that amiable manner which is capable of seducing reason itself, is often found under an exterior shew of unbecoming meanness. Therefore, to value one’s self upon a shadow or a shew, without the substance, is truly littleness of mind, compared with human nature in perfection, where the elevation of thought and agreeableness of manners proceed from principle; and not from imitation and from habit. At the same time, even the sha-
dow of humanity in perfection, is meritorious, compared with sentiments of folly and vice, in which the laws of order and humanity are disregarded or transgressed.

23. The laws of virtue, and those of honour, are necessarily similar in some respects, while in others they may differ. So far as founded on the principles of virtue, the laws of honour cannot differ from the rules of virtue; but, besides that which in honour is founded on the principles of virtue, there may be something which is not founded on those principles; and then the rules of that part of honour which is not in virtue, may either be indifferent in relation to the laws of virtue, or may be in opposition, and transgress those laws.

Virtue is from nature; therefore it is fixed, steady, and unalterable. Honour, again, is in art, or human institution; so far therefore as the laws of honour are not conformed to those of virtue, they must be variable, and occasionally erroneous. For, so far as the reasoning of mankind is not always in the strict rule of science, nor their intention in pure philosophy, the rules of moral conduct, prescribed even in the general opinion of a people, may deviate from the truth of virtue, and vigour of philosophy. This will be illustrated in an example.

The rules of honour, as of virtue, say, you shall not lie, you shall not be a coward. If a person injures you, in calling you a coward and a liar, the rules of virtue say, do not overcome evil with evil, but with good. Here honour may speak a different language; for, a man may be occasionally obliged to resent that injury with evil. Here, where the laws of honour and of virtue are in opposition, what party is a man to take? if he is a man of common virtue, that is, one who seeks the esteem of men, it is evident he must either conform to the rule of honour, or he must be a coward. Instead of being a man of common virtue, suppose he is one of superior knowledge, and
and that he holds the esteem of men, a motive of subordinate degree, compared with the approbation of his own mind; then, he will despise the injury, and will seek the justification of his character, in the eyes of men, from the uniform tenor of his conduct. But this is being a philosopher, who, having the substance, does not seek the shadow.

It must not be alleged, that we here confound cowardice and supreme virtue, in attributing to both the same effect. To such a superficial reasoner, it may not be easy to give an argument; but, to those who see distant causes, and in causes view the ultimate effects, the following distinction may be made. In the one case, a person is truly mortified in losing the esteem of men, and is conscious of having deserved that disgrace in not having the resolution to justify himself. In the other, a person is not mortified in being accused falsely; and, if he suffers from his virtue, he rises superior in his own opinion,—a recompense which the esteem of all the world cannot purchase.

24. Cruel and unmerciful may perhaps be considered as terms which are synonymous; there is however a distinction to be made; it is this. The one of those terms is only negative, denoting the absence of a virtue; this may be then considered as a vice; whereas the other is more; for here we may suppose there is an actual disposition to do evil; and this is crime.

Unmercifulness is, therefore, now to be considered as a vice; and we are to show, that this disposition, so far as it may be considered as a principle of action, is only sprung of folly.

Mercy, as applied to an action, always implies a change of resolution, in consideration of pity, tenderness, or affection. A person, for example, has injured me to such a degree as I think can only be expiated with his life; but, when I come to take that vengeance, I relent;
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relent; I change my resolution, and forgive the injury for the sake of human nature. I am then merciful, in sparing other people’s pain. A merciful man spares even the brute beast; and never gives more pain than what is absolutely necessary. The merciless, on the contrary, spare not the painful feelings of another, but indulge the dictates of a fordid view, or angry passion, in stifling the voice of pity and compassion.

In reasoning with regard to human motives, we must proceed upon this principle, that compassion and benevolence are natural to man. A person cannot take pleasure in putting another to pain; that is to say, in putting another to pain, a person must have some motive, and by that motive his natural benevolence is overcome. Here, where there exist two motives in opposition, it is required to see, which of the two it will be a person’s interest, on the whole, always to prefer.

Suppose that I indulge my passion, in bringing another person to pain and misery; my passion thus is pacified, it is true; but, What do I again upon the whole?—nothing, besides the disagreeable thought of having caused a misery that was not necessary, or which might have been avoided. If, on the contrary, I spare, in mercy, him who is in my power, I create a pleasant subject of reflection; my passion is appeased for the time; and I shall ever after think with pleasure on the transaction.

So far, therefore, as a man is sensible and wise, he will be merciful. But, so far as a person is either insensible or foolish, he will be merciless upon occasion.

25. Jealousy is the sense of injury, or evil, from a certain apprehension with regard to the qualities, the actions, or the influence of another person. In this case, the evil apprehended may be true, and
the jealousy may be unjust; as when my character or conduct is to suffer, in the eyes of other people, by the comparison which may be made with that of the person of whom I am jealous; and then, my jealousy is founded on injustice.

But the injury or evil may be real, while the apprehension may be unjust; in that case, I injure the character of my neighbour, who I suppose willing to commit an offence. Therefore, so far as jealousy gives pain to the person who thus suffers under that passion, it is folly; and, so far as a person entertains a bad opinion of his neighbour unjustly, it is in vice.

Lastly, the apprehension may be just; in that case, it will not be in vicious jealousy, but in wisdom.

26. Pride is the passionate or pleasing opinion of a person, in approbation of himself. This may be either founded scientifically, in considering abstract qualities which are esteemed as good and evil, or naturally, in the actual comparison of some other people. Thus, for example, a man may be proud of having done his duty, in opposition to a great temptation which he had the resolution to resist; or, he may be proud in having, upon trial, strength superior to all his fellows.

Pride takes its origin from the excessive value or admiration of one's self; vanity, again, from the excessive desire of being admired by others. But though thus founded upon the best of principles, pride and vanity become obnoxious from the intemperate degree, or the improper object of the passion.

The object of pride may be in folly, it cannot be in vice; for if I value myself for what I think valuable, it is only in the excess of
my passion that I could be blamed. But, who can blame me? Not myself; for, I am sincere in my opinion. Nor can any other person blame me, so far as I do not show that degree of self-approbation which is faulty.

The vice of pride is more than simple or innocent pride; and it must consist, either in admiring myself for something which in justice I am not to be admired for, or in an offensive preference of my own merit, compared with that of other peoples.

Thus, in a rational pride, there is always two things to be considered; first, how far the object of the passion, is worthy of a man; and, secondly, how far the judgment of an excellence is concluded in just reasoning. For, if the pride of man shall take, for object, an excellence which is more proper to a brute, his opinion of himself, though founded in a just comparison with other men, would but expose him to the pity of his kind; if, on the other hand, in comparing himself with men of wisdom and benevolence, the proper qualities of man, he exalt his virtue unjustly or in detraction of his neighbours, the pride of such a person, would justly excite the indignation of the impartial.

Pride, so far as composed of a principle of comparison, in reflecting on one’s proper actions, and of a spirit of ambition, to excel those of our kind who are justly admired, must naturally lead to virtue; but, so far as pride is misplaced, or assumed unjustly, it is vice, and originates in folly.

As a man cannot be proud of what he does not admire, so neither can a man be truly vain of that of which he is not proud. So far, therefore, as vanity is the exterior mark of pride, it must be always in vice. For, even in virtue, a man should not be vain, so far as he is wise; because, it is only in being vain that he can deprecate the merit
merit of his virtue, the implied comparison, which he has formed with his species, being then returned on him with an interest that he is seldom able to repay.

That vanity is folly, will appear by considering: When a man is virtuous, wise, or brave, and is not vain, mankind give him credit for his virtue in the whole, or to the full amount of that character which he discovers by his conduct; but, when he is vain, he wages war with other peoples virtue. In that case, he cannot, with any degree of reason, expect to have the full return in praise, for what he had expended, in his wisdom or his self-denial; he only has a claim, in justice, for that quantity by which his virtue has exceeded that of other men; and, in the disposition in which mankind are put by his vanity, it is good fortune if he shall even obtain bare justice. Hence, humility, or modesty, is a profitable virtue; not as undervaluing ourself, or over-rating other people; but, in assuming nothing to which another person may suspect our title.

Pride being the consciousness of excellence, whether natural or moral, and vanity being the display of that pride, whether well or ill founded, humility will appear to be the negation either of the one or other. In relation to pride, humility must indicate a person to have a mean, though not perhaps a just, opinion of himself; in relation to vanity, again, humility, at least, is wisdom.

That vain pride is the child of folly, will appear by considering, the highest perfection of the mind is to be conscious of its imperfection; that is, to form an idea of wisdom and benevolence, not from the comparative perfection or excellence of inferior things, but by knowing what is absolute and perfect in those attributes of mind. This is being a philosopher; and, a philosopher is only vain in proportion to his imperfection. For, if he has formed a proper idea of what is perfect, his conscious inability of doing what he would,
would, while it makes him more virtuous than the generality of his species, must guard him from a vanity, which only is the fruit of views more limited.

27. Ambition is not vice, no more than hunger or thirst: But, excess in ambition is the intemperance of ideal pleasure; and it hurry on the mind to neglect the path of virtue. Without virtue, a man travels on ambition, amidst the quicksands of crime, blindfold; without wisdom, ambition raises up a man, in order to make his fall the more severe. So far as happiness consists in a man finding his wishes and his state to coincide, much ambition, with virtue and wisdom, may make a man happy, in carrying his state to the summit of his wishes. With little ambition, again, virtue and wisdom must make a man happy, in bringing his wishes to the level of his state.

Ambition is an ardent desire to attain an end; so far, therefore, as that ambitious end is directed by virtue, and the means conceived in wisdom, ambition is a blessing to the human species, to whom the individual, in thus gratifying himself, then makes a return for the education he had received of mankind. But, when the object of ambition is directed by vice, it were to be wished that the means should be conceived in folly. When wisdom again conducts ambitious power to an evil end, it is then that man may regret his want of wisdom, and repent his folly in the education of his children.

Thus ambition is sometimes considered as a virtue, and sometimes as a vice; but both equally without reason, if not properly distinguished. This is also the case with contentment; of which there are two species. One of these is passive in its nature, is founded on the vice of indolence or sloth, and leads to no other end but ease. The other, though dispassionate, is in its nature active; being founded in philosophy, it is rational; and, it leads to happiness, in the enjoyment
enjoyment of every thing. This is no other than the enjoyment of one's self.

The vice of contentment, and that of ambition, destroy each other's purpose; people however will be foolish enough to pursue both of them by turns. But, virtuous ambition, and philosophical contentment, are not incompatible; they only moderate the aberrations of the human mind, which, like the planets, is not limited to one absolute path, but pursues one of which the principles are fixed, although it is always varying indefinitely within a certain bounds.

28. Envy and covetousness are vices derived from a desire which is natural to man; this is, to acquire that happiness which he sees another person enjoy, and to enjoy a benefit which he knows another person to possess. In desire alone there is no evil, unless so far as that desire is fruitless and intemperate. But when, to the intemperance of desire, there is conjoined injustice to our neighbour, then, evil necessarily springs from every action flowing from this passionate desire. The vices of injustice and intemperance being already explained, it is sufficient to have here derived, the vice of envy and covetousness, from a source that is thus understood.

29. Sensibility is from nature, for it is founded in a feeling which is necessary or instinctive. Therefore, insensibility, if natural, is a defect; and then, it is not vice. But if, instead of being natural, insensibility arises from the attention to our immediate personal concerns, when, in the natural course of sympathetic passion and virtuous view of our affections, we should feel for others, the being insensible to the joy and grief of others, is selfishness intemperately carried to excess. In that case, insensibility is a vice, which is naturally
turally aggravated with the degree of friendship, or connection in which we stand, in relation to the person who is grieved.

But, what heart feels distress, and does not feel! — That heart is not human. Even the shadow of distress, painted upon a scene, will draw tears from the eye that knows no real grief. Is this from nature then? or, is it in art? — It is in art perhaps, as is the seeing of Saturn's satellites: But, art could not have made those distant objects visible, if nature had not made us see. Art could not make beauty please, if nature had not given to human intellect the knowledge or understanding of order: In like manner, man could not take pleasure and pain in the represented scene of happiness and misery, if nature had not endowed him with instinctive love, and the seeds of virtuous sympathy. Therefore, when man does not feel in the cause of virtue, we have reason to conclude, that he has transgressed nature's laws, has formed to himself fallacious principles, and acts in vice from misconceived notions.

I must be insensible indeed, if I could hear that my friend had lost his heir, with no more emotion than is felt when I hear that the Sultan has lost his favourite son; but, bring the Sultan on the stage, and let me understand the justice of his grief, I should then perhaps feel more for that ideal thing, than for a friend who had lost a son that did not do him honour. Here is, therefore, intellectual sorrow; it is perfectly different from that of the mere animal; although it is founded in that feeling of the man, which is properly instinctive, and which there is every reason to believe is as regularly and equally distributed, among the individuals of the human species, as is the sense of hearing or of seeing. But, if we do not employ the talents and capacities which we have from nature, for the improvement of our being, in the intellectual progress of our mind, this must happen, either from the ignorance of mind, not knowing
a source of social happiness, or from the real misfortune of our vice, in preferring selfish pleasure to every other motive.

While a person has love for mankind, and common understanding proper to the species, he must have sympathy, which is essential in virtue. But, the natural love for mankind may be much increased, and the natural predominance of selfishness may be much diminished, in a philosophic view of things, whereby the narrow limits of our selfish pleasures are extended in the participation of a general happiness. We have but to consider, that the instinctive love of self cannot be improved, no more than the sensuous pleasure of the animal; although both, in excess, may be abused: But, the conscious esteem of a mind reflecting on its motives and its actions, and the intellectual happiness of the man, improved in true wisdom, are not by nature limited like the knowledge of his sense, but made to grow in that association of ideas, and generalization of our feelings, which, though natural to the species, is artificial in the progress of each person. Man, therefore, as the surest way to self-esteem, must love his neighbour; and, in order to love himself upon reflection, he must gain the esteem of another person, who is able to reflect in a general approbation. It is thus that the man who has not friendship towards his species is vicious in his morals, and is punished in having no friends, or in not knowing the happiness of friendship.

Sensibility, therefore, if natural, is always amiable; but, if cultivated in a mind from a principle of disinterested benevolence, it is a virtue. The difference betwixt the natural and the virtuous sensibility is this; the first, though not misplaced in its object, may be faulty in measure or degree; the second, so far as founded in the truth of wisdom, and in the virtue of humanity, cannot be either dis proporcioned or misplaced.

Thus either sensibility or insensibility, when intemperately carried to
to excess, may be considered as in folly or in vice, and not in virtue.
A virtuous person should always judge, both of the object for which
the natural passion is to be called forth into action or to be indulged,
and of the degree in which this duty of humanity is right or ought
to be performed. With regard, however, to the comparison of those
two opposite extremes in which a virtue may degenerate, it must be
evident, that the one of these, being the excess of a virtue, never can
become a vice, properly speaking, but only a defect of wisdom, or a
folly, which is indeed the general cause of vice; whereas the other,
departing from humanity, must be in the purest vice, so far as, by a
corruption of morals, the natural sympathy of the human creature
has been stifled, or diverted into the narrow vortex of a selfish ani-
mal.

30. The term truth may be considered as either belonging to sci-
cence in general, when it is contrasted with error, or more particu-
larly to morality, when it is opposed to falsehood. With regard to
general science, truth refers to a thing or thought, and it implies the
just relation of those things or thoughts, which then are termed true;
as they are called erroneous, when there is not a just relation subsis-
ing between the things or thoughts, that are compared in order to
form a judgment. A person speaking physically or scientifically
may speak erroneously, his thoughts not having a just relation with
things; but he cannot be said to tell a lie, which is a moral expres-
sion. A moral expression implies a design, in which the speaker
consciously means, either truly to inform, or falsely to deceive, an-
other.

In morality, considered as a science, truth is a term which equally
takes place as in that of mathematics or in physics; but, in morality,
considered as the proper conduct of mankind, truth comes also to
have another meaning; it there refers to the expression of our know-
ledge;
ledge; and it then implies the relation of the language, which we hold, with our thoughts or our intentions. Now, if a moral agent is to express his knowledge, this must be for some moral purpose, besides that merely of expressing truth, which is not a moral but a scientific purpose.

It will thus appear that man, who, according to our theory, is both a moral and a scientific agent, has two purposes in speaking truth. One of these is to gratify the intellectual satisfaction of his mind, which is always, or in general, pleased in knowing truth. The other is to obtain some particular good, or attain some end, which is then the object of his intention. Hence, the observance of truth in our expressions is held, by all enlightened men, to be of a nature that is sacred or inviolable; for, when even a good end should be attained by a falsehood, truth, as a general principle of human science, must be violated.

We may now consider truth and falsehood, so far as relates to moral agents, who, in expressing themselves to others, may act either in virtue or in vice. If they speak truth, and with a good intention, they act so far in virtue; if, on the contrary, they speak falsely, and with a bad intention, they act in perfect vice, and may thus become criminal. But, a man may speak truth with a bad intention; as also he may, with a good intention, tell a lie. Now, if the moral fitness of the thing is to be judged of from the intention, a person may speak truth in vice, and virtuously tell a falsehood: If, again, we shall make truth the standard of virtue, and falsehood that of vice, we might condemn a good intention, and approve of a bad one. Thus we are led into an absurdity in supposing truth to be the standard of virtue; for truth itself is only admirable so far as it is good. Truth is always good, or good necessarily in its proper nature; but, the consequence of speaking truth may be occasionally evil; in which case, surely, a wife man will consider seriously, whether he is to fa-
crifice the truth, or permit the evil, which is to happen in preserving truth.

If a man allows himself to suffer for the sake of truth, his virtue may be most illustrious; but if, while I am safe myself, my friends, my citizens, should suffer for my speaking truth, What species of virtue would that be which would not save a friend, in sacrificing some uneasy feeling in the future quiet of his conscience? Such virtue must proceed upon this principle, that evil cannot be the mediate or distant consequence of speaking truth; but, the contrary is the supposition of the case; consequently, it is not evident, at least, that this is perfect virtue.

Seeing, therefore, that here are two different principles to actuate a virtuous conduct, and that those two principles may be occasionally in opposition, there might be erected two systems of morality, each of which should adopt one of those principles, and which, therefore, in this particular case, could not agree. It has been the object of this treatise to show that morality is not founded upon one principle alone; and, it has been represented as founded on wisdom and benevolence. Now, it is impossible that a wise man should not have the greatest respect for truth; but it is no less evident, that benevolence to our neighbour will not suffer a wise man to sacrifice the actual good of man for the ideal good of an opinion which may change. A man is therefore truly virtuous who sincerely seeks the good of mankind; and he is truly wise who most effectually pursues that end.

31. The vice of falsehood and insincerity transgresses the rules of honour in the highest degree; for, truth is the foundation of philosophy, as philosophy is of honour. Therefore, independently of malevolence and infidelity, a lie degrades the mind of man. A person who is truly a man of honour, cannot voluntarily make a lie.
But, besides a direct lie, there are in disingenuity various species and degrees. It therefore requires a watchful caution, in a mind, to avoid some species of falsehood and deceit; and it requires wisdom or philosophy to avoid every deviation from truth, or the least degree of falsehood.

Man naturally is sincere and true. His social commerce, if possible, even improves this natural principle or instinctive conduct; for, he feels pleasure in communicating every thought, every feeling, every sentiment, to his friend. But, in the political intercourse of men, man finds it necessary to conceal his thoughts and his designs; he even finds it necessary to deceive. Therefore, in the refinement of political society, or the moral system, man forms certain laws for regulating the practice of deceit. There are certain occasions when he may conceal the truth in relation to his friend; and there are certain occasions in which he must endeavour to deceive his foe; although, even with that foe, there are also, in true wisdom or philosophy, rules to be observed, where truth must not be violated. But, in things which graduate into each other, and in which variable conditions change the nature of obligations, it is extremely difficult to be always guarded, or never to transgress the rules of artificial or political virtue, all which are founded on wisdom and the love of man.

It may be alleged, that perfect virtue cannot admit of any transgression against the law of truth, which is an absolute thing admitting of no degrees. It must be also allowed, that, wherever truth has been transgressed, there is a fault or a misfortune among men. But when, of two virtuous or approved principles, one must be transgressed, we have only then to make our choice. No doubt, to a virtuous mind, this must be a real misfortune; but, a person who is truly virtuous, that is, both benevolent and wise, will, in that emergency, endeavour to make the evil as little as may be, by doing what upon
the whole seems best. But upon no other occasion can a man of perfect virtue sacrifice any thing of his love of truth, for any other immediate or personal gratification.

Moral truth is a virtue which intellectual beings must necessarily cultivate; for, in the social commerce of moral agents, from which both the science and the happiness of man arise, it is truth alone which contributes to attain that end. Falsehood, therefore, is imi-
mical to the science and the happiness of man. But there are par-
ticular cases of necessity in which moral agents may be placed, and where one or other of two moral laws must be transgressed. Here the wise intelligent being man has to make a choice, whether to transgress the rule of truth, which he finds so pleasant to a virtuous mind and so beneficial to mankind, or to sacrifice the law of natural benevolence, which is the foundation of his social virtue. To save a citizen, for example, May I not deceive an assassin? Here a truly virtuous mind must have regret, in being constrained to transgress the rule of truth; but here a feeling person will not hesitate, in prefer-
ing the lesser to the greater evil.

It must not be alleged, that, in thus allowing a discretionary power to dispense with truth in cases of necessity, we will naturally introduce a laxity of duty in other cases where truth might be pre-
served sacred. No man has any discretionary power in relation to truth, more than in relation to justice and benevolence; but, where a person is under a necessity of transgressing either the one or other of those two moral duties which, however rarely, come to interfere, the common sense of mankind, virtuously instructed, happily is suf-
ficient to determine when the one and when the other is to be pre-
ferred. For, though common sense will save an innocent citizen by means of falsehood, it will not indulge the feeling of humanity, or the compassion of a man, when justice calls upon him to declare the truth. Where truth and justice are upon one side, it must be a dire necessity,
necessity, indeed, that could make a virtuous man transgress the dictates of his conscience; but when, with a pure intention, falsehood is employed to gain a virtuous end, which might have been attained through other means, we only have to commiserate that want of wisdom by which a moral agent had been led to sacrifice the truth, or hurt his conscience by the transgression of a duty which he holds so sacred.

It is devoutly to be wished, that truth at all times were to be inviolably preserved. A Stoic may also persuade us, in the enthusiasm of system, to sacrifice every other concern to truth, which doubtless is of divine origin.—*Fiat justicia, ruat coelum*; and, the same may be said of truth. But, however dear to us may be the sense of truth, however we may hate ourselves for telling a lie, we must sacrifice our own immediate interest for the sake of doing justice to mankind; and we must allow our social passion, when supported by the divine virtue justice, to triumph over every other human speculation. It is not to a cool dispassionate philosopher, who places his supreme good in the pursuit of truth, that we are to appeal, when the most imminent danger to the life of a virtuous citizen, or to the safety of a well regulated state, requires to be averted by another evil; an evil which, however great in the eyes of honour and philosophy, is certainly diminished when viewed through the medium of friendship and benevolence.

Infincerity is an offence to truth, of which every mind, properly human, must be sensible; and insincerity is an offence to conscientious duty, an offence that folly, and not wisdom, will commit. To be infincere in making a promise, or perfidious in breaking faith, subjects a man to the contempt and detestation of the society in which he dwells, or with whom he deals; whereas the opposite virtues, as they procure the confidence of men, so they reward the candid and the faithful with the esteem and love of mankind, and with the approval
probation of a person's own mind. It must not be alleged, that it is only a virtuous person who approves of this general conduct, and who is thus rewarded in his own reflection; for, though this may be considered as sufficiently true, it does not give a proper idea of the human mind in relation to virtue. The true state of the case is this: Whoever will look into his own reflection for reward or punishment, will find that approbation which the practice of this virtue must afford, and thus either enjoy or suffer, according to his moral or immoral conduct. With regard, again, to those who have no reflection, so as they might enjoy in the approbation of themselves, it is but just that they should have no remorse, in finding that they had committed an offence against their conscience. Such persons as these, who are unfortunate enough to want the means of happiness in the best motives of moral conduct, can only be guided by that inferior species of wisdom, which they may have learned, for conducting themselves in relation to the approbation and disapprobation of others. Accordingly, we find that it is only among the most liberal minds that such a value is placed in self-esteem, and that, in the valuing of ourselves, such a guard is placed against the misery of vice.

Voluntary dissimulation betrays a consciousness of vice, as affectation shows a consciousness of the want of virtue; for, why affect that which one truly has, or, why dissemble that which is no fault? This, however, does not hinder that occasionally the exertion of those talents, of deceit, may proceed from virtuous motives of benevolence or pious principles; in which case, simulation and dissimulation will take their place in morals according to the root from which the action springs. Human nature cannot help approving of the sentiment which is expressed by the Roman moralist:

Una de multis face nuptiali
Digna, perjurum fuit in parentem,
Splendide mendax et in omne virgo
nobilis aevum.

Love
Love and benevolence may, in a virtuous mind, be the source of a deceit, which otherwise would be hated and despised; but, virtue cannot allow a person to deceive from selfish motives; for, this would be to sacrifice a greater for a lesser good.

32. Fortitude is a virtue; and, in that case, cowardice is the correspondent vice.

Cowardice is the deserting of duty, in order to avoid danger. Hence, while a quick sense of danger may arise from wisdom or prescience, too great a sensibility to approaching evil is an enemy to virtue. When fortitude, as opposed to cowardice, is to be considered as a virtue, insensibility must have no hand in it; for, there is not the merit of fortitude in a person doing his duty, when he does not apprehend danger in consequence of his action. Thus it will appear, that it is impossible, from appearances, always to make an accurate estimate of the merit or demerit of an action, in relation to bravery and cowardice; but, the man who always does what he thinks to be his duty, notwithstanding of various temptations, has the true fortitude of virtue. On the contrary, he that, having a sufficient sense of duty, is often tempted to forswear it, in the view of immediate ease and pleasure, such, in the eye of virtue, is a coward.

Hence will appear the wonderful effect of rewards and punishments for the practice of virtue, this being the method that art, or human wisdom, has taken to allure to virtue, and to place a terror in the way of vice, and in this manner, though indirectly, to fortify the coward in the cause of virtue. There is a clear distinction between the quick apprehension of every evil consequence, and the just apprehension of those future events; thus a man may be a coward in apprehending evil, when, in a more accurate judgment, his fear of danger would be small. But, supposing a person to make a just
just estimate of causes and events, the vice of cowardice must arise from an impatience to endure or suffer. Now, the question is not if it be wisdom, or be not, to suffer evil when this may be avoided; the proper question is, whether the apprehended evil may be avoided without incurring the danger of a greater evil. This being the case, it will appear, that virtuous fortitude and vicious cowardice, so far as these are not merely in the animal constitution, depend upon the just or unjust sense of moral good and evil, and also upon the virtue of patience, which will be considered in its place.

33. There is a vice which, though disgraceful in its nature, and pernicious in its effects, is often cherished by men, and made the object of pursuit, as if it were a blessing; this is ebriety, or the vice of drunkenness. Sobriety is the virtue that is opposed to the vice of drunkenness; but, those co-relative qualities have a mean, in which neither vice nor virtue is found. The vice of intemperance has already been examined, and drunkenness may be considered as a species of that vice; but, as this vice of ebriety has something peculiar to itself, seeing that man is thereby degraded in his intellect, it may be worth while to examine more particularly this branch of intemperance.

Every thing that is agreeable or pleasant is immediately good; and every thing that is immediately good is agreeable. Here is a proposition which, so far as it is general, may be taken as a principle. Any apparent exceptions to this general rule may be easily explained, if the following reasoning shall be approved of.

The natural state of the animal is health; and the natural state of man is activity, whether of body or of mind.

When an animal is in health, he requires nothing but wholesome
meat and drink, that is, such things as are merely nutritive. At that
time, every thing that may alter his natural state, is in some degree
a poison, and is necessarily disagreeable.

When, on the contrary, an animal is not in his natural state, but
is diseased, the thing which is proper to restore him to his natural
state is then agreeable, although before, when in his natural state, it
had been otherwise: Therefore, that which was before a poison, is
now become a medicine. Hence the instinctive power of animals
to cure disease, and restore their health, when the means occur.

Man is an animal; and, as an animal, he has every instinctive
faculty that is necessary for his welfare or existence. But, besides
the healthy and unhealthy state of man's body, which he holds as
an animal, there is an uneasy or diseased state of his mind. Wil-
dom and virtue lead man to think agreeably, and to employ the ac-
tivity of his mind in such a manner as gives him pleasure. When
it is otherwise, or when man is miserable in his thoughts, he natu-
really seeks a remedy for that which gives him pain.

If man should find a remedy, however temporary, for the uneasy
disposition of his mind, it is natural for him to have recourse to this
solace of his pain; and, in his folly, he will often seek this fatal
palliative, which, in the end, increases the disease; when otherwise,
with more wisdom, he might find a remedy of a nature that is per-
manent. There are poisons of this kind that affect man's thinking
powers; they render him unfit to think consistently, or to reason in
a continued train of thought. Such a poison as this, to a diseased
mind, becomes a medicine, or gives a temporary relief. But, this
is perfectly applicable to inebriating liquors, and narcotic drugs.

Though, to an animal in the vigour of health, vinous liquors are
nowise necessary, yet, upon many occasions, when that vigour is
impaired,
impaired, those liquors may occasionally prove restorative, and be extremely agreeable. But, as the constant use of those medicinal draughts diminish their salutary or sensible effect, the doses come to be enlarged, and that, which in a smaller portion had been salutary in every respect, comes to be salutary only in one, while in another it is noxious. If still the dose be more and more increased, the constitution becomes diseased by the very means which had been properly employed to relieve.

Thus man, in an uneasy state of mind, is naturally led into a habit of ebriety; and, in the habit of inebriation, the constitution of his body comes to be diseased, as well as the vigour of his mind to be impaired. The virtue of temperance alone cannot now cure the evil, which both intemperance and habit have procured: There must be also joined the virtue of fortitude or resolution, to that of temperance or sobriety; and even, with a virtuous inclination, the remedy is difficult, sometimes it is impracticable.

If health then be a benefit, and the happy exercise of mind a pleasure, what folly must it be to risk the forfeit of those choicest blessings,—to add to bodily disease disempire of the mind,—and, to the impaired vigour of the mental faculties, to join the burden of a broken constitution! No person, who foresees the consequences, could pursue a course so ruinous to every thing that is most valued by mankind.

34. Next to the want of wisdom, nothing contributes so much to immoral action, as the want of command over the passions. Not that the passions are in their nature vicious; they are contrived in supreme wisdom. But, to be led absolutely, that is, instinctively, by passion, without reasoning scientifically, that is, distinguishing right and wrong, better and worse, is to act like a brute, who, before
fore he acts, does not consider the motives of his conduct, the consequences of his action, and how far he may do, either well or ill in the measure to be followed. Passion is not vice; but, the obeying those instinctive feelings inconsiderately, leads to vice and crime, as certainly as wisdom leads to virtue. How often does a virtuous person, do in passion, that for which he hates himself in cool reflection?

Patience or self-possession is a virtue; passion therefore, or impatience, is a vice. It is a rule in wisdom, to suffer evil for a greater good; it is a rule in virtue, to consider the good of others as our own; hence, in the rules of moral suffering, there is a compound measure which is to direct our will. It is the misfortune of ignorance in a human creature not to know the rules of virtue; and it is the error of folly to neglect the observance of those rules which he in his wisdom has approved of: Such is the case with passion or impatience.

When we suffer patiently that which natural necessity has ordained, we wisely make the best of evil, in not increasing the passions of our nature. The same rule that applies to natural, will also be found applicable to moral, evil. But, in order to see this in a proper light, we must make some distinctions with regard to the various nature of evil.

Evil is either on the one hand natural, when it affects the animal part of man, or, on the other, it is moral, when it affects the intellectual feelings. Natural evil is of two kinds, either immediate, or remote. I may suffer immediately from hunger or from cold; but, when my food or cloak are taken from me, the evil which I suffer may be remote, in suffering only at present from the thought that I am to suffer in the consequence.

When,
When, from necessity, I suffer in my nature, then it must be my wisdom to suffer as little as possible, by not tormenting myself with that which it is not in my power to prevent. It is therefore always my duty, to bear natural evil patiently when it cannot be prevented; and, it is always my duty to prevent it, so far as this is consistent with my general happiness.

But, I may suffer natural evil from an artificial cause, or from a moral agent; and, in that case, it may be also in my power to remove the evil which I suffer, in retaliating evil to the person who has injured me. Here, it is evident, a wise man will consider whether it is better to suffer patiently the present evil, or to remove that evil which it is in his power to avoid. But, if a person, unwisely feeling for the present, or without considering consequences, removes every natural evil which he feels, that person acts in folly, and may be subject to vicious passion or impatience, in ordaining evil where it was not necessary, and in not suffering evil when this was for his good. It is in the science of virtue that man learns to exchange with interest, the sufferance of natural evil, for intellectual good or real happiness; therefore, it must appear, that inconsiderate passion, or impatience, is an enemy to wisdom, and to the good of man, directed by the rule of virtue for his happiness.

Instead of natural, the evil, which from a moral agent I receive, may be ideal. Now if, in the case of natural evil, I am bound, in virtue or in wisdom, to abstain from vengeance, until the consequence of my action be considered, a fortiori, patient consideration is a duty required, when the evil felt arises from opinion. Not that this ideal sufferance is less important to the mind of man; but because, in the first place, human opinion may be erroneous, and thus I suffer injury when, in a juster way of thinking, I should suffer none; and, in the second place, because, though the injury be true, it may, not, in wisdom, be proper to resent it.
Thus it will appear, that the acting inconsiderately from the blind passion of impatience, is not acting in the wisdom of a man, who, in his reason, obtains command even over his nature. It is acting like a brute; not without reason; but without reasoning scientifically, so as to form principles, or general rules of action, which are to direct his moral conduct in his proper wisdom. Now, if he has formed these rules in his wisdom, or has approved of those rules which in the manners of mankind he had been trained to practise, then, the departing from these rules is folly; and, the consequence of this must be repentance.

Thus also it will appear, that among mankind educated in society, there is no just plea, in natural passion, for the transgression of the rules of virtue. It is in the wisdom of nature's rules, that animals are led instinctively to avoid evil, in repelling injury; had it been otherwise, the beautiful order of this world had not been preserved, in the wisdom of the system. But, what has the rules of nature binding over a being of intelligence, who has wisdom to form rules to himself even in opposition to those of his nature? Hence, man possesses more in the possession of himself, than in all that brute nature can bestow upon the animal.

The animal naturally acts by passion, which is a sentimental feeling of the mind; but, man learns to form ideal sentiments in conscious reasoning, as motives for his voluntary conduct; not only when passion does not excite to action, but in opposition to a passion, when the motive of conscious sentiment, or the principle of reason, is deliberately preferred to the passion, which is then overcome by reason. Suppose, for example, I find myself injured by the conduct of another person, the natural inclination of resentment is to retaliate the injury. But, when I reflect that the offence may have proceeded from inconsiderate folly, or a mistaken notion of my conduct on some occasion; and when I consider, that, instead of remedying the
the evil which I feel, retaliation of injury is the means of making evil worse; when all this is considered, which may be in the twinkling of an eye, resentment ceases, passion is in reason overcome, and then, instead of following the dictates of my natural passion, or instinctive sentiment, I pursue those of a sentiment acquired in the art of human wisdom.

But it is by habit that facility, for acting in a certain manner, is acquired; therefore, in a habitual course of preferring sentimental motives in action, commonly called a rational conduct, to the following implicitly the dictates of our natural passion, the mind acquires a power which it has not naturally, and may then command the strongest passion. This is the reason that education is of such importance, and that the temper and disposition of the man, depend so much on his infant education.

This early education of the growing man is commonly left to accident, or to the occasional dictates of common sense, with very little general principle, which principle is also frequently erroneous. Now though this surely cannot be the best method possible of education, yet, in a well regulated society, it cannot err extremely; and is, perhaps, much better than following a system not conceived in wisdom. It is thus that virtuous, rational, or wise, dispassionate people, will naturally breed a virtuous, wise, dispassionate race. Not that virtue or wisdom, like strength or fleetness, runs in what is called blood, and is propagated in the animal; but because children cannot be reared without being also educated; and, if a growing mind is educated, it must be either educated well or ill, in wisdom or in folly. In this case, either the animal mind must be cultivated and improved, or the soul of men corrupted and debased; and this in various respects, or in the still more variable degrees of these.

It is thus that in the natural course of things, or in the perfection of
of the species, the mind of man is led to wisdom and benevolence,—
to the principles of temperance and modesty,—to the cultivation or
employment of useful talents,—and, to the subordination of natural
passions, not their extirpation.

35. Simplicity of manner, and refinement of sentiments, are in
virtue; duplicity, again, and (what may be termed) over refine-
ment, may be considered as in vice; because, from duplicity and
over refinement of manners, more evil and unhappiness commonly
arises, than from a state, either more natural, or more virtuous. No
duplicity of manners can be in virtue, nor can any degree of refine-
ment of our sentiments be in vice; but good manners may occasion-
ally be mistaken for duplicity, or duplicity may be mistaken for good
manners, which it resembles though differing essentially; and, in
forming sentiments, there is a false refinement, which, being near the
truth, may be often mistaken for that which is just. Hence it comes,
that philosophers, mistaking things different in their nature, have
supposed that the ruder state of human knowledge, where nice dis-
tinctions are not found, may be more friendly to happiness and vir-
tue, than is that state of man which is improved by his scientific
art. This misunderstanding, however, of happiness and virtue, will
find an explanation in the doctrine here maintained, viz. that virtue
and vice are essentially different; but that it is impossible, in the na-
ture of things, for a mind to be made capable of virtue, without be-
ing also capable of vice.

From this theory it appears, that, if a person were to be led to
happiness without any degree of refinement, he must be led, like a
brute; only to enjoy life, without virtue. But, refinement must not
be confounded with virtue, although every degree or species of vir-
tue, may justly be esteemed as a refinement of the natural or animal
state.
state of man; and particularly there must be made, with regard to happiness, an accurate distinction, between refined manners and refined morals. In the refining of man’s moral sentiments, his happiness is necessarily promoted. But, in the refinement of his manners, though man’s happiness may be promoted, this is not necessarily; and, in this case, it may occasionally have an opposite effect. For,

As animal good and evil, (which are instinctive, being founded immediately on pleasure and pain), are also in certain degrees to be considered as relative, depending upon the more remote degrees of pain and pleasure with which they are compared, so, in a certain latitude of moderation, which may be termed the scale or region of indifference, the knowledge of good indisposes the mind to the sufferance of evil; that is to say, the ignorance of a superior good indisposes the mind to suffer without uneasiness a comparative evil, which it then thinks good. Hence, the sum of animal misery or uneasiness may be increased with the knowledge of superior good; and, the sum of the animal enjoyment may be occasionally diminished by the knowledge of superior pleasure, when this is not in the power of the person to enjoy.

But, this cannot happen in the case of moral happiness; for there, the greatest satisfaction of the mind is not dependent on the casualty of external things; it is often purchased at the expense of animal enjoyment; and, from the sense of intellectual misery, which is only felt in forsaking the rules of virtue, the mind, which is endowed with wisdom, will seek its proper happiness in learning to be virtuous.

But, this is making those nice metaphysical distinctions of things, in which there are to enter principles above the reach of common understanding, such as the points at which virtue terminates and vice begins, where pleasure ceases, and where pain though insensible takes place. In nature there is no indifference; but neither is there,
in nature, any evil. Now, so far as man refines his morals, this must be done in virtue, or in wisdom; and, so far as he preserves simplicity in his manners, he will please mankind, with that beauty of nature which art is so anxious to imitate. But, without accurately understanding the meaning of their terms, philosophers might dispute about simplicity and refinement, without having different sentiments on the subject.

36. Having thus examined the particulars of vice, and found them all derived from folly, or the want of wisdom sufficient to lead a person to his greatest happiness or most durable enjoyment, we herein find a confirmation of a theory which represents man as by nature made for wisdom, which he has to acquire in knowing error, and as by wisdom led to virtue, which he has to understand in knowing vice. Virtue, therefore, is the operation of the human intellect; and it leads to happiness, as the proper end of our existence. In this view, vice may be considered as a thing occasional, contrived only as a mean, and not an end. It is, in the moral system, what the motive pain is in that of animal life. It leads necessarily to misery; and therefore, it cannot be pursued by voluntary agents, arrived at the perfection of their nature, which is wisdom. Vice being now supposed as understood, crime may be scientifically treated of.

**Part IV.—Of Crime, as committed against particulars.**

1. There are two separate views in which crime may be considered, the one political, the other natural. The political view of crime respects transgressions of the penal laws, which are properly artificial, or of human invention. The natural view of crime, again, respects the transgression of the law of human nature, benevolence; a law which is written on every heart; a law which must be known...
when transgressed; and which cannot be transgressed, by a perform in posseffed of reflection, without condign punishment.

2. Thus there is a law, and but one law of nature, by which crime is immediately opposed, in the prohibition of evil. This law is not other than the conscious knowledge of the human mind, operating in relation to the natural benevolence, or social kindness, of the animal man; which affection is instinctive, or the work of nature. Hence, no excuse can be admitted for the transgression of this law, except necessity, which is from nature also; and no alleviation, except the good to be effected by means of the ordained evil.

3. Between vice and virtue there is an immediate relation; so far as, in a gradation, where virtue ends, there vice begins. But, this is not the case in crime, with which and virtue there is not an immediate relation; for, no degree of vice, which simply flows from defect of wisdom in choosing the means of happiness, will constitute in the eye of true philosophy, a crime. Therefore, virtue is removed from crime, not only *toto coelo*, absolutely, or in every degree, as is from vice with which it borders in its least degree, but infinitely as the lowest degrees of crime and virtue are still removed by the interposition of vice.

Hence, while vice is no absolute principle of wisdom, but a mistaken notion, and a negative both in relation to virtue and to crime, virtue and crime are both of them in their nature absolute and positive, so far as the intention of crime must be founded in, or proceeded upon, a vicious desire; and so far as good and evil cannot, like more or less of the same thing, be mistaken in the conscious intention of a mind.

4. Crime is therefore definite, and in its nature perfectly distinct, although, as to degree, it may be altogether indefinite, being occasi...
sionally aggravated; and this it may be in two different respects. For, as crime must proceed from a vicious motive, and have an evil intention, the guilt of crime is aggravated, first, by the degree of vice in which the action is designed; and, secondly, by the degree of evil which is required for the perpetration of the crime.

5. That this is a just view of the subject now treated of, will appear by considering; if, on the one hand, there is no evil intended in an action, then, it is not conceivable how crime should be imputed to that mind, however vice, in acting through folly, may be blamed. If, on the other hand, evil is accomplished without a vicious motive, as when, for example, a criminal is put to death, or when a soldier kills the enemy, then, however shocking to humanity may be the deed, and however regretted by the person who executed the evil, such an action, according to the common sense or general acceptance of mankind, is never considered as a crime. So that, in order to commit a crime, a person must have formed an unjust design, or a vicious desire; and, in order to have this fulfilled, must have committed evil, or have transgressed the law of natural benevolence.

6. As nature is no where deficient, so neither is there found any thing superfluous in nature. No action, therefore, ever takes place without a purpose; no purpose of nature is ever known but in the means by which it is effected. Man, again, often intends without wisdom, or in folly; but he never acts without a motive. Were man to act without a motive, he would not be in nature, he would be in himself a first cause; he would not be a creature, but a self-existent being. Man is determined, in all his actions, by a superior cause. Man never acts but either to procure ease or to promote pleasure; and it is the same with the brute animal.

Man, reasoning scientifically, forms to himself intellectual ideas of ease
case, and pleasure, besides those animal ideas which in the brute are
inflinfective or immediately from nature. But, though man thus
forms intellectual ideas of things that give him pleasure, and of those
that give him pain, he only forms these upon some natural principles.
Now, there is not in nature any law by which evil of any kind can
immediately procure pleasure, nor by which good of any kind can
procure pain. Here is a truth which should be well examined be-
fore it is admitted as a principle in science; and, here is a principle
that is important to the philosophy of morals.

Though evil of itself cannot procure pleasure, being on the con-
trary a cause of misery, it may be a mean in the procuring ease; a
mind tormented with the thought of an injury received, will, in
vengeance, find immediate relief from that violent passion by which
it had been torn. But a mind, torn with the sense of injury or
wrong, is not in the state of nature, or actuated simply by those
laws of its constitution by which it is made sympathetically to take
pleasure in good, and to suffer pain in evil; it is first made to suffer
occasionally in the sense of injury, and then is actuated by that prin-
ciple in its constitution which makes it seek its proper ease. In this
case, so far as a person acts from a principle in his constitution, in
seeking relief from uneasiness, he does not act without wisdom; but,
in seeking relief by means which are improper, he would act in
folly. For, though by these means he might procure immediate re-
lief from the urging passion, he would thus lay a sure foundation for
future uneasiness, which he must feel in repentance.

The present theory consists in this, that it is impossible for a per-
son naturally to do evil to another; because, naturally, man takes
pleasure in seeing another person happy, and in pleasing him. There-
fore, when a person commits evil in relation to another, there must
be a cause for that action or volition; and this cause consists in the
state of uneasiness, or the passion of that mind which wills evil in
order...
order to relieve itself. But, if a person shall have formed an ideal misery or uneasiness, in reasoning upon erroneous principles, or if he shall have erroneously chosen improper means of relieving his uneasiness, he must be afterwards accountable to his conscience for having violated the law of natural benevolence; because, in acting with more wisdom, he might have made himself happy, and avoided evil. Crime, therefore, is not simply the doing evil; but the doing evil, from a vicious motive; and, this vicious motive originates in folly.

7. Cain, in killing his brother, commits a crime; because he either acts from the motive of obtaining some pleasure by this means, or of removing some displeasure. Those means, therefore, being unjust, or disproportionate to the good to be effected by it, makes the intention vicious, independent of the law of natural benevolence which is transgressed. Brutus, again, in killing the usurper of supreme authority, acts from a virtuous motive, in bringing a remedy, with the least possible degree of evil, to the greatest evil in his estimation. Therefore, if he transgresses the law of natural benevolence, this violation of humanity, being from a virtuous motive, in not consulting his own private interest but the public good, is not considered as a crime, but as a necessary evil; it, therefore, will not be by him repented of.

8. Hence, as there is such a thing as virtue besides wisdom, and humanity besides virtue, there are natural principles by which to judge of crime, independent of the institution of penal laws, which is artificial. Thus we shall find, that in one action there may be either the transgression of virtue, or humanity, or both, and that in various degrees. Therefore, vice and crime may be either aggravated or alleviated; for, where, in a vice, there is great injustice and very little good, here is an aggravation, compared with a similar case in which there should result much good from little injustice; and,
in a crime, besides the degree of vice which enters into its composition, there is also to be considered, the variable degree of evil, which is to be found in the intention.

9. The essence of crime thus consisting in the transgression of humanity or the law of natural benevolence, when to this law there is opposed that of necessity or of self-preservation, which is an ordinance of superior authority, the law of benevolence must be transgressed by man, when in his natural state, uncultivated by science or unimproved in his proper art of making himself happy in the enjoyment of his species, consequently, acting only by the laws of nature,—a state supposed for the sake of scientifical analysis. But in this natural state, which is actually found in some degree, the man, who is the farthest removed from philosophy, is also extremely limited in his capacity for doing evil; perhaps exactly in proportion to his inferior capacity for beneficence or the exercise of good dispositions. In this state, he is easily angered, but he is also easily pleased. Not having either property or prerogative, he is extremely disinterested in these respects; but, in that of his particular feelings, he is extremely interested, compared with those who have had a proper education, not to mention public virtue.

But in proportion as man actually departs from that natural state which is here in supposition, and becomes artificial, in refining his understanding, so as upon principle to avoid evil and pursue good, he then also increases his capacity for doing evil. For, as vice must be known in learning virtue, so, in proportion as the species improves in virtue, the individual may increase in vice; but, in proportion as vice increases, so does the incitement to transgress the law of natural benevolence. Therefore, here is the natural progress of the cause of crime, which is founded on a vicious desire.

10. Hence, as man improves his nature, which is supposed to be originally
originally brute, and in virtue attains to a state which is justly considered as divine, he also acquires a capacity for degenerating from that divine state, to which virtue leads in knowledge. But, as the cause of crime increases with the knowledge of vice, so, in the wisdom of man, there is devised a remedy for that evil; this is that of penal laws: An institution which is truly human, not only as meaning that it is benevolent, but in opposition to natural, which it is not. This constitution of society in the sacred bonds of law, as it may be admired in doing honour to the species, which has thus created a system in ordering things with a beneficent intention, so may it be considered as the master-piece of human wisdom, exerted for the purpose of preventing evil.

11. It is an erroneous view of the penal law, which the vulgar take, that of considering the punishment of crime as the natural vengeance of man relenting injury, or the voice of heaven condemning evil. It is truly nothing less; for, it is the virtuous sacrifice of private vengeance to the common good, which is promoted in the example of public justice. In civil society, the individual learns to command his passion, that is, to submit it to his rational reflection, when provoked; and, in perfect education, he also learns, in a courteous behaviour, not to provoke another. As fire, in being excited from the smallest spark, is, in the mutual approach of kindled coals, gradually raised to the most furious effort of destructive violence, so, in the misunderstanding of mankind, evil, which springs from small beginnings, is, in the natural collision of opposing interests, or the casual operation of particular folly, increased with the reciprocal injustice of each party, and, unless suppressed with superior power, would often rise to wreck society in a general inflammation. The wisdom of mankind, proceeding on experience, has learned to interpose various checks to such growing evil; and, in preserving peace with the violence of law, not only puts a stop to those growing wars, but, in the exercise
exercise of public justice, trains mankind, to a dutiful bearance and forbearance, which is virtue.

There is a distinction to be made in crime, according as this transgression regards either the individual or the common weal. Crime, in relation to the individual, consists in the evil inflicted without just cause, whether in his personal or sentimental feelings. Crime, in relation to the common weal, is that evil by which the constitution of society is hurt, or its natural benefits diminished; thus, for example, in every state, the constitution of society is wounded in rebellion; and, in a commercial nation, forgery and theft diminish the blessings of the civilized state, in proportion to the progress of happiness in social commerce.

Hence, penal laws must have respect to more than private injury; although the interested motive, which is purely in vice, is not properly the object of legal punishment. And thus, in refined society, or well regulated states, besides the penal laws, there is required another branch of legislation, which is the order of civil law. This has for view, to correct the grievances arising from the unrestrained ardor of man, pursuing his private interest, in the exchange of things, and succeeding to the inheritance of that accumulated wealth, which is the child of scientific industry, and the natural fruits of well regulated government.

12. But, however perfect the institution or design, in which mankind, associated into a common weal, submit to law and form a certain system for its execution, yet, practically, the establishment of penal laws alone, cannot be an absolute remedy, or effectual in preventing crime. For, however wisely devised shall be those laws against crime, yet, while vice is suffered to flourish, the most rigorous execution of those laws will only prove a palliative, for the diseased constitution of society, and not a perfect cure. While therefore vi-
cious desires, subsisting in the heart, are sufficient to bring the mind to balance upon the commission of an evil, there will often be found folly enough, in the head, to conclude that crime may be committed without punishment.

13. If again, in order to remedy this defect, penal laws shall be devised against vice, no benefit can perhaps accrue from this effort of virtuous zeal; for, here the wisdom of man, in reasoning inconsiderately, or not in perfect science, defeats its proper intention. The common sense of mankind, which supports the penal law against crime, will not suffer the rigorous execution of the law inflicting punishment, in the case of vice without malicious design. From this arises the neglect of laws; from this neglect there naturally springs contempt; and, as mankind in general cannot distinguish philosophically the law regarding vice, from that which properly respects crime, this neglect and contempt, which naturally arises in relation to the one, is necessarily transferred to the other.

Therefore, it would seem reasonable to expect more harm, to the civil institution, arising from the necessary relaxation thus given to the penal law, than good resulting from such intended check to vice. Thus, in the officious aiding of the penal law against crime, by an improper institution of penal laws against vice, human wisdom would act inconsistently, or in opposition to itself; consequently, would defeat its own intention.

14. Is mankind, therefore, to be abandoned by philosophy, or upon principle, to the unrestrained growth of vice, in order that the law should be observed without relaxation? This does not follow; for, in prescribing an ineffectual remedy, it is not necessary to abandon the design, or to prescribe no remedy at all. But, to set about this work in wisdom, it should be considered, that, in order to abolish vice as the cause of crime, it is too late to attack the practice, if...
the vicious desire is not prevented. Now, for this purpose, there is no choice in the means to be employed; for, there is only one way in which the end may be effected; this is by means of virtue.

Virtue, it has been shown, may be founded either more immediately on science and philosophy, or more remotely on these, by means of superstition. It is here that the wisdom of mankind may be effectual in diminishing the cause of crime, and provide a remedy in understanding the nature of the evil. This remedy may be found in giving a virtuous education to the race, and not in making laws to be trodden under foot. True wisdom here proceeds by training children to the habits of patience, order, and voluntary obedience to rules; by disciplining youth in exercises useful to themselves and to the public, instead of suffering the pursuit of idle pleasures to corrupt their indetermined minds; and by exciting virtuous sentiments, not in the disgusting rules of an austerer philosophy, which must be useless in proportion as it is unintelligible, but in reasoning to the common sense of mankind, in speaking to the heart, and giving precept in a good example. It is thus that virtue, such as is practical, may be cultivated in the hearts of men, by making vice hateful in the eyes of the innocent, and, in those of the guilty, shameful.

Part V.—Of Crime, as committed against the Public.

1. Virtue, in relation to the actions of men in a regulated state, must refer, on the one hand, to the conduct of a person in relation to his fellows, independent of the society itself; and, on the other to the society itself, independent of its particular members, their persons, or immediate concerns. That is to say, virtue here comprehends both the duty of a man, which is by nature guarded with benevolence, and that of a citizen, which, in a state of luxury, is apt to be corrupted. The one is said to be private, and the other public.
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public virtue; and, this distinction of virtue is just, so far as considered in the effect, which in the one case is private, and in the other public good.

But, with regard to the cause of this virtue, another distinction may now be made, which will assist our understanding of the subject. Private good flows from wise benevolence; and this has for origin the love of man, or instinctive sympathy, which is properly humanity. Whereas, the idea of public good flows from a source which is higher in the order of science; for, it is founded on humanity, combined with the love of order and design; that is to say, this species of virtue requires philosophy in some degree. A person, whose private virtue were without defect, would be innocent, as having no hand in creating public evil; but, public virtue is more than that which is required in a private character. To be virtuous, in this sense, a man must have warm sentiments of public good, which he cannot have immediately from nature; and he must also have the virtuous resolution to sacrifice his proper case, and private interest, for the support of political order, from whence arise the blessings of a general prosperity or common weal. Now, this requires a person to have extended to the state that virtue which man first learns in relation to individuals.

2. But, the state is a thing purely in science; it is the natural production of human wisdom. The virtue of patriotism, therefore, is not immediately in nature, but in art; and, the natural man is not answerable to his constitution, that is, to conscience, for the transgression of this rule of human wisdom. As soon, however, as the man of nature has acquired science and artificial instruction, with regard to the rules of policy, or of human wisdom in governing men, he becomes answerable to the state for his transgression of that political institution; because, he approves of this order of things in conscience.
conscionably receiving the benefits which have arisen from this artificial state of man.

Hence, that which in a natural man is benevolence to his kind, is, in the artificial man or citizen, his good will to the state or constitution of society in which he dwells. Therefore, in both those cases, that benevolence, of which a man is conscious, being transgressed from a vicious or selfish motive, constitutes what is to be accounted criminal in his actions. In the one case, he is immediately answerable to the justice of God, that is, to his conscience; in the other, again, besides his conscience, which naturally disapproves of vice, he is answerable to the justice of the state, not only for that active part in which he is criminal with regard to the public good, but also for that inactive part, in which he viciously prefers his personal ease and pleasure to the virtuous discharging of that duty which, as a happy subject, he owes to the public.

3. The transgression of humanity with a vicious intention, has been considered as that which properly constitutes crime; but, this offence is of a private nature, that is, in relation to the subject injured, which is a particular; and this is only made a matter of public concern through motives of a general wisdom, in order to prevent the growth of evil. It will now appear, that evil to the common wealth, from a vicious or self-interested motive, is what may be with propriety termed public crime, in contradistinction to the private injury of particulars. For if, in procuring wealth, I sacrifice the duty which I owe my King, my country, or its welfare, I then will evil to the order of the state, from a selfish principle or vicious motive, and therefore I am punishable, in order to make virtue grow, or general happiness abound. Here is evil made subservient to good, and evil is thus created, from the benevolent intention of making people happy. Here is the wisdom of man, who, from his general views, learns justice in design; and who, from this knowledge of nature,
nature, proceeds, in art, to form a system, so far perfect as it copies that original which is divine.

4. As the heinousness of private crime is naturally in the compound ratio of the evil to be done, and the good to be acquired by that means, the one directly, and the other inversely, it must be the same in that crime which regards the public good. A little evil to the state, in order to attain a greater good to the particular, is certainly not so heinous as to purchase a little private good, with much public evil. At the same time, it is equally, in both cases, a vicious transgression of the law of artificial benevolence, and therefore subjects the guilty person to the punishment of that offence. Now this, in the rules of wisdom, cannot be an uniform thing; for,

Besides the different heinousness of guilt, arising from the nature of the crime, there is also the aggravation of this guilt, in equal circumstances, from the natural obligation of the person committing the offence. In private crime, where nature gives the law, conscience, which is in divine wisdom, accurately estimates this quantity in the cause of misery, and inflicts the pains with all the certainty of natural effect. In the case of public crime, again, where conscience is the creature of man’s art, there is also a plain rule to be observed for this measure of guilt; for, as mankind are here, in this artificial state, naturally formed into different ranks of due subordination, so, in a given crime, the guilt increases with the rank in which the offending person is then stationed. Now, as public order is the source of general happiness, nothing but ignorance can justify that which is an offence to public order; nor can any thing alleviate a crime to the commission of which man is not immediately infligated by any natural passion. Therefore, while the penal law is conceived in wisdom, the pardoning of this offence is, in relation to the wisdom of the state, a trespass equal to the crime.
As anarchy and civil war are the greatest of evils to the state of social commerce, the greatest crime against that state must be, the wilful propagation of sentiments or doctrines which tend to excite discontentment or disaffection in the people, and disturbance in the government. In the most oppressed state of political society, there may be good reason for individuals endeavouring to change the state of government, in order to bring about a reformation; and there, the crime, of exciting disaffection in the people, may be considered as impossible, where there is not affection. But, in a state where there is every reason for love and admiration of the government,—where the people are under no restraint farther than what is necessary to the preservation of that happy state,—and where there is a wise provision, in the constitution of state, for the reformation of any public grievance that may occur in the changing circumstances of the nation, and in the necessary imperfection of human government, there, the evil intention, of making ignorant people discontented with their lot, and prompting them to excite commotion in the state, must be the greatest public crime.

This crime, in its nature the most offensive to the interest of the public, may also be aggravated by the circumstances of the offender; for, those of a higher rank in life, who ought to know the duty of their station; and those who prostitute the talents which they have acquired in the progress of established society, by employing sophistry and falsehood to betray reason, and corrupt the greatest blessing of mankind, must be considered as adding, to the crime of public evil, that of debasing human nature by the voluntary malevolence of an intention, which does not arise from any natural passion, and which must be the pure creation of human art. Here, happiness is cruelly attacked, in its very source, by the vilest, the most insidious species of crime; and, here is a crime, which neither wisdom nor humanity could lead man to forgive.
5. Hence will appear a difference, that may be observed in the consequences of public and private crime. This arises from the one being founded upon the transgression of a law of nature, and the other from a law that is formed only in human wisdom. When the law of nature is transgressed, the common sense of mankind is offended; therefore, the state is naturally preserved from great corruption, in relation to private justice. This, however, is not the case with regard to the growth of public crime; for, as it is only in philosophy that man takes an interested view of order and justice, when he is not himself immediately concerned, so, that justice which respects the public, is not guarded in the feelings of humanity, which is general to the people; but it requires the wisdom of a generalisation in his science, or conscious principles, that does man honour. Therefore, as public crime naturally grows, in that offence being committed with impunity, it requires every effort of philosophy to preserve in purity the regulations which are founded upon human wisdom.

As there are, in the social state, two kinds of vice and crime, as being either public or private, so, there may be distinguished two kinds of liberty and restraint. If I do violence to my neighbour, and shall do or utter any thing unjustly, by which his peace of mind or personal property shall be impaired, I have committed moral evil; I am then answerable in my conscience; and also I am amenable, for this transgression, to the consciences of my fellow citizens, impartial spectators or judges of the transgression. Here, no more knowledge is required, in the person so to judge, than common sense; he puts himself into the situation of both parties, and then he judges from the feeling of his upright nature; and, in that situation, he cannot do wrong. In this case, the magistrate may safely trust the trial of the offence to the judgment of the common citizen. No virtuous citizen can have, in that situation, an interest which should clash with justice and morality, of which we must suppose him
him as possessed; such citizens, therefore, will do justice in following the dictates of their conscience,—that principle which nature has implanted in the breast of every person, of a sound mind, which has arrived at man's estate under the influence of political society.

But when, instead of offending the personal feelings of my neighbour, I shall endeavour to persuade him that he is wronged in the political constitution or administration of the state; when I incite him to desert his duty to the public, or not to comply with the orders of the magistrate; when I sow dissension in the state, by making the common people, or the lower ranks of society, discontented with their political lot, then I am not simply vicious, in seeking improperly that which naturally pleases, but I please myself with seeking evil; I am criminal, in doing evil to the state without the immediate solicitation of a natural indulgence; I am criminal, in forming a plot against the common interest of society, a conspiracy to which I am not naturally led in seeking my immediate personal satisfaction; I have then entered the dangerous career of political ambition; and, so far as I shall have transgressed the law of beneficence, of obedience to that government to which I owe my protection, and all the social advantage, I have committed a crime for which, in the wisdom of political justice, I am punishable in my person. With out this as a principle in the administration of government, there cannot be security against the disturbance of anarchy on every occasion, even in the most prosperous and happy state of a people.

But, here is a crime, of which the common citizen, however virtuous, is not qualified to be a proper judge; it requires the light of political science to understand the danger of allowing to men that liberty which they abuse,—of allowing them the means of hurrying thousands in order to pursue the visionary speculation of a vicious individual, and of disturbing public order with the base intention of promoting private interest.
6. As it is by wisdom that an individual pursues his personal interest, it is in like manner that a person is enabled to perform his duty as a citizen. But, though it is thus by wisdom that man acquires the ability, it is only by virtue that he attains the will to do his duty to the public, when he conceives this duty as being in opposition to his private interest or personal concern. In this case, it belongs to the wisdom of the community, and is a public duty in the council of the state, that of making men see their proper interest in public virtue. Now, this salutary purpose is effected by the hopes of honour, which should only be attained in promoting public good, and by the apprehension of disgrace, which should follow the neglect of duty with no less certainty than misery pursues crime.

It is in this manner that the justice or injustice of a nation may be productive, respectively, either of wise ability and virtuous inclination, or of public vice and inability to promote the interest of the state. For as, in the commission of public crime, or evil to the common weal, there is, on the one hand, the gratification of personal interest to promote the offence, and, on the other, no immediate evil towards a person to oppose the law of natural benevolence engraven on the heart, public vice, in vulgar minds, may be found not incompatible with private virtue. Therefore, in order to promote the virtuous attention to the public interest, in people not possessed of philosophic principle, it is required to devise some artificial means, for making this species of virtue be admired above the measure of common wisdom, and to involve the transgression of this benevolent system, or the offence of order in the state, with preternatural punishment; that is to say, in making a severe example, and in sacrificing individual interest, for the preservation of the public health. The one view is attained in the creation of honour by the sovereign or state, the other is effected in the degradation of corrupted citizens.
7. Ye Princes of the earth, whose power is not derived from the actual talents of your nature, nor from the efficient talents of your art, but from inheritance, which, being an artificial convention of the people, is, with regard to you, an accident,—ye Sovereigns of the social state, who have the distribution of virtue's wages, honour, before you have learned to know the importance of that task,—ye learned and enlightened rulers of the nations, to whom the people always must look up for wisdom, Whether are you to be pitied or envied? You possess a power which perhaps is not enjoyed; and you are often blamed for the fault, perhaps, of those that went before you. How much is in the power of that place in which, for the good of others, you are stationed! But alas! how little good is in the power of one, whose mind is not enlightened with the wisdom of the many!

O! then, learn to generalise your views of pleasure to the more extensive intellectual enjoyment; not to the exclusion of particulars, but to the enjoyment of them all, and more, much more than all,—to the enjoyment of yourself in all. There is but a certain measure of animal enjoyment which a King possesses in common with the meanest of his subjects; for, every sense is satisfied, every passion gratified, alike in all. But philosophy, which teaches the soul to enjoy independent of every sensual desire, must increase the happiness of a King, in proportion to the power he has of doing good.

O! that you always saw the principles of moral truth! and, in your science, generalised to the philosophy of government! Then, fordid vice would hide its head; and public virtue would prevail even among corrupted morals. But, from one erroneous principle in the ruling system, chaos is regenerated in the artificial world, and, every stream must be contaminated, that flows from the general
source which is in error. It is thus that, in the affairs of man, there
is a ne plus ultra; where the artificial system of human prudence,
government, like the body of a mortal being, becomes subject to
caducity; not from the decree of fate, which is unerring; nor from
the necessity of error in the human mind; but, from the contingent
folly of a people, and from the constitution of things which must
subside in change.

Of all the arts of government, of all the principles of policy, of all
the ornaments of a crown, there is but one ultimate, one universal;
this is justice. By justice, every thing is ruled; by injustice, order
and government are lost. It is in justice that the world exists; each
material thing possessest its due quantity or proportion. It is in justice
that the system of the heavens is conducted; each motion being op-
posed with a just resistance. It is in justice that living things subside;
for, life depends upon the just preservation of its necessary conditions.
The mind of man is made to proceed in justice; for, intellect is re-
trograde in a thought that is not just; and, in the artificial world, we
find, it is in justice that the species man unite in wisdom under gen-
eral rules, discovered in science, but subject to error and corruption.
Thus, justice is the true bond of society, the principle of policy, and
the scientific art of government. With justice, every law is right or
good; without justice, every human law is wrong, or evil.

Man is naturally benevolent; therefore, man, the animal, is just.
But, man is also made by nature to acquire wisdom; therefore, he
occasionally acts in folly, and commits injustice. Man is made for
anger; therefore, he is naturally tempered with mildness. He is
made for passion, in which the divine image of the rational man is
lost; mercy, therefore, is to man an ornament; it is a false that heals
the pain of fury; and, to the human race, subject to folly, it truly is
a blessing. But, the duty of a king is far, I had almost said infinitely,
above the rule of human nature, which is in the common man.
that, therefore, which adorns the one, may, in a more enlightened view, deform the other.

The duty of a king is to give general order, or to make effectual the law. If the law be just, there is in the king no place for mercy; if it is otherwise, the king, in hearkening to the voice of mercy (which he has as a man), only does his duty, which is justice. If the king shall suffer the benevolence of his nature to violate his sense of duty to his people, he has the weakness of a woman; but if, through weakness in his proper virtue, he suffers the passion of the animal and the selfish principle of the common man, to violate the laws of policy and general wisdom, in pursuing vengeance, then, the effect of folly, which in the lowest of mankind may be considered as only vice, is in the highest aggravated to a crime; and, that which, in the vulgar, is the lowest species of crime, is, in the exalted person, more, it is the crime of cruelty. Hence, the injustice of a judge, the cruelty of a tyrant, is that which human nature holds most in abhorrence.

Mercy, so justly prized in the narrow views of mankind, is only a virtue of subordinate value, and cannot find a place among the attributes of a being who is considered as supreme. Along with it, there is necessarily the acknowledgment of imperfection; and, in a ruler who is just and wise, there is no need, that is, there is no room for mercy. Mercy, which in man is proper to temperate the violence of anger, and in the natural feelings of humanity to correct the effects of artificial rules which may be in error, is not an attribute in the Divine mind. The laws of the Supreme ruler being all conceived without folly or imperfection, and executed without fallibility and passion, mercy is there a term inapplicable, as is that of vengeance. Kings, presiding in the artificial system of rewards and punishments, are the representatives of God; like the Ruler of the world, let them conduct themselves in perfect justice, nor ever carry the ideas of the animal to the throne of wisdom, where partiality, however benevolent,
lent, will make a stain. Let not the vulgar passion of resentment, nor the amiable weakness of compassion, make justice ever swerve from the right line; for, as the object of duty, in the ruler of the people, is general order, and not particular good, the only evil, which to a general constitution may arise, is from disorder.

Sovereigns of the earth, to all the rest of mankind, honour, place, or greatness, is an object of pursuit, while wisdom and virtue are the proper means by which it is to be attained; but, for you, who are in the most exalted place to which wisdom and virtue can promote, What pursuit is left?—The highest;—to deserve that place which you possess. Even the mean labourer, to whose necessity the wages of his future toil had been advanced, will honestly perform his task; but, to a noble mind, what an obligation, to feel the load of a generous recompense! The public virtue of a private person is as nothing, or like an evanescent quantity; but the importance to a state, of public virtue in a prince, is incommensurable with the duty of a common man; and, if joined to public wisdom or extensive knowledge, it is infinite. He that holds the scepter holds the morals of the people; in his right hand are the seeds of virtue, and those of vice are in his left. O! think then what depends upon your wisdom; and do not, from a cruel inadvertency, scatter misery among a multitude. Cherish every tender shoot of public virtue; and, with quick discernment, crush the weeds thatchoak the growth of amore patriae. Thus shall you preserve, with all the vigour of perpetual spring, the inheritance of your fathers, gained from the field by virtue and by wisdom.

Ye princes and ye rulers, how happy is your situation! If, on the one hand, ignorance conceals from you the nature and importance of your duty, then, to a narrow soul, the glitter of the place, and the emolument of office, please the vulgar man who represents the royal personage. If, on the other hand, an enlightened mind and cultivated understanding, discovers the true interest of your country, and duty
of your station, then, you have but to will, and, with creating power, your wishes in your wisdom would be realised: Like the rain from heaven, there would descend upon you, love, honour, power, happiness.

O! that you saw with the eyes of wise discernment, to distinguish merit through the veil of manners; and, with the hand of rigid justice, to sort men and places, frowns and favours! What scenes would then appear! the face of nature would be changed; fertile fields and cheerful villages would take place of dreary wastes, and, splendid cities would rise even to the sight: The beauty of order would then adorn your palace; the joy of prosperity would follow your steps; peace and plenty would cover your table; and a pleased conscience would shut your eye-lids:—Your life would then be blest, and, the memory of your virtue would be long preferred.

8. From the doctrine now illustrated it will appear, that the wise establishment of penal laws for the punishment of transgressions, and a judicious education of the youth in the rules of order and benevolence, are the proper means of leading the ignorant to virtue, must tend to the suppression of every species of crime, and will thus equally promote the public as the private good.

9. It is not, however, enough to train a person in the path of private virtue, in order to qualify him for the functions of a virtuous or useful citizen. His views must also be enlightened, so as to procure him the wisdom proper to his office; his ideas must be exalted, and that in proportion to the station in which he is to serve, whether he is taught in science by the knowledge of principles, only in superstition, which is the implicit faith in precepts.

But, for this general purpose of public virtue, above all, it is required...
required, that, while there is the most perfect subordination from the highest office in the state to the lowest in the parish, no office belonging to the community should be suffered to be hated, or to become contemptible in the eyes of men, whether from the improper jurisdiction of the office, or from the improper character of the person who occupies a useful function. Men judge naturally of things, and from particulars; it requires a degree of philosophy, not found in every person, to generalise particular power to the order of government, and to abstract personal folly from the dignity of office. Hence every abuse of ordination and authority, every prostitution of legal power and dignity, and every thing that tends to bring ridicule on a member of the general system of government, will also have a tendency to corrupt the morals of your growing citizens.

10. Thus, in the wise creation of civil offices, in the proper appointment of persons to places of public duty, and in just administration of rewards and punishments, men may be formed, by a rational education, to any degree of virtue of which their nature can admit. In this manner, love for their country and the constitution of state, may be instilled with infallibility into the minds of men, both upon rational principles, and with the enthusiasm of prejudice or superstition. The subject of one state admires the order of the law as coming from the wisdom of the monarch; the subject of another admires the will of the monarch as coming from the wisdom of the law; a third hates every order in the state that comes not immediately from the suffrage of the people. But, the philosopher, in every state, approves of every order that tends to fix government in justice; and admires every constitution, so far as, being founded in the consistency of moral and political truth, it tends to preserve itself, consequently to diffuse the blessings of life and happiness.

11. This theory of education must not be considered as an imaginary system, found on merely on abstract speculation, consequently not
not exempt from error. It is that which we actually find practised, not indeed with all the efficacy which might result from a judicious practice, conform to the just principle of that general rule. But in the actual state of things, which always must be more or less imperfect, there is enough to show, that a virtuous race must be the consequence of order, and wise regulation in the state; and of proper attention to the education and employment of the youth, which is no other than sowing the seeds of future virtue in a nation.

When this important service is neglected, and the opinions of men are left to the influence of accident and error; when prejudice and superstition lead not to the rules of public virtue; and when the youth are reared in vicious habits, or in idle and insignificant pursuits, instead of being trained in habits of virtue, and formed under good example, what wonder if viciated morals should prevail, and principles inimical to public order be adopted by the rising generation, reasoning on a subject far above the reach of their philosophy.

When senators assume the name of patriots only to mislead the people; when, instead of entertaining philosophic sentiments with regard to public good, they become mere sophists, and prostitute their oratory in order to impose upon the weak, the ignorant, and the simple; when the interest of the nation is either promoted or opposed, according as it serves their interested purpose; and when that which should be held as sacred, is sacrificed to the views of faction, viciously grasping at eminence and wealth; then may the morals of a polished and learned nation be relaxed, and the principle of truth may lose their influence in forming the opinions of men, of those who are to act a part in the society, and to guide the conduct of such as have not science sufficient to judge in generals.

When imposing talents serve to cover the criminality of viciated principle, a general corruption of public virtue might creep in, an
a laxity of opinion with regard to public crime. Faction and abandoned principle might then distract the state, and disturb the happiest government; the seeds of discontentment and sedition might be sown among the ignorant; and principles, subversive of order and government, might be propagated by the designing. The cause of anarchy might then begin to appear; and, with a spurious system of reform, Licentiousness, the bane of all society, might step forth without a blush, marking the degraded state of public virtue in a nation.

12. Now, though external prosperity, and much private virtue, may take place with all that public evil; yet, the political constitution, without having either real vice or absolute defect, may come to ruin, by the officious hand of ignorance, and the vicious struggles of ambition. For, when public virtue is disregarded or despised; when there is no other principle pursued but that of private interest; and when crimes against the common weal are committed with impunity, or expiated by the success in committing the offence, What prospect of reformation in the morals? What security for the continuance of the greatest of blessings,—the order of government, and the peace of civil society?

13. Public and private virtue proceed on the same principles, so far as sensual or immediate animal-pleasure is to be sacrificed for intellectual happiness, or for a rational good. Of those two things, public virtue is the more illustrious, as well as the most rare. Private virtue, again, in being more simple, is more easily attained. A person may at different times be variously actuated by motives that are either virtuous or vicious, but he cannot at the same time be both virtuous and vicious, where he acts only in relation to one other person. The case, however, in relation to public crime, is different: A man may be virtuously inclined, in relation to individuals, and be vicious at the same time, in relation to the public; or, on the con-
trary, a man may have a just sense of order, government, and public utility, while, in the intemperate or unreasonable allowance of selfish and invidious passions, he stifles the virtuous sentiments of natural benevolence.

14. Thus, public and private virtue and vice may modify each other, as well as either of those dispositions may subsist in various degrees. A man may serve the public faithfully in expectation of a personal reward; if this be virtuous, at least it is so only in a lower degree. A man may sacrifice his personal interest for his family, if this, though generally allowed as virtue, admits of indefinite degree. But, were a man to sacrifice his fame to the love of order, to the beauty of government, and good of his fellow citizens, or interest of mankind, here would be a species of public virtue, which, though inconfiscuous, might be properly termed supreme. Such would have been the philosophic satisfaction of a Roman Consul, who had preferred the office of a mediator to that of a conqueror, who had sacrificed a triumphal procession to an act of justice.

But, this distinction of things is only, perhaps, a subject of fictitious abstraction; and, it does not naturally happen that a man's fame and public virtue are in opposition, no more than, in general, the rational indulgence of animal pleasure, and the interest of one's neighbour, are necessarily things incompatible. There are many different motives influencing a knowing and reflecting person, almost every case of public action or forbearance; and, the general determiner of man's actions is a composition of motives, which, in the purely virtuous and disinterested, as well as the meaner degree of prudence, and the selfishness of vice, variously ponderate and prevail. Hence, in judging of the public actions, and estimating the characters of great men, such various opinion, in a subject in which the principles are all fixed in their nature, or unalterable, is the system of human intellect.

15. Support
15. Suppose it true that Pompey and Caesar were the instruments by which the Roman republic was destroyed, then, if destroying the republic be wrong, this act must be imputed to them as a crime. But, there is another view in which the subject may be taken: It may be alleged, that it is not the preservation of the republican form of government that is the object to be desired, no more than either the establishment or the proscription of monarchy is to be pursued. To a philosopher it is indifferent what be the form, provided the end of government be attained; and when, in the corruption of a state, by reason of an improper form of government, there is a necessity for a reformation, he is the most virtuous patriot who has the most extensive views of the just principles of government, and the best intention in the usurpation of a right which has become necessary; not he who has the greatest enthusiasm in a political constitution, which had been once successful and applauded. In this case of moral necessity, he is the best citizen who brings about the proper change by the most effectual means, and with the least degree of evil proportionally to the goodness of the end. But, in this case, change in the usual form of government must not be allowed as entering the estimate of evil. The measure of this necessary evil is to be taken in a general estimate of all the evils which, on the one hand, are to be suffered from continued or repeated anarchy, and, on the other, from the more regular contest for mounting to the throne of government.

16. Settled government, however, being once established in a new and efficacious form, it is the violence of passion, or the folly of man, that puts a bloody hand to the renovation of that erroneous constitution, which, in yielding to necessity, ought to be considered as dead. Now, though in the zeal of particular opinion, and in the generous sacrifice made by individuals of their personal safety, much public virtue may appear in the conduct of those who, from the dictates of honour, have rashly undertaken violence, rather than con-
sulted wisely; yet, in the speculations of philosophy, which, weighing every circumstance, has in contemplation nothing but the moral general good, such intentions, though apparently honest, are only to be pitied; and, the misapplication of courage, in that erroneous vi-
tue, is to be regretted.

If Cassius and Brutus shall be considered as laying down their lives in order to avert the impending ruin of the state, here would be a
eexample of public virtue perhaps more than human, or at least the most illustrious. But, if these senators were only struggling for their
own authority, which was sunk in Caesar’s power, then, whether the undertaking tended to the general good or not, it was actuated by a motive, which, though natural, though manly, though no
vicious, in seeking more than justly was their share of government, was not philosophic, or supremely virtuous, in sacrificing every selfish consideration, and consulting wisely what was most for the general
good.

In that case now considered, there are two extremes in which the action, as an object either of glory or of censure, may be viewed and according to which, either, on the one hand, the highest degree of admiration is to be bestowed, or, on the other, some degree of blame to be incurred. But, there is also a middle course between those two extremes, which, for distinctions sake, are represented a
grily acting man, and this is also that of nature, where two differen
t motives, both conspiring to one end, serve jointly to deter
mine a mind, when either of them separately would have been ineffectual. Here, therefore, the merit or demerit of the action is to be estinated, not from the one or other of those several motives, but from the proportion either of the disinterested or of the selfish motive, a calculation which it is evidently impossible to make.

17. In times of anarchy and riot, he that steps forward, at the peril of
peril of his life, to check violence and injustice with the only remedy the sword, is a hero, whether he has the virtue of a citizen or the ambition of a conqueror. In like manner, he who, in times of public error and constitutional disease, wisely considers the causes of the growing evils in the state, and the proper remedy by which those evils are to be corrected, and who in the execution of his design administers a remedy, in securing to the people the blessings of government, and in averting the danger of anarchy and violence, is certainly a benefactor to the interest of mankind, though, at the same time, selfish motives may have concurred in actuating him to the service of the public. Such a person, though using means not justifiable on all occasions, and though transgressing some particular rule, may be considered as virtuous upon the whole, as having general views beyond the reach of ordinary men, and as exhibiting a greatness of design in compensation of what may be thought wanting in the purity of that virtue which has no interest but in the conscious value of itself, and which places happiness, where it must be ultimately, in the speculation of its proper operations. Sylla, perhaps, may afford an example of the first, and Caesar of the last. If Caesar shall be allowed to have arrived at the supreme power with the benevolent intention of fixing an unstable government, nothing but defect of wisdom, and of public spirit, could have prevailed upon him to resign that power which was exerted for the general good.

Had Pompey and Caesar lived in an earlier period of the commonwealth, their great abilities had probably been employed in the extension of the Roman power, and their ambition gratified in the condition of distinguished senators. Had Cassius and Brutus murdered Caesar's son, this patriotic action of theirs would have been stigmatized with the odious name of regicide. Pompey and Caesar, Cassius and Brutus, having been diversely branded with the imputation of public crime, affords a lesson how difficult it is to judge in complicated cases, where so many different data are to be admitted in
in the general estimate; and is instructive with regard to the nature of public vice, which is the transgression of any order of government, even if virtuously meant to promote the public good; and of public crime, which is the sacrifice of public interest to the vicious desire of man.

C H A P. V.

General View of Human Intellect, as naturally leading, through Morality, Principle to Virtue, and through Philosophy to Happiness.

1. SENSITIVE beings, who have the power to act in consequence of reason or discernment, necessarily avoid pain and procure pleasure. This is the law of nature in relation to animal life; and this is a law which is constantly obeyed, except in cases where it is opposed by another of superior power.

2. This law being absolute and general, if an animal, who is a natural agent, could not form a law or rule of action to himself, from this of nature, he would always conduct his action from that law of nature; and, in cases where no actual pain or pleasure existed, existed not in sufficient degree to be distinguished, he would have no motive for his action. But, so far as animals, from actual sensations, which is real knowledge present in the mind, have a power to form idea, which is a type or representation of the knowledge past; as so far as they have memory and judgment to distinguish ideas which had been connected in the knowledge, they must be considered as having a power of forming a subordinate rule of action, founded on the first. Thus they must be capable of determining action, in cases where the first rule either did not exist with sufficient force to be distinguished, or existed with a force inferior in degree to that of the second.
second rule of action, which has already been considered under the term of sentimental feelings, and ideal though not scientific motives.

3. But man, besides being an animal, is a conscious person, reasoning scientifically as well as naturally or instinctively. He therefore distinguishes himself; and he forms the abstract ideas of pain and pleasure, of joy and grief, of love and hatred, as also the more general ideas of good and evil. It is then, and then only, that man may become a moral as well as a natural agent. For, voluntarily acting and suffering from a general principle of good and evil, of valuation and preference, he is thus perfectly distinguished from the animal, who is a natural agent, an agent who proceeds on the instinctive principle of pain and pleasure, and also on the sentimental principle of passion and of appetite, which are particular. Now, though appetite and sentimental passion are motives of action formed by the animal himself, or in idea, they are not formed in a conscious or reflected thought, but in a mind proceeding only instinctively to know. Therefore, though motives proper to that mind, these are not voluntary motives; they are not motives of which the animal may be conscious, and for which he may find himself responsible, as is the case with man, who forms design, and is conscious of his wisdom and his folly.

4. Man, having become a scientific reasoner and a moral agent, comparing motives, judging of quantity or degree, and acting from general principles of good and evil, is then capable of attaining the idea of virtue or morality, which is the distinguishing of more and less in good and evil. It is thus we are taught to prefer a future good, of greater value, to a present good of an inferior degree; and to suffer present evil, of a less degree, in order to avoid a greater evil which would otherwise ensue.

But, if a person has misjudged, in relation to those things which happen
happen at different periods of time, and shall find, that the present good he had preferred is not equal to the future good by that means loft, or that the present evil, which he had avoided, is less than the future evil, which by that means he had suffered, he then grows wiser, and learns to form certain general rules, for the direction of his future conduct, when it is necessary to judge in relation to the comparative values of several sufferings and enjoyments.

5. These are the rules of morality which a wise and virtuous person knows and observes; and he thus arrives at a happiness which he is conscious of deserving. For, having founded his conduct on what he knows to be right, whatever unexpected misery shall happen, he has the consolation to think that this is not his due, and therefore, may have a reasonable hope of being relieved from evil which he had not drawn upon himself; however, in the wilder of that system wherein we exist, present evil is often to be endured as the means of enjoying in a future period.

6. If, on the other hand, a person, who is not ignorant of the rules of virtue, or of wisdom for the attainment of future happiness, shall knowingly neglect those rules of conduct, wherein a present sufferance is to be rewarded with a future enjoyment, and shall unwisely prefer the satisfaction of the moment to the greater good that is to follow, his present enjoyment must be embittered with the idea of an evil which is then to come; while all the satisfaction of present pleasure only tends to aggravate his ideal suffering with the tormenting apprehension of deserved evil. A mind that is capable of enjoying under the misfortunes of affairs of a moral duty, without feeling the flings of intellectual misery, if such a mind exists, is a little raised above the animal to be considered as a man; and cannot be supposed as ever truly tasting that pure pleasure which arises from the approbation of esteemed men; far less of attaining the supreme enjoyment of an independent happiness, that is, to esteem himself.

7. Intellectual
7. Intellectual enjoyment being thus founded in our conscious knowledge of our proper motives, and our opinions of good and evil, the happiness of a virtuous mind must increase with its knowledge, in being properly founded on it. But is not misery, it may be asked, in like manner founded on our knowledge? Therefore, where is the beauty or benevolence of a system in which misery must with knowledge equally grow as happiness? This question is properly answered in the distinction which has been already made of good and evil; this is, that the one is absolute and necessary, the other occasional or contingent; the one being in nature the proper end or aim, the other only the means for conducting to the end, and ensuring the object of the benevolent intention.

8. It may be now observed, that good and evil have various appearances according to the progress of the mind, in which are formed those two opposite conceptions. In the beginning of a mind, when the person is to be considered as simply animal, there, pain, which is the cause of evil, is positive and absolute; pleasure, the cause of good, is not an idea that enters as a consideration, it is then only a condition for the conducting of action to a certain determined end; and action is always excited or begun by means of pain, which is not then to be considered as evil, but the natural cause of action.

In the middle state, where a mind is arrived at moral action, in consequence of conscious or scientific knowledge, there, good as well as evil is acknowledged as a thing positive and absolute; or rather evil is thought to be equally so with good. But, properly speaking, in this state of mind, neither good nor evil are absolute and positive; they are only relative and comparative: Things are considered as either pleasant or painful, principles of action as either virtuous or vicious, good or evil.
This however is not the case, when a mind, in becoming more perfect, has arrived at philosophy; for, having then seen the proper use or appointment of what is commonly considered as evil, that is, pain and misery, this is no longer considered as evil, but is properly good. Thus, for example, as it is for the good of an animal, that the fire in burning gives him pain, so is it for the good or happiness of a moral agent, that vice in repentance should give him misery. Hence, good is good, that is to say, it is good in all respects; but evil is not in like manner evil, or, not evil in all respects; for, in this view of intellect, evil becomes good. Thus, good, which before was only relative in its nature, now becomes absolute; and thus in this system, evil disappears, in finding that all is good.

9. There is no subject more interesting to man than the knowledge of good and evil, and no speculation more worthy of attention than is this general judgment which is to be formed with regard to the works of God. Too much pains, therefore, cannot be taken in order to see it in every possible light.

Good is an abstract general idea; it is founded on a principle which is positive and absolute, this is pleasure. In like manner, evil is an idea of the same kind, founded on pain. These two general ideas good and evil are either, on the one hand, scientific, or, on the other, philosophic principles; and, in those two cases, they are differently understood. This subject, therefore, may be now considered.

Good and evil, as scientific principles, are equally positive and absolute as are the natural principles from whence they spring: For when we generalize every particular pleasure, in order to form the abstract idea of good, or every particular pain to form that of evil, we then obtain two generals, which, though opposite in relation to each other, yet, have each in nature an existence independent of the other; and, therefore, in this sphere of reasoning, where pleasure
and pain are understood in comparison with each other, the one of those ideas is no more absolute than the other, nor no more positive, although each is negative of the other.

But, when we come to generalize our scientific or understood ideas of good and evil, in order to form a philosophic principle in understanding our scientific principles, and the most general judgments or ideas respecting pleasure and pain, good and evil, then, we must begin to change our opinion, with respect to the absolute nature of those two ideas good and evil, in understanding the instinctive principles pain and pleasure from whence they spring. Pain, in its nature, or end and intention, is equally good with pleasure; at the same time, pleasure is not equally evil with pain. For, though pleasure is sometimes evil in its consequences, this is not naturally, i.e. it is not necessarily in its nature; it is only occasionally, arising from the error of our narrow or partial views. Pain, on the contrary, is not occasionally good in its consequences, but is naturally so, independent of our erroneous opinions; and it is only evil in our scientific notions, or more limited generalization.

Therefore, in philosophy, it is no paradox to say, that evil is good, although such an expression, in common sense, would be absurd. It is the difference between the consideration of generals and particulars, that forms this apparent inconsistency. On the one hand, it is only the particular which is properly or truly evil; the general of evil is truly good. Thus, for example, it is evil for me, when the fire happens to burn my hand, or when my conscience punishes me in repentance; but it is good for me and every other animal, that fire should give pain in burning; this is the general, and it is good. In like manner, it is good for me and all mankind, that conscience should give misery in remorse. Therefore, the general of evil is always good. On the other hand, the particular of good is always good; even when evil happens, in being the improper consequence;
sequence; and sophistry itself cannot make the general of good appear evil.

Now, this deception which may be observed in human science of mistaking evil in the particular for evil in the general, is not properly an error in the constitution of things; nor is it properly an error in the constitution of the human mind, thus made capable of error. For, if the mind of man were not made capable of error in his reasoning, he would not then have the means, which he has at present, of advancing his knowledge through science to philosophy, and, it is only in reasoning philosophically, but without having understood or examined their principles, that men have been led to conclude, there is any absolute evil, or that every thing is not absolutely good.

10. Thus, true philosophy leads to the knowledge of absolute goods and supreme good; which is not found in science and common sense, where both good and evil are equally considered as being only relative and conditional. In common sense, pain and pleasure, happiness and misery, like heat and cold, are only the extremes, and both themselves or seem to terminate both together in a medium, which is called indifference. But, in the superior understanding of enlightened men, pain and misery are perceived as the effect of wise designing and as the operation of benevolence; they are considered as being equally with pleasure, the means employed in the All-disposing Power, and as being efficient in the end proposed, which is happiness.

Supreme good being known in a mind, it is as impossible for that person then conscientiously to will evil, as it is for a mind in the animal state to pursue pain. But, this is a doctrine which requires some progress in philosophy to understand. In order to see the truth of this proposition, it is necessary to consider, that though in philos-
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...a mind cannot will evil, no more than in wisdom there can be folly, yet it is not alleged, that a person is always in the proper state of mind to which philosophy may lead him; for, so far as he is a man, he may be in an inferior state, being occasionally called back from that superior state of intellectual perfection, in following or obeying the instinctive motives necessary to his animal nature. As a man he is also subject to err in reasoning with regard to the distant relations of things, where every step in that process is not accurately weighed.

Man having virtue only so far as he has a choice; and being perfect only so far as he never prefers a temporary enjoyment to a lasting satisfaction, a good that is precarious to one that is certain, a present pleasure to a future happiness, is not capable of practising virtue on all occasions equal to the general principle which he has formed. But when, to the habits of a virtuous education, there is joined the knowledge of principle and the love of virtue, man arrives at all that perfection which is required in his present state; which is a progress, from the animal who knows no principle, to a being who has no animal motives to affect his action. It is the proper purpose of philosophy, to prepare him for that change, in which he may contemplate truth without error, and act from a principle of absolute good without the means of pleasure and pain.

But man, who proceeds from the brute state, in aspiring at that perfection which in his science he contemplates, is not to be reproached with every imperfection which philosophy discovers. Man is not naturally a philosopher, although he is naturally good: And, artificially, man is highly improved in his morals, when there is but little philosophy in his speculations. Philosophy is the perfection of wisdom and benevolence; and, could a person arrive at this perfection,

* Vide meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. 
tion, he would be no longer man, who is associated with infirm in the constitution of his animal nature: He would be a n passionate agent, knowing what is good, and avoiding every spectacle of evil: He would be a being superior to what he is at present.

Man naturally is far from being a philosopher. In that flat nature, he is ignorant; consequently, he cannot then be wise. With his narrow views, man thinks that right, which he finds for his immediate good; or rather, he knows not the distinction of right and good. But man, become wise, makes that distinction. He generalizes his enjoyments, in order to know that which always pleases him, or makes him happy. In the progress of his knowledge, he makes the distinction of good and evil, of true and false, of right and wrong. In the progress of his wisdom, he discovers, that good is not always good, and that evil is not always evil; that is to say, that the present good is not always on the whole the best, but may lead to evil; that the present evil is not always on the whole the worst, but may lead to good. He thus learns to forego a present good, and to suffer a present evil; and this he calls right and fit, that is, the good upon the whole.

Man, naturally, pursues the present good, and avoids the present evil. In that case, man is right without knowing what is right or wrong; for, he then consults his animal nature, and he has then other to consult. But when man, advanced in the knowledge of his own nature, finds that he has a much superior interest to consult, he then considers what is right for him to do as well as what is pleasant. He cannot change his natural feelings of pain and pleasure; but he changes his opinions of what is good and evil. Then suffers willingly that which he thinks it is right to suffer; he willingly abstains from that which he thinks it is wrong to enjoy. From an animal, he becomes a man.
The animal consults his present state; for, he has not any future state to enjoy. Man, again, considers his present state as only a preparation for a future enjoyment. The animal does that which pleases him; the man, again, is only pleased with that which he thinks will make him happy. The one has an interest in futurity; the other has no interest beyond the present enjoyment. The one acts wisely, by the constitution of his nature, without any wisdom of his own; the other acts often foolishly, because it is his constitution to learn and to become wise. But, both those natures are in man; he is born a mere animal; he necessarily grows a scientific animal, or a man; and, in the progress of his science, he becomes a philosopher, which surely is the perfection of his nature.

11. Science is the knowledge of truth; and, philosophy may be considered as the knowledge of good. But, the proper end or object of philosophy is to attain self-approbation; which, though naturally founded upon the approbation of other beings, is the only approbation that can give us absolute happiness. Now, this is a truth that can only be proved by an appeal to a person's own reflection. Can I enjoy the approbation of another person, for that for which I fland condemned in my own mind?—This is impossible. Weak minds indeed, such as are indetermined in their principles of approbation and condemnation, may have their consciences appeased in the false approbation of another person; but, this is only to pursue error, and error properly conducts to misery, not to happiness; for, error is the mother of folly, and upon folly are begotten vice and misery.

12. Man, who is made for wisdom, while he is born to error, is of a twofold nature; consequently, he has a double office to perform; he has to gratify the appetites of an animal, and he has an intellectual part to please. Man, in his intellectual capacity, is also actuated by two different passions; he naturally desires to please another,
another, but he necessarily desires to please himself. If a person pleases himself in serving his animal part, then, instead of being a virtuous man, he is to far only a selfish animal. If, again, he shall please himself in gratifying another person, he is no more a selfish animal, but a being who has acquired a power of pleasing himself, even when the interest of his animal nature is sacrificed to his more substantial happiness. Here is the perfection of human nature, which makes good to proceed even from evil. Common sense leads man to pursue his happiness, in gratifying every passion which he feels; science, or supreme sense, leads man to gratify the passion which will give him most or longest happiness, and to despise the gratification of that which is either soon to cease, or which is to end in disgust. Hence the distinction, of a person who is wise enough to avoid that which comparatively he thinks evil, and of him who is still more wise in distinguishing the evil which it is properly his interest to avoid; to know not only what it is good for him to enjoy, but also what it is good for him to suffer; and who is wise enough to see the folly of indulging transient pleasure at the expense of lasting misery.

Prudence or vulgar wisdom says, do not offend another person, lest he should offend you; refined wisdom holds a different language; philosophy says, do not offend another, lest you should offend yourself. Of these two dangers, the last is infinitely more to be dreaded than the first; for, in receiving offence from another person, there are means of consolation to be found; but, in offending myself, I must repent the action as long as I remember it; I am left to suffer a punishment from conscience, from whose sentence there is no appeal; and, I have no other means of diminishing my suffering, except in meriting better in my own opinion.

Self-approbation will thus appear to be the same with the approbation of the supreme Being, in whose design virtue has been ordained
dained for the happiness of moral agents. For, how should I conceive that a perfect Being, such as the supreme Mind, can approve of any thing but that which I think right, or disapprove of any thing but that which I think wrong? If I could think in any other manner, or suppose that a perfect Being could approve of that which I think wrong, and disapprove of that which I think right, then, I should give up my understanding of right and wrong, and be no more a moral agent knowing good and evil; but, How could a person, in his reason, renounce his understanding? Therefore, self-approbation is the same with the approbation of the supreme Being; and, the check of conscience naturally incident to vice, or the remorse felt after the doing of what is thought to be wrong, is the same with the displeasure of God. Not that a philosopher can suppose a perfect Being to be affected with pleasure or with pain, with any thing that could either increase or diminish his perfect state of happiness or self-enjoyment; but because it has pleased the Author of our being so to constitute the nature of moral sentiments in the mind of man, or to have made certain things the conditions of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery. Thus also it will appear, it is philosophy alone, or the most general knowledge, that may give this perfect happiness in the comprehension of supreme good, and may perfect human nature, in conforming our will to that of the supreme Mind.

Man has been, no doubt, made upright, or after the image of God, so far as he is made for virtue; but, man is not made by nature virtuous; he only is made innocent, so far as he has by nature no propensity to vice.

By nature, man is made for virtue, as he is made for science, or for speech. Man must learn to speak, because, before speaking, he must have learned to think scientifically; and, before being virtuous, he must have learned to form a principle of conduct, in his wisdom.
wisdom. Man, therefore, who is made by nature to grow wise, in the exertion of his intellectual capacities, must grow virtuous; and it is only so far as man has made himself virtuous, in being a moral agent responsible to his conscience, that he may become vicious, by proceeding upon an erroneous or mistaken principle.

The first principle of man, like the instinctive principle of every animal, is to preserve himself. Next to himself, the most interesting object, in external things, is the happiness of his fellow creatures. In the speculations of his mind, again, truth only gives him pleasure; and, the beauty of truth is perceived through all the objects of his thought, (Part II. Sect. I. Chap. IV.) The true interest of man is to preserve inviolate these three principles of his conduct. When none of these conscious duties interfere, man naturally proceeds in virtue; he loves himself, he loves his neighbour, and he loves the truth. But, when his selfish and his social duties interfere, he learns, according to the degree of his acquired wisdom, more and more to sacrifice the first, and to preserve the second, as contributing to his lasting or his perfect happiness.

Having thus learned to make himself virtuous, by acquiring principles of moral conduct for his happiness, he learns to value himself upon his strictly adhering to his virtuous principles. In that case man has a source of happiness within himself, independent of his animal nature, and often founded on the sacrifice of his personal concerns. While all other enjoyments are temporary and precarious, the conscious virtue which is acquired in wisdom, by man arrived at the perfection of his nature, and contemplating the will of his Creator in the end of his existence, places him in a superior state of happiness, which is not precarious nor subject to decay.

It is here that man sees the truth of nature, and the nature of truth; that is, a perfect conformity with the divine will, in knowledge.
ing the nature of his own existence, as a Being contrived for virtue and for happiness.

In order to illustrate the progress of the human capacity, from brute animal knowledge to the summit of intellectual wisdom, let us consider man in his infant understanding, learning virtue from experience, and happiness from knowledge. Let us take an example in the speaking of truth.

No child naturally tells a lie, for this reason, that it is more easy to speak truth. To tell a lie, requires an effort of intellect, or human understanding, beyond that necessary for the speaking of truth. The faculty of lying is therefore a progress of the human intellect conceiving an end, and in wisdom adapting means. The end to be attained is the enjoying pleasure, or the avoiding pain. Let us suppose a child enjoined by its parent not to eat of apples with which it is entrusted; and that this child shall tell a lie, in order to cover its fault, or to avoid the anger of its parent;—the child, according to its estimation, so far has done no ill; the eating of the apple is certainly good, and the avoiding the anger of its parent surely is not evil; therefore, the child, in telling a lie, has done all it can, in this narrow sphere of reasoning, for the general good. In this, however, the child, though intending well or wisely, has reasoned erroneously, or from a false principle. The parent is not to be imposed upon, and the lie creates more anger than the disobedience. Here, then, a child has learned, from the anger of its parent, to know that lying is immoral, or unprofitable; and, as his understanding ripens with experience, he finds, that he is loved or esteemed for telling truth, hated and despised for telling falsehood. He is thus more and more confirmed in his morals. But, until he comes to value himself for truth, and hate himself for falsehood, he has not attained a virtuous principle. Now, having formed a virtuous principle, he cannot transgress that principle without offending conscience; he therefore
cannot tell a lie without being justly punished; and, in the consciousness of valuing himself, he finds a happiness beyond the satisfaction of a sensual desire.

Here, then, commences the philosopher, who, wisely considering the nature of his enjoyment, learns to bring his desires to that which will procure most happiness. But,—What is that which always will procure most happiness?—It is virtue; the conformity of man's will to the benevolent purpose of his constitution; and the wise election of his mind, co-operating with the general cause of happiness.

13. It is this perfection of the human mind that, in action, leads to the highest species of virtue, viz. that of making mankind happy in diffusing moral truth. Thus it is that man becomes an intellectual, as well as moral agent, in not only being virtuous, but the cause of virtue; in not only avoiding misery by following the rules of wisdom, but in making himself happy, in forming a virtuous design for the good of others. It is only for this purpose that a philosopher could wish to be a monarch; and it is in this manner that a common man may make himself much happier than a monarch who should knowingly transgress the rules of virtue.

14. Thus also may be made to appear the power of reason, in leading the mind of man to virtue. Not that reason, strictly speaking, is the cause of virtue; for, virtue is not the immediate effect of reason, although reasoning is necessary for the production of the sentiment which is termed virtue. But, though reason is not necessarily connected with virtue, more than any other end to be attained, nevertheless, virtue is proper to reason, as being the best end which is by that means to be attained, and as being that end which is discovered in reasoning with the ultimate perfection of the human intellect.
Reafon, as a comparing operation, is necessary for the determination of every action, that is to say, of those which are not altogether material, or without any species of choice and discernment, and without the use of knowledge in the agent. Reafon is certainly employed upon every occasion where an animal acts from sense or knowledge; but, there is no knowledge in those actions which proceed alone from animal motives, or the sense of pleasure and pain. Reafon may be also much employed by the human intellect, or in the route of science, without producing virtue; thus a man may be a mathematician or a chymist, and at the same time be a very vicious person. In order to produce virtue, reason must not only be employed scientifically, in knowing ends and means; the person must also proceed to reason philosophically, that is to say, a person must discover the best end in speculation for his action, and must understand the ultimate consequences of his choice, as well as the more immediate effect of his volition. It is only in reasoning to this extent, and seeing those distant relations of things, that a rational being is led naturally to virtue; which is a sentiment far removed from the comprehension of the animal acting, feeling, reasoning, in a narrow sphere compared with the perfection of the human intellect.

If, in thus reasoning to the full extent of philosophy, virtue be necessarily preferred to vice, or approved of in the understanding, which is the source of our determination, virtue must appear to be from nature, vice from ignorance or imperfect understanding. Conversely, if virtue is in nature, and not in accident as is vice, man, reasoning to the full extent of human intellect, must become virtuous.

As it is only in the perfection of the human intellect that the rule of virtue is discovered, or virtuous motives formed, none of the absolute passions of pleasure and pain can lead a mind in reasoning to virtue; even none of the sentimental passions, that is, the ideas of
of things immediately associated with the absolute passions, (more than which the mere animal forms), can lead in reasoning to a virtuous principle. This principle of action must flow from sentiments of above the common understanding of man, sentiments more complex and refined than the scientific opinions proper to the human intellect. Suppose, for example, a person considering whether it be his interest or not, to be honest; here is a question deeply involved with that science which is proper to the human intellect. But, it does not follow necessarily, that a person, who is capable of putting this question himself, should therefore determine according to the rules of morality, or law of virtue. The law of virtue, in this case, is only discovered in reasoning so deeply in the science of nature and of our mind, as to judge, that, upon the whole, it is truly our interest to be honest and just, in finding the reward of virtuous abstinence in our own opinion. Now, the science in which this question may be properly decided is philosophy, or the most extensive reasoning of the human mind. To that part of mankind who are not capable of examining the question in this sphere of science, it must be through prejudice or superstition that the law of virtue may be believed, like the influence of the sun and moon; or, it must be from fear of punishment, shame, or pain, that the moral duty of honesty is practiced by people who have not the principle of virtue.

15. Virtue is limited, in being proper to the species man, and no other animal. Virtue is honoured with praise; vice, on the contrary, is blamed and disgraced. But, the animal, in pursuing implicitly his pleasure, is not blamed; nor is the pleasure, occasionally annexed to a vicious action, considered as excusing a person who is capable of blame. A man has virtue to conduct him over the allurements of a present pleasure; he is therefore blamed for the transgression of a virtuous conduct. But, the animal has no fixing rule of conduct for his action; he cannot form a conscious principle in his mind. Therefore, the animal cannot acquire honour in a
abstinence or suffering, a thing which does not proceed in him from choice; nor can he be disgraced, in following the immediate infliction of his sensual desires, no more than he is sensible, in reflection, of honour or disgrace.

16. This is not the case with man. A mother rears a daughter, who proves an ornament to her sex; that mother is praised by her species, and honoured of men. On the other hand, a hen, with all the tenderness and anxious care of a mother, rears her brood of chickens, to the perfection of their species; but, he would be absurd indeed, who should bestow, upon the animal, that praise which is only due to nature; and yet, the hen has done her part, as well as the woman. What then makes this distinction? — a difference which is no less than infinite, and which is observed in relation to the conduct of the animal and the man.

If a woman rear an animal to the perfection of its species, that is, so as to subserve itself, that woman would have acted her part, as an animal in the system of this world, without having herself necessarily formed a design. This woman would be precisely on a level with the brute, which had perfected her brood. As an animal, she would have done her part, by means of instinct; and, in the instinctive pleasure of the animal, she would have had her temporary satisfaction, or her just reward. In that case, however, the praise of having conducted to a proper end, by means contrived in wisdom, must belong to nature, or to that power and wisdom which, in conceiving an end, had appointed means, and not to the animal who acts in necessity by the laws of nature, as a body falls by weight. But when a woman, who is perfect in her kind, as being of a species capable of wisdom, rears her young to the perfection of its species, she then makes a human creature, an animal endued with wisdom, and inspired with virtue. This is, in the ranks of nature, as much above the animal, as the animal is above the grafs on which it feeds.
That mother is therefore honoured, not for the child which she has born and reared, but for the education which she has given to her child; and which, in neglecting her duty, she might have withheld, or which, in folly, she might have neglected.

The education of a child is a painful task, in one sense, although it may be also pleasant in another. Much animal pleasure and sensual enjoyment must be lost to a person who pursues that object, or must be sacrificed to the painful watching of an anxious mother, and to the careful study of a philosophic mind; although, at the same time, this virtuous conduct may be rewarded with present happiness, as well as crowned with future enjoyment.

But, What is education?—Education, in relation to the parent, is a scientific operation, by which the natural capacity of the animal is called forth into the state of actual existence; but, in relation to the child, education is an operation in which a person, from ignorance, is led to wisdom, and, from wisdom, is led to virtue; that is to say, in this operation, a person acquires the means of happiness, which is infinitely more than the means of life and pleasure alone. Therefore, so far as a mother has educated a child to virtue or true wisdom, she has given more than life; for, this is that which makes life valuable in the esteem of men. A human form which lives without wisdom, and enjoys without a virtuous sentiment, however this animal may be improperly called a man, it cannot be esteemed such by those who understand themselves, or know what human nature is.

It is only to virtue that honour is due, when, in voluntary action, a person has done what he conceived to be right for him to do; it is also to vice that dishonour properly belongs, when a person has not done that duty which he knew. But, virtue is founded on wisdom, as vice depends on folly. Now, wisdom, it has been shown, is founded
founded in science; and, folly is not necessary or instinctive, but occasional, arising from defect, or insufficiency of science in a person who has neglected to employ those faculties in which his knowledge is promoted.

In this manner may be explained human nature as growing, not in the involuntary or unconscious action of the animal, or in the necessity of things which have not life, but in the knowledge of a mind, and in the art of intellectual agents, no otherwise than animal life is conceived as proceeding in the laws of nature, and depending on the system of material things.

It has already been observed, life without reason, although such a thing exists in nature, and forms a part of the system of this world, is a state inferior, in the scale of beings, to that of animal life; and, animal life, without science, is instinctive, that is, it has not voluntary or conscious action. But man, who begins in animal life, grows by science into wisdom; and, not satisfied with sensual enjoyments, he seeks a source of intellectual happiness, that is, an enjoyment in opinion. Thus he begins to contemplate truth, and proceeds to reason upon moral principles of good and evil. It is in this manner that he may arrive at knowing a general system of life and intellect; and it is then that he finds himself satisfied and happy, in seeing the utility of evil, and enjoying the beauty and benevolence of the system, by tainting good without alloy.

17. It is only in the scientific views of our own wisdom and benevolence, and in the contemplation of the wisdom and benevolence of the Supreme Power, that may be founded a theory of virtue, wherein the selfishness of the animal is naturally lost in the generosity of the man, and the love of the individual is extended first to the species, and then even to the kind, where sense and reason is observed. For, in this general view, we shall evidently see, that our own
own pleasure is involved in our neighbour's happiness; and we shall be led to consider the practice of virtue as consistent with true wisdom, in like manner as that of vice, or want of virtue, will appear to be only derived from ignorance and folly *.

But this philosophic view of virtue is far above the instinctive practice of morality, which may be observed, in some degree, in conduct even the actions of the brute; it is limited to the few among mankind, who have the opportunity and inclination to improve their minds. Now, in this also there may be observed wisdom; for, while the preservation of the individual, and the propagation of the species, properly belong to all, few suffice to give those precepts of morality that are natural to the human mind, and those laws of civil institution in which the interest of many are united.

It is here that human policy employs the natural superstition of mankind for the best of purposes, the general good; and it is here that may be justly lamented the pernicious effects of ignorance, misleading the docile nature of man, by precepts either corrupted proceeding from a philosophy which is imperfect. For, such practice being found to be unnatural, or such precepts not founded in the truth of science, the true principles of morality, along with the

* This proposition cannot be doubted, when it is considered, that the political world consists of nations, as the natural world consists of land and water, of heaven and earth, and that all those nations are ruled in some degree; for, without virtue, there can not be government, and anarchy would everywhere prevail. This however is not the case; and, though harmony does not always everywhere take place, government is everywhere established in some degree; now, that virtue, on which government is founded, is always the same. The Naudowskie nation of Indians is not ruled as cely in the same manner as the Empire of China, but, so far as it is ruled, it must upon the same principle of virtue. In those two cases of government, vice is the departure from the rules of conduct determined in the general opinion; and, however some degree of injustice or imperfection may be found in the constitution of every government on earth, it is only the transgression of that government, or those general rules, which is to be accounted vice.
false precepts of superstition, are trodden under foot. It is thus that
the natural folly of the unenlightened man is, in the polished race,
converted into the unnatural contempt of institutions that are good.
And thus the wisdom of a vitiated mind, contrary to the natural
tendency of knowledge, only enables the human creature to excel
the animal, in directing all their action to the gratification of sense,
and thus preferring the narrow view of the momentary enjoyment
to the perpetual satisfaction of a happiness that grows with the re-
flexion of what is past. But, with the progress of science, true phi-
losophy is cultivated; and, it is this philosophy that is constantly
operating in correcting the errors of general institutions, and the de-
pravity of superstitious precepts.

Philosophy, though always operating in correcting the manners
of men, can never be effectual; the reason of this is plain. For,
even supposing that philosophy shall be perfect, it can be so only in
a few; and, What is the exertion of a few, in opposition to a mul-
titude? On the other hand, the manners of mankind can never much
transgress the rules of virtue; for, though science and philosophy, in
perfection, may not be found in mankind, yet, most part of men are
sufficiently enlightened to acknowledge the general precepts of virtue
as a moral duty. Thus, every one would wish all mankind to be
virtuous, and only desires to himself the privilege of being occa-
sionally exempted from that rule of action, which he therefore, in
general, thinks right. Hence that rule of equity or general maxim;
of doing to others what we would others to do by us, is a precept
or principle of action wisely imagined, and calculated for the capa-
city of mankind in general, who approve the rule, however apt to
deviate from this principle of action, in following the unrestrained
bent of animal, irrational, or inordinate desires.

Thus, virtue is established among mankind, neither, on the one
hand, by instinct without philosophy, nor, on the other, by philoso-

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PHY ALONE WITHOUT ART. IF VIRTUE WERE INSTINCTIVE, IT WOULD NOT BE HUMAN; AND, IN THAT CASE, MAN COULD NOT BE ANSWERABLE FOR HIS WILL, ABSTRACTING FROM THE ACTION BY WHICH HIS WILL IS ONLY JUDGED; NEitheR COULD HE BE ACCOUNTABLE WITHIN HIMSELF TO WHAT IS CALLED CONSCIENCE.

IF VIRTUE, AGAIN, REQUIRED THE EXTENSIVE VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHY ATTAINED IN A LONG PURSUIT THROUGH THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF SCIENCE, HOW FEW VIRTUOUS PERSONS WOULD THERE BE ON EARTH! BUT IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY ARE NATURAL TO THE SPECIES, AND ALSO ARTIFICIAL IN THE INDIVIDUAL EDUCATED IN SOCIETY; THEREFORE, THE PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY IS SO UNIVERSALLY FOUND IN THE MORALS OF MANKIND. BUT THE SCIENCE OF MORALES, OR PHILOSOPHY ITSELF, IN WHICH THE SYSTEMS OF MORALES IS UNDERFLOODED, THOUGH THIS BE ALSO A SUBJECT TO BE TAUGHT, IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE PRACTICE, AND IS CONFINED TO SPECULATIVE MENTAL ACTIVITY.

NATURALLY, MAN IS NOT WITHOUT SCIENCE, THAT IS, NOT ABSOLUTELY; THOUGH THE DEGREES IN WHICH HE MAY POSSESS IT, ARE INDEFINITE. NEITHER IS SCIENCE NATURALLY WITHOUT WISDOM; ALTHOUGH ARTIFICIAL SCIENCE, TAUGHT TO THE INDIVIDUAL, MAY BE SO COMPARETIVELY, THAT IN RELATION TO AN EQUAL DEGREE OF SCIENCE THAT IS NATURAL. IN LIKE MANNER, VIRTUE NATURALLY FOLLOWS WISDOM; AS WISDOM FOLLOWS SCIENCE.

BUT, WISDOM MAY BE ARTIFICIAL, SO FAR AS THE INDIVIDUAL IS INSTRUCTED IN LEARNING TO FIND OR TO ADAPT MEANS FOR AN END IN VIEW, WITHOUT THE SAME TIME LEARNING TO KNOW THE BEST END FOR HIS PURSUIT. IN THAT CASE, WISDOM MAY BE ATTAINED WITHOUT VIRTUE; WHICH NATURE IS NOT THE CASE, IN A PERSON BECOMING WISE FROM HIS OWN EXPERIENCE.

BUT, TRUE PHILOSOPHY, WHICH IS THE GENERAL SCIENCE OF GOOD, CAN NOT EXIST WITHOUT PRODUCING VIRTUE, THAN TRUE VIRTUE CAN EXIST WITHOUT PRODUCING HAPINESS, SO FAR AS THE NATURAL STATE OF THE PERSON WILL ADMIT. THEN, WHAT IS VICE AND MISERY?—THIS IS NOW TO BE CONSIDERED.

18. WISDOM BEING AN ABSOLUTE THING, OR POSITIVE IN ITS NATURE, IT IS A QUALITY OR ATTRIBUTE THAT IS ONLY NEGATIVE. LIMITED WISDOM...
Virtue is no less positive than wisdom. Therefore, it is only in relation to virtue that vice exists; and is then in its nature merely negative. For, virtue may exist independent of vice; whereas vice cannot exist independent of virtue.

So far as reason is the same in all men; and so far as all men were to reason equally or from the same degree of science, all men would be inevitably led to virtuous principle; and, so far as the animal constitution and circumstances of all men were alike, they would all equally act from their principle of virtue. But here are equalities supposed which cannot take place. The principles upon which all men are formed are the same; but the circumstances, in which the forming powers act, are not equal. Hence false reasoning and imperfect views of virtue; hence vicious habits and the corruption of that nature which originally is good; and hence the debasement of sentiments, and perversion of faculties which in general are held in esteem and admiration by mankind.

Thus it will appear, that vice does not exist in nature; it is only in man; and that not naturally, but only so far as his state is artificial, that vice is to be found. Is man, therefore, to be preferred in the natural state, as some authors would insinuate, in order that he may be found without vice?—Mere illusion! In that case, man without vice, would be no more than man without virtue. Man without possession in the world, would be man without a motive for his intellect to grow. What would be the value of a herd of such animals,
animals, however innocent?—Nothing in the exlation of philoso-
phy, that is, in comparison with truly virtuous men.

19. The species man is never natural, as may be more or less an
individual or particular of that species. Man, as a species, is always
artificial more or less. But art, however effectual, when conducted
in wisdom, to make man virtuous, is not necessary for this purpose,
or to ensure the end, so far as man is in the wisdom of nature led to
virtue. Man is actually led to virtue in the wisdom of nature; for,
vice, or acting blindly through the instigation of momentary plea-
sure, necessarily leads the mind, that consciously reflects, to misery
and repentance; whereas, the conscious pursuit of more lasting sa-
tisfaction, and the proper means of attaining through a temporary
endurance to a continual happiness, is what is called virtue. Virtue
is in the nature of man. Now the nature of man, is first, to be an
animal, which preserves itself and propagates its species from in-
trinsic pleasure; secondly, to proceed in knowledge, so as to at-
tain wisdom, and, in knowing his proper interest, to become virtu-
ous; and lastly, knowing himself, and understanding wisdom and
virtue, to become happy, in the enjoyment of his intellectual, as well
as his physical being. If this is a true state of the cafe, or definition
of human nature, then, though every step in this progression, may
not be discernible in every man, yet, in different men, we shall find
the nature of man, advanced in different degrees, so as to illustrate
the analytical, or scientific distinction, which has now been made.

Man, considered merely as an animal, should only be conducted
in his actions, by his immediate feeling, or sentimental passions;
he should have very little of those sympathetic feelings, which dis-
tinguish him so much from the brute. In this state, if man be at
cafe himself, he will little consider the feelings of his fellow creature;
if again he be uneasy, he will pursue that action which could relieve
him, without considering the consequences in relation to his future
enjoyment,
enjoyment, or that of any other creature. Such a person as this, without any sympathetic feeling, perhaps is not to be found upon the earth, where man is always educated more or less with some sympathetic passion.

But, though man is not to be found, absolutely destitute of those social feelings, which he naturally acquires in the necessary commerce with his species, he may be found possessed of them in a small degree, or affected by them more or less. He may be also educated, so as to extend to the brute species, that sympathy which he naturally has in relation to his own. But, if these require education, in order to their being felt or practised in any considerable degree, as is most evidently the case, then there can be no doubt, with regard to the justness of the theory, in which the mind of man is considered as being originally destitute of these sympathetic feelings, although naturally he acquires them, in the progress of his mind towards virtue, which is a farther advanced state of his felicity.

If we suppose man without science, he is no better than a brute; for, with regard to the natural oeconomy of life, the knowledge and conduct of the mere animal is equally perfect as that of man. If again we suppose man endued with science, but without philosophy, here is a person very different on the one hand from the brute, and on the other from the perfect man: This person is no other than the savage; at least, the savage is the person who most approaches to that state. For, so far as philosophy operates in forming a principle of conduct towards our fellow creatures, by which the good of others is consulted, at the expense of personal ease and interest, the savage, however naturally benevolent, has no principle by which the passionate and interested motives may be opposed and overcome: he is therefore irascible and cunning. His ingenuity is employed in gaining an ascendency by force, by fear, and taking the advantage of superstitious opinions to promote his personal interest.

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The savage has all the science which is requisite for the purposes of his economy, but that economy has for object nothing but the gratification of brutish appetite and passion. He is wise or skilful in the necessary arts of life, but ignorant or deficient in the godlike art of propagating happiness. No general principle of good directs his inclination or forms a passion in his mind. His virtue is all particular, suggested by the immediate feelings of his nature; and when he commits atrocity, he does not transgress the principle which he has formed, or he does not offend his conscience in reflection. With him, as with the brute, an injury is to be resented; but, the savage still does more, he forms a principle of resentment which he pursues for happiness, as not knowing the pleasure of overruling evil by the power of virtue. He reasons superficially like a child, and sees not into the glorious constitution of the human nature, which in him is thus disgraced.

The savage has the wisdom of the individual, but not the wisdom of the species; in a savage tribe, where science is no farther cultivated than it serves immediately to use, the knowledge of the supreme good is not discovered. Here man, though infinitely above the animal which, in his proper wisdom, he is able to subdue, is infinitely below the human being who, by means of his more perfect wisdom, is able to subdue the animal nature in himself. The savage studies knowledge or his particular wisdom, for the purposes of his passion or his appetite; but he knows not to what end the flux of wisdom as a general would lead; and, while he is not tormented with the conscious guilt of a corrupted mind, or with the dissatisfaction of his own conduct, he is ignorant of all that pleasure and satisfaction which naturally flows from virtue, when sympathetic love is extended to the general welfare of mankind, and founded on the knowledge of our proper happiness.

The savage as an animal is wise, because he has the science which forms
forming a design, in which the necessaries of his life are procured, and
the passions of his nature gratified; but, as a man, he still is foolish,
in being under the influence of his animal passions more than is ne-
cessary for the preservation of his being, and in not forming a sys-
tem of thought by which his conduct would be changed, his pleasures
much increased, and his happiness secured.

Insensibility to the enjoyment and suffering of others, being a cha-
acteristic of the brutish state, man, the animal, is refined into feel-
ing, and, with an enlarged knowledge, he is made to practise virtue,
in having a general view of the common interest of mankind. It
is then that he learns to feel for the species in general, and to ap-
prove of virtue for its general utility; therefore he necessarily dis-
approves of vice, or the transgression of the rules of virtue; and it
is here that crime excites his anger and resentment. Zealous for
virtue and the general good, he with pleasure sacrifices, to his re-
sentment, those, whom folly has led into the allurements of vice, and
vice betrayed into the misery of crime.

But, this is not that perfect virtue, which terminates in happiness
or flows from philosophy, by means of which the mind enjoys the
perfection of its nature, in seeing the wisdom of the general system,
and acquires that voluntary influence, or command over its passions,
which may be obtained by reason or extensive knowledge. It is
not meant that the philosopher is to be rendered again insensible,
like the brute, to other’s feelings; but he is to be cured of his pre-
judices. He is not, for example, to suffer anger to be stirred up in
his mind, when reason may prevent that passion. Particularly, he
is to beware of entertaining resentment, against a fellow creature,
for the transgression of an ideal system formed in his mind; and, he
is to consider, that there is no absolute principle in moral philosophy
except that of willing good, and generalising happiness.
The animal man has no system or general idea of virtue, as though he has those instinctive feelings, on which virtue is in a general reasoning founded; he is only excited to anger, on the one hand, and to love, on the other, by pain and pleasure, his immediate animal feelings. But this is not the case with man, properly so called; he has systematic views, and virtuous sentiments, to conduct his love and his aversion, besides his feelings in which he suffers as an animal. It is in reasoning scientifically, that is, abstractly, that he forms those systematic views, which are to serve as motives for his voluntary conduct; and if, in this case, he reasoned always without error, then he might with safety indulge the passionate influence of those ideal motives. But, in studying human nature scientifically, we find that human reason is imperfect, that to say, it is in science that man, reasoning inadvertently, is apt to err; consequently, we learn again to distrust the accuracy of our systematic views: Therefore we should be temperate, in the indulgence of those virtuous motives, when these lead to the resentments of injury, and to the ordaining of evil, or any thing that is not absolutely good.

20. It has been shown, that science is the proper means of wisdom; and it cannot be doubted that wisdom is the means of happiness; for, this is a proposition in philosophy, no less certain or demonstrable, than that in physics bodies gravitate. But what is virtue?—virtue is the art of making happy. It has been also shown that art is founded in science (Part II. Sect. XIII.); and now, it may be observed, this science, in which man learns the art of making mankind happy, is philosophy; a sphere of science superior to that in which a mind becomes wise, in like manner as this degree of wisdom is a state of mind superior to that instinctive reasoning of the animal, on which it necessarily proceeds.

The animal, for example, hungers and suffers, cats and enjoys.
but this he does instinctively, without either wisdom or folly. The rational mind of man, on the other hand, besides suffering in hunger and enjoying in the satisfaction of that instinctive desire, does more; he provides for his hunger, in order that he may not suffer without satisfaction; and also, he eats when he is not hungry, in order that he may enjoy pleasure. Now this is proceeding rationally in his science, and wisely in his design; but still this is far short of the wisdom that man may arrive at, in studying wisdom or understanding nature and himself. For, though he may wisely attain an end which he has in view, he may also, in forming a design, choose that end either in his wisdom or his folly. If he provides for his hunger, in order that he may not suffer when he hunger, he acts from a wise motive, in doing what upon the whole seems best, and that of which he will not repent. But, if he eats when he is not hungry, in order that he may enjoy pleasure, he then acts from a motive that is not wise; in this respect, therefore, he has not consulted wisdom, or is not a philosopher. The language of philosophy is, that we should eat to live, and not live to eat. When we eat to live, that is, eat from hunger, we do wisely; for then we eat with pleasure, and for our good. But when we live to eat, that is, eat merely from the conscious or scientific motive of seeking pleasure, we then act foolishly; for, instead of true enjoyment, we lay the foundation of pain or disease.

Thus, in wisdom, there are degrees; and, as it is impossible to arrive at wisdom in any degree without that species of knowledge which is scientific, so, in order to arrive at supreme degrees of wisdom, the subject must be studied, by whatever term this progress of the intellect shall be named. The highest degree of wisdom is to know what is best, or what will make us most happy. Common wisdom seeks the best enjoyment of our sensual pleasures, as has been now exemplified, because those pleasures, with the pain that accompanies their transgression or defect, are most cogent in their

nature,
nature, or most immediately concern us. But supreme wisdom compares the sensual and the intellectual pleasures, in order to form a principle of enjoyment which may be termed divine, as not subject to that corruption and decay which necessarily attends our sensual pleasures. Now, this enjoyment is as unlimited in its subject or extent, as it is refined in its nature, or general in its intention; and this is truly what may be termed philosophy; a state of man that is altogether in art, so far as this acquired state is infinitely removed from the animal nature with which man is born.

21. Every philosopher is a man, but every man is not a philosopher; therefore, though in the philosopher we always find the man, and even the animal more or less, (for this is a part of his nature, which was once absolutely necessary, and naturally continues to be so in some degree, although in a rate that is decreasing,) yet, when the character of the man prevails extremely over that of the brute animal, and that of the philosopher over the common character of the man, such a person might be properly termed a philosopher; the abstract character of whom consists in this:

He practises virtue not immediately for his own interest, like other men, but immediately for the sake of virtue. Not that he neglects his proper interest, for then he would not have that prudence which wisdom properly inspires; but he is wise in a superior degree, when he knowingly sacrifices, what is commonly thought to be his proper interest, for the sake of virtue. In like manner, he loves his neighbour, not only from the instinctive motive of the animal, who is sociable in his nature, but loves mankind also from a general principle, which he has acquired in the use of reason. For, in scientifically removing every prejudice of passion, and every motive for ill-will, he voluntarily increases his necessary affection for the partner of his joys and griefs, and artificially doubles his natural propensity of doing good.
Sec. VI. PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS.

To say that a philosopher is nothing but a selfish animal, because he has pleasure in the pursuit of truth, and promises to himself happiness in the praises of his species, would be a sophism, or an argument founded in a mis-stating of the question and misapplication of the terms. In such an argument as this, there is no distinction betwixt the inordinate desire of praise, and the proper desire of being praise-worthy; now, this allows a latitude wherein, perhaps, both vice and virtue are to be found. If a person were insensible to praise and blame, he would not be a man; for, sensibility, in relation to praise, is an exertion proper to the human mind, and is more than the mere animal nature seems capable of attaining. Whereas, the acting virtuously without a prospect of praise, may justly be reckoned as forming the distinction betwixt the human nature, and that which may be conceived next in the order of ascent; a point of perfection to which, perhaps, human nature is scarcely made to attain. Nor does it seem possible that this perfect state should ever happen, in the most rigorous explanation of the terms; for, when there is no possibility of real praise for an action to be done, the human mind, endued with the power of fancy, pleases itself with an ideal praise; and this is also in the most rigid rules of virtue; for, otherwise, to be natural would be vicious. Therefore, to extend selfishness to this virtuous desire of praise, is evidently a misapplication of the term.

22. We may now sum up the doctrine, and draw a conclusion.

The pure animal has no enjoyment but what is sensual, no action but what is passionate, and no reasoning but that which leads immediately to action, that is to say, no rational enjoyment. It is also in this manner that the animal man begins to act and to enjoy; but, How soon does man, who is made for science, begin to depart from that brute line of conduct in which he had set out!

Man tastes his food, and feels the heat and cold, no otherwise at first
firt than does the animal; he perceives the objects of his action and his passion in no other manner than the perfect brute. It is by the colour and the shape, for example, that a certain fruit is known, which nourishes and gives a pleasant taste; the sight of this fruit is ever after a source of pleasure to those animals, at least when they are hungry, or have an inclination to that food. But, man soon learns to know the colour of this fruit, independent of its taste; he also learns to see the magnitude, the figure, or the shape, independent of the body which is coloured to his view. Man here proceeds to know by thought; and, in this train, he reasons purely to form opinion. He believes that things have colour, magnitude, and figure, and he forms a thousand fancies how things are. Here he may form a false position, and thus he may conclude in error. No matter, it does not immediately affect his life, or change his conduct as an animal; and it is a step which necessarily leads him to the knowledge of truth.

When man has thus formed an abstract subject for his contemplation, and created a source of intellectual enjoyment in seeing truth, (a thing which is not founded in nature, being only in the nature of the human mind,) Has he not then done more than what is in the animal to do? Has he not then begun to make himself? and, Is he not then upon the road to become a superior being, knowing good and evil? This at least is certain, that he has made a step in science, and arrived at a pleasure which is denied to the brute.

Here then is a man, an intellectual being, studying science, and pleased with the knowledge of nature. The next step is to study the sentiments of men; and this he may do at the same time that he studies nature. Here man finds a still more interesting subject for his thought; and he thus finds a source of entertainment that cannot be procured in any other way. Let us then see how he proceeds, in this new pursuit of pleasure.

Man,
Man, who is passionately pleased with man, is also scientifically pleased in studying the natural sentiments of mankind. He finds a source of joy in the approbation of his species, a joy which is not found in solitude, and which no earthly thing can give. He therefore cultivates this knowledge, not for the sake of knowledge, but for that of feeling social pleasure, and alleviating social pain, that is, the misery of thinking he may be either hated or despised.

This state of mind, or progress of intellect, is properly what is termed human. Nothing short of this is held as being man; because this is what man necessarily arrives at, if there be no impediment which may prevent the natural progress of his intellect. Here then is that rational being, who, feeling pleasure in the approbation of another, studies how he may acquire the enjoyment of this pleasure. But, he is as yet far from knowing how he may best attain that end at which he aims. He is, however, on the way to find the best manner of obtaining the best of his enjoyments.

Man then, studying sentiment farther for the sake of truth, and of seeing beauty in the abstract science of opinion, proceeds to general life, or know the general of pleasing sentiments and useful motives. Here he is pleased with the progress of his intellect, and he forms a general proposition in his science. He terms that virtue, which in the motive of the action pleases mankind, and that vice, which displeases. He finds himself happy in knowing what will always please, and what must be avoided as sure to give displeasure. He is miserable when he incurs the censure of his species; and he ardently desires their admiration or applause.

Thus man becomes virtuous, while yet he may be ignorant of virtue as a science that procures pleasure. This is not the philosopher who has reasoned on all things, and subjected all things to his reason; it is only man who has become wise by pursuing the science of
his sentiments, and by learning virtue as the means of pleasure. In this
career man sees what is truly virtuous; and he makes himself virtu-
ous, not in loving virtue above all things, but in wishing above all
things to be loved of men. In like manner, he avoids vice for the
fake of pleasing others, and not of being virtuous. He hates the vi-
cious who will not do him justice, and he loves the virtuous person
who will not offend; but he has not learned yet to love himself for
virtue, and hate himself for vice.

We are now to consider man the intellectual being, a person know-
ing and practising virtue, to have still another step to make in order
to arrive at the perfection of his nature. Now, this perfection he
has to attain by studying himself as well as other people’s sentiments,
by acquiring a view of his proper nature, and loving virtue for its
own sake, that is to say, loving virtue as the work of God, the end
of his creation, and the cause of human happiness. If this be a thing
merely chimerical, How comes it that the most enlightened men
have always entertained those ideas? If, again, this be the real op-
inion of rational men, and actually proves a motive for their conduct,
it must appear that we have now described the step in which human
intellect had proceeded on that occasion.

Here man, instead of being simply rational, becomes refined; here
man rises, in the scale of beings, above the rank of vulgar men; and
here man, who is naturally lord of the animal creation, becomes a
ruler in the world of opinion, and acquires a just dominion in the
mind of man. Here wisdom has attained its end, in making man
benevolent as well as powerful; here man has arrived at the proper
end of his creation, in being happy as well as being wise; and here
we may see the excellency of the system, in which man, the animal,
is made to transform himself into the image of his Maker. Here
man finds the approbation of his own mind to be the will of the
Supreme Being, and the sting of guilty conscience to be the neces-
fary
fary punishment of vice and crime. He finds that he is independent of every thing but the laws of his Creator, and that he has the means of making himself either most happy in the enjoyment of his nature, or most miserable in departing from the known path in which he had been designed to proceed.

Man, arrived at this state, is as perfect as the nature of his being will admit. Like a God, he knows himself; and, as a virtuous man, he knows the will of God. He is wise in knowing what concerns him most; and he is happy in having nothing to allay the pleasure of his enjoyments. He is independent of fortune; he is pleased with his species; he is satisfied in himself; and he is confident in his Creator.

22. Thus, philosophy may be considered as a purer species of virtue, attained in the more extensive views of human knowledge, by which we are led to perfect our systematic principles, from the investigation of the laws of nature, which are perfectly wise, and the contemplation of the will of God, which is absolutely good. It is here that vice is considered as the effect of folly; and, he that has committed crime is pitied, as one who has fallen into the greatest misfortune. The crime is hated, but not the criminal; because, to a mind that is sensible of its error, the consciousness of crime must bring a misery which nothing can alleviate; and, if not thus sensible in his reflection, the criminal cannot be an object of our aversion, however indifferent or contemptible he might be in our sight. The natural utility resulting from this philosophic view is public peace and private happiness, in not retentig injuries farther than reason may require, and never ordaining evil, excepting in the case of absolute necessity.

Thus, in reasoning from a certain theory of the human understanding, there have now been formed philosophical or general con-
clusions, such as may be compared with the opinions of philosophers, or the general sentiments of men. If those conclusions, therefore, have been properly deduced from the theory, and shall be approved of in the application, the principles, on which this reasoning has proceeded, will hereby receive some confirmation. If, on the contrary, any inconsistency shall be observed, here may be laid the foundation for farther examination, and more accurate reasoning, in a subject of much importance to the happiness of man.

C H A P. VI.

System of Morals, as being the intention of Nature, and the perfection of Art.

1. W E have been considering the happiness of mankind as depending upon the knowledge of virtue, that is to say, of that system of morality, or rules of conduct, which the wisdom of man has contrived for determining the manners of the species. We are now to examine how far this art of man, which is so perfect and effectual in procuring happiness, should be considered as a matter of accident, in being the work of man, or as a matter of necessity, in being the design of nature.

2. The theory of morality now laid down has proceeded upon this principle, that man is not naturally a moral agent, i. e. not immediately, having first to instruct himself with regard to his duty, or what is best on every occasion. Therefore, a scientific view of things is to be formed by man, before he can become a moral agent; and there is a duty to be conceived, in judging wisely, before man can act according to those rules which in the progress of his knowledge
ledge he had formed. Now, this requires man to have advanced in his science, and to have arrived at some degree of philosophy in his intellect. Consequently, this operation, which is the work of the human understanding, though not out of nature, as in opposition to her general intention, is properly in art, as having, besides the instinctive direction of nature or the laws of animal life, required that scientific progress which is only natural to man, and which art necessarily comprehends.

3. Hence it has appeared, that brute animals, so far as they do not in reflection form general principles, or scientific opinions, to serve as conscious motives for their future conduct, cannot have in their actions, what is properly termed morality; that is to say, they cannot have a general or scientific view of things, nor a conscious rule of conduct to direct their actions. These instinctive beings, therefore, must proceed upon the natural feelings of the animal, who distinguishes, with great accuracy, that which is agreeable or disagreeable, either to his sense, or to his sentimental feelings; and who thus is conducted, in the wisdom of nature, without the operation of art. Whatever the mind of the animal instinctively desires, that he pursues; until he is directed in his conduct by another motive, which in the natural course of things becomes a necessary cause of action; but, to form a motive to himself, by means of conscious thought and the abstract speculation of his mind, is altogether impossible, unless he had the like faculty as man, of thinking in that scientific manner, or of being wise.

4. It may therefore be made a question, how far the brute animal thinks in such a manner as consciously to form motives for his conduct, which would then be followed either by moral or immoral action, or by action in which wisdom, as proper to his mind, would appear in the adapting of ends and means conceived by himself; in that case, he must be considered as directing his own con-

\[3 \text{Q.2}\]
duet, and not as being led instinc
tively to pursue an end from the
intention of another mind. It is not
however in order to investi-
gate the instinc
tive operations of mind, that this inquiry here is
made; that subjeet has already been treated of largely; and, it is
now proposed to avail ourselves of that disquisition, in forming some
general and interesting conclusions, with a view to confirm the theo-
ry, in the explanation of every particular appearance or opinion.

The brute animal must either be capable or incapable of moral
action. These two cases we shall now consider. If, on the one
hand, the brute and human species shall be concluded as acti
ng from the same moral principles, then, either mankind err, in judging the
brute species to want inte
llect, or, (if moral action may thus be con-
ducted without intellect), it must be concluded, there cannot be a
rule in reasoning scientifi
cally for moral action, and, man would not
be a moral agent, accountable to himself for his past conduct. If,
on the other hand, the brute is found incapable of moral action, and
man be acknowledged as accountable to himself for that conduct
which proceeds from conscious motives, morality will be made to
appear a scientific subjeet, as it has been already represented; con-
sequently, here is a general view in which the theory would be con-

It must be evident, that the proposed question is only to be resol-
ved in judging from the appearances of things; for, those principles
of which we have an immediate understanding, or a conscious knowl-
edge in reflection, can only apply to the minds of the human spe-
cies. In judging therefore from appearances, we are to compare
the conduct of the brute species with that of man, in order to ob-
serve in what they agree and in what they differ. For, if it should
be found, that these are in all respects the same, we must conclude,
that the brute acts upon the same principles as man, and has the
same faculties of mind in acting from wisdom proper to himself.

But,
But, such a conclusion cannot be formed, so far as there is a manifest difference to be observed, in the moral conduct of those two different species of mind, the brute and human species. In order therefore to conclude, that it is for want of scientific views of things, the brute mind acts differently from that of man, it should appear, that those men who think most scientifically, and act with most wisdom, are also those whose moral conduct is most different from that of the mere animal; and conversely, that those men, who think least scientifically, and have least wisdom, have also the greatest resemblance, in their moral conduct, with the actions of the brute. In that case, there would be fulfilled every thing, in reason required, for the resolution of the question: We could not then withhold our assent to the proposition; and here would be an evidence, that must be deemed complete.

5. It is not an easy matter to compare the general conduct of those two species of reasoning beings, which are thus contrasted. The question is not, whether there be any, or if there be no resemblance, in those two things that are compared; there is the greatest resemblance, in many respects, and it is only in some particulars that they should differ *toto coelo*. Man is an animal; and therefore he has every appetite and affection, which is proper to this general class of being, consequently, which is common to him with the brute. Therefore, that man should not act with the instinctive wisdom, which is proper to nature, and which it has been maintained is the only conductor of the brute species, could not be concluded in reasoning from the principles laid down in the theory now given. On the contrary, the conduct of man, and that of the brute, must agree perfectly, so far as their animal nature is considered as the object of the action. Man, for example, like the brute, is sensible to fear, and prone to anger; therefore, that the brute should act, like man, from those instinctive principles, and so far man and brute agree in their general
general conduct, follows according to the doctrine, and does not transgress the theory.

But man, besides acting, like the brute, from fear and anger, forms to himself other motives of conduct, in his conscious thought and scientific reflection; as when, for example, he thinks, that it is shameful or impolitic to act either from fear or anger, as principal or preferable motives. In that case, here is an opposition betwixt the animal or instinctive motives, common to man with the brute, and the conscious principle or moral duties of the man, which it is alleged the brute cannot attain. If therefore examples are found, where man acts from his moral principle, in direct opposition to his instinctive principle or animal motive, and if no cases should be found, in which the brute species deserts in this manner the instinctive rule of his animal conduct, then, however men and brutes may be found, upon a thousand occasions, to act in a similar manner, from the same motives of fear and anger, no argument could thence be formed, in favour of the general similarity of their conduct; while, on the contrary, a single instance, of a man sacrificing his animal to his moral principle, must be decisive in the question. Here we may safely rest the argument.

6. This difference in the nature of those two several species, or this difference in their conduct, may be farther illustrated, in a case where man and every animal is on a level, and must act so far in equal circumstances; this is the affection of the sex, or animal desire of love. That this has been to man and beast the cause of bloody wars, is too well known to need a comment; the animal who never fights, will freely fight on this occasion; nothing but destruction to the animal can restrain the ardour of this passion. It is also in perfect wisdom, that nature has so ordered the laws of passion and desire; for, the life of the individual is thus sacrificed to the permanency of the race; and, in the eye of nature, the individual is as nothing.
nothing. But, man has, occasionally, a motive of action effectually opposing this of nature, or of the animal nature which he holds in common with the brute; and, this is a moral principle, in which man, thinking consciously, prefers the good opinion of other men to his own animal or immediate pleasure. Thus, for example, the virtuous conqueror, instead of enjoying the beautiful captive who is in his power, generously returns her to the lover of her choice. Now, Is there any reason to conclude, that a brute animal, who with respect to the passion love is actuated with the same affection as a man, may be found capable of this moral action, which every one, deserving the name of man, discovers more or less? And, is not man wise, in following the rules of conduct which, in conscious reasoning, he had formed for his future actions, in like manner as he is knowing, in having scientifically distinguished and generalised his ideas of good and evil?

7. There is thus a perfect distinction of man the intellectual agent, or a person acting upon rational principles, and the brute animal, who, though it acts like man by reason, cannot reason so as to form a principle for its action; this distinction is also to be observed, betwixt man, the informed person, acting from an acquired principle, and the less informed or more animal man, acting from instinctive passion like the brute; therefore, the theory, in which man is shown to be an animal necessarily acquiring science and philosophy, and thus acting from general principles more or less, is, in this general view of the subject, properly confirmed.

8. Farther, it follows from this general view, that as the brute animal is incapable of vice, in not acting from a conscious principle, he must be still more incapable of crime. For, crime is not only the willing of evil consciously or knowing it to be evil, but further, it is willing evil without virtuous motives or a necessary cause. Therefore, although a person of common sense, without having accurately
curately considered the subject, may be induced to believe that animals, so far as they act by reason, may be more or less capable of virtue, and, so far as their passions are not properly subjected to their reason, liable to vice, yet, in acknowledging the principle of crime as being a double transgression of virtue, in first unwisely pursuing immediate pleasure at the expense of future repentance, and secondly, in consciously transgressing the law of natural benevolence without a justifiable motive for this conduct, he cannot easily suppose any brute animal as being capable of crime.

Now animals, however naturally noxious, or occasionally destructive, are always, in the opinion of sensible men, judged to be incapable of crime, and therefore not a subject of punishment in making an example; they are therefore either destroyed, in self-defence, or trained to the use of man, by the instinctive association of ideas, in following pleasure and avoiding pain, vulgarly considered as rewards and punishments. Hence it must follow, that the opinions of all thinking men, concur in approbation of the theory, in which all these appearances and opinions are explained.

9. It now remains to consider how man, who, according to the theory, is either an animal, or an intelligent being, or both, should be capable of vice and crime, when the wise agent, on the one hand, and the mere animal, on the other, are equally incapable, the one of transgressing the rule which he has formed in his wisdom, and the other of forming a rule, which he might then transgress in folly.

The individual of the human species, though not naturally or instinctively vicious, is necessarily subject to vice; because, before he can acquire the wisdom of the species, he must have folly, in acting occasionally from erroneous principles; and because it is only in acquiring the wisdom of the species, whether in superstition, i.e. in prejudice, or in science, i.e. in discovering it himself, that he may become
become virtuous. But, though man is thus properly, or naturally, subject to vice, he is not so to crime; for, he may have vice without crime; and, he cannot have crime without vice. Vice proceeds from a defect of wisdom, which is only an acquired talent; but, crime proceeds from the transgression of a law of nature, a sentiment founded on an instinctive feeling, and only a moral principle after it is consciously distinguished in human science. Without malevolence, there is not crime; and, man is naturally benevolent, though he is not naturally virtuous; for, he must become virtuous either scientifically, or by art, and not instinctively, as he is benevolent.

In opposition to this doctrine, it may perhaps be alleged, that man is naturally irascible, and that, in his anger, he becomes malevolent. But, this would be a sophism, founded in the want of an accurate distinction between man being malevolent and vindictive. Now, it is true, that man is naturally vindictive, and that, in vengeance, evil is intended. But, on the one hand, this is in perfect wisdom; for, it is necessary to the preservation of the animal, that he should resent injury; and, in animals who have attained wisdom, this is the very means employed in order to prevent evil. Whereas, on the other hand, if malevolence is to be considered as a natural principle, this must be willing evil for the sake of that evil itself; now, there is not in nature such a principle.

Thus it will appear, it is only accidentally that man is subject to crime, while he is naturally subject to vice. But, though man is naturally or properly subject to vice, and occasionally or improperly subject to crime, yet seeing, that in proportion as he becomes wise he must become virtuous, so, having arrived at virtue he is then incapable of crime. This is a proposition easily demonstrated from the principles laid down; for, crime consisting in evil means employed in order to attain a vicious end, no vicious man would employ those evil means to attain his end, if he could obtain the same
by means of good. No man naturally commits crime, for the sake of crime; it is only in order to accomplish a certain desire, that it enters into the heart of man, which is naturally benevolent, to ordain evil. If this desire, therefore, which is pursued, proceeds from vice, the evil which ensues, constitutes crime; if it does not proceed from vice, but arises in necessity, it is not crime, properly speaking, but misfortune. It must now appear, that if vice were taken away, there would be no crime committed. But, virtue necessarily takes away vice; consequently, a virtuous person is incapable of crime.

10. Crime being thus considered as proceeding properly from vice, and vice being occasionally produced in the constitution of society, or intercourse of men, should not penal laws, in the wisdom of mankind, be directed against vice, the cause, in order that this being taken away, crime, the effect, might cease? The answer to this question involves some general conclusions interesting to the subject, as being explained by the theory. This, therefore, will be now considered.

It is not the being in violation of a law of human institution, that, in the science of morality, constitutes a crime; for, it is the actual commission of crime by men, that makes penal laws a matter of conveniency in society, and of utility to man. The utility of penal laws does not arise from the danger of crime passing unpunished; for, the punishing of crime is not properly committed to the charge of human art; but it is from the fear of having crime multiplied in the retribution of private vengeance, that penal laws are contrived in the wisdom of the species. Therefore, the institution of penal laws is not the simple convention of the public, in order to distinguish what is crime, and what is not; but, it is the wisdom of mankind, first contemplating the depravity of morals, necessarily introduced with the increase of wealth, or intemperance of passions, and then piously endeavouring to correct those evils.
The evil which happens from ignorance and folly, is not imputed to a person as his crime; it is only the injurious act of which he is conscious, that is considered as criminal in his conduct. If he has committed an evil unknowingly, or that could not have been foreseen, then it is his misfortune, not his fault; if, on the contrary, he should have known the injury which he through ignorance committed, then, though there is not properly crime, there must be a fault somewhere in this case. Now, the question is, where lies this fault, and what is the nature of it?

In minds capable of knowledge, ignorance can only proceed from one or other of two causes; either from defect of artificial education, or of natural application; and, as such defect may be either in the person teaching, or him that is to be taught, so this can only happen from the improper pursuit of animal pleasure and trivial amusement, that is, the foolish preference of a lesser to a greater good. But, a mind, naturally ignorant, is necessarily unwise; therefore, it is not every species of ignorance that can be placed to the charge of a person who is to be taught; neither is it every degree of ignorance, in a pupil, that is to be charged to every species of teacher.

Thus it will appear, both that ignorance in general, beyond a certain degree, in the subject of morals, is to be esteemed vice, where man is educated in society; and that the ignorance of man lies at the door of his parents, or those who have the charge of this species of education, at least in some degree.

It may be perhaps alleged, that youth corrupt each other. But, here is no question of corruption; it is ignorance alone that is the subject of the present speculation. Now, a mind must first know moral truth, before it is corrupted; and, the ignorance of morals can only with justice be deduced from the corruption, or the necessity,
fity, of those who rear the youth, i. e. from the corruption of their morals, or the necessity of their circumstances.

It would be the height of iniquity, and not wisdom, to punish children for their parents crime; because, the regard for his children may but little bind a father who is capable of crime; and, in any other view, evil inflicted on children for their father's sake, would be revenge, not punishment in which there is no passion. But, it would hold of human wisdom, to make fathers answerable for the crimes of those whose morals it was their duty to form or superintend; and if, in order to prevent crime in its cause, it should be thought fit, in virtuous policy, to inflict artificial pain on vice, which naturally leads to misery, then the neglect of forming childrens morals would be a proper subject of punishment in parents. Hence it may be proper to consider what is here meant by forming childrens morals.

11. Morals must have a foundation, either, first, in the natural wisdom of man teaching himself; or, secondly, in the artificial education given by man, in teaching the individuals of his species, by nature calculated for attaining to the wisdom of moral principle. If man is to be taught morals by man arrived at the art of human policy, it may be made a question, In what manner it were best to set about teaching a creature of the human species morals; whether we should endeavour to teach this rude or ignorant person scientifically; or, if it be habitually that we ought to inculcate morals? That there must be science in the person who is to teach morals, is so evident as to require no illustration; but, an infant mind may be considered as without science, and this brute personage may be also thought to be a proper subject into whom are to be inftilled morals. The question, therefore, now to be considered is, How best to set about this work.
The training of a brute animal, and the teaching of an infant, are not different in kind, so far as both these operations must proceed upon the same principle, (Sect. III.) that is, the habitual practice of actions, from the motives of acquiring pleasure, and avoiding pain. It is by this operation that children are instructed in the manners of mankind, without knowing morals. But, the intellect of children opens as they advance towards the state of youth; and, in this progress, those actions which they have been instinctively habituated to perform, come naturally to be made the subject of their conscious reflection. In this operation, they may be also afflicted by the endeavours of the species; for, an animal, capable of teaching himself in reflection, is also capable of being taught, in being made to know the opinions of other men.

If, in reflecting upon the actions that a person has been trained habitually to perform, his ripening judgment shall approve of the motives, that which at first was merely manners, then becomes morals; for, to approve of the moral, is to adopt the principle. If, for example, a child is trained in the habitual exercise of obedience to parents, respect to elders, justice and complacency to equals, and humanity to animals under his power and protection, Will he not naturally approve of those principles the moment that he, in the progress of his intellect, is made to understand them? So far as the practice is according to the laws of nature, or in reason, it is impossible that a person, in the progress of his intellect, should not approve; and, if he approves, his future conduct is secured by the double motive of instinctive habit, and moral principle. In this case, therefore, as reflecting upon his proper actions naturally leads him to see the moral principle, so, in order to become a moral agent, nothing farther is required than to think upon his actions, and to know the general relations of things.

If, on the contrary, this person shall be trained to the habit of ac-

tions
tions which, in his ripened understanding, he cannot approve of, then, though nature might correct the error of artificial education, yet, here is much to do. The habits of his youth do not lead him to just principles for his moral conduct; and, it is only by a just sense of those principles, that the error of his habits is to be corrected.

Thus it will appear, how important it is to the morals of a person, to be trained in the cheerful exercise of manners that are just and good, and how happy for that person to improve his understanding, in order to approve of the principle on which his manners had been founded.

Thus, though in nature there are laws of morality to which the species are in wisdom necessarily led, yet, practically among men, morals, in general, are founded upon manners. How important, therefore, must it be, to have those manners directed wisely for that valuable purpose!

An animal is trained to manners; and manners, if just, naturally train or lead to morals. It is in a family that manners naturally are taught; but, that which in a family are children, the same in society are the youth. Therefore, youth are to be trained, in society, to manners profitable for the state, in like manner as children, in a family, are trained in the manners which are agreeable to man in general, and useful to the individual himself.

Society is nothing but extended family; therefore, the just manners of children must be founded on the same principle as those of the youth; and, those manners will be naturally transferred from the one situation to the other. Thus, love and obedience to parents, necessarily dispose youth to have regard and reverence for teachers and for rulers; the habits of humanity and gentleness equally con-
duce to make youth tractable and amiable in an assembly of citizens, or in the field, as they had been in the nursery, and in the cottage or the hall. How important, therefore, is it, to found the manners of a citizen in the habits of a child!

But, though man in his infant state cannot be taught morals any other ways than by having his manners conformed to the rules of morality; yet, being arrived at that state in which he may understand scientific reasoning, he may be taught the rules to which his manners had been actually conformed; and, after knowing the rules, he may be also taught the principles on which those moral rules depend. He may thus be made to see his interest in the observance of those rules with which he had complied as a duty or a task.

Thus it will appear, that man may be taught morality in the same manner in which he is taught science; and that man, who is capable of science, is necessarily taught morality in proportion to the situation or circumstances in which he is placed, and to the degree in which he reasons with regard to that subject. If he reasons little on the subject, but reasons right or without error, he will not be vicious in his principles, although he may not be virtuous in a high degree. If, on the contrary, he reasons wrong, or from erroneous principles, he may be vicious, and will be so in proportion to the error of his reasoning.

If there is no principle of vice in nature, as has been shown, and if virtue is natural to mankind, as necessarily attained in the progress of science, then, well disposed youth, without corruption, cannot depart from virtue, to which they are led by their own manners, and by the morals of their teachers. Hence it may be proper to consider what is corruption, in relation to the morals of men.

12. Virtue

* Part III. Sect. III. Chap. II.
12. Virtue is a just view of things, in which a person comes to value pleasure and pain, happiness and misery. Hence, in virtue, a momentary pleasure is not preferred to a continued misery, nor a lesser satisfaction that is present, to a greater which is in time to happen; neither is present pain and misery to be apprehended, when the patient sufferance of it is to lead to future happiness. Such are the principles of virtue. Whatever, therefore, tends to justify this reasoning of a virtuous mind, must fortify that virtue; whatever, on the contrary, tends to deprave the understanding for the making a just estimate of pleasure and happiness, of the comparative value of present and future enjoyments, of those that are fleeting and those that are continual, necessarily corrupts the morals of a person otherwise disposed to be virtuous. A person cannot be corrupted until he has been educated, and has learned to know his duty in the observance of moral principles. Therefore, corruption of morals consists in acquiring a taste for the immediate gratification of desires, and losing sight of that profitable exchange which may be made of certain present pleasures for certain future enjoyments. It consists in a false reasoning with regard to the uncertainty of that happiness which comes into competition with present enjoyment; and it consists in false reasoning with regard to the uncertainty of that misery which never fails to punish the sacrifice of our duty to our present pleasure.

The natural course of man, proceeding to improve his mind in wisdom, and to refine his brute nature in the quest of happiness, is gradually to abate the violence of his desire for sensual indulgence and for personal pleasure; in like manner, it is to increase his taste of sympathetic pleasure, and for intellectual enjoyment. Corruption is to invert this order of things; it is to increase his taste for sensual pleasure, at the expense of intellectual satisfaction; it is to prefer the imaginary pleasure of a phantom to the real enjoyment of his neighbour and himself; it is to drown the calls of conscience in
in the tumultuous pursuit of sensual desire; it is to inflame the selfish passion at the expense of social love and generous sympathy.

Hence, though the end of virtue be to secure pleasure and increase happiness, yet, from the inconsiderate pursuit of pleasure, and neglect of intellectual enjoyment, a virtuously disposed person may be hurried into vice, and corrupted in his principles, by misunderstanding the true value of things. On the other hand, every thing that contributes to make a person prefer the lasting satisfaction of applause and approbation, to the momentary impulse of a sensual pleasure,—every thing that tends to discourage the hope of escaping without censure, when the rules of morality are transgressed, will necessarily prevent the corruption of a people, and have its effect in preserving to a state the blessings of a virtuous education.

13. Morality has now been considered as founded in manners, but it is more than these. For when, to the mere form of manners, there is added a sentiment of what is good and bad, of that which will be approved of, and that which is to be condemned, then, besides the power of manners for making a person act, there is also that of morals for making a person to abstain; and, to this practice of morality, a person may be habituated, without being truly virtuous. But, as morals are naturally founded on the manners of an animal thus educated, virtue, which is a farther step in the progress of intellect, may be likewise founded on the morals of a trained mind. For, when the knowledge of good and evil has been instilled into the minds of children, the motive of their conduct is then taken upon trust, or the moral principle is believed in superstition and in prejudice, which then supply the place of science. But, a reflecting mind naturally inquires into those motives by which it is determined on all occasions; and then, in finding just reason to approve of the motive, the moral precept, instead of being superstitiously believed, is voluntarily adopted as a principle.
But, if a person knows the truth of a principle in his understanding, and, in this moral progress, forms a motive for his conduct by his approbation of the known principle, then, in his moral character, which is good, he is no more to be considered as actuated by superstition, but by virtue. Not that he acts in a different manner now from what he did before; nor even from a different motive; but because he acts from a principle which is always present in his mind; and, because, now knowing the reason of his motive or the principle of his conduct, he cannot be corrupted in his morals, without violating his reason or suffering in his conscience.

Hence may be understood the nature and importance of forming morals, which ought to be begun in the most early part of life, when that operation is only considered as giving manners. Therefore, a parent should certainly be made responsible to the state, for the manners at least, if not the morals of his children; and that in return for the privilege which he possesses, of leaving his posterity, in case of accidents, to the protection of the public.

A family and a state differ only in degree. In both, there is a regular subordination, from a highest to a lowest; and, in every well regulated state, as in every family, the manners naturally flow from the head or highest. When it is otherwise, we may be assured there is perversion in the state of man. For, if the child could teach his father, if the common man shall instruct the magistrate in relation to his duty, authority and power are there misplaced.

But, in those two things, a state and family, thus assimilated, there is also a distinction to be made of that in which they differ. A family is a state regulated by nature; therefore, ordered in perfect wisdom. Whereas, a state is to be considered as a family regulated in the wisdom of man, which is imperfect.
That a family is perfect in the state of nature, will appear by considering; it is only from the imperfect state of human society, that disorder creeps into a family. The order of a family, or the constitution of its various relations, is fixed by nature, like all her works, in perfect wisdom for the general good; subordination there is perfect, and submission voluntary; affection and good offices here are reciprocal, while jealousy and envy find not a place, in minds thus linked together in love and mutual interest.

But families, who enjoy the blessings derived from the knowledge of the species, and those of social commerce, must also occasionally experience vices, derived from the imperfection of the artificial state. Nevertheless, in this constitution of things, there is no absolute evil. For, in the system of the moral world, however perfect be the natural order of a family, a family is only one link in the general chain of social commerce; consequently, it is not the ultimate in the comprehensive view of nature. A family, however in itself compleat, as are all the works of nature, is naturally subordinated to the political state, which is composed of families, and which is then a farther end or object of design. Thus though the order of a family, in the state of nature, is in itself a perfect thing, yet, a family in the state of nature is an inferior or imperfect thing, compared with a family regulated in the order of society, and virtuously sacrificing private interest to the public good.

Therefore, as the happiness of a family, in the social state of man, is necessarily connected with the virtuous state of human society, it is the interest and duty of private families, to rear good citizens in their children, and to prevent the practice of vice by instilling principles of virtue. Now, though this is only prejudice or superstition, nevertheless, it supplies the place of science and philosophy, for which they are, in the wisdom of mankind, substituted from the best intention.
Therefore, as it is for the private interest and internal happiness of families, to rear virtuous citizens in their dutiful children, it is in the rules of equity, that parents should be answerable to the state for the moral conduct of their children, in like manner as these are immediately answerable to their parents.

It is however to be observed, that the punishment of crime has no direct or immediate tendency to correct, or to diminish, vice. If, for example, I desire to rob my neighbour, of his money or his wife, the punishment inflicted by the law on the commission of that offence, may indeed restrain the commission of the crime, but not the vice of having the desire, to possess what is not my due. Now, though parents should be answerable for their children's conduct, so far as concerns the ignorance of moral duty, they cannot in justice be made answerable also, for the will of their children, in observing those rules of moral conduct which are truly for their good. In like manner the transgression of a vicious father, who has neglected to do his part in forming the morals of his son, so far as he knew his duty, though this be a proper object of public censure, highly deserving the contempt of virtuous citizens, and justly a forfeiture, of his right to honourable employment among the virtuous elders of the people, it cannot, in the order of equity, be made liable to the punishment of a malevolence, which had not entered the intention.

The parent, who in society has been enlightened with the knowledge of virtue, taught art, and habituated to the blessing of industrious application, comes naturally under an obligation to the public, for the instruction of his children in the knowledge of virtue; and is, in every sense of justice, bound to habituate them in the exercise, not of a flabby, but voluntary, submission to the rules of private duty, and of public order. A father, who trains up such children, as may fulfil their duty to the state, in being a credit to himself, deserves
serves well of his country, besides enjoying the natural reward that follows every step of virtue. Whereas, the father who trains up children, which, from ignorance, idleness, and vice, become a burden or grievance to the state, that man, besides being subject to the natural reproach of conscience, and contempt of virtuous men, forfeits his title to that favour and protection, which, upon every occasion of misfortune, a virtuous citizen may claim in the justice of mankind.

14. But why, it may be asked, employ so much care and pains, in constraining people to a measure, which it is their proper interest to observe? The answer to this question is founded in the nature and constitution of the human mind, which has been represented, as beginning in a brutish knowledge by instinctive reasoning, and ending in a state of science, when it is compleat. It is easier to train a mind instinctively by habit, than scientifically to make virtue grow in seeing truth, and reasoning from a general principle; that is to say, before man has arrived at a scientific notion of things, he may be habituated to the exercise of virtue instinctively, or to the practice of a virtuous conduct in some respect, without so much as knowing virtue. Thus a child is taught obedience, no otherwise than a horse or dog; and, with regard to matters of opinion, a child must first know a truth in prejudice or superstition, before he can in scientifical reflection examine the evidence on which he had believed the proposition.

The brute has reason given him, to distinguish what affects his passions more immediately; consequently, he may be led, in the design of another mind, to act according to a rule, without reasoning in relation to his action, or knowing the rule according to which he has been in wisdom made to act. Man again, reasoning in a higher sphere, distinguishes what affects his reason more immediately or directly, and his passions more indirectly or remotely; therefore, in reasoning
reasoning scientifically, he may form to himself a rule of action, or design, in opposition to the rule of animal action or instinctive reason. But, in proportion as the mind of man has proceeded little in the road of science to the knowledge of virtue, he must be considered as only in the brutish state, without that moral principle required for his conduct; consequently, he should be trained artificially, in the wisdom of man, to perform what, in a more enlightened state, will truly be his choice.

Thus the education of children, which in the natural state of a family is a necessary operation, may, in the order of society, be made a matter of choice; consequently this comes to be a moral duty. Its performance, therefore, should be rewarded with the approbation of the public. And the neglect of this duty should be followed with public censure. But, to make penal laws against a vice, that is not immediately or properly criminal in its nature, is not perhaps in public wisdom; at least, it is not in that perfect wisdom, which constitutes infallibility, and is found in all the laws of nature. This imperfect wisdom, therefore, will either fail of having the desired effect, or, in preventing one evil, introduce another, equally dangerous to the state. It is in this manner, that imperfect wisdom often proceeds, in the virtuous intention of correcting a perceived error, to increase the public evil; but, so far as wisdom virtuously proceeds, it naturally improves, in discovering the errors proper to itself, as well as those which it would piously correct.

Hence it may be made to appear, that there are two species of foolish conduct extremely pernicious to the practical virtue of a state. In the first place there is an undistinguishing charity either of the pious, who give for the sake of God, without considering that God is just; or of the benevolent, who obey the instinctive feeling of the man; but both without consulting the wisdom of the citizen. For, though in the natural state of man, connected only in love
love and mutual services, it is impossible that the exercise of benevolence can spring from error, or be followed by any but a good effect, yet, in the artificial state of human society, where, in the multiplication of relations, moral duties arise, and money, the common effluate of things, becomes the occasional cause of evil, it is otherwise. There, in place of natural motives, those of superstition often influence; and, the most benevolent are subject to the grossest imposition.

The second species of evil to the state arises from that easy forgiveness towards the vicious and guilty, which does not flow from philosophic principles, and general wisdom, tempering the various motives of justice and humanity for the public good, but follows from the imbecility of indulgence, the misfortune of ignorance, or the vice of indifference with regard to the welfare of the state.

These two errors in the moral conduct of a people contribute to the degeneracy of public virtue, and occasion to society, or the public good, a loss which is twofold. First, in wanting the proper means of a general encouragement to the virtuous exercise of duty in every station; and, secondly, in forming a general encouragement to vice, and the neglect of men's duty to the state.

15. A political state, being the regulation of art, has necessarily in it error more or less, which is not in that of a family in the state of nature, where every thing is wisely ordered. The disorders of a family are only those of accident, in relation to its proper constitution; therefore, these are without a remedy in nature. But, the disorders of a state being from the nature of its constitution, have a remedy in the perfection of its art. Now, the perfection of human art is only to be attained through science; and, the end or proper intention of science is philosophy. In proportion, therefore, as science is cultivated,
cultivated, and philosophy improved, the errors of a state are naturally corrected in the wisdom of the species.

It follows, from the analogy of things, that, as parents suffer for their want of wisdom in the vice or folly of their children, the magistrate, who has the charge of men, should be made answerable for the defect of morals in those who are placed under his authority; that is to say, for the public transgression of the rules of virtue: And, since the magistrate does not appoint himself to office, the person who appoints him should be answerable for his morals, or discharge of duty. But, this chain of reasoning must have an end; Where then must be placed the ultimate resort?—As the whole delegates its power to a part, to regulate the whole, so, if the whole is not regulated as it ought, i.e. in wisdom for the general good, the part is answerable to the whole, they being inseparably connected. When the head is diseased, Does not all the body suffer? and, Can the head enjoy when all the body suffers in disease?

If there were little public virtue, order, and obedience, in the people, much wisdom would be required in the rulers, in order to govern a people thus disposed to anarchy, or the wild resolution of governing themselves. But, were vice and folly to prevail equally among the ruled and the rulers, human wisdom can only see the consequence in judging from the general principles of human nature, in which there is order, and not from the history of human folly, in which there is nothing but confusion. There is another supposition to be made; this is, a perfect state of human, of political, society, founded in virtue, and ruled in absolute wisdom. But such a state, existing in idea, does not subsist in nature. A perfect political state cannot be found actually in this world, as it is a thing created by human art.

Therefore, in this world, from the natural deficiency of virtue or
of human wisdom, and the consequent imperfection of the art of government, more or less of all those different cases of supposition will occasionally take place; and of this the general tendency will be,—First, to enlighten the ignorant mind of brutish men, by setting before them order, which is naturally understood by man, and necessarily pleases when it is understood; and to regulate the disorders of barbarians, in subjecting them to the necessary rules of uniform government.

Secondly, to produce a virtuous people, in training citizens with the sentiments of hating disorder, and detesting vice.

Thirdly, to corrupt the natural innocence of mankind with erroneous notions of philosophy, and imperfect notions of artificial refinement; this being the natural consequence of intellect proceeding from ease to science and philosophy, but philosophizing from imperfect science and erroneous principles.

Lastly, to perfect morals, in the philosophic view of public virtue and self-approbation; and to make mankind happy in the general diffusion of good manners, and in the security of wise regulations.

Here is evidently a progress in the natural course of things, a progress that may be perceived at all times by examining the whole of human society in the world, or by consulting the history of each individual society. But history, in general, is an imperfect thing; we must be careful, in reading history, not to confound the natural progress of science and philosophy (forming and reforming government) with the occasional interruptions of physical and moral causes, which put a stop to that natural progress; and we must always make proper allowance for the natural imperfections of men, among whom, in general, much ignorance and folly must prevail.
CHAP. VII.

The Morals of Mankind compared with the Instinctive Manners of the Brute.

1. MAN alone has been considered as capable of morals; and morals are considered as the general manners of a conscious scientific person, who is wise. But, there are also manners natural to the animal; manners which are practised in the conduct of every species of brute; and these are also devised in consummate wisdom. It may therefore be inquired, Why the perfect manners of the animal are not reckoned morals; and why the imperfect manners of mankind are to be esteemed more than simple manners.

2. The passions or affections of the brute are so disposed in the order of nature, that the will of the animal, judging according to the invariable order of this wise design, shapes out a course of life conducted by the laws of nature, or follows this conduct which in every animal is the best adapted for the purposes of life. Here, then, are the general manners of the animal; but, these general manners are no part of the operation of the individual, who only implicitly obeys the laws of nature without choice. The animal, previous to his judging when he acts, forms no opinion as a principle in his reasoning, by which he should be influenced for the purpose of his conscious action. The animal, therefore, although he reasons, thinks, or judges, in order to act, never alters his way of thinking, nor consciously changes the motive of his acting. The first instinctive action of the animal is thus the same, in principle, as the last action of his life; it changes not its nature, however it may be diversified in the circumstances or natural motives by which it is conducted. Thus, the
the general of those actions constitutes the manners of the animal nature; and the general conduct of each individual of a species is conformed to those manners, which are purely animal. These, therefore, as the work of a design, belong to nature; although by us, observing the effect, these are considered as proper to the animal.

3. To illustrate this, let us consider the beast of prey. In the first instance of his acting, to which he is necessarily led by an instinctive motive, pain and pleasure, he is perfect in his manners; and, he changes not his character or sentiments during life. There is a character or manner of life chalked out for him by nature; and, he has no principle in his nature by which he may be led occasionally to transgress those rules of conduct which form his character. The cunning, therefore, of the fox in catching his prey, and the subtlety of the hare in eluding her pursuer, which by us are attributed to the individual, are proper to the species; and this is the work of nature, who had formed the design. If, therefore, in this design there is either wisdom on the one hand, or folly on the other, the animal is not for that reason either wise or foolish. The animal is fixed by nature in his affections and aversions, and by those principles he is necessarily conducted in his reasoning for the purposes of his life; he is regulated by nature as a clock is by the workman; not indeed mechanically, nor phyletically, as is the constitution of his body, but morally, that is, according to the rules of his sensitive existence. No animal, therefore, of the brute species ever acted in making himself become wise; however wisely he is conducted in acting according to the manners which are proper to the species.

4. Wisdom, in the brute mind, would be superfluous or absurd. For, Why appoint a faculty for taking into consideration motives which never can occur? The motives that actuate the instinctive reasoning of the brute, are no other than those comprehended in animal good and evil; these are either the immediate sense of pain and pleasure,
fure, or the sentimental feeling, i.e. the associated ideas of those passions. The animal has no intellectual enjoyment or distress to be put in competition with those natural motives of his conduct; consequently, wisdom, as the power of choosing the best end or object for his action, would be absurd, where one of those two kinds of motives only can exist. It would be superfluous to give him wisdom in order to discover the best means for happiness, when, without wisdom, he has, in sense and sentiment, the most perfect means of seeking animal happiness, which is sensual pleasure, and of avoiding animal misery, which is uneasiness, or sensual pain.

5. The brute animal learns, by experience, to act effectually in relation to his sensual and sentimental passions; he thus conducts himself properly in relation to the system of material things, without knowing the order of those things, or that they are in a system. But, he cannot conduct himself in relation to abstract opinions or intellectual things, unless there be an order of intellectual things conceived by him, and which then might be a motive in his mind, occasionally opposing the order of material things, i.e. the sensual system. Man, again, besides acting as an animal, or conducting himself in the order of the sensual system, by pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, acts as a superior being, in forming abstract general opinions, conceiving system, and designing with intelligence. He thus occasionally dispenses with the motive of the sensual system, in neglecting or despising animal ease and pleasure; and, he pursues that system in which wisdom is conceived, and in which good, the general of pleasure, is to be attained, as a pure intellectual enjoyment.

Man has his manners, as an animal, from nature; but it is not every one that may distinguish the manners of the animal in the man, and the morals of mankind in the species man, who has wisdom for his property. The natural character of man, when unprovoked, is gentleness, amenity, and sympathy; but, in anger, he is violent
violent and cruel; and he is easily provoked. Such is man the animal, made by nature for benevolence and wisdom, but made capable of malice and of folly. Had man no other nature to pursue than that of the animal, he had been uniform in his conduct, and equal in his enjoyment, so far as circumstances permitted in the necessary course of things. But, the nature of man is to become wise; and, in his wisdom, to be himself the cause of his proper happiness; for, having formed conscious opinions as the motives of his will, he is happy when he conducts himself so as to accomplish the end of his intention. This happiness, however, is only provisionally, i.e. in case the intention be wise, or calculated to make him happy in the enjoyment of his nature.

Man, who is made to think in a scientific order, foresees his necessities and his enjoyments, his pains and pleasures; he thus suffers and enjoys in his idea or in thought, as well as in reality; and, being wise, he forms design to avert the arrival of a disagreeable necessity or an apprehended pain; he likewise forms the design of employing natural means to bring about his future pleasure and enjoyment. But, besides these enjoyments of the animal nature, man forms a subject of enjoyment in the exercise of his intellectual capacity; he feels a pleasure and satisfaction in being wise, and attaining his design; he also feels displeasure and regret in being foolish, and designing without effect. Thus, man not only designs in wisdom for accomplishing a natural end conceived in his science, he also conceives an end which shall give him pleasure; an end which is not in nature, or in the animal nature which he enjoys; and an end which, being attained, gives him a happiness which is in himself, which does not pall upon the sense or decay in the enjoyment, and which opens a field for endless or continued satisfaction.

6. Were man led by nature instinctively to the enjoyment of his happiness, which is in conscious reflection, he had only been an animal
mal enjoying another species of sensation. Misery and folly had not then been made a portion of his constitution, or necessary in his progress. But, as the animal is led by the sense of pleasure and pain to fulfill the economy of his life, so is the conscious being man led to the end of his intention, happiness, by means of misery, or that disagreeable reflection to which he is led in the folly of his design. Here then is another source of action, perfectly different from that upon which the system of animal life is founded; and here is a system of manners, to which the animal nature is totally a stranger. It is to the manners of this system that the term of morals may be properly applied.

7. Man who naturally enjoys the manners of the animal, and who scientifically forms a system of manners in his moral character, has frequently an opportunity of electing which of these he shall pursue, and which he shall neglect. If he makes this election in his wisdom, he has, in his future enjoyment, his reward; and he has, in this reward, a source of further enjoyment, in the contemplation or reflection of his wisdom. If, on the other hand, he makes the election in his folly, he suffers when he should enjoy, and his misery is aggravated with the consciousness of folly. But, man, suffering in his folly, is wiser than he was before; and, he then forms a moral principle, or a motive for his future conduct, on a similar occasion. When, on the other hand, he enjoys in consequence of his wise election and his moral conduct, he establishes his moral principle; and becomes most wise, in loving wisdom.

8. The animal is made to act necessarily in wisdom for the purposes of life; but, the circumstances of things, in which he judges for his acting, are regulated in a certain order; and, in this order of things, there is no deceit. The order of inanimate things is true or steady; and, it is only man deceiving himself, when in that order of things he finds irregularity or deceit. The order of animal action
action has no more uncertainty or deceit than that of physical necessity; the laws of each, though different, are equally regular, steady, and unerring. There are therefore, in the mind of the brute animal, instinctive principles, by which he is conducted in the wisest manner to his purpose in the natural world, without science. But science or general knowledge is necessary to wisdom, in a being who has to form motives for his proper conduct, and who has to judge of truth and falsehood, or to distinguish amongst variable events those that are regular and true, and those that are irregular and false.

Man has to act on the one hand in relation to the brute animal, and on the other in relation to his species; and, in both those cases, he has occasion for his wisdom. Man is not by nature capable of making many of the brute species his prey by bodily talents; nor has he any instinctive arts of this kind, that might supply the place of animal imbecility; but, by his wisdom he can circumvent them all. For, man, in studying the nature of the brute, finds means to deceive the judgment of the animal, who is only made to act wisely according to the order of natural things. The brute thus falls a prey to man, in being deceived by his art.

Man, in being wise and knowing the nature of his species, learns to deceive those that are not so knowing as himself: Were it therefore the purpose of man to prey upon his species, the wisest of the race would be maintained at the expense of the most ignorant and unwise. Now, though man in general is not a beast of prey for man, yet, in a general sense, man may be said to live at the expense of man, so far as bodily labour is considered as the means of living and the expense of man; consequently, the most knowing and most wise among mankind, will be maintained by the labour of the most ignorant and unwise. Hence, in the manners of man, there is an infinite difference from those of the brute or the ignorant, who is thus necessarily subjected to the purpose of man studying nature in
his wisdom, and making every thing in nature subservient to his animal or sensual demands.

9. Were the wisdom of man no otherwise employed than in serving the purpose of his sensual desires, although in this case there would be a perfect distinction between the manners of the man of wisdom and those of the man in brutish ignorance, yet there would not perhaps be the distinction of morals in the manners of man, as we find at present, when the intellectual purpose of man is the chief object on which his wisdom is employed. It is but a small part of man's labour that is on the whole employed in procuring the necessaries of life; all the rest of his time is either exhausted in idleness, or bestowed on useful speculation. The useful speculation of man is of two kinds; one immediately useful to himself, and more remotely or meditately useful to his neighbour; the other is immediately useful to his neighbour, and meditately useful to himself. But in whichever of those two ways shall be exerted the intellectual powers of man, this forms a system of morals, or a manner of thinking which is infinitely removed from the conduct of the animal, or even from the wisdom of man employed in procuring sensual satisfaction.

10. In this system of morals, man considers himself as a superior being, compared with the animal, whether of his own or the brute species; and, having formed a rule of conduct for his own happiness, in the general prosperity of his neighbour and his species, he considers himself as bound, in the necessity of his conscience, to observe those rules. Now, here is a moral agent acting, not in the necessity of nature or wisdom of the creation, but, in the voluntary nature of a conscious animal, distinguishing his motives, and, in the proper wisdom of man, reciprocating pleasure and creating happiness.

The morals of man being thus founded on the wisdom acquired in
in the exercise of his abstract knowledge, or the general reasoning of his scientific mind, the most imperfect system of this kind is infinitely superior to the animal understanding, by which the conduct of the sensitive being is immediately determined, or by which the manners of the brute are conducted in the system of life. It is even indefinitely superior to that exercise of human wisdom employed immediately for the purpose of sensual pleasure, independent of that intellectual satisfaction which is so generally connected with the operations of the human understanding, and so interwoven with the animal constitution of the man, that the deepest metaphysical analysis is required to have it properly distinguished. We may thus be led to see, that the conduct of man in his political capacity, enlightened with the science of himself, and actuated by that virtue which may be justly termed divine, as much transcends the common wisdom of the species, as this common wisdom excels the limited understanding of the most accomplished species of the brute.

11. If wisdom be required for conducting a person in the various situations and circumstances of his life, how much more must it require wisdom for the production of a system, by which the conduct of a multitude is to be directed! If man scientifically learns to act wisely, in adapting ends and means, he must think scientifically in relation to wisdom, before he can intentionally make other people wise. But, the science of wisdom is philosophy; and, the office of the philosopher is to make mankind wise, in knowing general rules, and happy, in the application of wisdom to the best of ends. Therefore, philosophy is the proper science for enabling man to form the morals of a people, or to establish in a nation that general order in which men are led to the practice of virtue, by means of their natural wisdom, and to happiness, by means of this acquired virtue.

But, how different this from the government of brutes!—Certain species of animals are associated for their mutual support and con-
venience; they are sometimes formed into commonwealths, under
certain rules of order and dependance. Are such political establi-
ishments of the animal to be considered as similar to the wise govern-
ment of men? Here is a question which will lead us into a proper
understanding of this comparison between the man and brute, and
of those institutions which regard the many.

In a hive of bees, we see a commonwealth most orderly and well
governed. We see no private vice; and, we see the greatest exer-
tions of public virtue. Here is the perfection of government; and
here is a pattern of virtue. The virtue is perfect, so far as it serves
the end of the government; and the government is perfect, so far
as it knows not any corruption in its endless course. If this were
to be considered as a political government formed by the bee, we
should either consider this government as formed without a system
of science and wisdom, or look upon the brute as a person capable
of science and philosophy, either of which views of the case is in
direct opposition to the theory. But, if this oeconomy of the bee
shall be considered as the government of nature, who has thus dis-
posed of the animal in her wisdom and at her pleasure, we would
then place the imperfect government of man to his own account;
and we would see, in man, a self-governing animal, who is as much
above the bee as the bee is above the living plant, which then suc-
ceeds it in the order of nature.

Thus we are led to consider that order of human wisdom by
which is formed the institution of political government.

C H A P.
CHAP. VIII.

Importance of Philosophy to the art of Social Life, and the Political System.

1. The lowest state of government, in a nation, is that wherein the whole is conducted by each individual pursuing his own immediate desires, and only occasionally thinking for the preservation of the whole. For, though in this manner the whole of private interest be promoted, this whole of private interest is not proper government, and cannot be said to form a public good, in which should be consulted not only personal safety, and animal ease or pleasure, but political concerns, and moral happiness. In this lowest degree of policy, there is the least degree of virtue, in man sacrificing his private interest for the public good, and the least appearance of that human art which has for object philosophic virtue. Such a state is that of savage nations.

But, though this rude state of savage simplicity be the lowest in the scale of political government, it is the highest in the degree of its natural permanency; for, like the government of brutes, it has nothing in its constitution which disposes it to change. The whole nation consists of simple parts, which are the families; and there is no other constitutional part of the society. Each family is under the perfect government of its head; and, the nation is governed by the joint wisdom of those heads. Each youth receives an education adapted to the purpose of this government; it is to conduct himself, independently of any person besides his family. But, they are ignorant of that polished art of agreeable manners, by which is formed much social happiness among men. Here is therefore a species of government
government in high perfection, but a government of the most imperfect species.

No anarchy can take place in this society; for, there is no artificial subordination in this rude state of government. The constitution of this state cannot change, except in forming a state of government more artificial in its nature; for, this constitution of human government is the least removed from that which is absolutely natural, it being produced only occasionally, as the case requires, and not established on general rule, which should provide in wisdom for various occurrences, and restrain the will of individuals for the public good.

Nothing will tend more to illustrate the nature of political government, than the understanding this lowest state or degree of political system; a state in which a people begins to think for itself, as a nation, having before only acted from particular wisdom, in each man judging from his own interest, and for the present occasion, without foreseeing scientifically, or providing upon general principles for that which naturally is to happen to the whole.

When man judges from his particular wisdom, he acts not with the wisdom of the species; for, though he may have generalized his own knowledge, his knowledge is as nothing compared with that of mankind. Man, therefore, consulting his own interest without the general wisdom of man, though infinitely wise compared with the animal who has no wisdom proper to himself, is in the lowest degree of human wisdom; and he should be esteemed as much below the man of science or philosopher, with regard to his acquired talents, as the brute animal is, in point of intellect, below this man of common sense, although the man of common sense is nothing inferior to the philosopher, with regard to his scientific capacity.
Were man to be considered as acting, in his political capacity, no otherwise than as man instructed by his common sense, and judging from his particular wisdom, without having made human nature, or man in general, the subject of his science, he should then be considered as having acquired his art of government no otherwise than as the ant, the beaver, or the bee; and, he who made the tables of the Roman law, should, in that case, be ranked, in the scale of intellect, as equal with an insect, hatched in an hour, and lasting for a day. But there is an infinite difference betwixt the political economy of man and that of brutes; the last is perfect in its species, but of a species inferior compared with the other. The first, again, though perfect in capacity, is imperfect in reality; and, the reason of this is plain: It is the work of man, aspiring at that wisdom which is in its nature infinite, and which is only to be found perfect in the works of nature.

2. Every artificial constitution of policy, founded on human wisdom forming generals, is imperfect; because, the circumstances which are to be provided for, are variable indefinitely; and, human wisdom cannot provide for what it does not comprehend. Therefore, in proportion as human policy departs from that rude state in which it had begun, and proceeds in wisdom to generalise its form of government in establishing rule, it finds deficiency in those rules by which it is to govern, and is subject either to tyranny, on the one hand, or anarchy, on the other, in which people oppress each other, and act without justice, that is, general rule. In order to have government perfect, every individual in the nation should stand in a just, an equal, or a proportionate relation to the general rule; but, How form such a rule as shall stand in that relation to an indefinite variety of cases, which are also changing? Therefore, however wise may be the general rule, there must be more or less of injustice in its various application.

But,
PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS.

Part III.

But, though artificial government be imperfect, compared with the oecconomy of nature, which has no defect, it is not less perfect in proportion as it is more refined. It may perhaps be perfect in proportion as it is more simple in its refinement; but, the refinement of its policy is, in general, a progress towards perfection, from the rude state in which it is most simple in its constitution.

Although this most natural or rude state of human society, formed into a nation, be permanent in its constitution, it is so only from its defect. In having no distinction of the governing and the governed, it has no order in its constitution; and, in having no superiority, no privilege, no function to perform, but what are merely voluntary, it has no proper regulation in its government. As the permanency of this political state depends on its defect, it holds its constitution upon this condition, that the economical state of its members do not change. Such a state as this cannot become great; and it cannot admit of opulence or luxury. Man must here subsist in having the mere necessaries of life, without refinement in his taste or in his morals; and here, man must be found in the lowest degree of science, which is still infinitely superior to brute animal capacity, or that state in which the animal man is born.

3. The next state to the savage is that of the shepherd. Here man, in his wisdom, has laid a plan for the security of subsistence, and for the provision of his family, who are to succeed him in the possession of his art, and in the benefit of his possession. The cultivation of the earth is also a further progress of this scientific plan, wherein man wisely provides for his future necessities by his present toil, in knowing that by this means he saves labour on the whole, and acquires security for his subsistence in the future. Whatever be the mother of invention, the progress of those useful arts leads scientific man to others, in which either ingenuity or elegance prevails;
and, in the prosecution of those useful arts with his acquired industry, the man of nature, or necessity, arrives at affluence, or superfluity. Man was first prompted by necessity to invent; but, luxury, or wealth, proves to the invention of man a second necessity, or a proper cause. For, case in his circumstances contributes to improve his science, by affording him leisure to employ his mind agreeably in abstract speculations, as well as procuring subjects whereon science may be usefully employed; and, the possession of wealth, in order to be secured, calls forth the exertion of the scientific art of government.

4. Having by the fruits of wisdom accumulated wealth, man is no longer in that simple state, in which the whole are governed by the natural wisdom of each individual, without superiority or prerogative. Here, in proportion as the wisdom of man improves, so does the magnitude of the state, and the comparative wealth of individuals. Here also, virtue and vice become conspicuous, in proportion as opportunity is produced for their exertion; and here, irregularity and crime begin to take place of the natural benevolence of man, and the simple government of each individual. In this case, where the seeds of dissolution are sown in society, had not man wisdom to correct his errors, the evil would increase, until the state of society, and mutual comfort or convenience, were at an end. But, as it is only in proportion as human wisdom proceeds to bless society with affluence, that anarchy takes place of order, and crime of mutual support, so, that same wisdom, which makes vice to appear, becomes sufficient to provide a remedy in proportion as the evil grows. Hence, laws of equity are devised. Thus man, in loving truth, learns science; and, in loving wisdom, he improves his natural happiness.

5. Laws of regulation, or rules of action, can only be formed for such things as are known; nor can those rules be practised except upon
upon such occasions as have occurred often. It will thus appear, that the natural course of regulation, for a state emerging from that of a savage nation, is to form rules of morality. But, when a state has passed from simplicity to opulence, the occasion then demands a regulation of civil law; and when, from the effects of wealth, a state has arrived at high degrees of political refinement, then, besides the regulation of criminal and civil laws, there will also be introduced regulation respecting rights and privileges, as well as property. Badges of honour will then be created and disputed; and possessions merely ideal will become objects of the greatest emulation. Lastly, The possession of power, over the minds of men, will be pursued, according to a system, which has for its motive, either the erroneous opinion and vicious motive, of usurping a precarious empire over the voluntary actions of a people, or the wise opinion and virtuous principle, of forming a voluntary empire in the esteem of men.

6. Law being once established in wisdom, and just subordination observed in the wheels of government, a little nation, conducted upon steady principles, becomes a wealthy state; and, this wealthy state becomes a powerful empire. But as, in the order of civil virtue, vice appears, so, in the progress of political wisdom, natural virtue is corrupted; for, the increase of infatiable desires leads short-sighted man to designs against his species, by which he vainly thinks to increase his happiness. Hence, evils of a public nature are joined to crimes which are particular. But still the wisdom of man proceeds, in providing general remedies for every public evil; and still every public benefit is corrupted, in the folly of particular men. Hence it happens, that public crime may increase in the most flourishing state of private virtue; the causes of anarchy and general disorder may grow in the constitution, during the most prosperous circumstances of the state; and, the seeds of future misery may be sown insensibly amidst the innocent exertions of a happy people. In like manner, amidst the deepest misery and distress of public revolution,
volution, the foundation may be laid of public tranquillity. But, for this purpose, there is necessarily required public virtue, as well as general or political wisdom, in particular men. These men then step forth to heal the constitution of state, as others, in times of prosperity, had wickedly, unwisely, or unwarily, sought to ruin it.

7. Three different species of governments may be distinguished in a state; these are the domestic, the civil, and the military governments. The object of the first is the prosperous oeconomy of the state, which has a general interest to be promoted in the wisdom of its government, as well as each individual has his particular interest to pursue: The object of civil government is the virtue, or morals, of a people: And the object of military government is the defensive strength of a state, or the external power of a governing empire.

The object of domestic government is best attained in the wisdom and activity of individuals, who are immediately concerned; although it often happens that particular operations require the general wisdom of the species, and the combined activity of the nation.

If a nation is considered as being virtuous, there is required but little government for the civil conduct of that people. Such a people however is not found, or does not continue in that virtuous state. Therefore, there is required government or regulation, more or less, both in order to form virtuous morals in a growing people, and to preserve the morals that are formed in the members of the state. In this case, there is required more wisdom, to preserve the...
general virtue from corruption in certain circumstances, than there is originally to make man virtuous. For, man is naturally innocent, and, to make him virtuous, nothing is required but to inform him of the truth; but man, corrupted from the truth, has the prevalence of erroneous principles, to mislead his reasoning, and, it is only a philosopher who is able to correct his morals, in examining his principles.

It is otherwise with the military government of a nation. Much wisdom is required in order to form a perfect or a proper military discipline, in regulating a people, and subordinating men. But, being once established, a proper military government is easily maintained, in a people who are not corrupted, and by a sovereign who does not usurp improper power.

The reason of this difference, between the civil and military governments, will appear plain by considering the difference of those two Institutions. Virtue has the laws of nature for its principles; and, civil government is only required in order to supply defects of virtue. Military discipline, again, is only in the order of human art; human wisdom therefore is necessary for its existence or the appearance of it in the world: But, the preservation of a thing, employs little or no power, compared with that required for its production. Hence, every effort of governing wisdom, ought to be exerted in order to preserve the morals of a people; for, these being lost, the very source of government is corrupted; and, to suppose that a corrupted government should correct itself, or make immoral people virtuous, would be no less erroneous than to suppose that water, when at liberty, should not flow, in descending to the lowest place.

8. A savage nation, though governed by the united wisdom of the individuals, is not properly a political government, in which every person is ruled by one system, and the will of individuals constrained
strained by a governing power. The rude state of savage nations is neither a civil nor a military government; for, there is no coercive power, by which the will of individuals should be constrained, to pursue designs which have for object public good. A political state is that which necessarily subsists by public government, in which system is devised for a general good. Here, the idea of public utility is conceived, in the establishment of just order among the various members of the state. In this case of a public good, each person must resign his will, so far as this should impair the benefit of social commerce, or disturb the blessing of domestic happiness.

Each person, also, who has any thing to spare, must submit to contribute for the preservation of the government, which is supposed to make those exactions according to some rule of equity; although it be not always, or never, in the power of human wisdom, to proportion these with all that accuracy which may exist in human speculation. It is needless to look for perfection in the artificial system of political regulations; we might as well suppose the mechanic working up to the truth of mathematical ideas: But, in aiming at what is perfect, and in endeavouring, as far as may be, to do the best, the wise statesman fulfils his duty,—not in pursuing Utopian visions of the possible,—but in conceiving what is proper, and proposing what is practicable.

Political governments being formed by the concurrence of families to the regulation of a common weal, many of those political establishments may unite upon a more extended scale of government. Here, though the good of each community may not be equally pursued, in the general exertions of the governing power, yet, greater benefits may result from this confederacy of associated states. For, in the extension of regulated subordination, the governing power acquires strength, against every species of disorder, whether foreign or domestic; and, anarchy, the greatest evil to a state,
is thus removed at a greater distance. Hence we may perceive, the natural tendency of government to be disposed under a sovereign, or superintending power; and thus will appear the foundation of supreme authority, and of empire, among men.

In how much as it is necessary, for the prosperity of the state and happiness of the people, that the persons of the subjects should be safe and their property secure, in so much is it required that the government of the state be steady, and preserved on the one hand from the ambitious contest for supreme power among the great, or, on the other, from the anarchy of a popular invasion. Therefore, besides there being something imposing, in the grandeur of a prince, the idea or opinion, that a sovereign is necessary for the government of a nation, is naturally formed in reasoning from the ordinary course of human affairs.

9. In a state of political government, there are necessarily three different functions to be performed. These are, first, the forming of law, or prescribing rules of conduct for the nation. A function requiring philosophic principles, general knowledge, or political wisdom. Secondly, the judging of actual cases, or particular occurrences, according to the general rule or law; and this requires science, learning, and the just discernment of those principles. Thirdly, the employing of power for executing the orders of the state; and this requires virtue or discretion in the person who has the command of that artificial force. The various distribution of those three functions, in relation to the persons of the society, forms the various constitutions of state, or constitutes the different forms of government; a subject which Montesquieu has so well examined.

The legislative, judicative, and executive authorities, in a state or empire, however these may be multiplied and subordinated, must all hold ultimately of one supreme authority; for, legislation is the essential
fential of a state; and, the other two functions are only necessary to make effectual the law. Supreme legislation, therefore, with the subordinate functions, constitutes a state or independent empire, however small may be this state, or however these independent states may be variously confederated. But, in every state of perfect government, there is required power, to constrain the inclinations of men, and make effectual the virtuous design of general good. Now, the direction of this power, must always at one time be lodged in one mind; and be entrusted to one person, who is then supreme in power. It is only virtue that can make this post to be desired, or accepted of, for itself; and it is only vice that can make it become dangerous for the state, or general safety, to entrust this power in one person. Hence the importance of philosophic virtue, in the person of a potentate; and hence, the power of virtue and wisdom, for the prosperity of a state.

If there be no public virtue in a people, no form of government, or constitution of state, will remedy an evil, which must be increased with the number of competitors for the overruling power. If Cato, Cassius, and brutus, shall be considered as equally destitute of public virtue, as is the man who usurps supreme power, Will the number of usurpers diminish the danger to the commonwealth? Or will the struggles among the great, for power, ensure the peace and happiness of the people, who are to be ruled, and to whom it is indifferent who should rule?

16. Whatever be the several functions required in a government, there must be distinguished two parties in a state or nation; these are the governing, and the governed. But, though there be thus two different parties in a state, it does not follow that the interest of those parties should be opposed. It is the interest of every party to be governed, or to walk by rule or general law; however individuals may foolishly desire to be occasionally exempted from those laws. Hence,
Hence, it is the interest of every one, to have his will governed in wisdom; although every one, who has not general wisdom, desires to have a freedom in his will, which it is not in the nature of a regulated society to allow. Hence, those who rule the people should be themselves subordinated to authority, or subjected to some rule; and those, who are situated in the highest order of the state, should know the importance, to the whole, of having justice established in the regulation of their government.

The most general division of a state, is into the governing and the governed; but, as those who act in one capacity, and govern, may also act in another capacity, in being governed, we may now consider a state as consisting of three parties; first, the people who are governed; secondly, the magistrate who governs the people; and thirdly, the sovereign who governs the magistrate. In those several branches of the state, different degrees of virtue and of wisdom are required, for acting respectively in those several capacities. It may now be proper to mention those different degrees.

As the lowest degree of civil virtue, in a person, is to know his own interest in relation to the conduct and affections of his neighbour, without considering the intellectual enjoyment of his own reflection arising from his causing pleasure in another person, so, in political virtue or the science of public good, it is the lowest degree of wisdom, that which has for object merely the observance of the law, that is, not to transgress the regulation of the state, or not to offend the magistrate, who holds in his hand the rules of law.

The second degree of public virtue has for object, not simply the conduct of a man in relation to his neighbour, but the general virtue and the order of the people. More science and intellect is here required to constitute the character of the magistrate, who is more than simply virtuous; who loves virtue for its own sake; and who
virtuously sacrifices personal ease and safety, for the peace and security of others.

But, the virtue of a sovereign is to have political wisdom in a supreme degree. His knowledge must be extensive, and his views refined. He consults not simply the making his people happy in the fruition of their desires, but directs his people's happiness, by choosing in his wisdom what species of enjoyment should be desired by his people. Such was, for example, the philosophic view of the Spartan Lawgiver, who, in the framing of abstemious morals for an enlightened people, formed a nation of statesmen and of generals. What object for ambition, to hold an empire in the wishes of a man, and to conduct a nation in the will of future men! What pleasure for reflection, to consider honour, safety, happiness, as flowing from the hand which wisdom actuates, and from the heart inspired by benevolence!

It may perhaps be here demanded, What chance there is for a monarch, succeeding by inheritance, to be a person of that character which should be required for the supreme authority. If by that question it were meant to ask, What is the chance, of every monarch having all the accomplishments that were to be wished for in a person who in his will should hold the sovereign power, the proper answer perhaps should be,—that there were little or none. It is for this reason, that the wisdom of mankind has devised means more or less effectual, for attaining the same end. A monarch has a council, of the most enlightened men, the ruling power has laws, which it is the duty of that office to maintain; the executive power has established customs, which it were folly to transgress; and the monarch has but to will in justice and in goodness, in order to answer the end or fulfil the intention of government in his person. But, that a hereditary monarch should not have his will inclined to justice and to goodness, could only be considered as an accident in human
art, and no defect in human nature. To suppose a prince not educated to fulfill the duty of his exalted station, and execute the important office to which he is born, were to suppose a degree of ignorance and negligence, which would be mortifying to observe.

11. If the state be well governed, it naturally becomes great or powerful; if it be ill governed, it naturally declines, and is either absorbed by more powerful states, or continues to possess a jurisdiction, with diminished power and tarnished luster. Hence, in every respect, it is the interest of a hereditary sovereign, to preserve the wisest regulation in his government. But as, in the forms of government, there is a latitude, in which these may be varied, so, according to the degree of wisdom or folly in which these are chosen, it may be either advantageous or disadvantageous to a nation. For, as a nation prospers only in proceeding under government, and, as government can only take place according to the rules of justice, the defect of wisdom becomes conspicuous in the fate of nations. Thus, the defect of wisdom, in the general system of a people, leads to national weaknesses or to general misery. By wise laws of civil government, a people is made happy in the culture of wisdom and of virtue; by wise laws of political government, a state is made happy in the prosperity of its affairs, and in the permanency of its constitution; and, by wise laws of military government, a nation is made happy in the glory of its name, and in the security of its government.

The natural caducity of the body politic flows not from an error in the general system of divine wisdom, wherein human intellect has been ordained to form government; but, it arises from the nature of government, as an effect of human wisdom. For, as a nation is an artificial thing, and not immediately the work of nature, nature has not given to the political government of man a specific form, in which it is to be preserved, and in the resolution of which
it is to be dissolved, as she has done with regard to plants and animals. Nature therefore has left this work, of framing government, to the art of man; who, either in his wisdom adopts a form of government properly adapted to the constitution and circumstances of his artificial state, or in his folly adopts one naturally subversive of that constitution. The government of nations being thus the effect of human wisdom, nothing is more important to the happiness of mankind, than political wisdom in a state, or the true science of government in the leading people of a nation.

The head of civil government is a magistrate; the head of political government, or the governor of magistrates, is a sovereign. When a magistrate, instead of executing law or the orders of his sovereign, exceeds his authority in commanding families, he usurps the power or authority of a sovereign. When a sovereign exerts his power and authority over families or individuals, instead of governing magistracy or giving general rules, he then has usurped power which is not naturally in that supremacy. These are the crimes of government, in like manner as, in a people, it is crime to refuse the law, or to disobey the orders of their governor. Hence, vice, whether in the sovereign, the magistrate, or the people, leads to the commission of crime against the state, or happy constitution of equitable government.

12. The people do not change their state, but are still people, however many series of governing powers are over them; and, in a state, however multiplied and subordinated may be governments, there can be but one sovereign power. It will thus appear, that the farther removed from a family, in this series of governing powers, shall be the sovereign authority, the less will be the danger of their sovereign willingly trespassing on the people’s right, or having the vicious desire to please himself at the expense of any one individual in the state. Hence the natural connection and affection between the

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sovereign
sovereign and people. The people to the sovereign give power; the
sovereign, again, gives to the people rule and proper magistrates.
The virtuous sovereign naturally loves his people, as a parent does
his children, whom he governs; and the virtuous people naturally
love the sovereign, as they do their parents whom it is natural to re-
vere. Therefore, the military power is properly invested in the so-
vereign; and the application of that power, in civil cases, is only to
be directed by the magistrate who holds the law. Happy is the
people who have access to their sovereign, when injustice causes
them to complain of authority or law! Happy is the sovereign who
governs freely in the affections of his people! his throne is then esta-
blished on the nature and prosperity of man; his glory is founded in
justice and in truth.

13. The complicated state of a political government, however wise-
ly it may have been established, is subject to change; for, the nature
of the parties, who first composed this wise political state, may change,
and then the system of government would be no longer wisely adap-
ted to the nature of the nation, to the general adjutment of indefi-
nite relations, or to all the circumstances of an actual state. In that
case, therefore, some aggrieved party will be disposed to consider as
iniquitous the government which originally was equitable. The na-
tural consequence of this is, to introduce violence and usurpation, in
place of justice and subordination.

The usurpation of a people is to execute themselves the law, or to
impede its execution. The usurpation of the magistrate is to make
the law which he is to execute, or to act the sovereign where he is
the subject. The usurpation of the sovereign is to rule without wis-
dom, to act from passion or with injustice, and to order by his sove-
reign will against law, or in malevolence. The corruption of go-
overnment in a nation, consists in the various modifications of those
different usurpations. Thus, people will resist law; magistrates will
neglect
neglect the laws; and sovereign power will despise law and follow passion. Now, the usurpation or transgression of one party naturally leads to that of another; until disorder and crime spring from that system, which was originally intended to keep peace, and wisely established for the happiness of all concerned.

14. When, in a state, corruption is begun, government is no longer under the direction of that political wisdom in which system had been formed; and, it is then time for philosophic virtue to devise a remedy, in the renovation of that system which has justice for its basis. But, for this purpose, there are required men, who have the science of government and the love of virtue; that is to say, there is necessarily required philosophy to make political reformation. It is the business of the philosopher to watch over the constitution of the state, to see the evil tendency of every deviation from sound policy, and to warn those whom it may concern of the danger to which the constitution is exposed. In this manner, the enlightened politician may either correct the fault, or oppose the growing evil with a proper remedy. But, to suffer a popular cry, or the voice of the ignorant deluded by the sophistry of the interested and designing, to guide the council of the state, respecting a political reformation, would be like the truffling to the wind, instead of the pilot, to bring the ship safe into harbour.

It will thus appear, that the nature of political states, like that of physical bodies, is to change; they have their beginnings, and they have their end; but, while they are conducted with public virtue and general wisdom, it is not in human science to set a period to their subsistence. Now, this virtue which is required for public conduct, and this wisdom which is to ensure public prosperity, are to be found only in philosophy, that is, the knowledge of things in general, and the science of ourselves, or the knowledge of the nature and constitution of human happiness.
When men of this sort are honoured in a country, and when persons in public trust are enlightened by those men, the affairs at home are regulated with justice and executed with humanity; and those abroad are planned with prudence, and executed with vigour and decision. But, when private interest usurps the place of public virtue, and wisdom is employed in those pursuits which cannot make man truly happy; when science is despised in the nation, and philosophy confined to idle speculation, internal regulation is neglected, or injustice, the source of every disorder, will prevail; and then, with all the impotence of a diseased constitution, the body politic will act with the vice of ignorance and folly.

If it is thus in human nature to corrupt the best constitutions of artificial government; and, if it is only in wisdom and in virtue that such growing evils are to be corrected, it must appear to be of high importance to mankind, the science of that art by which men are to be governed in righteousness, and those who govern are to be made righteous men. But, the science of that beneficial art is no other than philosophy,—the knowledge of the principles of human nature, of the cause of virtue, and of the consequence of morals.

15. This theory will be confirmed, if history shows, that the happiness, the strength, the durability of a state, depend not on the specific form of its government (as being either monarchical, aristocratical, or republican), but upon the wisdom of its legislation, and the virtue of administration. It should also follow, conversely, that the vice or folly of administration, joined to a general relaxation or defect in the wisdom of its regulation, should corrupt the best instituted government, enervate the strongest constitution of a state, and subvert the most established order of human society.

If this shall be found to be the case, it will behove those who have the charge of nations to consider well how science may be cultivated, virtue
virtue nourished, and philosophy promoted. For, thus order and economy will be esteemed, virtue and probity will be honoured, wisdom and fortitude will be adored. These are the arts by which men will be trained to virtue and contentment, nations formed to voluntary subordination and just government, and mankind blessed in the regulation of their desires, and in the completion or security of their happiness.

If, on the contrary, it is the intention of those governors to make a vicious usurpation upon the rights and liberties of men, science should be discouraged and knowledge stifled; men should be trained to servile obedience, by means of fear and superstition; and, instead of virtue or philosophy, the most servile dominion of the passions should be cherished in order to enervate men. But, such a systematic usurpation cannot be pursued; for, science and philosophy, by which alone system may be formed, lead to one that is diametrically opposite.—Neither is the virtuous system, which man in his wisdom naturally attains, always pursued in science, or without error in its principles. It is, however, more or less in general pursued; and it is only the extremes, in the gradation of this moral scale, that may be by us compared, in order to confirm the theory from the explanation of appearances, and to explain appearances, in forming conclusions from an approved theory.

The question here is not in relation to a perfect form of government, no more than with regard to a state in which there is no government at all. It has been shown, that man exists not in that state; nor is it in the nature of things, that human wisdom can accommodate a regular government to an infinite variety of circumstances and growing relations. The point to be decided is, if the wisest and most learned people do most in order to establish government in justice, and form men capable of high degrees of virtue; and if, on the contrary, it is in the corruption of vice, and blindness of folly, that is founded
founded every abuse of power and perversion of authority; to the
ruin of public justice and private security, and to the decrease of ge-
neral happiness, which is the end or aim of government.

It may perhaps be thought easier to propose this question than to
solve it; there may however be here stated some considerations, ne-
cessary in determining the point to be discussed.

First, Is not every form of government either the casual usurpa-
tion, or the wife preposition, of one man over another, for the pur-
pose of mutual benefit or a general good? If that be the case, the
question is not, how far, in such a constitution of state, there should
be found all that ideal perfection of wisdom and of justice which in
the speculations of science may be imagined, but, how far, in the
practical state of a happy and prosperous government, it were not
better to submit to little imperfections, though perceived, than, by
acting from ideal apprehensions, to run the risk of losing the sub-
stantial blessing, in seeking nothing but a visionary reformation.

Secondly, in such a happy state, where justice, order, and security
prevail, Should not the estimate of good, in the constitution, be taken
from the general utility, compared with the quantity of injustice or
usurped authority?

Thirdly, Is not that constitution of things most eligible, or to be
preferred, which gives most security to the particular views of each
individual, so far as these are made in virtue or true wisdom; and
which gives most efficacy to the general views of the governing
power, so far as these are conceived in public virtue or benevo-
lence?

Fourthly, Must it not require the most general knowledge of man-
kind, and the most perfect employment of general principles, to
judge
judge of causes and effects in the various circumstances of complicated governments?

Lastly, Is not this knowledge the true science of man? and, Is not the practice or employment of this science the perfection of philosophy?

16. Systematic government being once established, the natural tendency of this is to increase the knowledge and the virtue of the people, and to perfect more and more the system of that government. But, it is in the nature of human things to have virtue corrupted in a state of public prosperity; and, it is in the nature of human government to be corrupted with the morals of the nation. The criminal intentions of the governed lead to anarchy, those of the governing to tyranny. Hence, the history of nations affords a scientifical detail of the rise or the improvements of systematic governments, the fall or the decay of those political systems; and thus exhibits the perpetual struggles betwixt those two extreme states of violence and corruption, in which systematic government ceases to prevail, and either, on the one hand, anarchy, or, on the other, tyranny, blend crime and justice, to the subversion of order, the extinction of public virtue, and banishment of social happiness.

17. In this struggle between the governing and the governed, or the usurpation of those different parties in the state, there must be always power upon the one side, and, on the other, wisdom more or less. Hence the prevalence of the one is only temporary, that of the other, in some degree, durable; for, even the most absolute establishment of anarchy cannot be continued: The people, who have tyrannized over the people, lose the support of their usurpation—power; and, the first tyrant, who with cruel oppression shall put an end to anarchy, will find himself established upon the throne of empire. He meets the wishes of a people preferring the arbitrary do-
minion of a peaceful sovereign to the hostile rage of conquering power, or wild disorder of discordant principles. But, a system of tyranny being once established in violence, and public virtue no more regulating government in justice, liberal men, aggrieved, only watch an opportunity for retribution; and, with usurped authority, they punish criminal despotism in the person of the tyrannical usurper.

18. Thus, as the transgression of private virtue and benevolence leads to crime and misery the particular man or individual, the corruption of public virtue, and the want of general wisdom, lead to vice in the sovereignty, to the commission of public crime, and to misery in the common weal. But, as philosophy, or general knowledge, is the only means by which private virtue can be produced, so, in a general depravity of political manners, philosophy alone can form a system whereby may be reformed the disorder of state, and public justice be restored in a nation. Hence it may be made to appear, that philosophy has always for its aim the benefit of mankind; and, particularly, it has for object the application of science, in forming and reforming government. Hence also it will appear, that every form of government, and all particular laws, are the proper effects of that political wisdom which distinguishes man, and which forms the subject of his study in the philosophy of morals.

When there is much public virtue in a people, a sovereign is not under the necessity of bribing his officers, to do their duty in the various departments of his government. But when, on the contrary, the sovereign has not the power to force a turbulent people, acting without virtuous principle, nor ability to persuade those to their duty who are delirious of public virtue, he must either condescend to bribe, with the property of his subjects, the officers of state and rulers of his kingdom, i.e. the armed force by which the executive function is to be performed, or he must make war upon the constitution,
stitution; and hazard a reformation, at the peril of his empire or his life.

If, from corruption in the public virtue and morals of the state, the natural authority of the first ruler should be lost, and the people be excited to revolt, there must ensue a fever in the body politic, which must end either with restoring order, or translating the supreme authority from its former place. Happy for the people, in such a case, that this authority should not fall into their own hand; for, the power by which a regular form of government had been destroyed, is not the wisdom by which a new constitution of state should be erected.

Thus ill constructed forms of government naturally fall into decay, and are corrupted with some prevailing vice. If, therefore, no human form of government can be made perfect, there should be in the form of government a constitution of reform. But, this should be administered in the greatest wisdom; for, the greatest vice in the constitution of a state, must be the exercise of that reforming power without virtue and superior wisdom. It were perhaps better to allow necessity to force a reformation, in correcting some intolerable evil, than, with officious folly, to aggravate the evil of a government, in the wanton exercise of power without wisdom.

To look for perfection in the actual state of human government, is not perhaps to see the subject in its true light, or in that more perfect view which science may enable us to take of it. Therefore, in aspiring at absolute perfection in the constitution of political government, human wisdom should see the danger of unhinging one political constitution, in order to form another which is then ideal. True wisdom lies in reforming such abuses as may have crept into the best formed constitution; or, in changing the political constitution gradually, as circumstances may have rendered its former mode improper;
improper; but not, from speculative ideas, to change a political constitution of state, one in which the people have been governed, in general, with justice, and in wisdom.

The present subject of discussion is not to say how a government is either to be established, preserved, or changed; but it is to show, that wisdom in those cases is required, so as to adapt the ends and means, in a design which has for object to increase the happiness of mankind. But, who are to be judges in this case, where political wisdom is required?—Not the people, surely:—The people, however wise each man in his particular oeconomy,—the people, however virtuous in relation to their moral duties, cannot be supposed as possessing political wisdom and public virtue. These great qualities require the refinement of a philosophic education; that education, again, requires the knowledge of political constitutions, which is learned from the general history of mankind; and it requires the knowledge of the intellectual constitution of man, which is acquired by the deep reflection of scientific minds. These sources of knowledge, as the means of political wisdom and public virtue, are far above the reach of vulgar minds.

But, if it requires general knowledge and political wisdom, to judge in the complicated affairs of state; and if it requires public virtue, to avoid preferring personal interest or importance to the duty of an exalted station, How dangerous must it be, in the affairs of state, to have recourse to the people, who, having power or brute force, have no distinguishing wisdom? It is, at best, the employing of power without design,—means that were fit to make a chaos, and not the order of a moral world. Whoever, therefore, applies to the people in political affairs, must either be extremely ignorant of the principles of government, or extremely culpable, in employing dangerous means for the prosecution of a vicious design.
The words liberty and equality, put into the mouth of a great commercial nation, and considered as a rule for governing their conduct, or for the conducting of their moral duties, mean no other than violence and injustice. The principle of civil government is virtue and equity; that of military government, order and subordination; but, liberty and equality, unqualified, and as a general principle, could lead to no species of government, but must be the cause of anarchy and confusion. In times of anarchy, crime will rage, and property will change its possessors, according to the rule of force and violence, instead of right and reason; but, if government is to be established, after anarchy, it can only be founded on the principles of virtue and of justice.

19. Montesquieu makes virtue the principle of a commonwealth, honour the principle of a monarchy, and fear that of despotism. But, from a proper consideration of the subject, it may be made to appear, that the true principle of every government, so far as it is true government, is wisdom; and that a principle of virtue, (which is only wisdom in a high degree, i.e. in being applied to the ends as well as means), contributes to make this genuine principle of government more perfect. With this view, let us now examine those three different species of government.

In a commonwealth, virtue must be found both in the rulers and the ruled; otherwise, that form of government could not subsist, but must either degenerate into anarchy, or would be changed for another form, wherein more wisdom, at least, if not more virtue would be found. For, not only is virtue required, to insure this species of government, there is also a necessity for wisdom, as there is, more or less, for the preservation of every form of government. But, that which calls our attention particularly, in the case of a republic, is this; that here there must be wisdom generally in the state; there must be political wisdom, a species of knowledge which, in general,
falls but to the share of few; and yet, that species of wisdom, which
is founded upon political knowledge, must here be in the body of
the people, if we would have this constitution of state adapted to the
governing of wealthy, great, and powerful nations. To find a little
commonwealth in an infant nation, may not be unnatural, in the
experience of mankind; but, to find a great nation governed upon
the virtuous principle of a republic, is an object more to be desired
than expected.

To give the common people philosophic or metaphysical notions,
whether of religion or the principles of government, is evidently to
unfit them for their proper station in the commonwealth or state.
In the different ranks of understanding or intellectual capacity, there
must be that of vulgar men, as well as that of men who are fit for
public virtue and political wisdom; the one of these must be ruled
by superstition and by law, the other must see the principle upon
which men are to be ruled. But, to give the ignorant any power,
however mediate or distant, in the governing of the state, is surely
to depart from the rule of wisdom, learned in the broad experience
of mankind.

We know that states have long existed, where people were edu-
cated for statesmen and for generals. But, however wisely, how-
ever virtuously may have been governed those states, the circum-
fstances of their constitution were peculiar, such as will not apply to
those which are, properly speaking, a republic; they were perhaps
the farthest removed from that constitution of a people in which all
men are alike; they were almost as different as possible from that
state of ideal perfection, which in Utopian speculations we are so
apt to indulge. These states were composed of two distinct ranks
of men; two ranks more different or distant from each other, in the
scale of political capacity, than any that necessarily enter into the
constitution of a monarchy. These were, first, freemen, the hered-

ditary
ditary governors and the defenders of the state; and secondly, bond-
men, or hereditary servants of the free. Here is a peculiar con-
titution, which perhaps may be the perfection of that species of go-
vernment; but it is not a state in that ideal perfection, which we
are now considering under the name of a republic. Such a state,
consisting of certain men educated to political wisdom and the use
of arms, and of others doomed to slavery and to labour in the ser-
vice of the free, is a state contrived in wisdom, if not in virtue; but,
when we call this a republic, we only mean to say, that the govern-
ment is not here monarchical in its constitution, however it may be,
with respect to the greatest number, despotic in its nature.

In a state of republican government, therefore, there must be vir-
tue as well as wisdom, both in the rulers and the ruled; and, so far
as such a state were to be found continuing to preserve itself amidst
the aggrandisement of its virtuous citizens, here we might place the
perfection of human art, in giving a regular oeconomy to a certain
species of animal, and in giving a motive, for the conduct of men,
distinctly different from and often in opposition to that of their ani-
mal nature. But, this is only an ideal case, in which we are suppos-
ing men different from those we find composing nations; we are
then supposing only virtuous men, such indeed as we find, more or
less, in every nation; we are imagining a state, amidst prosperity,
preserved from corruption in its principles and in its practice; we
are imagining a thing which is not found in fact, but only in the
visionary contemplations of speculative men.

If such a state were actually to exist, What is to be the efficient
cause of that perfect constitution of things?—Not surely the mere
name of public good; nor is it the mere form of popular elections.
Such a name, no doubt, has its charm; but that is only to the vir-
tuous and to the uncorrupted. Popular elections, no doubt, have
their utility, when properly employed; but, it is not by the com-
mon
mon people that ever a just judgment can be formed with regard to the affairs of state, to the general of infinitely varying things which are to be appreciated; nor is it in the people, in general, to distinguish truly wise and virtuous men, and not to be imposed upon by those who are selfish, unprincipled, and designing. Therefore, were such a state of ideal perfection to be actually found, it must be by the influence of philosophy training a nation of men to virtuous habits and virtuous sentiments, as an army of men is trained to the use of discipline, to the knowledge of order and subordination. But, here would be a constitution of state distinctly different from that of a republic,—from such as should be founded upon the principle of strict equality in the political rights of men. Here would be perfect virtue in a democracy, a thing perhaps as difficult as to find it in the state of despotism, although, in both those states, virtue may be found occasionally in a great degree.

According to the reasoning which we have been employing, it would seem, that the proper end or final cause of virtue, in the world, were to form governments or nations out of individuals or families. This, however, is no more the proper end of virtue, than it is the proper object of good government to preserve the virtuous principles or the moral conduct of its subjects. However, therefore, philosophy might find an object, in forming a regulated community out of ignorant and wandering tribes of savages, as in the virtuous empire of the Incas, a nation without virtuous principle, or morals, would be a nuisance on the earth. It may be a question, if such a nation could of itself subsist; but, this is evident, that it would not be the interest of mankind to prolong the existence of that nation.

Virtue is certainly the principle of a commonwealth, where the only contest among ambitious men is, or should be, who shall serve the state. Here virtue is of absolute necessity; for, if every one,
one, who has a share in the government, shall serve his vicious little personal interest, in sacrificing public good, the fewer individuals that were to be admitted to the administration of the affairs of state, the less of the public means would be wasted, in the corruption of citizens no longer fit for the state of a republic.

In a monarchy, again, the principle of government is said to be honour. Now, this will be admitted, so far as honour is allowed to be sprung of virtue, which has been already shown *. But, if that proposition were to be disputed, and honour supposed to be founded in vice, as vice is certainly founded upon folly, then monarchy, that species of government by which many nations have been wisely ruled, must be ultimately founded upon a principle in which no rule is to be conceived. But, such a supposition would be an insult to the common sense of mankind. Therefore, monarchy, as well as a republican government, must have for principle, whether more or less immediately, virtue and wisdom.

But, fear does not hold of virtue. If, therefore, fear shall be found a proper principle for one species of government, and not for another, the present theory, which holds virtue or wisdom as the principle of every species of government, would not be general; consequently, this would not be the philosophical principle of government. This, therefore, will be now a proper subject of examination. Let us first define the subject that we are to treat of.

Despotism is the government of a monarch ruling by his will alone, without the restraint of any law or custom. Here we take for granted that the people are ruled; in that case, there must be some principle by which this regulation, organizing the people, shall be formed. But, as we are supposing the springs of this government all in one person, the principle on which he is to proceed, must be attained,

* See Chap. VI. Part III. of this Section.
attained, either through virtuous education, or vicious corruption; for, there is nothing in the circumstances of such a sovereign, that could lead him to offend humanity, or the natural benevolence of his constitution, as a man. If the state, in which a sovereign receives his education, be so far corrupted as not to give the future ruler a virtuous education, or not to give him a wise education, such as should qualify him for exercising the function of his office, here would be an infallible source of bad government, or defect of every ruling principle. But, from the occasional imperfection or defect of any particular, it does not follow, that the ruling principle, of this species of government, should be any other than that which is necessarily required for governing in general.

In a despotic government, fear is said to be the principle of obedience. This is true; but this is the case in every political government. Obedience, no doubt, is necessary to the subsistence of a government; and, fear is one of the principles of obedience; perhaps the principle that is most general or cogent. But, fear alone could not produce good morals in a subject; and, it will hardly be disputed, that the object of government is good morals in the subjects of a state: The most vitiated government pretends to have this object in its view.

Rules of government being once established, whether engraven upon bras or in the memories of men, fear may be employed, in order to prevent the transgression of those rules; and, where the rules of government are unnatural, immoral, or unjust, fear, as a coercive to obedience, may be more necessary, than where the rules are natural, benevolent, and wise. But, here is no question in relation to the virtue or the vice, to the wisdom or the folly, in which those rules have been conceived. We are at present only attending to the power by which those rules are made to be observed in a state. In a despotic monarchy, the rules observed for the government
ment of a people may be good; in a republic, again, they may be not so good; although, in the last, the principle of the government be founded upon justice, while, in the first, it may be upon injustice.

If the passion of fear is to be employed as a motive for obedience, this would be to make wisdom the principle of government, and fear the means. Now if, in the wisdum of government, fear is to be made the means of attaining the desired end, then, upon this principle, hope should also be employed to co-operate with fear. But, if hope and fear are thus to be employed in the wisdum of government, there must be observed some system, in which justice will be the ruling principle. For, if a person is to be encouraged to the performance of a task by hope, and deterred from negligence or disobedience by fear, there must be the opinion of justice in that government, in order to render the means in any degree effectual; and, to employ ineffectual means to attain an end in view, or any means without such an end, would, as a principle in a government, be folly, and not a principle of fear.

If there be a system of government in which the motive fear alone, without the motive hope, or principle of justice, is to be employed, this might be considered as a government founded on a principle of vice and folly. But, to attribute such a system as this to a monarch, a person ruling with the absolute freedom of his will, would be to suppose human nature malicious, and not benevolent. The present theory has employed the opposite of this supposition as a principle. It is therefore a point of some importance to the present theory to show, that such a supposition could not be formed in reason, that is to say, consistently with the principles of moral philosophy; or to show, that power exerted upon such a principle could not, in reasoning philosophically, be considered as a government.
If, among the different forms of government, we were to choose one, then, the disordering accidents to which these may be more or less subject, must, no doubt, be considered, in the forming of our choice; but, having adopted a form of government which is subject to a certain evil, we must not represent this evil as the ruling principle of that species of government. So far from being a principle, it is truly a disorder, by which the principle of government is then suspended. This may be a reason against choosing such a species of government or constitutions of state; but it can afford no argument for considering that evil, to which this government is subject, as being the principle in that constitution of state. We might as well suppose the principle of conviviality and good cheer, to be the black design of murdering without a reason, because such accidents are natural, or happen in the disorders of a feast.

Man is not naturally vicious, although he is naturally selfish; and, he requires the wisdom of science to make him disinterested. Now selfishness, without wisdom, generally leads mankind in society to vice, in viewing the interest of one’s self and others as in opposition; but, so far as the particular interest of an absolute monarch, and the general interest of his people, do not interfere, there is not necessarily, or in his nature, any cause of vicious government. If, therefore, the nature of the man, made for virtue and for wisdom, be not corrupted in the ruler, he cannot rule from any principle but virtue. If, again, it be corrupted, and a principle of vice shall, in the folly of his conduct, be substituted in place of virtue, a principle or cause of crime will be established in that empire. In that case, no doubt, fear may be said to be the actuating principle, both in relation to the injuring person, and the injured; for, he that violates the laws of humanity, has reason to fear the vengeance of the injured; and, the party subject to be injured, has no reason to hope for justice in the virtue of the offender. But, to call this government, and to suppose it founded upon principle, would be to forget the
the use of terms; chaos or confusion might as well be termed order and arrangement.

Slavery and oppression are no part of government, or are not political government in any degree; no more than is the lashing of the generous horse, in order to increase his speed. Certain political constitutions, indeed, may be more subject than others to be interrupted by such a disordering accident; but it is the proper business of government to prevent those evils in the state, by which the person and property of individuals are unjustly forced. When, therefore, any people are misfortunately in such a state of slavery and oppression, so far they are not under government, although subjected to an over-ruling power. The orders of the tyrant, no doubt, must be obeyed, because he has the power to enforce his will, and we suppose his will not to be under the restraint of any virtuous principle. But, the will of a despot may be restrained by the virtue of the monarch; and it must be so by the natural humanity of the man. A tyrant, therefore, is not a natural thing; he is a monster; he is neither a monarch nor a man. Such a voluntary oppressor is a thing wholly in accident, and not either in the wisdom of nature or in that of art; it is the occasional perversion of the human nature; and it is the most deplorable misfortune that may befall a person who has not lost his reason.

But, though a monarch with unlimited power may be subject to the accident of losing his reason, and becoming tyrannical; and, though this may be a proper motive for limiting monarchy, it never can establish government on any principle whatever. Under a monarchy, under an aristocracy, under a democracy, if the government be properly conducted, a subject or a citizen must obey; and, in that case, every virtuous citizen will obey with pleasure. Under the state of tyranny, again, the subject must obey, whether pleased or displeased with his fate; so is he heated by the sun, and cooled by
by the frost; but, none of these are government. Government
must have in view a general good, and not the gratification of any
particular will. The good, which in that system of government is
to be attained, is the general pleasure or happiness of a people, and
not the particular pleasure of any individual in the state.

As that despotic use of power, which is now supposed to proceed
in vice, is not founded upon any natural principle, nor upon any
general principle of wisdom, it must require a system of violence,
instead of justice, to support an usurpation upon the natural and
political liberties of men. But, a system of violence would be im-
properly considered as government; it would be only conquest. It
may be alleged, indeed, that, after conquest, despotic government
is established; and that here is no question with regard to the origin
of this species of government, but its principle. To this it must be
answered, that, in establishing government on conquest, this must
either be founded on justice, or on injustice; if on the latter, vio-
ence still remains, and government is not established. If govern-
ment, again, is established in apparent justice, it must have virtue for
its principle; however, in the practice, that principle may be trans-
gressed; and, however that government may have taken its begin-
ning, immediately after power had been acquired by means of vio-
ence and oppression.

Hence it will appear, that in every state, whatever be the form or
denomination of the government, to employ the motive fear, in re-
venting the conduct of people that are virtuous, is nothing but the
abuse of power, and cannot be the principle of any rational conduct;
and, to employ this useful motive for regulating those that are not
virtuous or good citizens, is not necessarily despotic; it is not to
establish government upon the flabby principle of fear; it is to go-
vern virtuously, upon the necessary principle of wisdom.
If fear is to be considered as the principle of despotic government, without any principle of morality or justice, every change in the personal succession of a despotic monarchy would be a change of government; for, the rules of government being in the will of a particular, unless the will of this person be determined by the laws of morality, which are general to man, each person who mounts the throne, forms a species of government which can only be known a posteriori, or from the effect. There is, however, no such government. The most enslaved state, so far as it is governed, is governed by the rule of moral fitness, or the principle of justice. It may not be just to make a man a slave; but it must be just for a slave to obey his master. It may not be wise to rule men by the principle of bondage; but, if such bondmen are to be ruled, it must be by the just principle of reward and punishment, hope and fear, that those men in slavery are to be governed. But, to look for steady government, in which the rules of virtue should not be transgressed, in a state not regulated in philosophic wisdom, would be as much in vain as to look for apples upon thorns.

Ask the oppressed people of Syria and Egypt, if there be any good procured to them by their government; ask the happy citizens of Britain, if there be any person oppressed by their government. But, in Syria and Egypt, it may be alleged, that the labourer commonly has his sufficiency, and that, in the happier state of Europe, he has no more. Here sophistry might demand, what difference there is between the good and bad government. This question would be answered, if it were made to appear that poverty is in the one case necessary, and in the other only a matter of accident. But, in good government, skill and industry will procure riches; whereas, under bad government, honest industry and skill may be employed only to feed oppression, and gratify rapacity. No person is oppressed who enjoys the safe possession of his honest conquest;
quest; and nothing is to be esteemed proper government, but so far as it gives security to a person and his property.

All mankind have science; and science leads to the knowledge of the rules of justice and of virtue. But, all mankind are far from having arrived at that art of self-denial, which in a virtuous sentiment procures pleasure, and which, in the calm enjoyment of reflection, affords a source of pure untainted happiness. There are, however, always among mankind, men who know this art; men who have learned to govern their own passions for the general good, that is, for their happiness upon the whole. It is for such men as these, however they may be called, to give regulation to a state, in forming order in the affairs of men; it is for such men as these to establish manners, which shall supply in general the place of virtue in a people; and, it is for such men to establish government, not in employing physical necessity or brute force, but in constraining the desires of moral agents, and thus ruling a voluntary empire in the hearts of men.

But man, sunk in ease and indolence, is corrupted; without education he is ignorant and erroneous; without the knowledge of generals, without the wisdom of mankind, he is not qualified for political government. Disorder arises from defect in government; and from disorder, every misfortune incident to government may flow—every misery that afflicts mankind may be produced. But, Shall we name government, those evils which arise from its defect? In that case, anarchy must be a species of government; which would be absurd. Therefore, we must not consider the vicious oppression of a despotic monarch, no more than the transgression of the most virtuous regulation, as being government.

Man, the individual is precarious; therefore government, depending on the will of that which is precarious, may be unstable: But,
to suppose government could be founded on vice and on injustice, and preserved upon no other principle than that of fear, is not to treat this subject, government, with all the science of which it will admit: It is only taking a partial view of things, in specifying one particular evil which is to be apprehended from the vice of an unsteady form of government.

20. In infant states, there is often, or rather necessarily, displayed much public virtue; for this reason, that the virtuous self-denial of an individual is of great importance in such a state; which, therefore, either prospers in the virtue of its active citizens, or perishes for want of wisdom in its government. But, in a state arrived by means of virtue at much power and wealth, and at a high degree of perfection in its government, the virtuous sacrifice of personal interest, in an individual, is of little importance to the whole. The natural consequence of this is, to make men in general more negligent of public virtue in such a state, and more anxious to cultivate the shining qualities by which a man may be distinguished. Courage and conduct in the field, reasoning and discernment in the senate, will then lead to eminence and admiration; consequently, these talents will become the subject of emulation among a people.

While these shining qualities, that are useful to the state, are cultivated by its members, the general interest is promoted in the pursuits of men who are actuated by ambition, and seek to excel in talents which are immediately serviceable to the state. But, when the steady order and prosperity of the state renders those public talents of less avail, public virtue, or philosophic principle, then declines; for, the generality of men seek admiration at the price by which it is to be procured. Wealth then leads to honourable distinction and respect; honour to admiration; and, the admiration of others comes in competition with the virtuous approbation of a person's own mind. Therefore, though honour be not necessarily inconsistent with virtue, it
it may be so occasionally: And thus, philosophic virtue may be neglected; while honour, which has the affectation of that virtuous principle, may be promoted with all the vigour of this prosperous state.

In the infancy of a state, there is required all the exertion which every individual may bestow, in order to preserve the growing constitution of that state. In a state of perfect virtue, every one is willing to bestow every exertion in their power, in order to promote the public good. But, in the prosperous state of a community, little exertion of every one is required for the promotion of the common good; and, in a state of general corruption, there is no will or inclination in the people to bestow any of their exertion for the good of the community. Thus, that virtue, which is termed public spirit, naturally declines in each individual, in proportion as those persons in a state are multiplied, and prosper in their circumstances.

But, though the portion or degree of public spirit, which every one possesses, be thus diminished in the maturity of states, it does not necessarily follow that the sum, or general quantity of this virtue in the state, should not either increase or diminish. If the public spirit of individuals diminishes proportionally less than the increased grandeur of the state, the general quantity of exertion, if it were necessary to call it forth into existence, would be greater than in a state more virtuous according to the estimate of its individuals. But if this diminution of virtue, in the state, be proportionally greater than the increased power and grandeur, the state will then be actually weaker, though potentiually strong. The causes of its prosperous condition are then impaired; and, though apparently it may be increasing in its glory, it is deviating from the line of its meridian; it is inclining to a state of public degradation.

If the public virtue of individuals did not diminish as the power and grandeur of the state increased, little political wisdom would be required
required in the governing power. But, as it is otherwise, and as, in the progress of great empires, the public virtue may on the whole be either in a declining or improving state, wisdom is required in the ruling mind, to form an artificial system for political virtue, separate or distinctly different from the moral system, in order to influence those who have not public spirit, either from national necessity, or from philosophic principle.

Now, such an artificial system is that which is found in the laws of honour. In this system, philosophic principles are nourished upon the natural passion pride; and rules of deep wisdom are conformed to the understanding of a mean capacity. This is the great engine of a polished state; here is the system for preserving mighty empires.

It will thus appear how grandeur, in a state, naturally leads to monarchy in its form of government. The system of honour requires a visible object, for the adoration of its votaries. It requires a pomp and pageantry to inspire enthusiasm, in minds not capable of carrying scientific principle to the end of virtue. Such an object is the sacred person of a monarch; and such a power is the imposing splendour of his throne. The monarch is, in the system of honour, the supreme; he irradiates this principle of partial virtue, as the sun does light. He is reared in the dignity of man; and he is placed in a station utterly removed from meanness. Agreeable manners are formed in his education; and, in the virtue of his ripened manners, mankind are polished without the tedious study of abstract principle.

It is also for the blessing of a state, that pomp and honour should erect a throne for monarchy in the natural superfluous of mankind. It is for the advantage of humanity that man should be raised, in his station, above the natural equality of men; that, in his character, he should be refined with the most engaging arts of social wisdom; and that,
that, in his notions, he should be exalted with the most refined principles that speculative philosophy may inspire. There is thus established a pattern for that which is most excellent in social commerce, and for all that may be taught by means of pattern, i.e. manners. It is in the court of Kings that may be found all that is agreeable; the beauty of virtue is left even in the corruption of their morals.

In a monarchy, therefore, where an inferior species of virtue leads to artificial honour, less philosophic principle or virtuous self-denial is required, in order to preserve good government, than in the infant state of a community, where disinterested virtue is necessary to the very being of that government by which a state is to be rendered prosperous. But when a monarch, who is at the head of honour, and has the disposal of that reward, shall distinguish, in his wisdom, between the philosophic principle which seeks honour or eminence for the sake of virtue, and the secondary principle which seeks virtue only for the sake of honour, then honour may be employed for the best of purposes; for promoting public virtue, instead of those shining talents by which that virtue is often brought into the greatest danger.

It may be thought, that the giving of honour as a reward for virtue, is only leading people to seek virtue for the sake of honour. But it must be considered, that the honouring of virtue, when it appears eminent, is leading mankind to know virtue as a principle, and to admire it at least for its effect. Now, in order to employ virtue advantageously as the means of gaining honour, man must study virtue or understand it. But, no body can understand virtue without loving it; no body perceives virtue, even in the history of a dream, the subject of a tale, without being pleased with it, and adoring it. So far, therefore, as the desire of honour shall lead a man to study and understand virtue, which is necessarily its own reward, the proper distribution of honour conduces to make man truly virtuous. At
the same time, actions done merely for the sake of honour, are not actions flowing from the purest principle; and cannot be considered as philosophic virtue.

The example and source of honour being in the person of a king, the power of a monarchy, for glory or external greatness, exceeds that of any other form of government. But when, to the power of honour, the monarch joins the science of wisdom, and the principle of virtue, he adds, to the glory and aggrandisement of his empire, the power of promoting virtue and happiness among his people: For, holding in his hands the powerful motives honour and disgrace, What reformation upon morals is it that may not be performed by a monarch? It is under the auspices of such a sovereign that science may be cultivated with certainty or success; and that philosophy, laying aside its errors, may pursue with steadiness the happiness of nations.

If the employment of honour may be so effectual in promoting public virtue, How pernicious must be the prostitution of this reward, in bestowing it as the wages of personal gratification, or as the price of wealth! It is by such means as these that public spirit might be brought to the lowest ebb. But, while the laws of honour resemble those of virtue, it must be advantageous to a state to have in estimation any species of honour. It is thus that, in the art of human policy, there is formed a substitute for virtue, or a motive for some species of moral excellence, without the purest philosophic principle.

21. Men are made by nature equal; but, in being artificially accomplished, they necessarily become unequal; and, nature has given no right to any being upon earth to compel a voluntary agent,—one who acts, not by the instinct of his nature, but in the freedom of his will, or by the approbation of his intellect. It therefore now remains:
to show, how this voluntary agent is to be compelled in the state of human society, or how this intellectual being should, in his wisdom, voluntarily give up that absolute liberty which he had from nature, and submit his will to the governing power, which is in art.

Liberty is want of constraint; and constraint is either physical or moral. A man is naturally free, as he has a will, which he may accomplish. Therefore, there is such a thing as physical liberty; or there is perfect freedom naturally in the state of man. But, in the political state of man, there is not perfect liberty; for the political state is that in which man is necessarily deprived of part of his natural liberty; he voluntarily gives up his natural freedom, in order to receive a greater benefit, or enjoy a greater pleasure, in the blessings of a social commerce; he, in his wisdom, barters a certain degree of physical liberty for a certain fruition of social happiness.

To gain the good will of a voluntary agent, a voluntary agent must occasionally sacrifice his will. Natural liberty is restrained by necessity, or the laws of nature; moral liberty is restrained by the natural benevolence of man; and civil or political liberty is restrained by the wisdom of government.

In nature man is free, as having the capacity of forming to himself rules of conduct, and as being at liberty to follow those rules, so far as his nature will permit. This then is the natural liberty of man, which is so far absolute; and this liberty is limited by nothing but necessity, which then is physical. But, there is a political liberty, which a man may possess more or less; that is to say, political or civil liberty may subsist in various degrees: This liberty, however, is never absolute, as may be the physical liberty of man, when he is considered as being in nature, in contradistinction to the being in society.
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22. The highest degree of political liberty consists in man having a choice, with regard to the rules to which he is submitted, for his government in society. The lowest or least degree of moral freedom, or political liberty, happens to a man, when he chooses not those rules for his future conduct, to which, in society, he must conform. Thus it will appear, that political and moral liberty are only to be attained by a person, in studying scientifically the constitution of his state, or nature of his constitution; and in virtuously giving his consent to principles of humanity, to order and regulation, which are then his choice.

Slavery consists in being necessarily subjected to another person's will: But, every person who is corrupted in his moral principles, and is ignorant of philosophic virtue, has no choice in the forcible restraining of his will by law. Such a person, therefore, is enslaved in the happiest state of social government. He is continually solicited by his vicious will, to transgress an acknowledged rule, and as often punished in the reproaches of an offended conscience. He is enslaved by the dominion of his unrestrained passion, and tormented by the just reflection of his enlightened reason. He has acquired science, only to form his principles in error; and he has learned the enjoyment of intellectual happiness, in order to suffer an aggravation in his misery.

23. No question has been more difficult of resolution, than this with regard to the freedom of will. To throw some light upon it from the present subject, government, let us consider man in the two extreme states of society or associated life; the savage state in which man first subsists, without the institution of political government; and the civil state, in which man is governed by law. It has been here alleged, that, in the state of civil or political society, there is no absolute freedom for a man to act; but that, in the savage state, every man is free, so far as there is no statute or regulation
tion in his government. Thus, it would seem, that in proportion as man, from brutish ignorance, proceeded on his intellectual course, he lost his freedom, and became a slave. The opposite of this, however, is true; but the apparent contradiction arises from the occasional opposition, betwixt man's sensual affections, and his rational desires; betwixt his passionate desires, and his intellectual affections.

To see this, it must be considered: Each man loves another person; but, each man also loves himself; and, those two different interests, in his estimation, often interfere. Now, there are few, perhaps, who know how, on this occasion, to conduct themselves in perfect wisdom. This will be illustrated in considering what are the general opinions of men with regard to law, that is to the regulation of man's conduct in relation to the wills of other men.

In the state of civil society, though man is not absolutely free to act, so far as others are concerned in his action, and so far as he is necessarily subjected to the regulation of the law, yet this does not infringe the moral freedom proper to the will of man, who in his acting or his suffering has a choice; for, in the state of political government, though man has it not in his power, to bring absolute freedom to every possible arbitration of his will, he may bring his will absolutely to the arbitration of the law. Such a man was Socrates. He studied wisdom for the sake of virtue; and he loved virtue, for the sake of truth. He had a will averse to evil; but he voluntarily submitted to the evil of the law. There was no constraint upon his noble mind, but what arose from voluntary legislation,—from the unviolated laws of his own conscience. His virtue overcame necessity; and he suffered cheerfully that evil, which, in its end, he judged to be good. Such was a Socrates! and such is also every virtuous man, in some degree. The person who loves truth,
and firmly seeks the approbation of a well informed conscience, is naturally free, and is necessarily a slave to nothing but his reason.

It is thus that man, in the lowest state of intellectual existence, a state which is to be considered as bordering with the brute nature of the animal, is only free, so far as he lies not under the constraint of moral principles, but acts from that humanity alone which is from nature. Whereas man, in the perfection of his intellectual existence, is virtuously inclined from his moral principle; he acts without the influence of physical constraint; and he thinks in corroborration of his natural benevolence. Betwixt those two extremes, which are but ideal states, we find mankind in general; and every particular man is placed somewhere upon this determined scale. In other words, man, the scientific animal, is always free in some respect, and in some respect he is restrained; whether by moral principle, which is natural, or by political principle, which is refined. But, in proportion as man refines his morals in his wisdom, he emancipates his will from all restraint, by chusing that which nature had disposed him to love.

The free-will of the savage is not to be immediately compared with that of the philosopher; these two different states of mind are too far distant, in the scale of correspondence or analogical reasoning, to be assimilated in a scientific view. But, savage freedom may be now compared with what has been already termed civil slavery or bondage; for, these are immediately connected in the course of nature, or in the natural progress of the human intellect: We may thus be led to understand the relation in which the two extreme states of freedom stand to each other, that is to say, the natural freedom of the savage, and the moral freedom of the philosopher.

In such a state as that of Britain, the mind of man revolts at the word slavery or bondage, and exults at that of freedom; but, to be
affected merely by a term, is prejudice; and, there is nothing farther than this prejudice, to make a rational or enlightened person give a preference, to the lawless freedom of the savage over the lawful bondage of the citizen. It is the freedom of the savage to be left to the misfortune of uncultivated intellect. It is true, indeed, that civil bondage does not necessarily imply the cultivation of the mind, which is constrained; for, it is only in proportion as the intellect is cultivated, that this bondage ceases to exist, in man approving of the moral law, by which a citizen must be restrained. There is however this advantage of civil bondage over savage freedom, that, in the first, man has his will restrained for his good; in the last, again, man’s will indeed is not restrained, but no benefit arises from this useless freedom. He, that can freely will a vicious action, knows nothing of that happiness which a pure reflection may bestow; and he, who cannot freely will that action, is not in the state of freedom which we now suppose, for he is under a restraint. Now this restraint must either arise from fear of the evil, or from approbation of the good. If it is from fear of evil to a person’s self that evil intention to another is restrained, such a person is under the bondage of social government. But if he is restrained from crime, by his aversion to vice; and if he is prevented from willing evil, by the conscious benevolence of acquired principles, he then is in the moral freedom of his own design, and he is not restrained in the necessity of law, or in the coercion of other people’s will.

The freedom of the savage is, to the intellectual being, a misfortune; it is that of man not having virtuous regulation in his sentiment, nor any proper determination for his conduct, in relation to his fellow creature man. Civil bondage, again, is the triumph of human art in nature; in man, it is the privilege of being born to government; and, to him, it is the blessing of having his will directed in the wisdom of his species. But man, who is often over avaricious of happiness, grasps at the end, without the means; he thus often
often catches at the shadow, and lets go the substance. Not content
with being governed in the wisdom of mankind, man wishes to go-
vern in his own right, when he has not wisdom equal to the ambi-
tion of his views. What a world of mischief comes of this rage—
i. e. for being wise without having just principles—for being happy
without being truly wise! Man thinks he should be happy if he
governed nature, or ruled over the wills of other men; but, man is
truly happy, when he has learned to govern his own wills, and to
know that he shall enjoy a state of happiness only so far as he obeys
the rules of nature.

Mankind, taken any where between the two extremes, of ungo-
verned freedom on the one hand, and of philosophic virtue on the
other, are subject to pursue a certain state of happiness which is
ideal, and which it is not possible they should attain. But, he who
truly knows himself, and regulates his inclinations by the laws of
nature, may be called a philosopher; he is properly a man, in seek-
ing happiness; and, he is truly wise, in seeking that happiness which
is within his power. He again, who, having in his power that
which should make him happy, makes himself miserable in pursu-
ing what he cannot find, is no doubt a being infinitely superior to
the animal (who has not formed a general idea of happiness, and
who cannot in wisdom form to himself an object for his pursuit),
but he is inferior to the philosopher, who knows the nature of his
happiness, and the way in which that happiness is to be attained.
He who, in studying happiness, has learned to will that which is
the best, all things considered, and not to think that best, which he
may will without considering all things, is truly wise. Instead of
being governed blindly by his sense and passion, the philosopher ex-
tends his reason to the infinitive feelings of the animal, in making
himself a moral agent; he is conducted, even in his sensual enjoy-
ment, by that which in his common sense is rational; and he is di-
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rected, in his rational enjoyment, by that which in his science is refined.

Such is the philosopher; and such it is in the power of every man to be; for, such is the capacity of man. It is not that every man has it immediately in his choice, whether or not he shall be a philosopher; it is by study only that a man acquires the knowledge of a subject; so far, therefore, as a man may study, he may attain the end in view, but not without the means. But, being by means of science arrived at philosophy, no man would voluntarily degenerate again to ignorance, or be satisfied with the wisdom of the common man, no more than the man of science could wish to change conditions with the brute, who knows in order to enjoy life, but knows not as a man in order to enjoy knowledge. This will appear by considering, that being a philosopher, is being happy in himself; and, he is not man, who wishes not for happiness. But as, betwixt the brute and the philosopher, there are an infinity of degrees, and, as men, who are not arrived at philosophy sufficient to conduct themselves in virtue, must be trained like the brute by hopes and fears, mankind, in the privilege of political society, must be regulated with regard to their opinions, or their moral conduct. They must also be subjected to the restraining power of those laws of human institution, which are properly political, as being formed in the wisdom of the species, or general knowledge of the many; and which are not natural, so far as they are not derived, immediately, from the instinctive principle of virtue, but from that which is acquired in the progress of the human intellect.

24. From what has now been offered on the subject, it will appear, that the rules of conduct, for each person in society, may be distinguished as of two different kinds; the rules of political government, and those of moral conduct. The rules of political government have no other principle or foundation than in the acquired wisdom
wisdom of man, which is commonly deficient, and is never perfect. Therefore, these rules are more precarious than the others, which are founded in nature, and which have for principle, besides the influence of human wisdom, the benevolence of man, or natural humanity of his constitution.

Hence, while the institutions of political society, and the forms of criminal and civil law, are so changeable in nations, the substance of moral government is steady among men; and, the existence of virtue is not precarious in the world. While therefore it requires much philosophy to see truth in the principles of political institutions, much less suffices to preserve from great depravity the principles of moral government; for, these are founded immediately on those which are instinctive.

Hence a valuable lesson may be learned, with regard to the art of forming government; it is this, not to separate the civil authority in a state, which is an arbitrary thing, from the authority of morals, which is founded on nature. For, while these two species of authority are separated, the least inconvenience or evil, to be apprehended, is,—depriving the governing power of the means of procuring a virtuous obedience. Whereas, by giving to the magistrates the forming of the virtuous morals of a people, the governing power would thus acquire an authority that could hardly be disputed. The laws of morality are in nature; those again of civil policy are in human wisdom. Therefore, if man be wise, he will graft his artificial regulations upon the laws of nature; thus, virtue and civil policy would go hand in hand, and be made mutually to support each other. But, if Lycurgus should lend to another power the help of this authority, which is from nature, and engraven on the heart of man, he might find reason to repent, when he should not be able to recall the benefit.
25. When scientific education is established in a state, and when monarchical authority has prevailed in a nation, to suppose the monarch uninstructed in science, and deficient in philosophy, is to suppose the heir of empire as being either deficient in his understanding, or neglected in his education. But, a person of ordinary capacity, with all the advantages of the best education, must be a philosopher in some degree; and then he cannot willingly transgress the laws of wisdom and humanity,—laws calculated for his own advantage, and the general happiness of men. Hence, of what importance to an empire is the education of its prince! And, of what importance to a prince is the philosophy of his empire!

26. In a despotic monarchy, the person governing must be supposed to be wise; for, without wisdom, there would not be rule; and, without rule, there could not be government. Such a government, therefore, is truly ruled by wisdom. But, this ruling principle is not the principle of wisdom; it is the wisdom of the particular, and not the wisdom of the general, that is to say, of men of science, reasoning from general principles, and for the general good; it is the wisdom of man consulting the interest of his narrow view; and it is not that of man seeking satisfaction in the general of enjoyment,—in the approbation of a pleased conscience,—and in the happy reflection of meritorious conduct.

As such a state of government would not necessarily derive its practice or its principles from general science, i.e. from philosophy, it would not naturally lead to the culture of science; nor could it willingly contribute to the progress of philosophy, which reprobrates the idea of despotic government.

Perhaps there is no government originally founded on despotic power; but there is often despotic power entrusted in a man for the purposes of government. Now as, in every species of government, entrusted
entrusted power may occasionally become despotic by a vicious usurpation, and disgrace government in the exercise of injustice, so, in a state where despotic power is entrusted in the person of a monarch, virtue may prevail, and justice adorn the head of him who wields the sword of state without control.

European subjects abhor the idea of Asiatic monarchy; but, Asiatic subjects certainly may live happy, and perhaps detest the idea of European government. In China, the people are trained to the observance of proper manners, which renders the principles of virtuous regulation of less necessity in the state. In Europe, the people are trained to morals as much as manners; the first of these only is considered as necessary, the last as only being agreeable. The consequence should be, that, in the Asiatic government, order, without virtue, should prevail; in the European, on the contrary, virtue should prevail, but not without disorder. What a difference in this character of people! and, how improperly, to those formed characters of men, would be interchanged those different constitutions of government!

If thus just government be formed in every soil, and under the influence of every climate; and if virtue, or just morals, be made to spring up under every government, we will have reason to conclude, that it is only the abuse of government that deforms its character; and that the form of government is respectable only from its utility, in serving to prevent the abuses of that power which is employed to the ends of government. No government without restraining power; and, the most perfect constitution of government is the proper adjustment of that restraining or commanding power to the end or purpose required for the general good. On the one hand, excess in that power may be hazardous for the security of individuals; but, on the other hand, deficiency in that power may be hazardous for the security of the whole. Is there any wonder, then, that there should be found actually
actually in the world so much excessive power employed in the go-
vernment of nations, and so rarely that private interest is reconciled
with the security of the state? Give an African prince the limited
power of a British monarch,—his kingdom would soon fall a sacri-
fice to the impolitical reformation.

The savage is free; but he is free no otherwise than the brute
animal, from the unconstrained exercise of his own will. Here is
no principle of liberty; or it is only a natural principle, that is, the
habit or the prejudice. It is for this reason that unenlightened men,
or nations, submit to tyranny, as they would to the best of govern-
ment; it is the habit or the prejudice of their education which they
pursue; and, in following the freedom of their will, they are not
free. Here is a state of man, which, in its natural purity, is the
most abject possible; but it is rare, perhaps, to find it in its natural
purity; and, as the purest government may be corrupted, and must
contain some imperfection, so is this abject state of man in some de-
gree subject to be reformed, and may actually contain some princi-
ple of good government.

Thus we may see, that true liberty in man must proceed from
principle, and depends on knowledge. Nothing short of science
can form a system of language for a people; nothing short of phi-
losophy can form a system of government. But, man born under
good government is naturally a free man; that is to say, let this
man be properly educated and not corrupted, and he will be truly
free. In like manner, let a man be born a slave, let him be educa-
ted in that station, and not corrupted, and he would have no princi-
ple of freedom; the perfection of his freedom would be to tyrannize.

27. In the state of despotism, or the government of slaves, there
is neither virtue nor ambition; for, in those who govern, there is
no room for excellence, in wisely contriving rules of general good,
and virtuously submitting to those rules. In the governed, again, there is no room for virtue, in sacrificing, for the sake of ideal pleasure, a personal interest which they have not to bestow: There is no other excellence in a slave than strict attention to his master's will; nor is there, in his idea, any other pleasure, besides what is mean and personal, in its nature.

In a republic, where each man personally forms the law, and where the good-will of each person is towards the common weal, the reigning ambition is to sacrifice personality for ideal pleasure; to enjoy the idea of the public good, in suffering real hardships to themselves; and to submit to the most humiliating condition, in order to promote the glory of the state. With justice, therefore, has Montesquieu made virtue to be the principle of this species of government.

In monarchy, again, where a royal person superintends the law, men often lose sight of the public good, in pursuing their allegiance to the prince, and seldom fail of their allegiance in consideration of the public good. The reason is plain; the one is a being that is real, the other is only an ideal thing. Every sense, and every sentiment, conspire to fill the heart of man with loyalty to his sovereign; but, to form the idea of a constitution in the state, contrived in wisdom, and for the best of ends, requires a degree of abstract general reasoning which falls but to the share of few.

Hence it appears, how honour is the principle of monarchical government; for, honour is a sentiment truly sprung of virtue, although deficient in point of scientific principle, or in the generalisation of its views. It is only a philosopher who, in a monarch, may distinguish the man that in the wisdom of his reason holds the sceptre, and the man that in the folly of his passion will transgress the law. But, in a virtuous state, where disinterested motives are held
held in esteem, a monarch, with the understanding of a man, cannot depart far from that rule in his conduct, which is so forcible in every man, and which binds to virtue a monarch, who shall think, more than any other person in the state. This will appear by considering, the personal interest of a monarch is no more than the personal interest of a common man; whereas, his duty is as the interest of a nation. But, no man of common understanding wantonly sacrifices duty; and, an enlightened monarch cannot surely see his duty as being in competition with his will. A prince who has the intellect of a man, who can see his duty on the one hand, and his selfish inclination on the other, cannot hesitate to sacrifice that which is as nothing, compared with that which, in human estimation, is so great. How important, therefore, is it to the happiness of nations, to have enlightened the minds of princes! No extraordinary talents are required for a monarch to reign in virtue. He has but to see his glory in the prosperous system of his government; and, to love his honour, in seeing justice, which, without interfering with his proper interest, is the duty of his exalted station. On the other hand, How miserably inferior, in point of understanding, must be the man, who would sacrifice such a source of real happiness for the wretched enjoyment of pleasures or passions in abuse! - a conduct that would disgrace even the man of common manners.

28. A man who may protect himself, will not be a slave. Therefore, he who keeps a slave, protects a man; as he who enslave the privileges of citizens, must protect a city. In society, the will of man is necessarily limited, whether by manners, or by law. Manners are the effect of human wisdom, acting naturally under the circumstance of social commerce; law is the effect of human wisdom, scientifically forming rules of manners for those who have not wisdom to conduct themselves. The civil liberty of a citizen consists in being under no restraint, that is to say, in having his will conformed to the necessary regulations of morality. The political li-
berty of a citizen consists in his having the virtue to defend the constitution of the government which he enjoys, or in his approving of that constitution of state which he is bound in duty to defend. If he has not virtue to defend the constitution of a happy government, he may soon lose the enjoyment of that blessing which it is baseness to desert; and he who shamefully sacrifices public government to his private ease, may soon have occasion to repent his folly, in the disappointment of his selfish views, when he shall be obliged to abandon ease, and struggle with uncertainty, perhaps most direful in its aspect.

It being thus evidently the interest of every man, who has the enjoyment of an agreeable state, to support the constitution of political government, no man with an enlightened view would disturb the tranquillity of peaceful regulation in the state. But when, to the misfortune of mankind, the rage of empire seizes nations, and individuals are esteemed only so far as they may govern, what wonder, if, to these people, the blessing of peaceful government has not any charm! and, if the most esteemed citizens should most disturb the state, in either pursuing their own ambitious views, or in opposing a virtuous resistance to the usurpation of a power which they apprehend in others!

29. A nation that subsists upon the natural produce of a country, without the application of art for directing nature in her productions, has only nature as a common property. In such a nation, no individual has any property or possession further than what is in his hands; and, though they are all equally concerned in what affects their country and their nation, they have but little occasion for that internal regulation by which the wills of individuals are restrained, and in which there is necessarily formed the idea of a public good, in compensation of the limit set to personal liberty.
In such a state as this, the science of the people being extremely limited, though not erroneous, their wisdom, though not deficient for its purpose, is inferior in its order, and ignoble in its object. This people leads a life but little removed from that of the brute, who has no science; and their learning or experience enables them only better to submit.

The moral character of the savage is selfishness, benevolence, and passion; philosophy is the farthest removed from them who are in the lowest degree of virtue; and crime is by them committed in the lowest degree of vice. Therefore, in proportion as a man recedes from savage ignorance and brutish innocence, he advances, through science, to philosophy; a state of intellect, in which man is supposed to be well informed of all manner of truths; a state in which he is to judge the best, or summum bonum, not from particulars, from sense or passion, but from generals, from what is always pure and perfect in the enjoyment.

Man has not from nature any form of government; but he has the capacity of learning to govern himself. Now, if all mankind would learn to govern themselves in justice and in wisdom, then, political government, or general institutions, would be as unnecessary to a state as to a family. In that supposed case, a nation would act in unanimity, like a hive of bees. But, in this case, they must be either a nation of philosophers, or a herd of brutes. If, on the one hand, we shall suppose them endowed with all the passions and capacities of man, nothing short of moral philosophy could make men virtuous, when they should be without any other restraint than what they formed each man to himself. If, on the other, man had no capacity for vice, he would be no better than a brute; and a nation of such animals would be no better than a hive of bees.

30. Hence, in the state of civil society and refined morals, the
object is not, as in that of the savage nation, simply to form men who may sublift themselves, but to form citizens,—men who may be happy themselves, and make others happy. But, for this valuable purpose of forming virtuous citizens, and making people happy in the practice of morality, there is necessarily required a system, or the formation of a wise design. For, if the most inferior piece of human workmanship is not produced immediately by nature, or ever exists without that wisdom which is properly in man, to suppose the masterpiece of human art, political government, as happening in the natural course of things, without the necessary intervention of human intellect, and the highest ability of scientific man, would be an absurdity which no man could support.

Let us consider the people as a mass of brute matter, or physical agents, which are to be regulated in their action; in that case, the wisdom of man makes a machine, which effectually answers the design. But, the people is a mass of moral agents, each of which has a will, which, though naturally formed upon the same general principles, are not always equally actuated by the same motives; and, though virtue be necessarily the principle conducting human wisdom, yet, the wisdom of virtue, which only is learned in philosophy, is miserably deficient in a mass of ignorant men. Hence, to organize a great people into a moral and political system, must appear to be the most amazing work of human wisdom.

It will thus appear, that the utmost exertion of the human genius is required, in order to establish political society in justice, and moral government in wisdom. Man is not made to grow wise and virtuous by the hand of nature, as he is made to grow large and strong; man is made wise and virtuous, either in being taught scientifically to know the summum bonum, in understanding what is truly for his good, or in being trained superstitiously to think that to be for his good, which in the nature of things is truly best.
Now, here is philosophy, either in the teacher or the person taught. As, therefore, without philosophy, it is impossible to constitute a state of political society and of refined morals, it is as little possible to maintain that state from going into corruption, without cultivating science and promoting wisdom.

CHAP. IX.

The importance, to Virtue and Social Happiness, of the Wise Regulations in a State, illustrated with examples.

EXAMPLE I.—Effects of growing Power and Wealth, in changing the Political Regulations of a State.

1. MAN, as he is born, is without intelligence; and, in that state, he should be considered merely as an animal. But man, though born an animal, is not a brute. He is endowed with a conscious faculty, which employs his understanding; and, he acquires a power to investigate the nature of things around him, and to understand the means, the progress, and the purpose, of his intellectual nature. Thus man has, from nature, the capacity of improving his own mind, by reflecting on what has passed in his knowledge; and, therefore, he may be considered as having acquired, from nature, the power of forming what is properly himself. What is properly man, therefore, is that which he makes himself; and this is an indefinite thing, beginning with that dawn of understanding which is early to be observed in the child, and proceeding to the summit of human wisdom, to which we cannot set a limit.
Human understanding, as the intention of nature, affords the greatest subject of admiration to mankind. For, though man has the faculty of producing intellect, it is only conditionally that he thus proceeds: And, though mankind are arrived at a certain state of understanding, which leaves no room for comparison with the brute or mere animal which he is born, yet, by himself, man might spend his lifetime, like a brute, without advancing in any considerable degree beyond the animal capacity. But, by communicating their ideas, men improve their knowledge; and, it is only by the enlarged knowledge of the species that the science of individuals is brought to that perfection which does honour to the race, in exalting human nature as the chief intention of the First Cause. Thus society is necessary to the human understanding; and, a proper education is required for the accomplishment of man.

As human happiness consists in conscious feelings and intellectual satisfaction, education, which promotes the progress of the human mind, is absolutely necessary to make man happy, not as an animal, but as a man. But, human education depends upon the order of moral conduct; and, moral conduct depends upon the order of human society, which is termed government. Hence government, in man, which is the ruling of his passions for the happiness of his life, arises not immediately from nature, but from human art, to which man naturally arrives. Wise government being thus necessary for the happiness of mankind, we cannot too often see the value of this blessing, nor too much reprobate that spurious species of liberty in a state, which is properly termed licentious, and which is in its nature inimical or pernicious to government; a liberty which has for object to pursue the selfish views of individuals, in resisting or disturbing the political order of the state; and a liberty which, instead of suffering men to pursue in virtue their true happiness, leads man, in vice, to misery and crime.
2. Liberty, in man, is not the acting according to his pleasure, which is the liberty of the brute; but it is in being pleased with that conduct which is for his happiness, that is, for his intellectual enjoyment. Man, therefore, is truly in liberty, only so far as he rules himself; and he is truly happy, only so far as he rules himself in wisdom. Perfect political liberty, therefore, belongs to the philosopher alone; as for other men, they should be ruled for their good; and it is a misfortune for them to have the power of degrading human nature, and of hurting themselves in abusing arts intended for their happiness.

But, there is not perfect wisdom in any man; at the same time, he is not properly a man who has not wisdom in some degree. There being thus an indefinite variety in the understanding or abilities of men, in proportion as they have produced their intellectual capacities, it is always profitable for one man to be ruled by another; but, it is impossible for mankind to be always ruled in perfect wisdom.

The state of human society being always changing, and always to be ruled, there must, in every state, be a power of regulating manners, and not fixed rules which cannot change. Heritage, or succession to wealth, is one of those regulations which must have an influence upon the manners of men; and now, it may be proper to show what influence, upon virtue and the happiness of a people, may arise from a proper attention to those regulations which affect the manners of mankind.

3. There are, in the natural progress of a political state, or constitution of human society, two different periods to be remarked; the period of growth or aggrandisement, and that of perfect policy and refinement. In those different states of things, which happen in those two periods of this progress, different motives influence the manners and the morals of the people.
Sect. VI. PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS.

The succession to property or wealth may be among the public regulations of a state, and may affect the morals, as it must more immediately the manners. Now, as the morals of men may be much changed in the progress of a state, or, as the political views of things may alter greatly with the opulence and prosperity of a people, the rules of succession or inheritance, in order always to be calculated for the best, ought to follow the changed constitution of things; and such a regulation as this, at certain periods of a national change, will not be a matter of indifference, with regard to the benefit or the prejudice of the common weal; at the same time, it may not be an easy matter to see all the consequences of a public regulation. This arises from certain considerations, perhaps not unworthy to be noticed.

4. The first of those interesting periods of political society, is that in which the persons of a commonwealth or kingdom give actual service to the state. It is here that public virtue forms the most powerful motive for the exertions of mankind; and, it is here that virtuous citizens are excited by the esteem of others, and are rewarded by the approbation of their own mind. In such a state as this, there is no mercenary view in the affairs of state, no public service to be bought and sold; it is the golden age of public virtue, and not that age where virtue is to be exchanged for gold. At this bright period of a growing empire, it is according to the actual abilities of a man that a patriot will serve the state, and not, from motives of pecuniary profit, undertake a service, which he either is not able or not willing to perform.

In this constitution of human society, where actual service is required of the persons in the state, no other wealth is requisite besides the necessaries of life, and means of personal defence. Money might here be a convenience, in procuring those necessaries which the preservation of the state requires; it could not be a necessary, in procuring either inclination or ability to serve the state.
In this state, all the wealth or superfluity of individuals would be naturally employed in promoting the prosperity of the public, with which the mind of man, when at his ease, is principally occupied, and in which men would then find their personal, their particular, interest and delight. The hereditary interest, therefore, should descend in right to those who are to occupy the place, at least in time, and are to follow the steps of their predecessor in useful service and in glory. Here, therefore, in the wisdom of man, is the proper foundation for a male heir, in the succession to the inheritance of property.

Man, in this state, has a noble example in his view; he naturally is educated to his office; and, he does not stand in need of any foreign allurement to guide him to his duty. Here dignity consits in office; and, the reward of virtue necessarily follows the actual discharge of that which a man owes to his friend, his family, and his fame. Nothing could be more preposterous than in such a state to propose, that, for the promotion of virtue, there should be created some ideal dignity; or that, for the discharging of a man’s duty, there should be offered some pecuniary reward.

5. In such a state, the ambition of a man is to serve the public; and the interest of a man is not to sacrifice the public good to his ambition. But a state, arrived at this degree of wisdom and of virtue, cannot be supposed to continue without change. Order and virtue will beget a general wealth; wealth and wisdom will beget much superfluity in a nation. Hence, the enjoyment of other benefits will creep in among a people, who before had little more than social duty for the object of their wishes. For, in the growing wealth of individuals more than the necessity of the state requires, the foundation would be laid for the enjoyment of ideal and visionary pleasures, in the room of those which, in the primitive state of things, had been substantial.

6. In
6. In proportion as public safety shall grow upon this general prosperity of a state, and government be extended with the increase of a wealthy people, more rulers will be required for the purposes of government; but, at the same time, there will be required less sacrifice of private interest from each ruler, in contributing with his services to promote the welfare of the empire. The personal interest, therefore, of each ruler acquires a greater power in his esteem, in proportion as the proper execution of his office becomes less necessary to the preservation or prosperity of the state. The allurements to the neglect of duty will also, to the individual, be increased, in proportion as this part of public service may be dispensed with in the general prosperity of the nation. Thus, in proportion as private virtue is enforced by the wisdom of the law, the effect of public virtue is enfeebled in the folly of corrupted citizens. Here, then, begins the relaxation of that rigid virtue, which in harder times had been inflexible to every selfish motive; and here it is that the caducity of a state is necessarily founded in the nature of human things, and in the changing circumstances which affect the constitution of artificial government, when not wisely changed with the nature of things in which it is to exist.

We have been considering a state of human society, in which wisdom and virtue are the prevailing motives: We are now to contemplate this political state, as enriched by the cultivation of useful arts, and as grown wealthy by its general commerce; and thus we are to consider the effects of wealth and national prosperity upon the morals of the people.

In the state of industry and virtue, the wealthiest of the people engage themselves in the business of the nation; first, because their interest is naturally most concerned in the well-being of the state; and secondly, because it is their dearest interest to seek the reward of virtue, i.e. the love and the esteem of men. But, in the more artificial
ficial state of things, when wealth and population have arrived at a certain summit of perfection, there are other means by which a wealthy man may render himself eminent and admired. A gilded coach dazzles the eyes of people, who are ignorant of the true source of happiness; and, a sumptuous table will corrupt the morals, even of the learned. There is thus established, in an enriched nation, a competition between virtue and vice, which of these should most prevail; a competition which begets disturbance in the government, and naturally calls forth the exertion of philosophy, in framing wholesome laws for this enlightened state.

7. The political system, however simple in its beginning, grows complex with the power and wealth of nations; and, that which at first required nothing but vigour and integrity of mind to execute, now requires much art and learned education to perform. Hence, men are set apart for the execution of this public duty; talents are called forth to be exerted in the great business of the nation; and, a new source of gaining wealth is thus established, upon the motive of preserving that which had been gained. With the accumulation of wealth, the splendour of public offices is increased; and, the system of things is so far changed, that, instead of the most wealthy being naturally the most virtuous and most useful citizens, it is the most virtuous and most useful that have it in their power to become most wealthy.

8. Here again begins the greatest corruption of our morals. For, when acquired wealth gives a title to pre-eminence, money will be sought merely for the sake of riches; riches will compensate for the want of virtue; and then, nothing but philosophy can suspend the vilest degradation of mankind. But here, philosophy steps in to the aid of virtue, in giving knowledge of order, beauty, system; and thus making virtue, which necessarily pleases in the eyes of men, an object of general love and admiration.
Various devices may, in the wisdom of men, be contrived, in order to remedy this growing evil in a mercenary state. The view of the Spartan lawgiver was the preservation of public virtue, in proscribing wealth, as being the corrupter of a people’s morals. But, how much better, to make wealth, which is the necessary consequence of political wisdom, the very means by which should be preserved public virtue! It is upon this principle, that we are now to consider what may be necessary in the regulations of a state, when arrived at a period requiring change.

9. The pursuit of arts calculated for the pleasure and the happiness of man being established in a state, and the necessary offices of government being lucrative instead of costly to the possessors, the same motives for the succession of heritage, as fixed in the male line, no longer now subsists; and, an accomplished female becomes a personage as necessary to the wellbeing, i.e. the virtue of the state, as any other in the kingdom. For, having as mothers the education of the children, and as mistresses the affections of the youth, What may not be the power of wisdom and of virtue, in such hands?

10. It is therefore for the general happiness of mankind, as well as for the particular advantage of a state arrived at all the arts of virtue and corruption, to dignify the sex which contributes so much to pleasure and enjoyment; and thus to create a source for virtuous emulation in the minds of men, and to procure the most honourable employment for those, whose natural power is founded in the sense of beauty. Thus nothing will contribute more to the perfection of a state, than to have the women employed as instruments in promoting public virtue; and to see them valued for those accomplishments which best can make man happy; instead of being considered as only fitted for domestic service, and for the idle entertainment of the little tyrant, in the thoughtless moments of his life.

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The office of woman, in the political state, is of high importance; women form the manners of the children; and, they may form the morals of the youth; but, for that purpose, they should surely be informed. They should be educated in useful knowledge, and in the purest principles, both of private and of public virtue; they ought to understand the true sources of their rational, their independent happiness; and, they should be made to see the wisdom and benevolence of that system, in which man has his animal existence only for the purpose of his intellectual enjoyment,—an enjoyment, not temporary, nor subject to corruption, as are the sensual pleasures.

It is not in reading Greek and Latin that our learned women are to be employed; nor is it in the pursuit of abstract science, which is only for the few among mankind. But, our learned females should be instructed in that art of government which is the means of making mankind happy; and, they should be accomplished in every species of learning that may lead to amiable and useful manners.

In Europe, the world enjoys, in this very manner, a state of virtuous happiness, now well understood; and, it is thus that may be reconciled the progress of almost every virtue, amidst a general corruption. For, though to sacrifice personal interest for the sake of virtue does not fall to the share of little minds, there is scarce a person in an enlightened state, such as are those of Europe, that does not, unknown to himself, adore the image of virtue, even when he cannot imitate that which he admires.

Therefore, to an improved state, which is by wealth corrupted, and is to be supported by philosophy, where virtuous education is required, and a school for honour, nothing is more important than the character of women. It is in the wisdom of man, to form wo-
men virtuous and intelligent; it is in the wisdom of woman, to form men honourable and temperate; and, it is in the wisdom of philosophy, to consider both female virtue, and manly honour, as bulwarks of the state which they adorn.

Example II.—Wisdom required in the mode of Exaction, and in that of Election, for the Service of the State.

1. There is not any natural form of government, or political constitution, for man, as there is for some species of animals, such as, for example, in the oeconomy of ants or bees; and, the reason is plain. In the natural state, man has particular views, which he pursues in wisdom, and attains the end; but, in the artificial or political state, where the general interest of the whole independently of any particular should be consulted, the wisdom of the individual leads not immediately to the happiness of the whole; the common good is only promoted, by each person sacrificing some part of private interest; and, this may be executed in an indefinite variety of ways.

The political state is the interest of many. But, in a multitude of men, there is not properly wisdom; and, when the multitude are actuated by the wisdom of a council, there is then exhibited the effect of a governing power, which is the work of art, and not immediately of nature. Now, if political government be in its nature artificial, we are not to look for any natural form, in its constitution, which should be invariably pursued; but, we are to exert political wisdom, in administrating to the exigencies of a state, according as these arise in the naturally changing course of things. Let us however carefully distinguish the natural exigency of a changing state, and the spurious exigency or artificial clamour, whether of the speculative who see not all the effects of a well-meaning innovation, or
of the unprincipled, who have an interested view, and who are willing to change the order of heaven and earth to gain their end. Nothing but the dictates of wisdom and virtue should ever be attended to, in the council of the state.

2. To seek a form of government in nature were in vain; but, in order to see its principle, we must go to the natural constitution of the human mind, formed with benevolence, and attaining virtue, in the progress of its science, by which the various degrees of good and evil, of justice and injustice, are distinguished. These are the principles of every government; and they are, like truth, invariable; though, in the mind of man, which is subject to error, they may be perverted. The forms of government, again, being artificial or proper to man alone, who in his wisdom forms rules according to the occasion, are necessarily various and changeable; consequently, these are to be considered, in science, as indefinite.

But, among the various objects of political government, there is one which is simple and distinct, and which therefore may be considered by itself, in order to see how far there may be found, in science, principles for establishing a general rule in this department of the state. Taxation and popular election are the subjects of regulation here to be examined. If rational principles for regulating those operations of the state could be discovered, it would be for the benefit of mankind, that these should be held in view by every legislature; to the end that justice and wisdom, which in the natural constitution of things are perfect, may appear in the artificial system of human government. Man, by the very imperfection of his wisdom, proves his title to free will and moral liberty; but it is by forming a system of justice, wisdom, and benevolence, in which government is contrived for the benefit of the species, that man rises infinitely superior to the animal, and claims alliance to the Ruler of the Universe.
We may now consider the legislature of a state as having three distinct subjects for the exercise of its political wisdom. First, those regulations which concern the moral conduct of the people: Secondly, those rules which have in view the political constitutions of a state: And, lastly, the mode of raising those contributions which are necessary in the government and protection of a nation. It must be evident, that very different species of knowledge are required, in each of these departments, in order to qualify the council of the state, so as to proceed with wisdom and with justice.

With regard to the first, as every individual of the nation is concerned with virtue, and interested in good morals, every one might have some voice in the regulation of the duties to be performed. But, every one is neither equally qualified for that office of regulating morals; nor, if qualified, is every one equally concerned in that object.

Let us suppose a nation possessed of no property but that which daily is procured for the purposes of life; in that case, every one, who is duly qualified, would have an equal concern in what were prescribed for the general conduct of the whole; because, each has an equal claim, by nature, to life, to liberty, and to the enjoyment of his happiness. But, when skill and industry have procured property, by the conquest of nature, and in the luxuries of life, all have not equally concern in moral precepts or restraining laws. The rich may find a luxury in relieving those that want; but, those that want must not claim a right to participate with those that have. In this first department of legislation, it would require the greatest wisdom, in order to encourage virtue and discourage vice. It is neither to the rich who have the greatest property to protect, nor to the poor who have the least, that we are to have recourse for the election of such a council, who are to conduct the morals of a people; but, it is to the learned, the amiable, and the wise.
With regard to the second, the political constitution may be contrived either with a vicious or a virtuous intention; but, it is our object, as much to avoid the one, as it is to pursue the other; and now we may consider, who are the persons on whom this duty, of preserving the virtuous intention of a constitution, should be devolved.

Constitutions which give occasion to or encourage the usurpations of men, in tyrannising over the persons or the property of others, are vicious in their nature and injurious to a people. They, therefore, who have the greatest property in a nation, have the greatest interest to prevent this evil in the state. This council, therefore, ought to be chosen out of the most independent and enlightened men.

With regard to the last, viz. the council for regulating contributions to the necessities of the state, this evidently should be chosen out of the contributors, and, in some proportion to those contributions.

But now a question may be made, viz. Who are the persons who should contribute to the exigencies of the state? It is a question of the greatest importance, in this subject of political oeconomy, as it should be the principle for regulating every public contribution. Here is, therefore, a proper subject for political discussion; and now we are to examine the principles on which that should proceed.

3. A savage nation has its property in common. Each individual subsists entirely by his proper industry, in taking from the common stock of nature all his wants. Legislation is not known to them; far less is taxation. But this is not the case with barbarous nations; these differ from a polished state only in degree. They have the arts of peace and war; and they have the art of government, al-
though that art may be in its infancy; The government of Britain is perhaps better than that of the ancient Gauls, only in having been improved by means of the science and experience of government.

A polished state does not differ from a barbarous nation, in being governed by laws; for, the barbarous state has customs which are equivalent to laws. But a barbarous state differs from one that is properly civilized, so far as it has not equitable regulation for the contribution of individuals to the necessary support of a government, or to the occasional exigencies of the state.

4. The expenses of a political state necessarily increase with the state of civilization among a people; but it does not necessarily follow, that the exaction upon each individual of a nation shall increase in proportion to the general civilization of the state. The exaction necessarily to be levied upon each individual depends upon the magnitude, the oeconomy, the wealth, and fortunate or unfortunate circumstances of the nation. But, in abstracting from every thing that is particular in the constitution and circumstances of a state, we may consider the general principles upon which may be regulated legislation, when connected with taxation, or so far as those two things may have a natural connection in the political constitution of a state. We are not to inquire how far the exactions, which are levied upon the people, may be either properly or improperly employed for the purposes of state; we are at present only concerned with the mode in which a exaction, necessary for the state, may be contrived, in justice to individuals, and in wisdom for the whole.

5. In a polished nation, there may be distinguished three different conditions of life among the people: The state of indigence, the state of independence, and that of wealth. In the first of these, there are indefinite degrees, from the helpless condition of an infant, which
which must have everything done for it, to the feeble condition of
an infirm person, who cannot earn just sufficient for himself.

The independent condition is a definite state; it is that of one
who can provide the necessaries of life for himself; and also for
his family so far as they are helpless.

The state of wealth, again, is as indefinite as is that of indigence;
and, the state of independency is terminated, on the one hand, by
the least degree of indigence, and, on the other, by the least degree of
wealth. But in order to understand what are the necessaries of life,
independent of every degree of wealth; and what may be wealth or
luxury, independent of the necessaries of life, some little discussion
will be now required. The nature of man must be here examined,
in order to distinguish the real from the artificial sources of his
happiness.

6. In the natural state, without social commerce, man is able to
maintain himself, and his family. This is all that he desires; there-
fore he will do no more. But man, in the state of society and of
art, is able to do a great deal more; and, in the state of human re-
finement, he has a great deal more to desire. Hence, all the art and
industry of man, is evidently engendered by necessity. He must
have food and raiment, therefore his active genius is employed; he
acquires a taste for the luxuries of life, art then forms necessity to
activate the inventive powers of man.

Man is thus by art refined in his animal enjoyment; but, in
nothing is the animal nature of man improved by this refinement.
The pleasure of eating is only improved by hunger, the pleasure of
activity by health, the pleasure of rest and sleep by exercise; so far
as man uses any other means in order to promote his animal enjoy-
ment, he, in the quest of pleasure, finds nothing but dislike. It is
therefore
therefore only in folly that the art of man, beyond a certain degree, is employed in the pursuit of that pleasure which is merely animal; but, there are other pleasures which the mind of man pursues with profit. Man's taste for beauty, whether natural or moral, grows; and, in the opening of his intellect, man finds a new source for pleasure, a pleasure which is artificial, and which is uncorruptible by art, although it may be lost by error.

The pursuit of intellectual pleasure, therefore, while the good of the animal constitution is not neglected, leads not to evil him who seeks it in the way in which it is to be attained. The enjoyment of this pleasure belongs exclusively to man, and leads to wisdom in the progress of his science, and to prudence in the general knowledge of ends and means.

To have this pleasure in a high degree, requires not all the knowledge or progress of a Newton; but, it requires his knowledge, in some degree; and, he is not to be esteemed a man, who has not that knowledge. The happiness of man is not measured by the height to which he may have arrived at in any particular branch of science, but to his love of science, which grows in the enjoyment. The happiness of man bears no proportion to science or knowledge in general; for, the nature of man is finite, that of knowledge infinite. Man is made happy in proportion to the progress of his mind, and to the utility of the knowledge which he may have acquired in that manner.

Now the utility to man, of knowledge, consists in this,—that it be proper to serve the constitution of his being, or nature of his existence. But the nature of man is two-fold, animal and intellectual; therefore, the utility of his knowledge may either respect the one or other of those two parts of his constitution. This forms, for man,
two different kinds of objects, viz. the necessaries of life, and the means of happiness.

7. To every man, who is in health and has the necessaries of life, the means of happiness are attainable; but, the necessaries of life are not the means of happiness, so far as life and happiness are different. The necessaries of life contribute immediately to man's happiness, only so far as they are used; and only so far as they are used with propriety, and not intemperance. No superfluity contributes immediately to make man happy, farther than as it may put his mind at ease in relation to the future provision of those means of life.

But, man may easily misunderstand the proper means of happiness; and, he may set his desire upon a thing not equal to the end in view. In that case, he pursues a phantom; although he may find pleasure even in that pursuit.

Thus as, in man's animal enjoyments, there is a species that is good and another that is evil, so, in his intellectual enjoyments, there is a species that is just, as leading absolutely to happiness the end, and another that is erroneous, as not leading absolutely or necessarily to that end, although occasionally answering that end in giving a temporary pleasure.

Man's true happiness, or intellectual enjoyment, is not limited to any station of life, and is not comprehended in any particular object of pursuit; it is general to the understanding mind, and is an universal in the human disposition; it is the approbation of ourself, and the conscious esteem of those whom naturally we love. But, this true source of happiness, though natural to man when uncorrupted, is nevertheless highly improved in the culture of the mind; it is therefore important to promote a source of intellectual improvement.
In like manner, though man be calculated for virtue, from the natural disposition of his mind, and necessarily improved in a virtuous education, yet, subject as he is to error, man is corruptible with the intemperate desire of pleasure; and, he becomes vicious and miserable in the inordinate pursuit of animal enjoyment, and in the erroneous formation of his ideal happiness. Therefore, in the wisdom of the species, every means should be devised for restraining vice, as well as for promoting virtue.

8. It will now be easy to understand what are the necessaries of life, and what is to be considered as the means of luxury. By the necessaries of life, is meant all that is necessary for maintaining health and strength, to act with vigour of body and of mind; consequently, this is all that is necessary for procuring happiness, to a person who has not formed to himself ideas of a state above his natural condition. The means of luxury, again, is the possession of anything beyond the necessaries of life.

The necessaries of life are definite; the means of luxury are indefinite. The one of these is necessary to human happiness; the other is not necessary, although, when properly employed, it may be a mean in promoting intellectual enjoyment. None of the one can be taken away without causing real distress; all the other, again, may be withheld, without necessarily producing the least disturbance to what is real happiness.

9. There being thus, in a political state, three classes of people naturally, the indigent, the independent, and the wealthy, these may be now considered severally, in relation to legislation and taxation.

10. The lowest state is evidently precluded from any share in legislation or taxation; let us therefore next consider, how this may
be with respect to the middle state, which is that of independency. But this term must be explained. Man naturally is twice in his life to be found in the state of indigence. He necessarily comes into the world in that state; and, what with accidents, and what with natural infirmities, he may be said to go out of the world not exempted from dependence. Man, however, is not to be considered singly by himself; he must be considered as naturally existing in a family. A family is composed of indigent and independent persons, variously proportioned, but which, upon the whole, must be considered as independent by the united efforts of every individual. Thus those two states of life, which for distinction's sake we had separated, are now to be conjoined, and considered as one, in having the necessaries of the indigent provided for, and every exertion of the independent person occupied in his family concerns. This forms a state of life which is here termed independent, as being placed betwixt the two extremes, of indigence on the one hand, and of affluence on the other.

To exact any contribution from the industrious labourer who has nothing but the necessaries of life, is contrary to every maxim of political wisdom; and, to suffer the voice of ignorance and indigence to enter in the most distant manner into the council of the nation, is to admit of palpable error in the constitution of the state. On the one hand, a man, who earns his bread with the sweat of his brow, has, surely in justice, a right to eat that bread in peace, and to have it unimpaired in its quantity*; and, in sound policy, such

* This reasoning does not extend to those doubtful subjects which may be considered either as the necessaries of life, or the means of luxury; subjects on which a certain tax may be allowed, with great propriety, without transgressing the principle here laid down for our political wisdom. Thus, for example, a revenue from salt, soap, leather, candles, is not properly a tax upon the necessaries of life: Those commodities are much
a person should be encouraged to aspire at more than barely to sustain his life, that something may thus be provided for the necessity of future time. On the other hand, if it be the chief view, in political restraint, to preserve to every one the conquest of his ingenuity, and the possession of his wealth, what folly to consult with those who, having neither, would willingly abolish consultation on the subject! Thus, in every view, the indigent, and the barely independent, are, in sound policy, to be excluded from every species of contribution to the operations of the state.

The labourer contributes his industry, and he receives its price; to take from him any of that price, is to discourage industry, and increase the flock of indigence. But, who can profit by the decrease of industry?—Not the wealthy; for, these have their wealth to buy the fruits of industry:—Not the sovereign; for, he is made to glory in the prosperity of his subjects:—Not the state; for, it is made to prosper in the rise of individuals from mere independency to wealth. Therefore, wisdom says, encourage industry, by laying no restraint upon the hand that works; justice says, give to the labourer the unimpaired wages of his toil. If justice and wisdom join to plead the cause of virtuous industry, it could be only in the delusion of his systematic reasoning that man might be led to transgress the law of natural benevolence. Tyranny may, in the error of its ignorance, or in the folly of its council, devise the iniquity of oppressing man; but, true government is not founded upon conquest; it is the gift of Heaven in being founded upon virtue, and the pride of man in being founded upon wisdom, as has been shown in the preceding chapter.

12. He much more to be considered as the means of luxury. But, even suppose they should be considered as being in some respect the necessaries of life, yet, if the industrious have those useful articles by means of the beneficial influence of steady government, incomparably cheaper than they could otherwise procure them, a reasonable tax on those commodities should not be considered as increasing the expense of labour in a state.
12. He who, in employing the labourer, gives him bread, must have more than the necessaries of life in his possession; and, it is from the use of his superfluity, that he expects to benefit himself while he provides for others. Such a person should, in justice, contribute to the expenses of the state; because, it is by means of the security which is procured by government, that he forms his gain, in lending out his superfluity, and finding a return which yields him profit. In like manner, every man, who by his skill, or his improved talents, earns more than the man of simple industry, should in justice contribute something, out of his superfluity, to that state of political commerce, in which his natural talents are improved, and his acquired skill is recompensed with a suitable return. But, from the man who only earns a livelihood, What can be taken? Nothing of his daily sustenance; this would be no other than to kill the hen that lays the golden eggs. If, therefore, anything is to be taken from the wages of the industrious, it must be the provision for a family; now, let us see what should be the consequence of this procedure, or what the purpose of a measure which revolts at the first sight.

By diminishing the revenue of the laborious, the means of propagating industrious citizens are impaired; and, the purpose of this must be, to spare the means of families who are wealthy. But, will the end proposed be in this manner gained?—No; the diminution of the laborious families of the nation must be followed by the reduction of a proportionate quantity of the idle, or the easy, to the state of industry and labour; for, in our golden age, the earth produces not spontaneously. But, this would be a change extremely disadvantageous to the state. The natural course of things is for the industrious labourer to become wealthy, and not for the wealthy to become laborious. When a man by industry becomes rich, he increases the stock of national wealth, and he promotes the general happiness; but, when a rich man is reduced to the necessity of labour,
bour, he has so far diminished the general wealth, and has lost the means, which before he had, of making other people happy. In those two cases, indeed, the state may neither gain nor lose; for, what one individual loses may be gained by another. But, the losing of the rich is not necessary to the gaining of the poor; whereas, the prosperity of the industrious is essential to the fruition of the rich. A rich man cannot be ruined, without the gain of others in compensation of that loss; but, when the hands of industry create wealth, the state is so far benefited without a loss; there is a bonum, which is absolute, to the commonwealth, in leaving no evil consequence to be compensated.

13. As it is a thing unreasonable, to expect a contribution for the state from him who earns the necessaries of life, so would it be in vain. He who possesses something, will, of that thing, give part, in order to secure the whole; but he who possesses nothing, will not seek to acquire that which he is not to possess; nor, will he desire to possess what he is not to enjoy. Statesmen may delude themselves, and, in taxing the necessaries of life, think that they increase the industry of the people. But, they would do well to consider, that the necessaries of life belong not to the industrious labourer who earns his daily bread; and, whatever be the artificial value of those necessaries, the labourer must have his maintenance. Therefore, by increasing the price of his provisions, you only increase the artificial value of his work, but not the quantity. The industrious labourer works not for himself, farther than to gain his livelihood; he works for the rich, who have possessions; he works for the idle, who consume. This valuable member of the state works for those who labour not themselves, but who set to work their ingenuity in employing others. But, to be ingenious, requires thought; thought requires care; and, in order to employ others, a person must have wealth, or power to procure the necessaries of life, which he then barter for the labour of the poor. Therefore, to tax the necessaries,
is only a mode of taxing wealth; but, to a trading nation, this mode of taxation is perhaps that which is the most pernicious to industry.

In order to see this, let us suppose, that, instead of laying the contribution on the luxuries, all the necessaries of life were taxed equal to their natural value; then, either the price of labour must be doubled, or the number of the labourers must be only the half of that which was before employed. Neither one nor other of those effects, indeed, could happen precisely as here stated; for, there would necessarily be produced a mean participating of both the extremes, which have been stated for distinction’s sake. The price of labour would increase, and the demand for labour would diminish. The rich, by being saved in their taxes, would have the more to spare upon their luxury; but, the superfluous of the idle and luxurious, is laid out most unprofitably for the public. Therefore, while the more profitable industry proceeds decreasing, the wealthy, if things could thus proceed to the extremity, would find themselves at last deprived of their means,—means which are properly created by the hands of the industrious.

There is another reason for not levying any tax that should more immediately affect the poor, although in the end it were to be paid by the rich. The common people cannot see how any tax (which they feel, by taking the money out of their pocket, or increasing the price of a commodity necessary to their sustenance) is to be repaid in the increased price of their labour. A wise statesman, therefore, will avoid any thing that might cause discontentment in the common people, or give occasion to the raising of commotion in the multitude, who are prone to be misled by the false declamation of the designing, in a state where the people have the freedom of giving their opinion.

It is not the necessaries of life alone, that should be preferred
in the natural value of the commodity; the means of industry should also be exempted from taxation, in order to facilitate the operations of the industrious,—operations much more important to the prosperity of the nation, than is the mode by which a minister of state shall take the money from the pockets of the rich. Let us suppose, for example, the price of flax and iron increased to that of silk and brass respectively, what a change this would produce in the system of economical industry! But, let us suppose, that every substitute for those two valuable subjects of useful manufacture were equally taxed, or taxed in a due proportion, whatever shall be supposed the quantum of that tax, it must be evident, that, though those who were rich enough might still be supplied with the manufactures which they want, those who before were just rich enough to use the manufacture, would not now be rich enough. Hence, many valuable purposes in life to which those manufactures had in the natural state of things administered, would, in the artificially increased value of those commodities, be abandoned. But, so far as the manufacture of useful commodities adds wealth to the nation, and so far as the prosperity of the industrious adds strength and happiness to the state, the natural price of those productions which are the subject of useful manufacture, should be preserved from the rapacious hand of ignorance or folly, and even of imagined necessity; for, what evil can be greater, to the prosperity of a state, than the loss of industry? The loss of wealth may be repaired by the increase of industry; but the loss of industry is not repaired,—no, not with the riches of Peru.

Here will appear the difference which naturally subsists betwixt the interest of the hereditary sovereign of a state, and that of his minister. The interest of the minister is to lay the tax upon the subject which will, with the greatest ease and security, produce the revenue required; and it must be public virtue, in him, to resist the temptation of a present good which is to sow the seeds of growing evil. The interest of the sovereign, again, is to have the taxes disposed.
posed in the best manner for the preservation and prosperity of the state; and he has naturally no temptation, to prefer a temporary convenience to a lasting good. Now that which, in a virtuous person, is the patient endurance of a temporary evil, for the attaining of a permanent good, such, in the political system of a state, is the despising of immediate danger and difficulty, when put in competition with a benefit which is to grow in time, by the salutary effect of a judicious regulation,—a benefit which may be also enjoyed in the present moment, by the virtuous contemplation of what is wise and good.

15. It is a task far from being easy, that of calculating the various taxes that may with more or less advantage be allowed upon commodities; for, there are dangers and difficulties upon the one hand and the other; and it requires extensive knowledge, or profound wisdom, to judge how those difficulties may best be avoided, and the purpose most valuable to the community be fulfilled. This may be illustrated in an example.

So far as the use of beer should be employed merely as a necessary of life, in preserving health and giving vigour to fatigued labourers, the taxing this commodity ought to be avoided; but, on the other hand, so far as this commodity may be employed as a superfluity, to give intoxication, and to corrupt the morals of the industrious, it ought to be prohibited. A proper tax, upon this useful and dangerous commodity, forms a middle course. Man may enjoy both health and strength without the use of any species of fermented liquor; the Mahometan lawgiver has even prohibited its use, surely as finding it pernicious upon the whole to people not actuated by a principle of virtue; therefore, it may certainly be considered as not absolutely a necessary of life. But, on the other hand, nothing contributes more to the comfort of the industrious labourer than the proper use of a fermented nutritive liquor, such as beer or a moderate strength.
strength. What judgment, therefore, is to be formed upon the whole? Let the industrious have the use of this invigorating draught; but, let it be the price of his increased industry.

16. Wealth is a thing; it is separable, and may be divided. Wealth is the having more than what is necessary; therefore, of a superfluity part may be spared, for the advantage of the possessor, who has to look for the security both of his person and possession. But, industry is not a thing; it is a capacity for procuring things. Industry is in the individual, and it is in its nature indivisible; no part, therefore, may be taken of that which is inseparable.

In a state of freedom, wealth may be taxed without the infringement of that state; whereas, to tax industry is to erect a state of slavery in a nation. Conquest may give possession of a man; and, the labour of a slave may be exacted under pain of bodily infliction; but, no laborious task may be imposed upon a man, who has the freedom of his will, unless by necessity which is from nature.

Wealth is a superfluity; and this is procured either by conquest or by industry. While, therefore, industry is made to flourish in a state, the loss of wealth is little important to that nation; it is only reducing those wealthy families to the state of industry, by which they had acquired riches. But, industry is not a superfluity; it may not be taken from a person without material detriment to the state; and, while superfluity is the natural consequence of industry, the political danger is, in the discouragement of industry, to make it be deficient.

17. If taxing the necessaries of life be highly impolitic in a commercial nation; if any distressing degree of exaction, from the laborious part of the community, be tyrannical and unjust; and if the natural consequence of taxing the independent members of the state be
be to restrain the growth of industry. How cautious should be the council of legislation with regard to imposing burthens on a class of people who should be encouraged with all the artifice of political wisdom! At the same time, nothing is perhaps more difficult than to judge how industry may be affected in the various operation of restraining laws, which therefore should be, as much as possible, avoided; while every regulation of state should be studied, by the philosopher, in its principles. For, in the complex state of political regulations, and in the slow operations of a diversity of causes, influenced by the indefinite circumstances and gradually changing state of human things, it is not in the power of man, reflecting on what is past, to ascribe to every effect the just value of its proper cause, or to learn from mere experience the just rules of political wisdom. Man, therefore, wisely systematizes, in knowing what is most general in things; and thus forms principles from whence to reason, in relation to what shall happen, in the political as well as natural and moral systems.

We are now treating of the necessary exactions to be levied upon the members of the state; but, it is only the ordinary state of a nation that we are now considering; and it is not that necessitous state, in which it requires the actual exertion of every member immediately for the preservation of the nation. But, even in this case of supposition, the same principles will apply; for, though in ordinary cases, where his immediate prosperity or existence is not in danger, the independent member of the state is exempted from taxation, he cannot be exempted from defending with his arm, and at the peril of his life, that state of independency in which he has the means of health and happiness.

Thus, in the case of necessity, every man is called upon to give his assistance to the support of the happy state in which he lives; but still, every man is only called upon to contribute according to the principle of taxation which we have been considering as morally and politically
politically just. For, though the independent are necessarily called forth to fight in the defence of the state, of safety, life, and freedom, they must be armed and maintained at the expence of those who contribute their wealth *

18. It will thus appear, that it is only in the wealthy rank of citizens that the power, of either giving council for the laws, or paying taxes for the exigencies of the state, can be expected. We may therefore now consider, what are the natural principles according to which these duties ought to be divided among this rank of men. First then of taxation.

19. It must be evident that nothing more than the superfluity can be taken from any man without rendering his state indigent, consequently doing him injustice, in making him worse than nothing, or diminishing his natural state of health and happiness. But it is also evident, that no man has a title to with-hold what is necessary to the support of the state, out of his superfluity, provided that the exaction be equally proportioned, according to the wealth or superfluity of each individual.

20. If this be acknowledged as a just principle of taxation, it will appear, that there are two different methods which may be employed in regulating this matter of finance: 1st, People may be taxed personally, in proportion to their wealth: 2d, The luxuries of life themselves

* Thus may appear the false view of pressing seamen, which is entertained by our *virtuous* enthusiasts for a freedom which they do not understand, and which may be held forth by our *vicious* advocates for a liberty which they are abusing. I do not mean to say, that pressing into the service should ever be employed, if it could be avoided; this is evident; and, the greatest benefit to the state arises from the salutary mode, of recruiting the national forces by means of volunteers. But, when necessity demands it, the mode of pressing, into the service of the state, those by whom alone the state may be saved or served, is no infringement of political liberty.
selves may be taxed. Each of these have both advantages and disadvantages in the execution.

21. In employing the first method, an equal taxation would be obtained, so far as the true wealth of each person should be known; but there would be great difficulty, as well as inconvenience, in the execution. In adopting the second, again, there might be great advantages, both in equalising what ought to be paid, and particularly in preserving virtue, by taxing in a high degree the means of vicious habits. But, in the taxing of commodities, moderation must necessarily be preserved; otherwise, the intention of increased revenue is thus defeated; and there is thus introduced the vice of lawless practices, in defrauding government.

22. In order to have every benefit arising from those methods of taxation, there should be required, in the legislation of the state, great wisdom and justice to proportion things. Without these, the most perfect principles of taxation might, in the execution, be most oppressive and unjust. We may, therefore, now consider legislation in relation to this necessary part of human polity.

If the sovereign of the state should regulate taxation, then, provided he had proper information and wisdom sufficient for this task, we could not reasonably suspect him of injustice. The general interest of the state is his, and every virtuous subject is to him dear, and should be, in his royal disinterested justice, equally supported. If, again, taxation be devolved on the council of the nation, where men to be taxed fit judges of taxation, it would require more than ordinary virtue and wisdom to actuate this council which is to regulate the taxes of the nation. Nothing but the wisdom of man informed by long experience, of the various modes, their several advantages and defects, and generalising all those different principles of legislation, can be sufficient for this arduous task.
In proceeding any farther upon this subject, we would naturally depart from general principles, which is the proper object of this treatise, to consider those that are more particular; and this would lead into discussions that would not be proper to the science of metaphysics, in which the general principles only, of politics as well as of the other sciences, may be examined.

CHAP. X.

General Conclusion from the Doctrine of this Section.

1. No where is the wisdom of nature more displayed, than in the constitution of human intellect. Man, the animal, is not made to err; no more than the brute, who cannot learn from error to know truth. It is only as he learns to reason scientifically, that man comes to err in reasoning; and it is only in knowing error, that he may distinguish truth. But, without the guide of truth, What would be human intellect? and, with the truth of science, To what may not attain the power of human wisdom? Nature, therefore, in making man an animal capable of error, has made him a being that must proceed in wisdom; not only, like the brute, in that wisdom which is not his own, but by knowing his own nature, as a being capable of acting voluntarily, of choosing wisely, and of creating to himself either happiness or misery.

Such is the rational being man, who, instead of reasoning, like the brute, in order to act, reasons scientifically, i.e. in order to know; he thus is made to know, not for the purpose of his animal nature, but in order to become wise; and, he is made to become wise, not to increase his animal pleasure, which is fixed in the wil-
dom of nature, but to increase his intellectual enjoyment, and to make himself happy in learning to be virtuous.

2. Thus the nature of man is perfect; although the individual, of the human species, is imperfect. Man, who is made for virtue, is necessarily subject to vice; for, as he is made to become wise, he must be also capable of folly. Were it otherwise, man would be wise as an animal is sensible, as the grass is green, and as the earth is heavy; his ruling principle would not then be virtue, according to our idea of this attribute of the human mind; and he would be a per sonage as different from what he is at present, as the brute is from the virtuous man.

3. Thus it will appear, that wisdom is proper to man; and that it belongs not to the animal, who nevertheless acts wisely, in employing reason to distinguish his instinctive motives, or to assimilate his knowledge, without that conscious distinction which is in science, and that generalisation which is in philosophy. (Part I. Sect. IX.) Thus also it will appear, that the wisdom of every particular man is subject to be debased by folly, as their science is by error; but, from this, there is no reason to view the wisdom of the species man through the narrow prospect of individual sagacity, no more than it is possible, in reason, to limit, either with ignorance or error, science in that mind which conceived nature, and taught man to know.

The nature of man, as the work of God, is perfect; but, the nature of man, as a moral agent, is not to become perfect without the proper means. Man, therefore, on his road to wisdom and virtue, must be foolish, and feel occasionally the effect of vice; in like manner as a child must creep before it walks, and be subject to fall before it learns to balance its body. But, in this we find no evil; on the contrary, we may here perceive the wisdom and benevolence of that
that system, in which the animal is directed by the motives of pain and pleasure, and in which the moral man is led, by the misery of repentance, to virtue, and, by conscious virtue, to a state of independent happiness.

4. Having thus finished the subject of morality, it may now be observed upon the whole, that nature has fixed laws, for mind to feel and think, as well as for bodies to act and move; and that this law, or rule of action, discovered in the order of event, and investigated in the scientific application of reflecting minds, may be the subject of contemplation, in relation to the moral, as well as the material system.

5. The conduct of man is thus determined by his Author, who has given him three different states in which he shall be found to act. First, he is to act merely as an animal, preserving his life in employing the means immediately within his reach, and continuing the race by means necessarily suggested on the occasion; but without wisdom, foresight, or design, proper to himself. Secondly, he is to act as an intellectual being, a person wise, compared with the animal, knowing what is for his good, or judging what he thinks best upon the whole in a compound estimation; but without having that knowledge of his own nature, or of his Author’s will, which is proper to enable him to judge on all occasions without error or mistake. Lastly, he is to act as a person who has completed his knowledge, in having a proper view of the laws of nature, and the order and constitution of his own thought: This person is therefore wise compared with man in general, seeing he has learned the way to conduct himself with perfect wisdom on all occasions, by judging from a principle of truth, and not of prejudice or superstition,—and by acting from a motive which is approved upon principle, consequently, of which a man may not repent.
6. Having thus analized the constitution of human knowledge, in
finding science and philosophy to be the natural progress of the mind
of man, let us now endeavour to comprise the system of nature, with
regard to the constitution of man, in a few words; that so we may
see at one view the beauty, or justice and benevolence, of that sys-
tem.

The constitution of man is admirable or perfect; although it be
only imperfectly that the individual arrives at the end to which he
is proceeding. Here is a complicated system, of which we are to
endeavour to take an extremely abridged view.

Man is actuated in his moral conduct by two different motives,
which may be distinguished as the sensual and the intellectual mo-
tives. By the first, he has animal pleasure and satisfaction to con-
duct his action, which is naturally excited by the sense of pain or
appetite. In pursuing this motive to excess, it degenerates into un-
cautious and disgust; and, the conducting pleasure, now converted
into pain, naturally puts a stop to that action which the exciting
pain or appetite, when conducted by pleasure, had successfully pro-
moted *. Hence man, becomes wise, tempers his sensual pursuits,
in order to increase the sum of his enjoyments. Thus it is with the
one motive, by which man is influenced in his moral conduct; let
us now see how it is with the other.

The pleasure, which is not founded upon sense, but upon consci-
ous sentiment or opinion, is of a nature contrary to the sensual now
considered; for, it grows the more it is indulged; and the pain, at-
tendant on the transgressions of this intellectual motive, also grows,
in proportion as the pleasure of a conscious motive is made perfect.
Therefore, when man becomes wise, he learns to indulge his intel-
lectual pleasures, in order to promote this source of happiness. He

* Part I. Sect. VI. Chap. IV.
thus enjoys the beauty of truth, in proportion as he sees it; and, in proportion as he has indulged his satisfaction, in seeing the pleasures of his species, he delights in doing good or loving man.

But now the difficult part of his task comes to be considered. Man is actuated, as we have seen, both by sensuous and intellectual motives; and he has to shape his moral conduct so as to increase, as much as may be, the sum of his happiness. Here, it requires superior wisdom to form a proper estimate between those different motives, when these happen to interfere. But here, we may perceive the beauty of the human constitution, as this is designed by nature; and also, we may understand the anomalous appearance of this system of morality, as it is executed by the imperfect agent man.

Man has a double part to act; he has, on the one hand, his animal nature to maintain, and his species to preserve; on the other, he has to acquire an independent source of pleasure, in the enjoyment of his proper thought, in order to complete his happiness when animal pleasure shall decay. In such a situation of things, to steer a course on every occasion without error, would require consummate wisdom; at the same time, man has to acquire his wisdom by his errors. But such is the beautiful constitution of mankind united in society, that the wisdom, which is acquired in the particular pursuits of individuals, is preserved in the general progress of the human mind; and the general wisdom of man, which originates in the individual, is always more and more promoted in the prosperity of the species. Hence the art of government is the work of human wisdom, in the perfection of mankind. This is the great art by which virtue is propagated, and both natural and moral good are made to grow. This is the design of nature, in the constitution of the human species; and thus the wisdom and benevolence of our Creator is manifested, in the misery as well as in the happiness of man.
A conscious reflecting being learns, in the repentance of his folly, to be wise. Hence, a being of foresight and intelligence, arrived at wisdom, then contrives means to prevent the folly of the rising species from leading them to vice and crime; and, in this apparently disinterested action, finds his true interest necessarily involved. Thus man, in reasoning superficially, thinks that he conducts himself in his proper wisdom; whereas, in reasoning more profoundly, he finds that he is conducted, to his happiness, by the goodness and the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and, to his misery, only by his proper folly. Such is the system of nature, in the education of the human intellect; and such is the Being who has made man for wisdom and for happiness.

7. The use will now appear of these general conclusions, so far as, in comparing the result of the theory with the opinions of thinking men in all ages, means will be found for trying either, on the one hand, the theory, if those opinions are supposed to be just, or, on the other, those opinions, if the theory shall be approved of.
SECTION VII.

Of Piety and Religion, considered in relation to Philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

Religion considered as affecting Morals.

Morality has been represented as the rules which human wisdom discovers, for the happiness of man connected with his species in the social state. No motive taken from religion has been supposed to actuate the moral opinion, or influence the principle of his action. But now we are to examine such motives as may be brought from any other science, in order to see their influence upon the opinions, and consequently upon the morals of men, which are founded on opinions. It will therefore be necessary to mention all those subjects in relation to which man may reason, in forming opinions to influence his rules of conduct.

Man, having knowledge of external things, and consciousness of his own thoughts, acts in relation to those external things, which are of two different kinds, viz. animated and inanimated beings. Besides simply acting, man, who thinks scientifically, forms also rules
rules for his general conduct in relation to those external things; and, as these objects are of two different kinds, there are corresponding rules of action formed in the mind of man in relation to those things. Therefore, the misapplication of those rules of conduct, in relation to the objects to which these respectively belong, is considered as being absurd, and is termed folly; such, for example, was the conduct of the Persian monarch, who ordered the sea to be punished.

But, besides two different kinds in external things, there are distinguished two different species of animated beings with whom man is concerned; the one of these is reckoned rational, and the other irrational; more properly these two are the brute and human species. Here again two different rules of action are formed in the mind of man, for his conduct in relation to those two different kinds of animals; and the misapplication of those rules of action is considered as absurd, and the effect of folly; such, for example, was the conduct of a Roman emperor, who ordered the consular dignity to his horse.

The rules of action that man forms for his conduct, in relation to his species, constitute morality; which, though in general or theoretically founded upon the fixed laws and invariable principles of his nature, yet practically, like that human nature on which it is founded, it admits of some degrees of latitude, is even variable in some particulars, and must be accommodated to the various circumstances, in which this compound being lives, or is conceived to exist. But, is there no other being in relation to which man has to act and think, and with regard to whom rules may be conceived, for that conduct of a rational being?

2. If there is any other kind of being in relation to whom man is to act, and with regard to which conduct he has to form rules in his
his mind, the nature of this being must be known, and the relation in which man stands to that being must be understood, before he can act with propriety, and form rules in wisdom for his conduct on that occasion.

Now such a being cannot be known immediately from sensation and perception, for then it would be comprehended in those already enumerated, and would not be a different kind; but, in reasoning from those already known and properly understood, another kind may be inferred. This then will be a judgment or conclusion, that is, an opinion in our mind; and this opinion may exist either with or without proper evidence, being, in the one case, truth, and, in the other, fiction.

It is in relation to such an operation of mind as this, that human reason is now to be considered as proceeding.

3. In that first progress of the human species which is distinguished as the savage state, the mind of man is, on all occasions, subject to the highest degree of superstition, and infested with imaginary motives; that is to say, he finds a subject of dread and apprehension of evil, and a hope or expectation of good, without knowing why, or without any just cause resulting from a train of scientific reasoning from well examined principles. It is here that insignificant things are worshipped; and that benevolent and malicious spirits or agents are everywhere imagined as bringing about every natural event, which is important enough to attract the attention of these men, and be distinguished by this ignorant or unlearned, but artful race.

4. To this rude state of the human mind, succeeds that in which, although much more enlarged or general views of nature are admitted, wherein the absurdity appears of worshipping sticks and stones, or
apprehending the anger of the water and the wind, yet, an invisible being is still considered as controlling the ordinary course of nature and the will of man.

It does not here naturally occur to man reasoning from what he sees, that perceived things must have been contrived by an intelligent mind, and created by the exertion of, what may be called, a supernatural power; but, a certain order of things is considered as existing necessarily, at the same time that there are, upon all occasions, invisible and supernatural beings to be called in to the assistance of man, in overruling and changing the natural course of things. Here is the source of invocation and oblation.

5. Upon the natural superstitious of mankind, still advancing in their knowledge and sagacity, is ingrafted artificial superstition, founded on the imposition of the crafty, and the credulity of the simple. It is here that are employed, the arts of divination, and the pretended revelation of the will of the controlling spirits.

Civil policy founded in the wisdom of experience (which is a species of philosophy more or less perfect), although it may not approve of imposition in general, nevertheless employs superstition for the purpose of imposing obedience to social laws, and preserving the order of government, which is founded in morality. Hence a general connection, and often a confusion, of religious and moral duties.

6. In the progress of civil society regular science is advanced, and true philosophy, founded on that science, is cultivated, to the honour of the species, and for the blessing of a state that should be regulated on those principles. For here, religious ceremonies, freed from all absurdity, and moral precepts, strictly conform to nature, would be associated
associated for their mutual support, and for the education of a virtuous race of citizens.

But, this perfect state of policy, like that of science and philosophy, is perhaps ideal. Science is indefinite, and philosophy, so far as practised, is at the best but an imperfect thing. This however is the most conclusive argument, for our endeavouring to proceed in the correcting of error, and the advancing of truth; and thus every ideal contemplation of a more perfect state, whether in policy, science, or philosophy, necessarily contributes, in some degree, to bring about that end.

7. But, though science is imperfect, and consequently philosophy not infallible, this is only so far as conclusions are drawn beyond the data on which the reasoning proceeds, or so far as philosophy is founded on conjecture and false principles. For, when science is properly pursued, there is no defect of evidence in the result; and, philosophy or just reasoning, so far as founded upon that perfect science, is no ways deficient. Thus science leads to truths, which are no more to be called in doubt, than those which the animal, without either doubting or believing, proceeds upon in reasoning; that is to say, the truths of philosophy are as evident to reason, as those conclusions which we form naturally upon the testimony of our senses and perception.

8. Philosophy being thus a source of information that leaves no room to doubt, no more than in science upon the truths of which philosophy proceeds, so, after having applied our science, first to nature or external things, and then to the nature of our own thoughts, we find the means of forming the most important conclusions, in relation to that being who is the author of all things, of that which within us thinks, and of that which without us makes us to know in affecting our sensations. It is thus that, from the nature of hu-
man wisdom already investigated, we find an argument for infinite or perfect wisdom, in the author of the human mind, who has made the species man capable of proceeding indefinitely in wisdom; and, from the perfection of this attribute, the most irrefragable argument may be formed, for the conclusion of equal benevolence as wisdom, in the superintending power, or cause of our existence.

In order to see this, let it be considered, it has been shown, that man is made virtuous, by thinking scientifically, and reasoning philosophically, in relation to that instinctive principle of benevolence, which he has from nature in his sympathetic joy and grief, his fellow feeling for another person whom he knows to be either in pleasure or in pain. Now, is it conceivable, that benevolence should be the principle of action, designed for the conduct of man by the author of his nature, upon the supposition, that malevolence were to be imputed to the superintending mind? Or, could pain have been contrived, for the purpose of turning the mind of man from evil, if the author of our knowledge, could take pleasure in the misery of man? Such an idea, would be unworthy of a mind that reasons scientifically; it would be impossible or absurd in a man who feels pleasure in the knowledge of truth, and in the progress of his mind in knowledge.

It will now be allowed to draw this general conclusion, from the theory, (of wisdom and benevolence being the principles of morality), that, however indefinite the degrees, either of wisdom to be acquired in the pursuit of science, or of benevolence to be improved in the philosophy of man, these cannot be infinite, being only comparative and imperfect; whereas, wisdom and benevolence, as attributes of the divine mind, are truly infinite, as being in their nature absolute, and admit of no degree, as being perfect.

9. But, the evidence of that truth is not open to vulgar eyes; and,
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a full persuasion of that proposition is not to be attained in reason-
ing from common sense alone; for, in order to see every step of this
investigation, we must have reasoned in moral philosophy, after hav-
ing in the science of metaphysics carefully examined our principles.
A truth that is demonstrable may be taken for granted, or believed
in superstition; but, a person who proceeds no farther, or believes
upon no better authority, knows not truth, and thus is equally ex-
posed to believe in error.

It is in this manner that among mankind the truths of philosophy
are so confounded with fable and absurdity, that men of science,
who always look for evidence, finding it not to be in their power to
distinguish, in such general systems, what is true and what is false,
think they are obliged to reject the whole; and thus, truths, believ-
ed by some in superstition, are by others reprobated or denied upon
principle. But, a truth deduced from the principles of our knowl-
edge, must be believed when the steps of investigation have been
seen; and, a truth of such high importance to man, as that now
considered, deserves every attention that the mind can give.

10. Piety and philosophy, if different things, have been consider-
ed as both equally founded in science*; but philosophy and super-
stition are diametrically opposite to each other. The essence of the
one is to doubt, where evidence has not been found; and that of
the other to believe, upon authority which has not been examined;
that is to say, philosophy does not believe without examination; and,
in that examination, it regards the rules of truth; whereas supersti-
tion believes upon authority, which is either not examined, or not
examined strictly on the principles of truth. Hence, in the natu-
ral struggles of a state towards perfection, there springs up a race of
 sceptical philosophers, who are always reckoned atheists, by those
who are not qualified to judge their principles.

11. Now

* Part II. Sect. VIII. Chap. IX.
11. Now this free spirit of inquiry originates in scientific principles, but is not always conducted in true science, so as to arrive at philosophy to which it naturally tends. In that case, finding absurdity in received tenets, a virtuous sceptic, zealous in the cause of science, sometimes exposes the prevailing superstition, without considering, that this may be sprung of true religion, although corrupted and disguised. This virtuous principle may be the cause, however innocently or unintentionally, of irreligion; for, men of loose morals, who are impatient of restraint, adopt in superstition the hereby of sceptical philosophers, that is, they convert a laudable spirit of doubting or inquiry, into an absurd principle of disbelieving without evidence or examination.

Hence there may be found two different species of bigotry, both founded in superstition; these may be termed religious and irreligious bigots. The one is offended at the supposition that there may be any error in their dogmas; the other, on the contrary, despises those who should think, that there are any just principles which may lead to piety. These two species of bigots therefore differ from each other much less than they imagine; for, so far as their moral virtue is not influenced by their theories, they are in the eye of philosophy the same, their credulity being equal; that is to say, every species of faith, if not founded on evidence, is mere superstition. The man, therefore, who can believe that things exist without a cause, reasons much worse than he who believes, upon the authority of his mother, that God made the world out of nothing.

12. But though, with regard to philosophy, which is in its nature speculative, every species of superstition is alike, yet, with regard to civil virtue, which is in its nature practical, one species of superstition may be better calculated than another, both for the interest of the community and the happiness of the individual. It is thus that a future state in which virtue is rewarded and vice punished, at
the same time that this is a philosophical truth, it is a part of most religions which have been contrived in this world.

13. There are for us two sources of religion, viz. philosophy and superstition; both of these may be considered as leading to one end in morality, although conducted through means which are extremely different. On the one hand, philosophy teaches, that virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment; but, on the other, superstition always supposes an avenging spirit, pleased with virtue, and offended at vice. The effects of those two different principles may be now examined.

In the one case, where virtue is considered as leading to enjoyment, and vice to repentance or remorse, there is no absolute evil in the constitution of things, and every thing has been there contrived in perfect wisdom, for a purpose in which nothing is to be observed but benevolence: In the other again, where an offended judge condemns transgression to misery as a punishment, there, absolute evil is originally in the constitution of things. Those things, therefore, either have not been conceived in benevolence, or have not been contrived in perfect wisdom.

14. Here are two different theories, which may be considered as producing two different systems of religion; and, though these two are opposite in some respects, i.e. with regard to their origin and result in reason, yet they may both serve or be employed as conducting to the same end in the practice of morality, so far as the same rules of action are prescribed by each. For, whether it is from the dictates of a capricious, the threats of an avenging, or the allurements of a benevolent spirit, that I am warned to avoid offending my fellow creature, and inclined to do him good, yet, so far as this injunction, order, or constitution of things operates in the effect, it leads me, in acting, to the same end.

15. But,
15. But, this is not the case, in the contemplations of the mind, when reasoning upon those several principles of action as speculative truths; for, there, very different or opposite conclusions will be necessarily formed, according as, on the other hand, we shall consider the motive of action placed in that source which is derived from philosophy where the final cause is good, or, on the other, as this is placed in superstition, where the superintending spirit is considered as pleased with virtue, and offended at vice. This may be illustrated.

16. If, for example, when I observe the rules of virtue, I am persuaded that this is for my own advantage, as well as that of my fellow creature, then, in contemplating this system of actual things in order to know its author, who is neither offended when I transgress those rules of morality, nor pleased with my adulation and compliance, but, who has established such rules in things, that I cannot comply without a consequent enjoyment, nor transgress without an equal suffering or remorse, I find in this constitution of things a wisdom which I admire, a justice or beauty with which I am charmed, and a benevolence which I adore.

Hence I am persuaded that there is a God, who exists in necessity as the cause of all things, who subsists in perfection as the end or object of all things, and who acts in benevolence as the means for affecting in power what he had conceived in wisdom. Consequently, while with piety I acknowledge the supremacy of a God, it is with pleasure or choice that I conduct myself in following his laws. But if, on the contrary, when I observe the rules of virtue, I do this to please a capricious being, or to avoid offending an angry one who punishes vice; then, however, in prudence. I may practically conduct myself in the rules of virtue, I cannot, in reasoning approve of the motive of my conduct.

17. If
17. If in this case, where compliance with what is supposed to be the supreme will is enforced by means of fear for offending the avenging power, a person shall be inclined to relax in his religious principles from reasoning in relation to natural things, then, in following this course of thoughts without arriving at philosophy, he will be naturally led to atheism, in denying such a superintending being as in superstition he had been made to believe. If, on the other hand, this person should by any means be confirmed in his superstition while his mind in reasoning proceeds to form scientific conclusions, then, instead of atheism, he will necessarily be led to demonism, in acknowledging a principle of evil, as well as a principle of good.

18. Thus it will appear, that in the natural progress of the reasoning mind, if we are conducted in science or by the principles of truth, we shall be led to the contemplation of design and wisdom in the works of nature, and to the practice of virtue and piety in the fullest persuasion of the existence of a God. But if, without this scientific progress, we are made to acquire motives of superstition instead of principles of true philosophy, all further reasoning should be avoided, as leading either, on the one hand, to absurdity in admitting of a principle that is at the same time both good and evil; or, on the other, as landing in scepticism, where all principle of religion as a motive for a virtuous conduct will be lost.

But, in this alternative, the last is by far the least evil to be dreaded for the sake of civil society; for, on the one hand, from doubt there may naturally arise examination, from whence evidence will appear and philosophy may follow. On the other hand, from an implicit obedience to the will of a being who is not perfect, we cannot have an absolute dependence for our good; and it is impossible to limit the evil that may be admitted into a system of conduct, where there...
is not a fixed rule of virtue, or of general good, which is above all authority, and by which every thing is to be judged.

19. Thus virtue, which is founded on philosophy, has a basis which is steady and unalterable, like the laws of nature from whence it springs. Such a virtue may be more or less practised, according as the wisdom of individuals or their folly shall prevail; but it cannot be corrupted, so long as science is cultivated, and philosophy consulted. On the other hand, virtue founded in superstition has no proper basis of its own, and, in the practice of erroneous man, will naturally be corrupted; for, though true virtue cannot be corrupted by what is done in ignorance and folly, yet, the morals of the species must be depraved with their thoughts. In that case, public virtue, losing the support which it should have from time to time in the reasoning of philosophy, must degenerate, when ignorance and folly shall prevail at the fountain of opinions and of morals. Vice, then, will occasionally occupy the place of virtue, in conducting the actions, or influencing the manners of a people.

20. Superstition, under the guidance of philosophy, is natural, and is good. It is impossible for mankind in general to see those truths of science which require the investigation of many steps; for, mankind must not consist of theoretical philosophers, no more than of kings or judges. But, though mankind cannot see those truths which are above the degree of their proper science, they may believe them when revealed. For example, the system of the heavenly bodies is here generally believed by those who read or converse with men of science, although there are but few of these who see the evidence of that truth which they then believe; and there is nothing so incredible but what will be believed, if coming from an authority that is not suspected, and if not opposed by the prejudice of the person, whose faith is thus to be formed in superstition, and not in science.

21. Thus
21. Thus philosophy properly conducts the faith of mankind, in the moral sense, or opinion of good and evil; and, in this course of things, which, being natural, is from God, there follows nothing but the happiest effects. For, if science reasons from knowledge, and not from supposition, and if philosophy reasons from the truths of science, and not from the superstition of deluded minds, it is equally impossible for that philosophy to mislead the opinion of those reasoning men, as it is for nature to do wrong. But when, from circumstances adverse to the perfection of the human species, science has degenerated, and the order of nature is inverted, by superstition taking the guidance of philosophy, then, if the theory which has now been given is just, and if the natural course of things is right, and conducts to good, that perverted state of things is wrong, and must conduct to evil.

22. It appears, from the history of mankind which we possess, that, where philosophy prevailed, and superstition was held in a subordinate sphere, the annals of the human species have not been stained with the highest crimes that it is possible to commit, that is, to torment our fellow creature from the capricious fancy of a vitiated mind, and to murder one another without even the shadow of natural provocation. States that were implacable in their natural resentments, and often coolly imbrued their hands in the blood of unfortunate enemies, left their citizens in the peaceful possession of those thoughts which necessarily employ the restless mind of man, and help to soothe his cares.

It has been otherwise where superstition had assumed the reins of government, in order to extend a despotic empire over the mind of man, intended by nature for the investigation of science, and freedom of opinion: There, ignorance, begetting cruelty, has disgraced human nature. Human nature, though necessarily subjected to the imperfection of its science, and occasionally led to err in mis-stating truth,
never was known to have departed so far from the rule of right, and the duty of moral agents, as when, in reasoning from superstitious principles, a theory had been devised,—not for the conduct of man in what respected virtue,—but for the opinion of man in what respected God. It was then, that man, made by nature gentle, made himself ferocious, in avenging wrongs which only existed in his imagination;—it was then, that man, whom the wisdom both of nature and art had linked together in ties of mutual convenience and of sacred friendship, broke those chains of social love and natural benevolence;—and it was then, that man, by nature innocent, as ignorant of vice and crime, made himself guilty, by knowingly departing in his practice from humanity, as in his theory he had, inadvertently perhaps, forsaken truth.

23. But, for the transgression of the rules of wisdom, evil is a remedy; in like manner as, in reasoning scientifically, absurdity, the consequence of error, leads to truth. It is thus that mankind, who occasionally err, are naturally reformed, in reasoning from effect to cause. But it is the business of philosophy, which in knowing causes must foresee effects, to prevent those aberrations of the species, in teaching that which is amiable in speculation, and useful in the end. Thus will appear the blessings of extended knowledge. A general ignorance, while men are in the associated state, is naturally attended with a moral evil; whereas, in the culture of science by the species, moral good follows the enlightening of mankind, as necessarily as heat flows from the sun.
Sect. VII. OF PIETY AND RELIGION.

C H A P. II.

Religion considered as affecting Happiness.

1. W E have distinguished the good and the evil effects of superstition upon morals, in comparing it with philosophy. Upon this occasion, it has been shown, that, though particular good may arise from superstitious principles or precepts, when these are conducted by philosophy, which is founded upon science, and free from error, yet, that those principles, without the guidance of philosophy, are at least precarious in their effect, and, when they usurp its place, become pernicious. It may be now proper to draw some comparison betwixt philosophy and religion; that so, in finding a relation of those two things, one of which is known, in having been distinguished in relation to every other thing, we may thus be enabled to form some understanding of the other. In this manner, we may learn a rule for the application of a term, which is so frequently abused.

2. Religion, considered as a science, must have for object, to discover the will of God, so far as relates to the conduct of mankind. Philosophy, considered as a science, has for object, to discover the way in which man may make himself most happy. Now if, on the one hand, it is the will of God that man should make himself happy in the exertion of his intellectual faculties, there must be certain means by which mankind may be conducted to such a degree of knowledge as is consistent with this benevolent intention of his Author; and, in that case, those means may be properly termed natural, as distinguished in relation to those of human invention.
If, on the other hand, it is true, as has been alleged, that philosophy leads man, in understanding himself and every thing, to know the best way to make himself happy; and if it is natural, as has been shown, for the mind of man proceeding in science, which all mankind has in some degree, to attain philosophy, here are those means,—means which have been appointed, in the order of nature, to fulfil the divine will. Thus, upon the supposition that it is the will of God that man should be in this manner happy, religion and philosophy will appear to be terms properly commutable.

3. The argument now employed proceeds upon this supposition, that man had been intended to make himself most happy in the employment of his faculties, or in producing his capacities. It will require but little reasoning to persuade us, that such has been the intention of the supreme Being, if it truly appears that man has those capacities by which he may be enabled to discover what is most for his good. Every one believes that man was intended to employ his legs in walking or in standing erect; and, although he falls occasionally, and lies upon the ground, that caducity of man is not considered as the end intended by his Author, in making him an animal with legs. In like manner, though man occasionally makes himself most miserable, this must not be considered as the intention of nature, if man is truly made capable of seeing his errors, and thus made able to inform himself. But, that such is the constitution of human nature, and therefore that man truly has the capacity of discovering the way in which he is to be made most happy, I truth, has been made clearly to appear.

If, notwithstanding what has here been given, it should be alleged, that, in order to homologate religion and philosophy, it should appear, that man acts according to the will of God when he makes himself happy, in the progress of his wisdom, and in pursuing the rules of virtue with a philosophic patience;—while, on the contrary,
contrary, when man makes himself miserable in his folly, and by inconfiderately pursuing vice, this should appear to be against the benevolent intention of nature in the constitution of the human soul, or to oppose the will of God. — To this argument it may be replied, That it has already been observed, how absurd it is to suppose that any thing, which actually happens, comes to pass in opposition to the Divine will; therefore, though the state of the argument now given may be acknowledged as substantially true, it is not expressed in a proper form, as nothing can happen that is not perfectly according to the will of God. Nevertheless, it does not follow, that, because man occasionally makes himself miserable in vice and folly, it is not the will of God that man should make himself happy in the perfection of his nature, which has folly, vice, and misery, as means appointed to bring him to happiness, as a general end, in the perfection of his natural course. For, here it is to be inquired, what is the final cause of human intellect, or the intention of nature, the author of man; — Is it happiness or misery? — If it is the first, then it is not the will of God that man should make himself happy in the perfection of his nature; and, in that case, although happiness of mind should be a mean employed in the course of nature, for making him in the end more miserable, or miserable with the greater certainty, yet, to allledge it was the will of God man should enjoy a state of permanent happiness, would be manifestly absurd.

Now it has been shown, in the preceeding part of this work, that, in the animal oeconomy, nature employs pain as a motive of action, and that pleasure is the end or intention of life. In like manner, it is happiness that intellect has for the object of its intention, and not misery; for, though misery takes place, in departing from the rules of wisdom, and in opposing the natural virtue of man by foolish motives, the general intention of the system is to make happiness the
the final cause in man, and misery a mean in the production of virtue, as virtuous sentiment is the efficient cause of that felicity which is enjoyed by man in the perfection of his intellectual capacity.

The will of God is therefore made to appear, in studying nature by the careful investigation of her general laws, and in observing the wisdom of that system which then we have in contemplation. Upon no other system can the happiness of man be acknowledged as the end or intention of nature, or as the will of God in the production of human intellect. Particularly, this conclusion could not apply to such a system as should suppose that evil was not according to the will of God, as well as good; and that misery is inflicted upon the vicious as a punishment for having offended an avenging principle; for, in this case, we must suppose the Author of that system to be either impotent or malicious. This is a point so clear, that no sophistry can make a person hesitate, who thinks but for a moment upon general principles, and makes a scientific distinction of his thoughts; and it requires a despicable degree of vulgar prejudice to believe that the Author of good should hate its correlative evil, or entertain resentment at his creatures following the order of his wisdom, in which he had appointed the knowledge of error as the guide of truth. The Author of our intellect has, in perfect benevolence, ordered the conscious suffering of misery, from evil, as the means of leading through happiness to the thinking justly, and to the acting from a principle of doing nothing but what is judged good.

Therefore, in supposing it to be the divine will, that man should arrive at happiness in the perfection of his nature, or progress of his knowledge, it must be concluded, that the state of mind called misery, is truly the means employed, in divine wisdom, for accomplishing the end in view; whereas, were misery the end intended by nature in giving man his intellectual capacities, the means appointed
in wisdom to bring about that end, might be inquired after. These, we have seen, are folly; that is, the want of wisdom sufficient to avoid evil. But, want of wisdom is no other than the negation of the intellectual capacities of man being called forth into their actual state. These faculties, therefore, being imperfect, so is man's happiness; but, from this to contend that misery is, in the will of God, appointed for the final cause of human knowledge, or man's intellectual existence, would be no less absurd than to maintain, that putting her beloved child to grief and sorrow, was the end of intention in a fond mother, who was following a system similar to that of nature, in giving present misery in order to ensure the happiness that flows from wisdom.

Thus it will appear, that the identity of religion and philosophy, as a conclusion, is indeed founded upon a supposition, and in the resolution of a question. This question is not, if it be or be not according to the will of God that man should, in his proper wisdom, make himself happy, but if religion be that science in which man is to make himself happy, in knowing the will of God. Now, in answering that question in the affirmative, it has been shown, that philosophy will naturally comprehend religion, or that true religion necessarily requires philosophy.

4. Happiness consists in animal pleasure and intellectual enjoyment. Therefore, if philosophy leads to happiness, it must be by means of wisdom and of virtue; and if, by means of these, the life of man is made most happy, then, it must be made most miserable in vice and folly. Now, if this reasoning is just, we have, in the experience of mankind, the means of trying the theory, in the observation of what actually happens; and thus the subject will be scientifically treated of. But, if religion has for its object to make mankind virtuous and happy, then, this subject may be also treated of scientifically, and must appear to be no other than philosophy.
5. If religion is no other science than philosophy, then it will appear that the true worship of the Deity consists in the proper culture of the human mind; and that the best temple of God is the school in which man is taught philosophy.

But to the vulgar, the knowledge of the Deity is a subject by far too abstract to be apprehended; it must therefore be clothed with a figure. The true worship of God is also beyond their reach, it must be represented therefore in some form of action. Hence every nation perhaps has religious notions in some shape, and religious worship in some form. Thus national religions always differ more or less, while true religion is always the same.

6. The religion of a nation, though not pure philosophy, should correspond to the actual philosophy of that nation; otherwise there is, in that discrepancy, established a source of irreligion, which will tend to corrupt the morals, in those who have these only founded in superstition; for, in superstition, irreligion leads to vice, in losing the proper source of virtue. Hence it is necessary, that national religion should assume a different form, as science is cultivated, and philosophy diffused.

7. When the philosophy of a nation is extremely erroneous or imperfect, religion must then be either little, or impure. In this case, it is impossible for the religion of that nation to improve naturally, or from within; for, while the philosophy is erroneous, and the religion corresponding to the science, how is it possible for the last to change without the first? As well might the shadow move, while the body and the sun stand still. For, religion does not form itself; it grows not like a plant or animal; it is founded in the operations of the human intellect. While, therefore, the philosophy of the nation is erroneous, the religion, as having no other source, must be corresponding
corresponding to that philosophy; and it must not be considered as 
having, in itself, a cause by which it is to change or be improved.

But, as science and philosophy have natural causes in the system 
of mind or constitution of man, a nation may be now considered as 
improving in these, in order to understand the effect of this change 
upon the religion of the country.

8. If we consider the nation as an individual or one person, then 
it is not conceivable how the acquiring true philosophy, or correct-
ing the error of his science, could produce irreligion and immorality 
in man. For, as his virtue, which had been founded upon a false 
foundation, shall be in his religion undermined, it will in the same 
transaction be supported on a purer basis; and, in proportion as his 
religion, which was superstitious, is removed, his philosophy, which 
is religion of a purer species, supplies its place.

Instead of considering a nation as an individual, let us suppose it 
to consist of two separate persons or different orders of men. In 
this case, it is easy to conceive the philosophy and consequently the 
religion of the one to improve, while that of the other shall remain 
without change. Hence no disorder in the state would arise from 
this constitution of things; for, the philosophy, or the religion of 
the learned, would be, as it always is, a mystery to the vulgar, or 
above their understanding; and, so long as the power and admin-
istration of the state was conjoined to wisdom and philosophy, it is 
not conceivable that evil should arise from any progress in this or-
der of things.

But, the natural constitution of a nation may be considered as 
having a third order of men, placed in the rank of power and in-
tellect betwixt those now considered. Then, let us suppose this or-
der of men communicating in knowledge, with the order immedi-
ately above, and that which is below; from this would follow a sit-
tuation of things, in which there might naturally arise disorder to
the state, and change in the constitution, whether moral or political.
For, though there be no danger of evil in teaching a mind true phi-
losophy, there is much to be apprehended, when, instead of this just
progress of mind, erroneous principles are acquired; when, instead
of being confined to common sense, and those superstitious principles
which are derived from philosophy, a person, without true philoso-
phy, assumes the right of forming principles, which shall affect his
moral conduct; and when the errors, of the national religion, are
exposed injudiciously to eyes that cannot see the wise institution of
rules, and the usefulness of form, however ideal.

9. If found reasoning from truth, or philosophic principles, leads
to a just idea with regard to the existence of a Supreme Being, and
the proper relation in which we stand to the Author of our nature
and existence, then, to conclude without diffidence of thought or
danger of falling into error, would require the most extensive know-
ledge and highest generalisation of abstract ideas. A philosopher,
therefore, in learning to know the most general truths, must also
learn to entertain a diffidence of his general conclusions, seeing that
human science is naturally subject to error, although not founded in
delusion. The consequence of this will naturally be, to make gen-
eral conclusions be examined before they are believed, and not to
make those conclusions be disbelieved without evidence.

On the other hand, reasoning from principles that are not exa-
mined, or reasoning from prejudice and false principles, without the
general principle of examining that on which their reasoning pro-
ceeds, may give unjust ideas of subjects the most interesting to man-
kind; at the same time, it may breed, in ignorant men, the greatest
confidence of their erroneous opinions. Hence, while among phi-
losophers there cannot be dispute upon the subject of religion, nor
yet among the vulgar, who are taught religion in pure superstition, among the rest of mankind there may arise the greatest difference of opinion upon that subject, the greatest zeal and bigotry in their persuasions, and the utmost violence and atrocity in their perfecutions.

10. If religion be considered as the rules which man has to observe for his deportment, in relation to his divine Author; and if those rules are to be attained through philosophy, as the most general reasoning of man in relation to thoughts and things; then, in proportion as man arrives at knowledge, in order to enable him to commit moral evil, he also must acquire wisdom in proceeding according to this order of intellect, and thus discover his most substantial good.

11. As it is natural for man, exerting his faculties and producing his capacities, to arrive by means of science at philosophy, so, in the contemplation of this actual constitution of things, we are made to perceive wisdom and benevolence which are infinite, that is, perfect. We are therefore made to know the will of God, in studying nature or the constitution of things; and we are not made to understand the nature of things, in having any supernatural knowledge of the divine will. Now, this will of God, which has for object nothing but the happiness of man, is properly contained in the theory of the material, intellectual, and moral systems; it is revealed by the voice of nature suggesting truth to scientific minds; and it is understood by man, in proportion only as he perfects his philosophy.

12. To see this, some things may be recollected from the system already given. There, it has been shown, that man is taught virtue, first artificially, in the wisdom of mankind. This virtuous person, however, in arriving at wisdom, may also teach himself, when he is conscious that there is a happiness in the enjoyment of the praises of his species. He therefore forms a principle of disinterested
ed conduct, and of benevolent intention, in the view of pursuing general happiness, then the proper object of his reason; and it is thus that he sacrifices his immediate personal enjoyment, for the enjoyment of other peoples approbation. If he receives this tribute of praise, he is actually recompensed for that abstinence, or personal endurance, which it may have cost him in his search for happiness. Herein he both enjoys instinctively the pleasure of his approving species, and also scientifically applauds his proper wisdom, in having made an advantageous exchange, of an inferior or animal pleasure, for a superior intellectual enjoyment.

But man, thus arrived at the wisdom of science, is far from having attained the wisdom of philosophy? he is however on the way to attain it, if he is guided in his reasoning still by general views, and if in his generalisation or philosophy he reasons right. Man, proceeding scientifically to consider, what it is which in virtue procures him satisfaction and enjoyment, enters on a new career of wisdom. It is here that, in abstracting the praise and approbation of his species, for the obtaining of which he had proceeded in virtue, he still finds himself rewarded in the pleasure which he feels in doing good, and in the satisfaction which arises from the approbation of his own mind. Now, it is philosophy alone that brings him to this state of mind, which is in perfect wisdom, so far as it is to be deemed unalterably good.

When arrived at a proper understanding of himself, or of the human constitution, and that of every other thing, a person considers how precarious it is for other people to judge truly of the motives, which had conducted those actions of his that are to them apparent, and how uncertain a thing it is, that he should in this manner receive the just reward of that virtue which respects the general good, he then begins to reason philosophically, or upon a subject which is not simply moral, but superiorly wise; and it is then that, instead of
of being made by others, he makes himself either vicious or virtuous, in reasoning either erroneously or right.

On the one hand, he makes himself vicious, when he thinks that the reward of virtue is so precarious that it is not worth the pursuing, or is not always to be attained in the steady observance of its rules; in that case, he is apt to dispense with the motives of moral action, when solicited with a present gratification, and departs from virtue upon a false principle, viz. the precariousness of its reward. It is thus that he may inadvertently allow the prevalence of vicious habits; and at last be led into a state of misery in his repentance.

On the other hand, when he takes a just view of the intellectual system, which is then the subject of his reasoning; when he sees that the esteem of men, which is instinctively pursued by the human mind, is no other than a proper mean, appointed in the order or wisdom of nature, for the virtuous approbation of his own mind; and when he is satisfied, that, however the event is brought about, it is he alone must make himself happy, in the conscious opinion of his own merit, or miserable, in the knowledge of his proper folly; then, he makes himself truly virtuous; virtuous upon a principle that will not forfake him, in reasoning with all the light of science which it may endure; and virtuous upon a principle, that must cooperate with the natural benevolence of the man, in making himself and all his species happy.

Now man, in thus being a philosopher, is the cause of his own virtue; in like manner as, in science, he is the cause of his proper knowledge. Not as acting in opposition to nature, but as walking in the way that nature had intended him to choose; a way in which he is by nature properly directed, although not led blindly or instinctively, like the animal, acting necessarily from motives in which it had no election, or did not form the law. Man therefore, in thus forming
forming laws, unto himself, laws by which those that he originally observed are to be controlled, must be considered as having assumed a superior power, and as having arrived at a state, in which he may dispense with implicit obedience to the laws of nature. It is here that man, in dispensing with nature's laws, despises the allurements of sensual or vain pleasure, in opposition to what is right, and disregards the suffering of inferior evil, compared with supreme happiness; it is here that the philosopher directs his views to the most general good; and it is here that he may find a happiness, independent of nature, and of man, founded in the knowledge of himself, and of his Author.

Hence man, in thus making himself virtuous, departs from what may be considered as his original or first nature, so far as he enters on a new progress, which, by removing him a step from that nature in which as a reasoning animal he once had been, is to be considered as superior, in advancing towards the nature of the First Cause. For, in being the cause of his proper virtue, the philosopher is also the cause of his own happiness, and thus has an enjoyment that is properly independent of natural things; not in opposing nature, (which is considered as conducting the mere animal in perfect wisdom,) but in distinguishing the science or the art of man, who here is made to come in place of nature, when he conducts himself according to the will of his Creator, in seeing the laws of God the cause of nature.
CHAP. III.

Of Piety as related to Religion, and as flowing from Philosophy.

1. We have considered religion and philosophy as the same, in promoting virtue, and in procuring happiness. We have now to examine piety, and to investigate its cause.

To say that piety is founded on religion, would teach us nothing; for, with equal justice it might be said, that religion is founded upon piety. But this is not the case with regard to philosophy, which we have found equal to religion in making people virtuous and happy. Philosophy cannot be said to be founded upon piety; can piety be said with justice, to be founded on philosophy? Here is a question for our discussion.

Philosophy is a subject that has already been examined scientifically; and therefore it is so far understood in seeing its principles. We have also found philosophy, as the cause of virtue and happiness, to be equal or synonymous with religion. But religion, if not the same with piety, is nearly related to it. Therefore, a question here occurs; In what relation to philosophy is piety to be held? The resolution of this question is not meant to be given, as throwing light on piety as a subject, no more than what has been already given, as affording any explanation of religion. Philosophy is properly the subject matter of this treatise; and, the use and application of this subject for the benefit of mankind, has led us to consider, first, religion, and now piety.

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2. Whatever be the nature of piety and religion, so long as these are held to be of the same nature, it may be of some importance to see in what relation those two things stand to philosophy. For, philosophy has been found similar if not equal to religion, in its effects upon the virtue and the happiness of mankind; if, therefore, we have reasoned rightly, philosophy should have a proper influence on piety as an effect, so far as piety shall have in view the duty or the happiness of man. Having therefore proved the relation of philosophy and religion, if we shall find piety, which is related to religion, to be also properly related to philosophy, the subject will be discussed, in affording some confirmation to the theory.

3. Philosophy has been now considered as the same with religion, so far as this last is considered as the means of conducting man to a system of happiness; a system founded, not on sense, but upon a rational opinion, which is the proper character of man. But besides that rational enjoyment, which is the proper result of virtue and philosophy, there is a passionate enjoyment, of such an object as is capable of exciting our love and admiration. If we shall now consider the supreme cause of all things as being the object of this passion in our mind, a passion as far removed from sensual as the object of it is from our idea of body, then here would be something of a passionate enjoyment, a happy feeling of a pleased conscience, satisfied with itself, and transported with a view of certain attributes in an object inspiring love and veneration.

4. That this frame of mind, in which the Author of our being and enjoyment is held in the highest esteem of love and veneration, may be termed piety, will appear by considering. By piety is properly expressed that love and esteem which men, come to the perfection of their nature, show towards their aged parents, who had been the immediate instruments of their life and happiness. Now piety towards God, will be no other than an extended intellectual view
view of things, in which we find the general parent of mankind, providing bountifully for the life, and benevolently for the happiness of his children. It is now required to see, how philosophy is proper to promote this disposition of mind, which has been termed piety.

5. If piety shall be considered as submission to the will of that Being who had created human nature, then, in order that piety and virtue or philosophy may agree, this submissive disposition of mind must spring from a motive that, in the reflection of a conscious person, may be approved of. But, submission to the will of another being, may be either a vicious or a virtuous sentiment. If, when I submit to the will of another, I do this without considering whether it be just or unjust, good or evil; and if I only submit because I have been trained, like a brute, to comply from fear or apprehension of some evil, or from the expectation of some pleasure, I then proceed from a motive that, for a rational being, is vicious, that is, unworthy of a man, however virtuous in itself may be that action, or however proper for me may be the imposed duty.

In order to be truly virtuous, my submission must be voluntary, in having my will conformed to that of the person whom I am to obey, and in thus approving of the conduct which I am to pursue. Now when, from a philosophic view of the works of God, the author of nature and the father of mankind, I see the justice, the wisdom, and the benevolence of the divine will, by which I am ordained to do nothing but what is to make me happy, then, while I more and more abhor the flaviest submission to the will of a tyrant, I must love that superintending Being who has willed that man should become virtuous;—while I hate the selfish disposition of a little mind, I must admire the bountiful intention of our Creator, who has made man a voluntary agent judging what is just and good. If this shall be considered as piety, then, I am pious upon a virtuous principle,
in gratefully accepting the benevolent conditions of my being, and in submitting to the will of God from the purest choice.

It must not be here alleged, that piety is submission to the will of God, not because it is our choice so to do, but in sacrificing our own will on that occasion. It has already been observed, that a rational person cannot conceive, what he thinks wrong, to be according to the will of God; therefore, so far as he does what he thinks right, he cannot sacrifice his own will, in complying with that which he conceives to be the will of God. If, again, he shall do what he thinks wrong, he acts in vice; and he cannot avoid repentance or the condemnation of his conscience, by supposing he has the approbation of his author. But if, instead of thinking rationally, a person shall reason erroneously, he may then suppose that he is complying with the will of God, when he is outraging the benevolence of his nature and committing the most atrocious crimes. If such a person were to be esteemed pious, it must be, not because he had been either virtuous or good, but because he had been in a delusion with regard to the will of God. Therefore, it is impossible to disjoin piety and virtue, if we reason right.

6. If piety be a happy effusion of the intellectual soul, in the feeling of love, and the adoration of a grateful heart, these affections of the soul must be founded on something which is known in science and learned in philosophy; for, to suppose a person blindly led, in superstitious, to true piety, is to acknowledge, that there is truly such a thing; and now we want to see, by what means man may arrive at this end in his proper wisdom; an end which, however attained, is surely for his happiness.

7. In natural philosophy we learn to know the power and wisdom of the first cause, attributes which increase in our opinion as we proceed to know, and which soon become infinite in our apprehension or
or unmeasurable in our science. For, in the contemplation of this world, so beautiful is the order and arrangement of things, so plain and simple are the means, so deep and complicated the design, so secret every cause, and so certain the effect, we must conclude that nothing but a wisdom without defect had been employed, and that such wisdom is infinite or incomprehensible to man. In like manner, surveying the universe with the enlightened views of science, we must acknowledge power infinite in its operation, or unmeasurable in our comprehension. Systems of illuminated spheres, rolling every where, or through infinite space and endless time, must give an idea of power that has no bounds; and the indefinite complication of system within system, for the production of an animal, enjoying sense and acting by reason, must appear to us as filling the measure of perfection, in that wisdom by which power infinite or endless is employed.

8. Man has power and wisdom in himself; and it is by that means he is enabled to conceive the attributes of the supreme Being, by whom man himself and all things have been made. Now, though man occasionally designs in folly, and acts with power still more circumscribed than his wisdom, he learns from his defect, to estimate the boundless nature of that Being, who has endowed him with knowledge so superior to his power.

But man, reflecting on his wisdom and his power, is also conscious that he employs those limited attributes of his being, for a purpose that may be evil in its end, as well as good. He therefore concludes, that the intention of good does not necessarily flow from power to execute, and from wisdom to design. Here then is suggested to his mind, the inquiring after the intention of the supreme Being; whether this be ultimately for the good or evil of his creatures, who are made capable both to suffer and enjoy.

9. If, on the one hand, perfect wisdom should have employed omni-
nipotence in making voluntary beings capable of evil, and necessarily subject to misery, as an end, then, however awful might be the manifestation of a God who ruled in the operations of his will, no sense of love and gratitude could arise for that which could not be esteemed a benefit; and, instead of admiration, in contemplating the power and wisdom of that supreme Being, we should hence be led to nothing but fear and apprehension.

If, on the other hand, man has been made benevolent for his proper happiness, and capable of wisdom in order to avoid every species of evil, then, however occasionally he may act in folly and suffer in his conscience, he would hence have no reason to be diffident of the benevolence, any more than of the wisdom and omnipotence, of the supreme Being. In that case, all his groundless fears might be dispelled; and he might enjoy with pleasure, the contemplation of that power and wisdom which he knows to be boundless, and of that supreme design which he could not suspect of treachery.

10. So far as natural philosophy is only concerned with efficient causes, we would not thus have our apprehension of evil, or fear for misery, removed. For, in the system of material things the object of natural philosophy, although the end be effected without fail, or in all the perfection of a wise design, yet, the intention of that end, in relation to a being capable of happiness and misery, is not inquired after; consequently, that intention might be evil, notwithstanding omnipotence had created intellectual beings, and wisdom had presided in the adapting of ends and means. But, that which falls not to the share of natural philosophy, may be the subject of inquiry in another science. For when, instead of asking if the end be wisely provided for in the appointed means, we shall seek to know the nature of that end, whether as leading to pain or pleasure, to happiness or misery, we may then find reason to believe, that malevolence exists not in the Author of the moral system, any more than folly,
in creating useless or ineffectual beings. We might thus find, that
goodness had presided, as well as wisdom, in the council of creation;
and that benevolence had actuated the Supreme mind, who was
pleased to call forth into existence, beings who should know them-
selves; beings who should know the good will of their author; and
beings who, in following the dictates of the supreme will, should
know their own happiness.

11. But now, in examining the constitution of man, and the na-
ture of good and evil, we have found, that all is good; and that
evil has been contrived with the most benevolent intention; first, in
the animal, to preserve his life, and thus wisely serve the purpose of
the general system; secondly, in the feelings of a reflecting con-
science, to lead the moralist to virtue, in which may be procured
happiness,—such happiness as no animal, who knows not good and
evil in the abstract, may enjoy.

If such is the wise system of intellect, which it has been the object
of this work to unfold; if the sense of evil has been implanted in
created beings for no other purpose than their good; and if it must
be plain to a thinking person, that no sinister view can lurk in the
omniscient and omnipotent author of existence; Must not man be
filled with admiration in knowing himself, and in seeing the nature
of created things? Must he not be filled with love and gratitude, in
seeing the source whence is derived all enjoyment? And, must he
not be happy to find, amid the uncertain progress of a transitory state,
a bountiful preserver, who rules in wisdom, and who knows no
change?

12. Had man, like the brute, been formed only to enjoy the sen-
sual pleasures; had his knowledge led no farther than to conduct
his life according to the perfect wisdom of his nature, which is not
of his disposing; and had he only reasoned in order to live and feel
pleasure,
pleasure, instead of living in order to reason and enjoy happiness; then, when his life should finish, he might cease to reason as he ceased to feel. But man, in his superior understanding, is made to rise into a sphere above the nature of the animal, who has solely, for his purpose, life; he is made to enjoy a happiness, independent of that life which he occasionally possesses in common with the brute; and he is made to form for himself an existence neither natural nor animal, but intellectual, in seeing the wisdom, in valuing the justice, and in reading the benevolence of the divine will. Here then is man the favourite of heaven;—man to whom it is given, to understand the world in knowing himself, to learn justice and wisdom in studying nature, and to see the beauty of benevolence in contemplating the laws of God. If this leads not to piety, at least it must lead to that disposition of mind in which is naturally expressed love and gratitude.

13. Luminaries, without number, irradiate the spheres, which roll through boundless space and endless time; but in this we find not a system worthy of all the attributes of divine perfection. To the illuminated system is added animal life and sensual enjoyment; here, then, is infinitely more than endless systems of moving bodies; but infinitely less than a system of intellect, the image of the supreme mind, grafted on the animal called man. Is man then made thus to participate of the divine nature, for no other purpose but to perish with the brute? Are we to suppose this spark of divine light to be extinguished, while brute matter, without sense, rolls for ever round luminaries which radiate without reason? No; such a supposition is impossible, while wisdom is acknowledged as actuating divine power. But, in thus depending on the perfection of the divine nature, man will surely esteem in piety the Being upon whom he thus depends; he will feel those sentiments which actuate a child, in flying for refuge to a beloved father; and the overflowings of his heart will breath nothing but the affectionate feelings of his soul.

Man
Man thus finds himself truly allied to God his heavenly Father; he finds himself to be the peculiar care of provident wisdom, and the only created living being which is to have a future existence. Now, shall the mere savage love the man who was his parent; shall the most ignorant revere the bones of him whom he had called father; and shall not man, enlightened with the knowledge of his true defect, look up, with all the duty of his situation, to the cause of his existence, to the Power who made him know himself? Shall he not look up, with deep submission, to the just disposer of his present life, and, with filial affection, to the anchor of his future hope?—Impossible; man cannot learn to think and know, without acknowledging divine perfection in his Maker; he cannot learn to value himself, without adoring his Creator.

14. If this is the necessary effect of philosophy in man, to make him admire the wisdom of nature, and to love the cause of his enjoyment, philosophy must be considered as a cause for piety, in like manner as it is a cause for virtue and for happiness. So far as piety consists in the acknowledgment of a God, the creator and disposer of all things, philosophy, being the science of causes, must conduct to piety.—So far as piety consists in an humble submission to the will of God, and a constant dependence on his providence, philosophy, or the wisdom of man, is required, to interpret the will, or read the laws, of his Creator.—So far, again, as piety consists in reverence, love, and admiration of the First Cause, philosophy, the knowledge of nature and of man, the science of the intellectual and moral systems, must be the means by which this disposition of mind may be attained in sincerity and truth.

Upon the whole then, we may conclude, that both a virtuous and a pious disposition of mind, is the necessary consequence of that perfection of the human intellect which is termed philosophy. In like manner as nothing but peace of conscience, and contented happiness,
nefs, can be the natural accompanyment of that disposition of mind, in which we love our fellow creature, and adore our God.

C H A P. IV.

Of the true Religion, as subject to be corrupted, when in the possession of Men not guided by Science and Philosophy.

1. THE doctrine of this treatise has all along held forth, that man, who comes into this world in a brute state, is, in the opening of his intellect, made to inquire into the nature of things,—to discover truth,—to know himself,—to understand his duty,—and to look up, in admiration and expectation, to his Author. It is thus that man discovers the laws of human nature, or the will of God in relation to mankind; and then it is that he willingly obeys those laws, which are calculated in perfect wisdom for his happiness. Here is the foundation of natural religion, which we have considered as being synonymous with philosophy.

By revealed religion, again, is meant, that which is received by men upon authority, and is not the immediate result of their philosophical reasoning.

But, let us now suppose religion to be revealed to man immediately from God, whether in language or in thought. Such religion would be perfect, pure, just, and true. Particularly, in such religion, there would be nothing to contradict the law of human reason, which is written in the heart of man by the Author of his being; and, in such religion, man could find nothing inconsistent with the
flate or progress of his science, which is the natural constitution of the human intellect.

Here, therefore, we have a test, by which to try the purity of a received religion. Without that test, how could a reasoning man have any confidence in what were called revelation, but which, for any thing that he knew, might be no better than deception? For, unless to those to whom it were immediately revealed, there could not, in the nature of things, be any manner of certainty; there could be no dependence upon the accuracy of human scripture or tradition.

Now, there are two points upon which every religion must be founded, and by which every pretended revelation may be tried. These are, first, our ideas with respect to the Deity; and, secondly, the duty of man with respect to his fellow creatures. Both of these are attained by man, in the progress of his intellect, reasoning upon the information which he has from nature. So far as such revelation corresponded to the soundest reasoning, and to the law of nature which is written within the heart of man, no danger can arise from our receiving such religion upon that authority. But, so long as there is naturally in man a source of error and corruption, the most pure religion must be subject to degenerate; and, therefore, there must be a standard somewhere, in order to correct those aberrations.

It is in the science of morality that the duty of man, with regard to his fellow creatures, is understood; and, of that subject, we have already treated fully. We are now to consider the other point, viz. the ideas which man must necessarily form with regard to Deity, or the cause of all things. The object of this investigation is to see that our pure religion has been more than once corrupted; consequently, that it is still subject to degenerate; and therefore, that
philosophy is the only means by which the purity of that religion may be re-established or preferred.

2. Before entering upon this subject of Deity, the definition of which is, *A Being possessed of infinite wisdom, benevolence, and power*, we may consider what is properly implied under these attributes which we ascribe to the supreme Being.

Wisdom, as an attribute of God, may be said to be infinite; the proper meaning of this expression being, that the wisdom of God is perfect, that is to say, without any mixture, alloy, or participation of either ignorance or folly, as is always the case with human wisdom, which is imperfect. Therefore, the infinite wisdom of God is not to be compared with the wisdom of man, although our conception or idea of the one is only founded on that of the other. In like manner, the goodness or benevolence of God is an attribute which may be considered as infinite; which expression will then mean, that this attribute is perfect in the Being which thus possesses this quality without any of the opposite. This will also appear to be a thing perfectly different from that attribute or quality in a human mind, which is occasionally more or less subject to malevolence, or the willing of evil.

Power, which is an attribute of God, may be considered as infinite; not that, in consequence of this power, God can be supposed to do that which is impossible; it is only meant, that God must have power to do whatever is possible to be done. In this case, possible and impossible mean no more than conceivable and inconceivable. But, here a distinction must be made with regard to two different expressions which by inattention might be confounded. Impossible means that which we *cannot conceive*. This, however, must be distinguished as very different from that which we *do not conceive*. We can conceive much more than we do; indeed, we conceive
conceive but little of that which is possible; but, we must necessarily consider as impossible, that which we are conscious is inconceivable, as implying a contradiction or absurdity. Consequently, that power which is attributed to God, although this be conceived from the power of which we are conscious, it differs from the power of man \textit{toto coelo}, that is, perfectly; the one is finite, the other infinite.

Let us now consider what we mean in saying, that God is the cause of all things, or that all things have been made by God.

The order which we attribute to the universe, as consisting of a world containing a variety of objects, and which necessarily implies design, subsists truly in our mind. But, we refer this thought of our's to a thing subsisting without, for this reason, that we are able to distinguish other thoughts which are proper to our mind, and which do not require an external conductor, like those that respect the world which we perceive. Therefore, when we say, God is the cause of that order which we perceive in the world, we mean that God is the conductor of our knowledge, when we are informed of things by sense, things which we are conscious it is not in the power of our mind of itself to attain. In this manner, God may be said, with great propriety, to be the author of this world, in which there is to be observed the greatest order and design; for, we are conscious that this world without, or this order of thought within our mind, has not followed in consequence of any thing that we are able to do. We are indeed able, after having surveyed the world, or after having been informed by an external conductor of our knowledge, we are, I say, able to conceive things of a similar nature, or to contemplate in idea things which we must have first learned in reality; but, from this, there arises the greatest assurance, that a cause is necessarily required for every thing which happens, or a wise conductor for that design which appears in the objects of this world.
It is not, therefore, as only explaining a known effect by an unknown cause, that we say, God is the cause of this universe which we know; it is a necessary inference of reason which we cannot withhold, after observing beauty, order, wisdom, and design; for, these we must necessarily attribute to the operations of a mind. Now, if we can persuade ourselves that this is our own mind, in which these had been originally conceived, then indeed, we need go no farther in search of a deity; but if, on the contrary, we are convinced, that in the universe there is displayed power and wisdom superior to that which we possess, we must at the same time acknowledge a mind, and a mind that overrules or informs our mind; and, this is God.

3. With regard to deity as the foundation of religion, there are, have been, or can be, but three opinions. These are, atheism, polytheism, and theism. We may now briefly consider these three opinions, in their order.

4. Atheism we are here to suppose a steady opinion, founded upon some principle that might command belief; otherwise, to reason seriously upon the vagaries of an inconsiderate sceptic, or the artificial reasoning of a despicable sophist, would be to disgrace science, in condescending to pursue or to remove a phantom.

We have already considered the system of this universe; and so far from finding any principle upon which the opinion of atheism could be supported, whether in the examination of efficient or final causes, everything appears to be the effect of wisdom and benevolence. If therefore there be actually such an opinion as that of atheism, as we are ignorant of any principle or truth upon which it might be founded, we have no means by which we might be led to examine it more particularly, whether in order to confirm it or confute it.
If it be allowed that there is an universe existing, whether material or intellectual; and if it must be allowed, as is evidently the case, that this universe is the work of at least superior design or wisdom, whether good or bad, it must have either conceived itself, or it must have been conceived by a superior being, which is called God. Now if any person, in consequence of more profound thinking than we are able to arrive at, shall conceive how, either material things or the system of intellect, had formed themselves in all that beautiful order which we may perceive, and which it is the greatest enjoyment to contemplate, in that case, it would be presumption in us, to attempt to change the opinion of a person who sees farther than we do into the nature of things.

But here I must be allowed to observe; that the supposing things to be made, or to exist, by chance; or to have made themselves without at the same time seeing clearly how this could be, were only the deceiving of ourself with the empty sceptre of an opinion. This is not the case when we believe, that we do not inform ourselves; and, therefore, that there is an informing being, by whom our knowledge is conveyed. This is an opinion which I cannot change; it is founded on a fact which never fails. Therefore, herein I do not deceive myself; whatever reasoning I may afterwards build on this opinion; and however I may possibly be imposed upon by this informing cause. To illustrate this:

When man perceives the various luminaries in the heavens, and feels the different climates upon this earth, is it only the imagination of his fancy, or has he not something on which he must depend,—a revelation which he cannot refuse to believe? Are the necessary seasons of the year a mere deception, and the fruits of the earth no more than a dream without reality?—no. Our senses and our perception, which no man dares deny or disobey, forbids our ever doubting of a fact; however in reasoning we may dispute a proposition.
proposition. But, how comes the mind to be informed on those occasions, where it knows, where it feels, where it sees and tastes, without thinking, reasoning, or doubting? Even supposing that there were not in this universe any thing but matter and motion, form and mechanism, still this matter and mechanism of mine must think; and now, How insignificant those thoughts that are not founded on some information, which is then superior to my thoughts! Thus I am constrained to acknowledge that I am only a subordinate being, and that there is something on which I must depend.

My opinions are indeed my own; and thus I am answerable for my opinions, when not conformed to the principles of my knowledge, that is the information which I have from without, and over which I have no power or control. Here, therefore, is a system independent of that in which I form opinions.

It is offending common sense to suppose a person truly persuaded that there is not harmony and order in the material system; and it is no less an insult to the understanding of man, to suppose he thinks without a rule, or exists without a cause. So far, therefore, as I conscientiously am not the cause of my knowledge and actual information, there must be a cause continually operating in order to give me sense or knowledge. Now, to avoid all ambiguity, this external operation, by which I am informed, I call the work of God, the supreme ruler or the first cause. It is not necessary to resolve this question, whether it be mediatel or immediately that I have my information from God my author; the only question at present is, whether I have an author or not.

That there is a deity or first cause, is a proposition or a truth which man has not necessarily, as he has his sense and reason; it is a proposition which is not instinctive, but must require a proof or principle on which it is to be founded; and this proof may be more or
or less convincing. Consequently a person may deny a proof of this sort, or refuse assenting to it, without meaning to deny there is a Deity; which is to maintain another proposition; and which, therefore, would, in its turn, require a proof. But as I am persuaded that there is not any doubt, about the sufficiency of that proof on which the existence of a deity is founded, I now take it for granted, that there is no absolute atheist. For, if a man have not sufficient understanding to examine properly so profound a subject, why impute to him an opinion which he is not qualified to form? If, on the other hand, a person, by the ingenuity of his reasoning, thinks he is able to disprove the arguments employed by the most pious in support of the existence of a deity, here is no offence against God; it is simply the contest of men employing reason in the abstract system of opinion; and surely the most pious need not be afraid that, in the use of reason, their favourite cause should be in any danger. It were the most unjust distrust of human reason, or jealousy of opposite opinion, to apprehend that the cause of truth should suffer from the misstatement of facts or momentary triumph of an erroneous conclusion.

5. Atheism and polytheism, however they may seem opposite in reason as they are in terms repugnant, will, I believe, be found to be reducible to the same predicament of error, viz. the believing what we do not see, whether immediately, or by the intervention of any known principle.

It is not from the consideration of the material and intellectual systems that may be founded such an opinion as this, that there are more Gods than one. The universe which we perceive and the human intellect of which we are conscious, so far as in these there are means employed and an end in view, lead us to the contemplation of one design. If indeed we could perceive two different intentions in the constitution of created things, such as for example those
of good and evil, we might thence be led to suppose two different beings as having been the cause of what has come to pass; for, we cannot reasonably suppose, that the same wise being, who had created us and all that we see, should at the same time have designed things with an evil and a good intention. There is no question, if men have not deceived themselves, in thus reasoning from very imperfect views of things; but it is here denied, that there may be found in this any foundation of an argument for a plurality of deities.

The idea of polytheism not being in the order of nature, are we to seek for it in the order of human government? Here no doubt we find often many subordinate persons contributing in the execution of one design. But the design is not more perfect in that it requires the subordination of different agents; and every example of human government, founded upon the wisdom of mankind which is imperfect, is defective. We should therefore in vain have recourse to the political system of human government, in order to establish a system of polytheism that were not to be found either in the physical or moral systems.

Atheism, in order to be true or in perfect science, must give the principles on which is founded this positive opinion, That things exist without a cause, or that there is no God. As to the polytheist, who believes that there are more than one God, we may be allowed to ask; first, how many Gods he knows of; and, secondly, how he comes to know them. After we have received satisfactory answers to those questions, we may with some propriety reason upon the subject; and not till then.

Thus the belief of many Gods upon the one hand, or of none upon the other, if there be truly such a belief, implies a knowledge which has not been communicated in the manner of science, that is, intelligibly;
intelligibly; consequently, we are as yet ignorant of that knowledge. Here is no question about scepticism; for, he who believes that there is not in the universe any provident wisdom, any superintending mind, or that there are more than one of such supreme beings, must have no degree of doubt in his opinion if he has formed it himself.

6. With regard again to scepticism we shall only observe, that, however respectable the character of one who is cautious of concluding from imperfect data, the man who cannot, in the examination of the universe and of his own mind, find data to determine whether he truly knows or not, as such a person is not answerable to any body but himself for his opinion, so is he not fit to be the author of an opinion in another.

7. It is upon the supposition that atheism, upon the one hand, and polytheism, upon the other, are either demonstrably false, or admitted to be erroneous, that we now proceed to consider theism as the only remaining opinion, with regard to deity. We may therefore now suppose this to be the foundation of our religion, which is that of Christianity; and we are to examine this subject of the Christian religion, in comparing it with our philosophy.

8. We have considered, theoretically, what true religion should be, according to the principles of our philosophy. We are now to examine what our religion actually is; and how it may be found to correspond with that of which, from our principles, we have reason to approve.

If, on the one hand, we should find the religion, which we profess, to be inconsistent with that religion which from principle we must approve of, we would then find reason to re-examine our principles, in order to see wherein we had erred, if we entertain no doubt
concerning our religion; or, in being satisfied with our philosophic principles, we would be inclined to examine our religion, in order to discover wherein should consist the evidence of that of which, in reasoning with all the light of science, we could not approve. If, on the other hand, we should find this religion, which we had been taught to believe, perfectly conform to that which upon principle we approve of, then we should be no longer under the apprehension of any superstitious notions in our faith; and we should felicitate ourselves, as having been educated in a religion calculated for the happiness of mankind.

9. If the principles of true religion depended on circumstances which no human wisdom or sagacity could discover; and if man, come to the advanced state of science, had no faculty by which he might reason with regard to the true or spurious nature of a received religious tenet, dogma, or principle, he would be, with respect to that religion which he was taught, the same as a brute animal is to the daily operation which by habit he is trained to perform. Whereas, if true religion is to be distinguished, and spurious principles, whether of faith or moral conduct, are to be rejected; or, if man be in his nature superior to the brute, knowing himself, and judging with regard to the motives of his conduct, he cannot upon any occasion desert the principles of his reason, or refuse to employ those precious faculties, with which he has been made, and by which he is so eminently distinguished among sensitive and reasoning beings. It is therefore of great importance to inquire into the nature of our religion, in order either to be satisfied with our condition; or, in not being satisfied, to seek a remedy.

10. But, before we can understand the nature of our religion, we should examine into its history, and see its origin or progress. Because, there is such a misrepresentation of things among the sectaries of religion, that we can only reason upon what is general in the subject,
subject, and what may be admitted among the most reasonable part of men.

It will thus be necessary to take a retrospective view of our religion, in order to see the changes that it may have undergone; not in the insignificant forms, things which occupy the attention of little minds, but in the principles of its constitution. We may thus observe how far it is either unalterable in its nature, or occasionally changeable, like the laws of human institution. But that which renders this discussion a proper subject, in a work which is only philosophical, is this, That hence we may see how far the best religion, and the purest doctrine with regard to Deity, may be preferred uncorrupted and in its genuine truth, without the watchful eye of science, and the proper superintendence of philosophy.

11. The Christian religion was formed in Judea; and it was founded on one which the Jewish nation then possessed. But, the Jewish religion had its origin among some ancient tribes, before the code of laws, which Moses is said to have given that nation, had been devised. Now, though we cannot know, from history, the particulars of that religion which among the Hebrews was reformed by their enlightened lawgiver, we have reason to believe that it was, like the religion of all barbarous nations, founded on superstitious notions, and suited to the ignorance and inhumanity of rude ages. Thus, from the knowledge of mankind in general, we may form some idea concerning that rude state of the Hebrew religion which had been reformed; and we may judge, with regard to the nature of that reformation, from the state in which we find the reformed religion in the Jewish records.

Man, in the savage state, is only occupied with what affects his passions, whether sensual or more sentimental, that is to say, his feelings
ings which are either more or less immediate. He is a scientific being, and therefore he forms the idea of cause and effect; but, in that state of human reason which is not highly improved by science, he does not inquire for that which in causes is the general, nor always for that which is ultimate in the effect. He therefore is extremely ignorant with regard to the justest principle, whether in religion or morality.

In this progress of the human mind, which we have termed the savage state, man, though infinitely above the brute who forms no scientific notion, is almost equally depressed below that cultivated or more perfect state of mind which we may term philosophy. In this inferior state of man, he never can look up in contemplation of a First Cause; for, his views are limited to the particulars, the more immediate object of his knowledge. In this rude state of the savage, he seldom generalizes, so as to arrive at universals; and, when he reasons beyond the more immediate objects of his knowledge, or what is generally termed common sense, he falls into the grossest error and delusion.

Such we may suppose to have been the original of every nation. But, in the dark ages of their barbarism, nations have had religious opinions and certain rites or forms of worship. It is then that many gods have been acknowledged; that the most absurd rites have been complied with; and that most cruel sacrifices have been offered to their idols and their demons *.

Such

* We are not to look for this barbarous institution in the manners of a savage nation; their intellectual progress is too little advanced, in philosophy, to form any regular system of worship and invocation. But in the intermediate state, between that savage ignorance and barbarian error, where philosophy has established order and government among men without knowing the true principles of virtue and of government, there we are almost sure to find the institution of erroneous worship and bloody oblation. In the old world we cannot find examples that may not be subject to objection,
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Such had been once the state of the Hebrew nation; superstition, cruelty, and idolatry, derived from the savage or the barbarous state, had pervaded their opinions and their worship. This then is the natural state of their national religion, considered as in its barbarous and unreformed state.

It is unnecessary to inquire more particularly into the state of that original religion of the Hebrews, which in the advancing light of human science is to be reformed. It is enough to see that their original religion must have been erroneous; and now we are to look for the first epoch of its reformation.

12. We do not now inquire from whence had come the light of science, which shone in upon the barbarous religion of that nation, and disposed it to change, in adopting principles of truth among their errors and their rites of savage origin. It only concerns us to know, what was that scientific truth, and that philosophic principle, by which a religion, full of error and atrocity, had been reformed.

History informs us, that the ancient Hebrew religion was reformed by the introduction of a principle which could not have been discovered by tribes of wandering nations, a principle which evidences the light of divine revelation; for, truth originates in God, while error is only found in man.

The doctrine of the reformed religion was this. That there is a First Cause, an eternal, self-existing Being, who has disposed all things with order and design, and who has ordained man to shape his as being perhaps the rites imported from another nation. But, in the new discovered world, the republic of Tlascala, and the monarchy of Mexico, afford us such an example, of that progress of nations in forming their religion, as must have the weight of demonstration.
his course in this world, or conduct himself in society, according to the laws of justice and of truth.

More particularly, the doctrine which that religion may be considered as having taught, was this. That God made man upright or perfect, after his own image; that is, man was made a being capable of becoming intelligent, knowing good and evil, and approving of virtue in avoiding vice. Man therefore, according to that doctrine, only degenerates and becomes corrupted, when in his free will he forfakes the laws which God had given to his nature, of loving justice and benevolence; and, he introduces vice into the world, when he forms to himself principles of a base and selfish nature, principles by which the rights of others are infringed, and the harmony of society (intended by nature) is disturbed.

13. It is not to be supposed, that either revelation, or a pure philosophy, which might have discovered those divine truths, could have dictated the false opinions, the unwarrantable rites, and the improper worship that prevailed among the Jews. Therefore, we are to suppose, either that sublime truths had been introduced while errors were retained in the Jewish legislation, or that, after a pure religion had been introduced, it had been corrupted by the prevailing error of the vulgar, and the retrogradation of science and philosophy in dark ages of the nation.

The great truth which was retained in the Hebrew code was this: That there is but one God, the cause of all things, a Being unlike to any thing which may be imagined by man. In other respects, their opinions were erroneous, and their worship was still barbarous. They represented their god as partial, jealous, and revengeful; and they sacrificed animals, as an atonement for the sins they had committed, and to appease a being, who had the inconstancy to change his purpose like a man.

14. How
14. How long they had continued in that corrupted state, perhaps cannot be known. At last, however, science flourished in Greece; and from thence we have authentic records, with regard to the progress of philosophy in that quarter of the world.

We know, that then the purest system of morality appeared among the various speculations of philosophic men; and, it is upon the purest morality, as well as philosophic principle, that the Christian religion reformed that of the Jews, in abolishing their abominable and absurd rites, and in justifying the character of the one God, in representing that perfect Being, not as the partial and revengeful despot, but as the benevolent Father of mankind.

This true religion was founded upon that sacred principle of morality—benevolence. Here, brotherly love and fellow sufferance were made the first duty of man to man; the rational virtue of a philosophic patience, was to supersede the instinctive spirit of the animal resentment; and, man was to consider himself as one among the children of his heavenly Father. The joys of heaven, according to this religion, were gratitude, love, and harmony; the agonies of hell were hatred, anger, and envy. In fine, man, during the progress of his temporary state, is to imitate the justice and the goodness of his God; he is to love and to forgive his brethren; and, on all occasions, they are to look up to their common Parent, the sovereign disposer of all things in the present as well as in a future state.

The knowledge of this pure religion requires no metaphysical reasoning, either with regard to the nature of God, or to the essence of our thinking principle; it is adapted to the common understanding of mankind; and it is founded upon the rational principles of human nature. It is impossible to refuse our assent, to a religion which exacts no more than every man, in his dispassionate moments, is heartily
heartily disposed to contribute; and it is impossible to refuse giving adoration to a God, who asks no more of man—than that he should learn to make himself most happy.

Here is the second epoch in the reformation of the original barbarous religion of the Hebrews; and here we may congratulate mankind upon the happy event, of a pure religion introduced into the world, in a form which to common sense is plainly intelligible, and, in a spirit which is consonant to perfect virtue and philosophy.

The most evident marks of divine approbation appeared upon this occasion. For, this new doctrine of benevolence, corresponding with its type (the law of God which is written in the heart of man,) made a conquest upon opinion, in opposition to force and the most rooted superstition; and it was received by the nations as the immediate gift of Heaven, sent to make those happy who embraced it.

15. Let us now see what became of this pure religion, when left to the empire of popular error,—when falling into the hands of designing men,—and when unsupported by philosophic principle, the most precious gift of God for establishing the true happiness of man.

By the violent inundation of barbarians, philosophy received a blow of which it has but of late recovered. In the mean time, the rapid progress of the Christian religion, in persuading men, laid the foundation of a Hierarchy, which perhaps has been perverted to purposes disgraceful to philosophy, and inimical to the spirit of that pure religion.

In that state of ignorance and superstition, doctrines arose, the most absurd that ever were devised; the common sense of mankind was insulted beyond example; and nothing but experience could have
have persuaded us, that such doctrine could have been offered to men, far less that it should have prevailed in nations that were polished, virtuous, and learned. But the truth, or beauty, of the pure religion, carried its superflitious votaries over every obstacle which nature could oppose, and still continues to protect absurdity, which is often interwoven with the sacred doctrine of a true religion. We thus find the most important lesson in the science of opinions, viz. How dangerous it is, to admit of any dogma which has not been examined in science, or which philosophy has not sanctioned with its approbation.

The Jewish religion, on which the Christian doctrine was ingrained, held as its first principle, That there is but one God. The reformed religion proceeded upon the same principle. It taught us to look up to the heavens, and call God Father; it taught us to express our confidence in him, who leads the soul of man to seek his real good in knowing and avoiding what is evil; and it taught us to adore in spirit that one God, who had created man after his own image, that is, a being possessing knowledge, wisdom, and benevolence.

But man, who is made to perfect himself in knowledge, is apt to err, when reasoning in the abstract system of opinion. No wonder, therefore, than this happened, when ignorance conducted speculation in the most abstruse subject of the human thought. No sooner did the proselyte to the new religion attempt to reason beyond the narrow limits of his infant science, than he fell into the grossest error and delusion. The pure religion was then corrupted in the speculative opinions of men reasoning upon a subject far above their comprehension; and this corruption has sown the seeds of evil, in a subject where nothing was intended but the purest good.

Instead of studying the moral duties of their own nature, or the
laws of our heavenly Father respecting brotherly love and charity, beings, who know not how they think, employ their thoughts in forming abstract speculations concerning the nature of God. Having thus formed erroneous notions, with regard to the cause of things, and order of that system in which there is displayed nothing but wisdom and benevolence, they proceed, from those false principles, to judge the conduct of their fellow creatures, and prefer the conditions by which divine favour is only to be obtained.

Miracle and mystery have been employed, to the disgrace of human reason; and thus religion, which, (after understanding morals,) is in its nature the plainest of propositions, and in its natural tendency, the most agreeable of informations, has been made to puzzle the minds of reasoning men, and to fill the superfluous with dreadful apprehensions.

Now, as in science there cannot be absurdity, so, in revealed religion, there cannot be a mystery; for, to what purpose should a mystery be revealed? The revealing of a mystery is only the announcement of a proposition which human reason is not able to sustain. Now, if God is truth, as there is every reason to believe; and if man should love God, as the Christian religion must incline him from the heart to do, then man, enlightened with the progress of science and knowledge of religion, must abhor mystery; for, mystery is a proposition which opposes truth, that is, other propositions which mankind must believe.

Mystery, in a doctrine, must vitiate every proposition with which it is necessarily connected; therefore, to rational people, mystery must be the cause of disbelief. Thus it will appear, that those who introduce any species of mystery into a religion which is pure, just, and benevolent, whatever be their motive, are, in fact, the greatest enemies of mankind; for, religion is the source of happiness to rational
tional beings, thinking with regard to their future existence, and acting in relation to their fellow creatures; but disbelief, which must proceed from mystery, is the only source of irreligion. Hence also we must conclude, that those who explain the appearances of nature, or reveal to men the laws of God, are the greatest friends to mankind, in promoting knowledge, virtue, and religion.

But when, instead of seeking to know the will of the Creator, with regard to our social affections and our moral duties, men employ their talents in vainly seeking for the essence, the beginning, and the end, of things, (the present order of which is all that human knowledge can arrive at); and when, instead of piously submitting to the will of God, in virtuously avoiding every species of evil intention against their neighbour, and in gratefully adoring the bountiful Provider for their present and their future happiness, men shall assume authority and power noways falling to their share, and shall presumptuously contend about the nature of a Being incomprehensible to finite understandings, What wonder that the purest religion should be corrupted, that the most sacred truths should be perverted, and that the precious gift of reason should be abused?

Now this corruption, in a pure religion, may be considered as arising, partly from the ignorance of mankind reasoning upon abstract subjects without general principles, and partly upon the vice of ambitious and designing men, raising a hierarchy in the superstitious of the ignorant. But, it is the business of philosophy, in reasoning from the soundest principles, to detect those evils in the constitution of political society, and, by enlightening the rulers of the people, to prevent authority and power being abused, in supporting the usurpation of absurdity and superstition over reason and humanity.

16. How far the propagation of superstitious and absurd doctrines, and the domineering hierarchy of an ignorant or designing priesthood,
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priesthood, has either served, or not, the divine purpose of religion, in proclaiming to the ignorant the will of God, that is, in procuring peace and happiness to mankind, let the history of preceding centuries unfold. It is not our purpose here to state the evils, which are infinite, of departing from the right religion, that is, from the truth; we only are illustrating the necessity of science and philosophy in those who are to direct the morals of the people, and to lead the opinions of mankind.

In short, we have seen, that under the protection of divine religion, the most absurd tenets, and dangerous principles, may be propagated among the simple and the undistinguishing, that is to say, among the indolent and the ignorant. In like manner, by combining those absurd tenets with the truths of a religion which is pure, the character of that religion must suffer, or be lost, among inquiring men. From these errors the greatest evils may arise. It is thus, perhaps, that the foundation has been laid for scepticism, for atheism, and for worse,—for irreligion or abandoned principle,—for the prostitution of the sacred name of God to the vile purpose of cruelty and oppression.

17. If it may thus be made to appear, that the doctrine of the Christian religion, which is in its nature pure, had been corrupted by the ignorance, if not the vice of men; and that, since philosophy has again acquired an ascendant in our European States, the practice at least, if not the doctrine of the corrupted religion, has been improved, we shall then be led to acknowledge the value of science in teaching people to be wise, and the blessing of wisdom in teaching mankind to be happy.

18. But, in order to be convinced that it is philosophy which alone must judge in those cafes of religion, and that it is only a philosopher who may be capable of making a reformation in the
religion of a country, it were proper to see, that common sense, which is sufficient to judge of the moral fitness of things, is far from being properly adapted for the purpose of judging, in relation to the nature of a religion, how far that may be found to be in truth and perfect purity, or only in superstition and delusion. I shall therefore now conclude, in endeavouring to give some arguments a posteriori, by which that important proposition may be proved.

Upon the supposition of there being but one true or genuine religion for mankind, (a proposition which will hardly be called in question), there must have been in the world an indefinite number of those that are false or spurious. Now if, in all those cases, the common sense of mankind, which always judges justly with regard to the moral duties of man, make no distinction of the true and false, in approving of the one, and disapproving of the other, but always judges the received religion, however spurious, to be the only true religion, then, we may with confidence affirm, that common sense is not a proper judge with regard to the nature of religion, but must take it upon trust, in relying upon the teacher.

In order, again, to show that this proposition is proved in the experience of mankind, we have but to consider, that at all times, and in all countries, the received religion, however spurious, false, or even absurd, is always believed by the people; and that in those cases, it is only so far as they have acquired some philosophical notions, that any body doubts or pretends to dispute the veracity of the religion which they had been taught.

This is certainly the case, with regard to mankind under the influence of different religions; the same thing happens, and thus gives us a similar example, among the different sects of the same religion, whether that be true or false. It is notorious, that every sectarian judges his own tenets to be true, and those of the other sects.
aries to be spurious. But, we find mankind, with respect to common sense, equally proportioned in all the various sects, as well as in the different nations of the earth. Consequently, it is thus demonstrated, that common sense is not the faculty by which mankind may be enabled to judge, in the general or abstract, of the nature of religion, although it be by means of common sense that mankind must acquire science, and thus, in reasoning from those principles, arrive at higher degrees of knowledge, which is philosophy.

If this be the case, that, in order to judge of religion, it requires more knowledge than falls to the share of common sense unimproved by science, or unassisted by philosophy, it must appear, that mankind, in general, should be distinguished as consisting of two sorts, viz. the vulgar, or the multitude, and the philosopher, or the few. This is the most simple division, or the most perfect analysis of the subject; and, from this, we shall be enabled to understand the various phenomena, or to explain what has already happened in the world, with regard to revolutions in religion.

Mankind are naturally uninstructed: They have necessarily common sense, which is the effect of natural science, and which leads to all the purposes of life; but they have not the science of their knowledge, which would lead them to the understanding of their own nature, and consequently of their dependence on their Author. This last is the province of philosophy, or the ultimate progress of human understanding; and, in favourable circumstances, this is a state of knowledge to which they will naturally arrive.

Let us now suppose mankind subsisting in that state which has been here distinguished in analysing the subject, that is, as consisting of a multitude who are ignorant of every thing beyond common sense, and of a few who have arrived at philosophy. If that is the case, then there must also be an intermediate state, in which we should
should find many who had advanced, in some degree, beyond that of common sense, but short of what we have termed philosophy, as different state. Thus there must be naturally an indefinite gradation between those two extreme states, which are necessarily to be distinguished; and now, this may be considered as the natural state of mankind, exclusively of any artificial or instructed state.

In science it is necessary that we should distinguish this natural state of mankind, although, it must be evident, mankind could not long subsist in that natural state. For, in proportion as any part of mankind should have been enlightened by the study of nature and their own mind, others, who were willing to know, would be by them instructed, and would thus be advanced in their knowledge, without having taken all the steps necessary in order to have of themselves arrived at that knowledge.

Hence another distinction in the constitution of mankind, which will now appear to consist of three denominations, viz. first, the ignorant or uninstructed; secondly, the instructed; and, lastly, the instructors. Such is the natural constitution of mankind, formed for science, and intended for wisdom and for happiness, in the knowledge of themselves, and in the enjoyment of their knowledge. Such also is the state in which we actually find mankind at present; and in this state they must have been from the most ancient record of their knowledge.

This being the state of mankind in relation to philosophy; and, philosophy being necessary in order to judge of religion, or to teach the duties of that conscious state of our dependence, it must appear, that mankind, with respect to religion, will always necessarily consist of the multitude who must be instructed, and of the few who are capable of instructing. Thus we acquire a principle for explaining what
what is past, and also for understanding that which will always happen in every future period.

In the dark ages of the world, when the science of knowledge is little advanced, and when, in place of philosophy, there is only superstition founded upon ignorance and usurpation, then, the true religion, or the knowledge of God, must either not exist, or be corrupted. Whereas, on the contrary, when science is cultivated, and consequently philosophy is attained, the genuine religion will be distinguished, and spurious religions, along with the corruptions of the true religion, will be more or less abolished. Now, so far as this shall be found to correspond with that which has already happened in the world, the principle, upon which we now have reasoned, will be approved, and those occurrences in the history of mankind will be explained.
SECTION VIII.

A Summary View of the Intellectual System, in order to understand the Nature and Importance of Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION.

The subject of human understanding has been treated of so diffusely, in the work which is now brought to a period, that I wish to give a more compendious view of human nature or the intellectual system, in laying aside those discussions which were necessarily required in order to ascertain it.

To those who have studied the subject now treated of, this section, though perhaps unnecessary, will be easy. We are to reason from the principles already fully examined; and we are to endeavour to come at general and interesting conclusions. To those, again, who have not studied the book, or seen the formation of those principles from which we are to reason, though this section might save them greater labour, in seeing the general scope of the work, it could hardly be entertaining, or perhaps intelligible.

But if, by comprising a diffused subject in a smaller compass, those who may have laboured through the work shall be entertained; or
if, by giving a general view of a subject so interesting to mankind, those, who may have been afraid of engaging in the tedious task, should be enticed to examine principles, in order to come at truth, in the science of mind and morals, the end of the author, in giving to the public what has pleased himself, will be completely served.

C H A P. I.

General View of Knowledge, or the Progress of Mind in the Perfection of Art.

1. PHILOSOPHY being founded upon science, and science upon history, we ought to see, in history, the origin of the several branches of science, so far as dependent on those events that may be discerned. History, therefore, may be distinguished according to the different subjects with which it is concerned, and the several ends in science to which it leads.

With this view, history may be considered as of three kinds; first, natural, which comprehends all the changes that happen in perceived objects; secondly, metaphysical, which has for object the changes that happen in our conscious thought or reflection; lastly, moral and political, which has for object the opinions or motives which influence the voluntary actions of men. On these three species of history, or recorded events, is founded science; and, upon the scientific notions or generalised judgments of man, in relation to these subjects, is founded philosophy, which is commonly considered as being either natural or moral.

2. In natural history, there are two different channels through which
which we receive the knowledge, or information of the fact, which is to lead to science; these are, sensation and perception. With regard to the first, as the knowledge or information is immediate, we judge immediately of the change, or event which truly happens in our knowledge. With regard to the second, as we have our information not immediately but by means of sensation, the judgment, in this case of change, though truly founded in the action of our mind, is nevertheless necessarily conducted by sensation, and thus respects qualities of the sensible object which are properly perceptible.

3. In the sciences of chymistry and mathematics, there is made an attempt to separate science, according to these two sources from whence the knowledge springs. In the first, the sensible qualities of bodies are considered independent of magnitude and figure, the perceptible qualities. In the last again, these perceptible qualities, magnitude and figure, and their changes in relation to space and time, are considered, independently of their sensible qualities. This is the natural consequence of science analyzing and generalizing the subjects of our knowledge.

The science of chymistry is founded on the changes which happen in the known qualities of bodies; for, knowing the conditions in which these changes have been made, the record of those events forms a theorem or principle with which to reason for direct to the discovery of other truths, or for the generalisation of those that are discovered. In mathematics, again, the science proceeds upon our conceptions, as being founded on the proper action of the mind. In this case, reasoning proceeds upon supposed equalities; and change is not supposed as taking place: We thus learn to know the proper relations of our conceptions with regard to magnitudes and figures. This science is then a fixed and unalterable thing; and with it we may proceed, in discovering the ratios of changes in the situation
situation of perceived things. Thus we acquire real knowledge, or establish an actual science of moving and resisting things.

4. It is in this manner that, among changing things, we discover causes of action, in generalizing the observed effects; and thus conclude powers, in acting things, as causes of their motion. Now, having measured and distinguished those acting powers, we may form a system or general of causes and effects; which is the physical system, or wisdom of nature, as distinguished from the mind of man. In thus explaining all the appearances of nature, in a general system of laws, investigated from the knowledge of particulars which are the subject of actual observation, we arrive at that philosophy, or knowledge of generals, which is termed natural philosophy.

5. The purpose of natural philosophy is to make man wise, in relation to that part of nature with which his life and animal pleasure are more immediately concerned. Were man nothing but an animal, nothing more would be required besides natural philosophy, to make him happy in providing for all his wants. But, no species of the brute ever arrives at philosophy; it is even doubtful if any of them ever attain the least degree of science or knowledge of principle, which is so necessary to philosophy. Whereas man, though born a brute animal, continues not to move in that subordinate sphere; he early manifests his talents for conscious reflection; and he has a desire to arrive at a superior happiness, in having a sense of dissati-faction and misery, which science properly relieves.

Man is no more concerned with physical knowledge, considered simply as knowledge, than the brute, who must perceive and judge for the purpose of his life. But when man, in scientific reflection, has analyzed his animal knowledge, and comes to compare his own imaginations with those principles of knowledge, which he has no more power to change than to produce, he then proceeds to reason from scientific
scientific principle; and, by reflecting on what passes in his own
mind, he proceeds to understand that principle of science, which he
had employed in his reasoning. But, if it is in this manner that
man proceeds to know more than the brute, (who is equally con-
cerned as man in the sensual system,) there must be implanted in the
mind of man, by nature, an ardent desire to understand; and, there
must be a pleasing satisfaction in the pursuit of this desire.

6. To the enjoyments or satisfactions of science, are properly op-
posed, those of the animal; and, as either one or other of these may
become the object of pursuit, it is of much importance to the proper
education of youth, early to have inspired the love of science, and
late to improve the sensual pleasures. For, though man, enlighten-
ed with science, is captivated with intellectual enjoyment, man, un-
enlightened, is corrupted with the pursuit of animal pleasure re-
duced to a system; and he becomes an animal more vile, in propor-
tion as he has acquired wisdom to attain that end, when this is con-
dered as his only or supreme good.

Man is born to eat and drink; this, however, is only subservient
to his animal nature; and, it enters not into the consideration of
him as a man. Accordingly, we find that man is not satisfied with
meat and drink, with clothes and sleep, nor with any or all of the
animal enjoyments. Man, sature with food, and fatiate with brute
pleasure, longs for intellectual enjoyment; those hours are heavy
on him, that intervene between the paroxysms of animal satisfaction,
which on the whole are but of short duration. In this state, there-
fore, of intellectual desire, man grasps at every object of human un-
derstanding, in like manner as if, when perishing for hunger, he
should have presented to him food. With this exercise of his un-
derstanding, the impatience of his spirit is solaced; and, nothing but
the objects of this understanding can give entertainment to the hu-
man nature, when at ease, as not being excited by the duty of life, or infligated by the necessity of brute appetite.

7. For the truth of this assertion, let every man look into his own breast. On the one hand, Is there not a pleasure in contemplating beauty, that is to say, an order observed in the arrangements of colour and form? Is there not a satisfaction in considering truth, that is to say, the natural order of knowledge in every subject? And is there not a happiness in pursuing with wisdom the dictates of our nature? On the other hand, Is not the mind distressed when it contemplates nothing but deformity or disorder? And is not man miserable when he knowingly transgresses the dictates of his nature, and sacrifices, to the folly of a human fancy, or to the unbridled fury of a brutish passion, the superior enjoyment of his reason.

It must not be here alleged, that there are men who seem happy without thought or scientific contemplation. We are apt to judge ill, when we judge only from superficial appearances. The scientific view of the subject is this; from the brute animal who has no such source of happiness nor misery, to the philosopher, who contemplates the universe and the system of human nature, there is an indefinite gradation; and, in each step, the intellectual satisfaction or distress, (according as the faculties are either properly employed or not,) may be considered as proceeding pari passu. Hence, in the lowest state of human intellect, the mind in contemplation may be either as happily or as miserably employed, as it is possible for it to be; although the degree of that happiness or misery may be little, compared with a mind of greater capability, that is, one more advanced in science, consequently having a more extended field of contemplation, in which it may be entertained with observed order, or distressed by seeing nothing but disorder and confusion.

8. Abstract science is the entertainment of the few; but, to every man,
man, the relations, in which he stands with regard to others of his species, afford an interesting object for his understanding. Man is to man always either a rival or a friend; and these different relations, between the same men, will change in the varying circumstances of their views of things. Man may be to man the subject of love or of hatred, of envy or of admiration. The rules, that are to be observed in the intercourse of men, form a science which is known more or less to all, and is interesting to every one of human kind, or to every person thus related with the species. Hence the generalisation of those scientific rules of moral conduct, gives man knowledge of another part of the wisdom of nature, in teaching him the affections of the human mind, and the causes of those affections in which he is so highly interested. Here is then another species of philosophy, in which man is only concerned as a man, and not as an animal; and as, in external things, the knowledge of causes is termed natural philosophy, here, in the science of humanity, the knowledge of motives and affections is termed moral philosophy, or the knowledge of human nature.

9. There are but few among mankind who proceed scientifically beyond this subject of speculation,—this species of philosophy which has for object to know, how best to form a subject of enjoyment from the social state, from that part of nature which is possessed of rational thought and conscious reflection, and which is endowed with mutual sympathy and reciprocal affection. But, to a mind arrived at this philosophy, which has for object the opinion of other men, there is still a subject of great importance to be learned; this is, the philosophy of intellect, or that sublime science, in which man, understanding every truth of nature, proceeds to act, in seeing the design of that being who had willed him to be. Here, man forms a subject of happiness to himself, independent of the opinions of other men; and here, man, without despoiling any of his natural affections, is affected with pleasure of a superior kind, in having a satisfaction which
which nothing can deprive him of; a satisfaction which is not diminished by the influence of other enjoyments, but which grows, upon the understanding, in proportion as other pleasures fade, upon the sense.

In this highest species of philosophy, man sees himself as a being of intelligence, calculated to enjoy pleasure in the paths of truth, of wisdom, and of benevolence; and to suffer misery in nothing but in transgressing those laws of his constitution, which have been wisely contrived for his happiness. Man, therefore, arrived at this height of science and philosophy, chooseth to observe those laws which are for his good; and he necessarily forfeits his own esteem, in every wilful negligence of his duty as a man. Here is a point of knowledge which makes man a being superior to the generality of his species; and which sets him far above the animal state, from whence he had proceeded. Here is a satisfaction which is made to fill the soul of man, in giving him the full fruition of himself; without either, on the one hand, the palling of his sense of pleasure, or, on the other the anxious craving of a vain desire. Instead then of being like the successful Hero who was unhappy that he had not another world to subdue, he fits down satisfied with having conquered prejudice and error, and finds real enjoyment in following the laws of wisdom, justice, and benevolence, ordained by his author, and discovered in the exercise of those talents which have been given him for his happiness.

If, from the sources of his knowledge, man may thus form a system of thought productive of his happiness, a system which will bear examination in every light, herein will naturally be placed the utmost step in the order of human intellect, and *summum bonum* in the scale of finite happiness. Thus man will necessarily be regulated in the wisdom of the creation, or will of God; the view of which must
must give the highest satisfaction to the human soul. Let us now attempt to make an abstract of this view of human regulation.

10. Science, it has been shown, is the knowledge of truth; and, man is excited to acquire science, by the pleasure which he immediately enjoys in that pursuit. But, this is abstract science, in which there is no other immediate profit besides that pleasure which is enjoyed in seeing truth; and there is another species of science, which serves immediately to conduct our action when we have some object in our view. In this last case, there is a profit as well as a pleasure in the knowledge, or rather there is a pleasure of another kind which enters the transaction: This, in the lowest state of man, is nothing but a sensual pleasure; there is not an object in the animal man but has a reference to sense, and must be esteemed sensual in the gratification. This is the proper distinction of the animal; and, man is only an animal, so far as he pursues those objects.

Here, therefore, in the lowest state of man, there would seem to be both a profit and a pleasure in the pursuit of science. But, in the gratification of the sensual pleasure, there is no pursuit of science: The actual knowledge of the animal man terminates in itself; it is a final cause; and, in the animal state, this is an end which draws to no other consequence than the preservation of that being which has life.

As the sensual pleasure is thus noways scientific, (as leading to a farther state in knowledge,) neither is the scientific pleasure to be accounted any thing, in this animal transaction. The knowledge of truth which gives pleasure to the mind of man, either has not begun in this first step, or is eclipsed by the sensual pleasure which here is perfect, and exists with all its native power.

It is indeed true knowledge, that which leads the animal to enjoy;
but, the animal sees not the truth of that knowledge by which he is led to pleasure; and it is only man, (who makes his knowledge the object of his thought,) that can enjoy the pleasure of knowing truth. Man therefore, though an animal, enjoys a pleasure independent of his animal nature, a pleasure in the exertion of his intellectual faculties, and a pleasure distinct from the gratification of his sensual appetite. Here then is an intellectual pleasure, which is properly opposed to a sensual enjoyment; and, this pleasure is pursued in science, which is the progress of knowledge abstracted or separated from actual things, from sensual pleasure which is the proper end of animal knowledge.

But, science is not limited to this end, of giving intellectual pleasure; abstract science indeed can have no other immediate object of pursuit besides the pleasure of seeing truth; but, as it is on truth that every pursuit in order to attain pleasure must proceed, so surely, the more of truth that is known, the greater power will be acquired of pursuing and attaining pleasure. Hence, a man advanced in abstract science has more the means of attaining actual pleasure, than one who has no science, but who is led, like the brute, to actual pleasure by means of his immediate knowledge.

But, the application of abstract science, in order to attain our animal desires, or serve the purposes of life, is more than simple science; it is wisdom, in conceiving means to attain an end. It is by science alone that man acquires wisdom; and, science proceeds by abstraction, in analysing thoughts, and in assimilating those distinguished things. Hence, man comes to know the relations of the most distant things, and thus to perceive the similar qualities of things most different. This may be illustrated in an example.

In analysing the motion of the moon we find a part of this motion tending towards this earth; and in generalising the motion of heavy
heavy bodies we find this applicable to that part of the moon's motion which had been before distinguished; here science is compleat, in finding the moon actuated by a power similar to that which makes a heavy body fall. We now are wise, not only in knowing that the moon is heavy, but also in knowing the measure and conditions of that power by which heavy bodies are actuated; here is philosophy, by which man is led to know the causes of things, or those rules of nature by which things are made to come to pass. But if man knows the ends and means of nature, he makes himself more powerful in relation to actual things, than he was originally before he studied nature; here then is natural philosophy, by which the power of man, with regard to material things, is actually increased. When man removes a rock, which opposes his way, by means of gunpowder; when he travels across the ocean by means of navigation; when he converts a wood or marsh into a field of corn, and grinds that corn by means of water or of wind; in all those and a thousand other cases, man is infinitely superior to the animal, who employs his own powers; for, here man calls into his aid the powers of nature; here, knowing the nature of things, he wisely adapts his ends and means. In proportion, therefore, as man proceeds in science, he becomes wise; and in proportion as he proceeds in wisdom, he becomes powerful.

We may therefore sum up the definition of science and philosophy in this, that science is the knowledge of truth in every species of subject, and philosophy the application of science for every species of good.

Science is the knowledge of truth; but philosophy is more, it is the application of science for the purpose of a wise design. Now this purpose, to attain which science is to be employed, may be various; but all these may be comprehended under two general heads, viz. animal and intellectual good. If animal good is pursued according to
to the just rules of science, man acquires great power in providing for his animal desires. If man again employs his science, first, in knowing what is his most valuable enjoyment; and, secondly, in knowing how best to attain that end in his desire, he must arrive at that which in his nature is most perfect. This perfect nature of man, then, is formed by himself; and, it is founded on wisdom. He therefore, who thus forms himself, or who forms others, according to the perfection of human nature, is termed a philosopher.

10. In natural philosophy we employ the abstract general ideas of time, space, and number, in order to compare the several actions which, from their effects, become the subject of our observation; and, in thus finding rule or measured degree in action, we discover system in the changes that take place, as well as in the just proportions of the forms which apparently are fixed. Hence we conclude intelligence subsisting in the cause of that which then appears; because, those things appear to be ordered in wisdom. In like manner, the sensible qualities of bodies appear all to be contrived with a wise intention, in order to serve the purpose of our life; and, all the changes, that take place in those qualities, are in science reduced to certain rules. Now man, discovering those rules, thus becomes wise, in knowing that design which is in nature, and which is ultimately employed for the use of man.

Thus, from an animal which only reasons in order to live, or serve the purposes of nature, man becomes intelligent in the acquiring wisdom, and he becomes, in his wisdom, powerful, by making every thing in nature subservient to his proper purpose. The most distant objects in the heavens are not to him indifferent; he makes of them a subject of entertainment and utility; and, it is the chief purpose of the human intellect, from these objects of his understanding, to draw a source of happiness, in promoting knowledge the essence of his being.

Besides
OF HUMAN NATURE.

Besides the heavens and the earth, man finds a fund of entertainment in the social intercourse with others of his species. Man is not to man a subject of indifference; upon this occasion, his passions, affections, and enjoyments, are more excited than on any other; and, by means of this intercourse, which he finds with congenial minds, either the happiness or the misery of his nature is exalted. But, while every enjoyment of his animal and intellectual nature may be increased in that intercourse of minds, mutually and sympathetically affected, every misery may in like manner be alleviated, or diminished in our estimation*. Hence this great lesson in the science of morals, that in mutual benevolence every good is increased, every evil is diminished; whereas, in mutual malevolence, every good is diminished, and every evil is increased. Man therefore, in generalizing, arrives at truths important to his happiness, as well as interesting to the pleasures of his life.

Thus man, in his wisdom, is made to enjoy the heavens and the earth; and also forms a rational intercourse with sensitive beings, and congenial spirits. But, he is even made for more; for, he is made to enjoy himself in his reflection. Man thus learns to know the sources of his happiness; and, by distinguishing in happiness degree, he becomes most wise in knowing how to make himself most happy. Thus there is a distinction of happiness, as on the one hand the effect of nature's wisdom, in giving man the capacities of enjoyment and the opportunities of enjoying; and as, on the other hand, the effect of human wisdom, in so disposing things naturally indifferent to the species, as from them to form a subject of intellectual enjoyment.

* But not only is man to man an object so interesting, even the brute resemblance of human nature is to man an object of some value. The submissive deportment and sympathetic sensibility of some animals, particularly the dog, receives from human nature its just return of gratitude; nor can the most enlightened intellect refuse to receive a satisfaction from this source of his natural enjoyment.
ment. This source of enjoyment is then in human art; although this art be ordered in the system of nature, by whom man is directed, in that progress wherein he acquires his proper wisdom.

In reflecting on himself, and making his proper knowledge the subject of his science, man discovers a ne plus ultra or a limit, in which his power stops. For, all the knowledge comes by sense, by memory and reason; and, over these he has no power. He was a sensible reasoning animal, before he was a rational reflecting man. There was a time when he had no wisdom; he then existed with the capacities of his nature. Man, therefore, did not make himself; although he now is able to increase his wisdom in pursuing science, and to increase his happiness in pursuing wisdom.

Let us now contemplate man supremely wise, in having proceeded according to the laws established in his nature, at the same time conscious that he is not himself the author of that wise establishment which he discovers in his science. What is the conclusion?—Either that man exists, in his proper wisdom, without a cause; or that the cause of man's existence is a being as much superior to man, as are the works of man inferior to himself. Now to suppose that man exists without a cause, is to say that man is a self-existing being; and this is manifestly false; for, man exists in consequence of having been first made to know, and then to think in reflecting on his knowledge. Of ourselves we do not know; our sensibility is not of us; and, even the brute exists not without sensibility. Therefore, the cause of our sensibility is the cause of our existence; the author of our existence is the author of our science, by which we know more than the brute in knowing that we know; and the author of our science is the author of our wisdom. Now it is in wisdom that man rises superior to human nature, in which he had existed with the folly of a man; and also with the sense of folly, in order to improve the nature of his being.

Whatever,
Whatever, therefore, man in his wisdom learns to know, this must be ascribed to the power and wisdom of that Being who caused him to be. In like manner, whatever pleasure and satisfaction man finds in his senses and his science, this must flow from the benevolence of the Supreme Being, who has willed us to suffer in order that we may enjoy. Thus, if man be happy, he may look up to a Supreme Being, as the cause of his enjoyment; if he again be miserable, in repenting of his folly, he then becomes more wise, and thus learns to adore the Author of his intellectual constitution, which is truly made for happiness. But, if the animal part of man shall suffer, in the contingency of natural things, here is the will of his Creator; and, philosophy will teach him how to bear that evil which is only temporary, and which, he has reason to believe, is intended, by the Author of his being, as the means of happiness.

11. Thus man, in knowing himself and studying the nature of his knowledge, learns to know his Author; who is thus manifested to his intellect, although infinitely above his comprehension. But man, in finding reason to conclude the existence of a superintending Being, of infinite justice, power, wisdom, goodness, has made a discovery of greater importance than all the rest of his knowledge. For, having perceived the benevolent intention of his Author, in understanding the constitution of his own nature, he may act worthy of himself, in thus deserving that happiness which his Author has appointed as the end or purpose of his existence. Therefore, by a strict compliance with the wise rules of his constitution, which he has investigated, he may, in the greatest security, enjoy himself, and every thing appointed in the order of existence for that end. Hence man, in learning to read the intention of his Author, learns to know the means appointed for his happiness; and thus he arrives at that which infinite wisdom had, from the beginning of existence, benevolently intended as the end of being.

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12. But,
12. But, this understanding of his own nature, or the reading that intention of the First Cause, is a work which necessarily requires the progress of science in the species, and the united efforts of succeeding ages, improving science and producing wisdom. Man the individual, considered independent of the race, may arrive at some degree of scientific understanding, in pursuing the instinctive inclination of his mind, made by nature for the birth of science; he might then discover scientific art, as founded on that progress of his intellectual capacity. But, how little would the progress be of such a man, thus insulated in relation to his species! How little even is the progress of some savage nations, who live in climates or circumstances where necessity begets but little invention! Man therefore, by himself, could not have arrived at that art of human policy, which in the social state contributes so much to the happiness of man; and, in dumb nature, which speaks not to the animal, man, unassisted with the reflection of his proper image, would have but little exalted that image of divine perfection which we find in the progress of the human species.

Instinctive arts there are, by which the nature of the animal, and the man of nature, must proceed, in fulfilling the will of their Creator, who had designed them in wisdom; but the production of the will of man, who designs in wisdom, and thus rises superior to the brute animal which he was born, is a curious as well as valuable speculation. Therefore, too much pains cannot be bestowed in the study of it; and better entertainment cannot be proposed to the mind that values happiness, or seeks after more than the sensual satisfaction of his animal nature. With this view we shall now proceed, to consider human nature in all that perfection which may be arrived at in this life.

13. Human arts are founded upon science. This proposition deserves to be considered, as leading to the knowledge of art in general,
ral, and to the knowledge of the effect of science in this particular —of acquiring art.

Art may be defined, as being an useful practice founded upon science. It will thus appear that a man may be an artist, without being a man of science; and also that a person may have much science with few useful arts, or without many of those useful practices that may be founded on his science.

If a man learns a useful practice, he must either do this instinctively, as a brute, without science, or he must do it scientifically as a man. In the one case, he would do it without knowing how he did it, or reflecting that he did it; in the other, he would know that he had done the thing before, and therefore that he might do the same again, in the same or similar circumstances. But, in thus making the distinction betwixt a man and a brute, we do not fully see the distinction, of a man of common sense and a man of science, either of which may possess an useful practice, but on different conditions, or by different means.

Man considered as by himself, cannot learn a useful practice, that is to say, an art, without at the same time making a certain progress in that science on which the art depends. This is clear; for, if he learns from experience an useful practice, without science, he only knows like an animal, who judges of what appears around him from his sentimental feelings, or his memory and the connection of his ideas, without science or a generalisation of his knowledge. Whatever therefore is the art of man the individual, his science must be justly proportioned to his art. But, in the pursuit of science, man may neglect many useful arts; and, in consequence of sublime science, a person may acquire an useful practice, which he may teach to a man of common sense, without teaching him the science, by means of which this teacher had acquired it. Here therefore is a
clear distinction of art and science, which can only be made scientifically in considering abstractedly those two different things,—the knowledge of generals, by which a particular practice may be suggested,—and, the knowledge of a particular practice, by which pleasure or satisfaction may be procured.

In the opinion of the vulgar, or men of common sense, who do not make proper scientific distinctions, experience is opposed to science, when these are considered as the means of acquiring useful knowledge or practising useful arts. In this case, as an artist may be to them more useful than a man of science, they must judge very unfavourably of science, as the means of acquiring arts; and, they may erroneously suppose, that arts are acquired by experience alone, without science. But, if the present theory is just, no art has ever existed without its just proportion of science; although much science may exist without its just proportion of art.

Suppose a man, in practice, doing some useful thing which he cannot do again, as frequently happens; Can it be said, that this person has acquired an art? No surely; but, he has learned a fact, which is, that he had done such a thing. Let us suppose, that he had stained his cloth with a colour which pleases him; but that he cannot do it again, as not knowing that simple by which it had been done, or that composition of known simples, or those circumstances of a known composition, by which the particular effect had been produced. This person, in relation to the thing under consideration, is not an artist, as he cannot do the thing again; far less is he a man of science, as knowing the reason of the thing, or how it had been done. If, on the contrary, this person had known scientifically every simple employed, and every circumstance of the operation which had been performed, he might have said confidently, after the first operation, that he could do so again; and, experiment would justify his science.
Let us now suppose that, without knowing the simples or the circumstances of the process, this person shall incline to do again by design what had occurred to him by accident; and, for that purpose, shall make experiment, in order to discover what is necessary to that effect: Here is, at least, a person proceeding scientifically; and, when he shall have arrived at the knowledge of all the ingredients, and circumstances necessary to the end, will he not have made some progress in his science.

It will thus appear, that no man, of himself, independently of others, can attain an art, without science proportioned to that art. But, man lives in society, where he learns his arts without all that science which had been necessary to discover these. The present example will illustrate this.

A common artificer, who knows how to dye scarlet, has the science of his art in any place, where he may procure the materials which he employs; but, not having the science of those materials, he would be ignorant of his art, in a place where there were plenty of nitre and vitriol, or the materials of which these are made, but where there were nobody that knew the process of making aqua fortis. In complicated operations, therefore, man may be a perfect artificer, as having the knowledge of his art, in relation to one part of the operation, but an imperfect artificer, as not having knowledge of his art, in relation to other parts of the design.

The making a mill to grind his corn, and the application of wind or water as a power to actuate that mill, could not occur to man by accident. He had to learn himself the art of cultivating corn and making a mill, in studying the laws of nature, no otherwise than he, by the same means, learns to circumnavigate the globe. It is science therefore which forms man the artificer, who contrives wise
ends to satisfy his desires, and who industriously attains those ends in wisely adapting means.

14. Let science be considered as the relations of all material causes or external things, and let us suppose this science in a person to be perfect; then, as this person would know every possible event and relation in this order of things, he would also know all the means that might be applied in effecting any end in that series of events. He would therefore be perfectly wise, in having the means of every art that concerned the animal part of his constitution,—that part which is immediately connected with material things. But, he might be ignorant of that art of man, in which intellect consults its proper happiness. Here is a different end, or here is a different order of event; and, he is ignorant of the relation of things in this order. He knows how to attain his sensual pleasures; but he is ignorant of those events that concern his intellectual enjoyment. Here is a supposition that will serve to illustrate the nature of man, by giving a separate consideration to the sensual and the intellectual parts.

In order to have this view of human nature, let us separate, from the supposition, all that is unnecessary to the animal nature, which is alone intended to be thereby served; thus we shall have a proper view of that person whom we have supposed to be wise. If we shall suppose this animal as living in a system of being, where every thing necessary to his purpose is wisely provided, and as having every necessary means immediately within his power for the accomplishment of those desires, which to him are natural as not being the result of his proper wisdom, then it will appear, that here is an artifl formed by nature, not by science; an artifl, not without knowledge, but with no more knowledge than is necessary to his art. Here is evidently the animal; and now it is required to see how this order of being is infinitely inferior to man.
The brute animal has now been considered as a perfect artist in the limited circumstances of his existence, and for the limited purpose of his life or sensual satisfactions. He arrives at the wisdom of his practice, not from any previous science in his mind, but from the necessity of things, or that arrangement of events which is immediately from nature. He is an artist, as having knowledge adapted to his practice; and thus he is distinguished from the plant, which acts wisely for the purpose of its life, but acts not in art, in not having knowledge for its acting. The animal is an artist, as having all the knowledge necessary to his acting; but, he has no more knowledge than what is necessary to his art. As, therefore, he has no superfluous knowledge, he has nothing on which to found a voluntary art, by proceeding on his knowledge in order to make his knowledge grow. But, this is not the case with man; for, after practising (like the animal) the necessary arts of life, man likewise employs his mind in order to acquire knowledge; not animal knowledge, or that in which his life and brute art are immediately concerned; but intellectual knowledge, abstracted thought, and the consideration of relations in things, independently of their immediate use.

Let us now suppose man as proceeding in that speculative knowledge, which pleases in contemplation, and does not immediately relate to his practice, or to that art which he has in common with the animal; then, as there are two different ways in which his intellectual power may be employed, viz. either, on the one hand, in contemplating external events, or, on the other, those which happen in thought and his own reflection, we may consider these severally as the subject of his meditation, in order to understand the effect of this intellectual progress of the mind, a progress that is peculiar to man.

Man, regarding things in his scientific reflection, and consider-
ing their variable qualities and changing relations, approaches more and more to that state of being, which we had supposed, in considering the animal as acting with perfect wisdom, and as contriving all the possible means, in that order of things immediately connected with his life and animal pleasure. In that case, man must appear as a being infinitely superior to the brute animal, who contrives no end in his life or his pleasure, but who follows implicitly the ends appointed in his nature, and employs the means which naturally occur in following his instinctive appetite or inclination. Man, however, never arrives at this perfect state of science and of wisdom; therefore, though man be superior to the animal in thus pursuing science, this may be considered as only in degree, so far as the end is supposed to be in both the same, that is, animal life and sensual pleasure; an end pursued, in the brute animal, by the wisdom of nature, by a wisdom that is perfect; but, in man, pursued also by his own wisdom, which is imperfect. Man, therefore, pursuing the end of his own wisdom, instead of the end of nature, or, pursuing the end of nature by means conceived in his own wisdom, instead of those contrived by nature, may even appear to be inferior to the brute animal, who never departs from that order of things which nature had prescribed him to follow, and who has no other object to pursue but that of life and sensual pleasure.

Man, thus forming design, but with imperfect wisdom, becomes sensible of his folly, in reflection. He thus learns to become more wise, and to improve his science. Whereas, the brute animal, who proceeds wisely without conscious design, or who acts in the wise design of nature, never acquires science; consequently, never can be sensible of wisdom or of folly.

But man, besides his animal pleasure, has also his intellectual enjoyment, as an order of things in which he may pursue science, and acquire the useful practice of making himself happy in the enjoyment
joyment of his knowledge. Here man will appear to be infinitely superior to the brute animal, as having, besides the art of making himself happy, or procuring pleasure in his life, and in the propagation of his species, the art of making himself happy in another manner, and procuring pleasure of a different species, in the propagation of his knowledge. Here, curiosity is the effect of a natural desire; and, the conscious satisfaction of this desire, proves the excitement to a further exertion of his mind. The understanding thus forms to itself a motive of exertion; and, knowledge is promoted in the pleasure of the understanding. Here is science, which is proper to man alone; science, which is not immediately connected with any animal action; and science, which leads to the pleasure of thought, but not to the happy thought of having acted well.

As the wisdom of man, or the power which he acquires by means of science, may be employed in directing the course of things which are material, in which case he increases the instinctive arts, or those of animal life, so it may be employed in disposing of those events, in the human mind, which are the work of intellect, or those opinions which necessarily produce either happiness or misery. It is not in the power of man to make a conscious thought or intellectual sentiment either please or not please, no more than he has any jurisdiction over his feeling or sensations; these are established in their effects by nature; but, there is a natural constitution in the system of intellectual events, which, being known or perceived in science, may be turned to the profit of that intellectual agent. If, for example, I shall know, that, in order to be pleased myself, I must please others; and that, in order to please others, I must be amiable, benevolent, and just, then, with science, I increase my power of gaining happiness.

Wisdom, therefore, is the chief pursuit for man. Wisdom is not acquired except by means of science; but wisdom, being once attained,
tained, is the means of happiness, and that whether we consider the
instinctive happiness of the animal part of man which is limited to
life, or the rational happiness of a conscious being,—a being who
suffers and enjoys in his reflection, and whose enjoyments are not,
like those of the animal, limited, in their measure or existence, to
the present pleasure.

Man, become wise in having arrived at the understanding of his
thoughts, forms the design to make himself always happy in the
enjoyment of his reflection, and in reflecting on the actions which
he has performed. Here man considers the motives of his conduct,
and the passions of his nature; he distinguishes the instinctive plea-
sures of his animal constitution, and the artificial pleasures of his
science; he generalizes pleasure, in order to know that which in ac-
tion is the good, and that which in the good is best; he generalizes
evil, in order to know that which in actual things is evil, and that
which in evils is the worst; he thus arrives at such a degree of wis-
dom, as to judge what, in the competition of his desires, is to be
preferred. Now, until he is arrived at this period in knowledge,
he has not the wisdom of a man; he has not acquired the scientific
art of making himself either most happy for the present, or most
happy for the future. But, having arrived at this point, man is
properly wise; wise, in consequence of his proper knowledge; and
wise, in knowing how to acquire a species of happiness, distinctly
different from that of the animal nature, which he nevertheless en-
joys.

15. When man is thus become absolutely or universally wise,—
wise in knowing generals, and in appretiating degrees, he then turns
his thoughts to his own nature, in making wisdom the object of his
admiration, and in studying wisdom as the cause of his chief hap-
piness. In this career, he stops not till he arrives at what is ultimate
in wisdom; at that which is the first cause of all being or existence;
and at him who is the Author of that wisdom, which is the immediate cause of human happiness. Man, arrived at this knowledge of the First Cause, stops in admiration of all that which thus he knows; he is happy, in seeing that nothing but wisdom and benevolence presides in nature; and he is truly intelligent, in knowing that here is the limit of his knowledge.

From the brute animal, actuated by the wisdom of nature, man has thus become wise, in knowing himself, and in seeing his dependence on a supreme Being, who had willed him to be, and who has willed him, in the constitution of his being, to be happy. Here man, in his science, learns to love that creative wisdom which has been employed in producing happiness; and then he naturally acquires the desire to promote happiness, by employing his proper wisdom in the art of training the brute beings of his species to be happy. Here is philosophy, which is the foundation of wise government, as that government is the source of social happiness and intellectual enjoyment. Man, arrived at this perfection of his intellect, has then learned the supreme art of his capacity, that of making people wise, in being taught science, and that of making people happy, in being made to know virtue.

16. Man enjoys the progress of his animal nature, like the brute who has no other nature to enjoy; but that which is properly man, differs absolutely from the nature of the brute, who has no scientific art. Now, it may be inquired what this is which constitutes human art; an art at which no brute animal arrives; and an art by which man is made happy in a superior degree, compared with the brute, who has no other but his animal nature to enjoy.

This intellectual art of man consists in his learning to value himself; for, in this thought, there is placed a source of happiness to man. What pains does he not take in the pursuit of this satisfaction!
tion! What industry does he not bestow, in order to arrive at this end! And, what dangers to his animal constitution does he not despise, when in competition with this darling object of his design! From the first dawning of humanity, in his childhood, to the last moment of departing breath, the view of this enjoyment never leaves him; or, if at any time he, in his folly, loses this enjoyment, his misery is in proportion to his former happiness.

If this is the case, that man may learn an art of valuing himself in order to be happy, how valuable must be the science of that art! This science is comprehended in a little compass. Man begins to enjoy, in gaining the love and admiration of others; and, he ends this intellectual career, in gaining the estimation of himself. In the illustration of this theory lies the whole system of morality and virtue.

Man wishes to have the love of those whom he loves; but, he wishes to have the admiration of those even whom he does not love. Man begins to have moral sentiments at a period of his life when he knows not love, at least when he distinguishes but little in his sentiments. But, at this time, man courts admiration; every action of the boy shows this to be true; all his plays tend to this end. How soon does a boy weary in twirling his top, if he is by himself? but, no fatigue is thought too much, if in his exercises he may be admired by others. But, what the boy is in his play, the same is man perhaps in all the periods of his life. The boy studies to be admired, so does man. But, at the several periods of his life, from the beginning to the end, he is often changing the object on which this admiration rests.

From the flying of the kite, to the driving in a coach and six, what is changed?—Nothing but the means; the end is still the same; it is the admiration of man which is the object of desire, and it
it is by man desired. The useful inquiry therefore is,—How best to attain this object of our desire, this admiration which pleases man, from whatever subject it arises; for, if a method could be found, by which with certainty the end may be attained, here perhaps would be discovered what might spare much pains, much fruitless labour, much disappointed hope.

The sure way for man not to be disappointed in his views of being admired, is to make himself admirable in the eyes of mankind; for, in what other way can he proceed with safety? If I am improperly admired, or admired for a quality which I do not possess, I must have imposed on others, who believed me possessed of that quality or object for which I am admired. But, if imposition is not a quality that may be admired of men, or if, on the contrary, it is hated and despised, how can I hope thus to escape being plunged from the imaginary pleasure of admiration to the misery of contempt? Therefore, in order to arrive at the happiness which I desire, I must not court the admiration of my species, for that which has not a sufficient title to procure me the approbation of those by whom I wish to be admired.

But now we may consider, who it is by whom we would wish to be admired for the quality which we truly possess. For this purpose, it is needless to discriminate mankind into rich and poor; riches are no part of man. Neither matters it what nation it is by whom I am admired, if I am admired of men. But, all mankind may be considered as being either virtuous or vicious; and it may interest me to understand, whether I should court the admiration of the one or other of those characters thus distinguished. I cannot seek the admiration of the vicious; for, they admire nothing but that which promises to give them personal pleasure; and, whatever be my merit, they will not regard the disappointment of my wishes. It is not, therefore, the men of this complexion of whom I should study.
to be admired. On the other hand, the virtuous man, instead of being self-interested, is always just; instead of being pleased in his passion, which is animal, he is pleased in his understanding, which is intellectual; instead of bending all his mind to animal enjoyment, he pursues truth, and loves benevolence. It is by men of such a character as this, that a person may expect to have his actions viewed with impartiality, and his meritorious conduct rewarded with applause. In the eyes of such a person, therefore, What is it that would be admirable, or deserve applause?

If the esteem and admiration of vicious and foolish men is not an object worth acquiring, even if it could be procured; and, if the esteem of wise and virtuous men be an object worthy of our desire, and certainly to be acquired, here is a most important truth. But nothing can command the esteem and admiration of this rank of men, so much as virtuous principle and wise design. Agreeable manners please; and, those that please the generality are admired; but, agreeable manners hold of virtue and of wisdom. Here, then, is the surest means of obtaining the esteem and admiration of mankind.

But, why am I to seek the esteem and admiration of mankind? Is it not because this makes me happy, in giving me a greater value for myself? And, does not my happiness ultimately depend upon this esteem and value which, in reflection, I am to put upon myself? If this be so, the proper purpose of that virtue and wisdom in which I am employed to make my species happy, is to acquire an opinion of myself; an opinion founded on truth or matter of fact, and not on fancy or imagination; and, an opinion on which, independently of my will, my happiness depends. Here, then, is the great art of human wisdom; an art employed for the purpose of acquiring happiness. But, this art of man is founded on the system of
of nature; a system in which both general and particular happiness is the end or aim.

17. Hence, the great art of man is to please himself; but, man cannot please himself upon a perfect principle, except upon the principles of virtue; man cannot form a perfect principle of virtue, in being beneficent for the purpose of serving his own interest, but in being beneficent for the purpose of pleasing himself in doing good. Therefore, though man, in innocence, might please himself, without being virtuous, he cannot, in the progress of his intellect, become virtuous, without pleasing himself.

Besides pleasing himself, man has the ambition to be happy; for, there is a difference in being pleased, and in being happy. The being happy, is being pleased with our pleasure. But, a person may be happy, without being happy upon a perfect principle. It is therefore only when we are happy upon a perfect principle, that we may be said to be truly happy; for, who can be satisfied with happiness upon the fleeting condition of a momentary opinion? Where then shall we find a principle, to build our happiness upon, that will not change? Shall we be satisfied to found this principle on our own opinion?—No; this cannot be; for, we are conscious that our opinions, which have no other support, change.

Thus, in pursuing happiness, we are led to seek for something on which to found opinion without error, consequently, on which to build a happiness that will not change. Now, it has been shown, that erroneous opinion originates in man. *Humanum est errare* is a truth; although it is not true, that man is *made* for error. Man is made for truth; and, error is only in the way. Man is made for knowing truth; he surely then may find it. If truth is to be found, it must be fought; and, where?—Not in the vain inventions of deceiving
ceiving and deceived man, but in the constancy of nature, and in the consistency of well examined thoughts.

Thus we are led to philosophy, the highest generalisation of general truths. Without philosophy, man errs even in his science on which philosophy depends. Science is the corrector of man’s vulgar notions; but philosophy corrects the erroneous notions of his science. Science removes the inconsistency only of individual thoughts; but philosophy, if it is just, removes the inconsistency of thoughts in general. Without science, man, in his ignorance, is credulous; in science, again, man is cautious, and even may be sceptical. But, in philosophy, man sees the reason of his knowledge and his doubt; he then knows what he knows without dubiety; and he knows his ignorance, without being sceptical. Imperfect man thinks, first, that he knows things; and then, that he knows himself: But, man is more perfect, when he knows that things are only in his thought; and that he knows things only in his thinking consistently with the order of his knowledge. Thus the nature of man is to be imperfect; and, he is improved more and more in learning to know the perfect nature of truth, and seeing the perfection of his own nature.

A philosopher will thus appear to be a person who has the understanding of every subject that properly belongs to human knowledge, although his understanding be not absolutely perfect in any of those subjects. Philosophy is the perfection of art and science, although the nature of human art and science is to be necessarily imperfect. Philosophy is the knowledge of generals; and, man is led to philosophy by science, that is, the generalisation of particulars. In short, philosophy is all that is useful, amiable, and admirable in man. In every man, philosophy is found in some degree; in no man is philosophy found perfect.
18. Human nature being thus considered in the perfection of its present state, or actual existence, we find man regulated, for his good, by three different kinds of motives.

First, We find a regulated conduct, founded on the precepts of the wise, and on the example of those that are admired. This is the lowest order of regulated man; and it is founded on the instinctive credulity of his nature, which may be either employed on truth or falsehood.

Secondly, We find a regulated desire, founded on truth and scientific principle, and restrained by the consciousness of duty, in a person sensible to system. Here man appears as man,—a being exerting his intellectual capacities, knowing according to the rule of conscientious principle, and scorning fallacious authority, or refusing to believe even truth itself of which he has not seen the evidence.

Lastly, We find in man a regulated satisfaction, founded on the knowledge of his own nature, and on the admiration of the general or divine wisdom; a wisdom which has ordained happiness as the end of our existence, which has appointed life as the means of science, and science as the means of human wisdom. Here man appears in the capacity of a superior being, giving light to man, (who naturally sees not beyond the instinctive knowledge of his animal existence,) and creating system for the extension of happiness, which he feels himself, and wishes to make others feel.

Three distinct capacities may thus be considered as subsisting in the being man; first, the capacity of the animal, acquiring art with no more knowledge than the art requires; secondly, that of the man of science, who has more knowledge than his art requires; and lastly, that of the philosopher, who, to the extensive nature of his
his science, joins the interesting nature of his art. This subject may be worth examining.

The animal, as well as man, has sense and reason, by which he knows again that which had happened in his knowledge; he thus conducts the oeconomy of his life, by the instinctive faculty of reason assimilating his affections, and by the retentive faculty of memory preserving his ideas. But the animal of the brute species proceeds no farther in his science. His art is, therefore, limited to the natural oeconomy of his species; and he never arrives at the art of forming an artificial oeconomy, by which the enjoyment of his nature may be improved, in the refinement of his art.

A man of science again is he who discovers differences, in order to increase his knowledge; and who compares that knowledge of his own production, in order to discover truth, which is the generalization or assimilation of those distinctions in his knowledge. But, a philosopher has in view something beyond those truths of science; although this is truly founded on those truths.

In animal action, it is instinctive desire or sensual pleasure that is the end; and the motive is an idea founded immediately on matter of fact, or the action of external causes. In science again, truth is the end; and the motive here is the pleasure immediately flowing from the operation of the mind, or the exercise of the intellectual faculty. But, in philosophy, man has a further end; and, this end is proper to himself, as being purely the formation of his thought. He considers the pleasant effects to which the discovery of truth or the progress of his science is to lead; and thus he leads himself to pleasure, in having acquired a knowledge which, as an animal, he had not from nature.

In nature, as distinguished from art, man may be excited to the study
study of science, from the enjoyment only which arises in the study itself, or purely from the pleasure annexed by nature to the progress of his knowledge. But, having some knowledge of philosophy, or the use of science, he may then study science from another motive, that is, with a view of thus promoting his philosophy, or this art which he has acquired of procuring pleasure.

Science, doubtless, has an ultimate; and so has philosophy. The ultimate of science is to discover general truths; the ultimate of philosophy is to employ those general truths, in order to find new pleasure,—a further enjoyment beyond that of knowing truth. The end and motive of science is intellectual pleasure; the end and motive of philosophy is something which man esteems happiness or good. The motive of science is a natural end; it is therefore an instinctive motive, the operation of the human art has no hand in it. Man feels pleasure from the seeing truth, as he feels pleasure in eating his food; but this is not the case with the motive of philosophy. If man shall scientifically attain an end, which he thinks is to make him happy, or which is to gratify a certain desire formed by himself, here is more than science; for, here is wisdom, in man attaining an end which he had foreseen, and in employing means in order to attain that end.

But, in considering the various ends, thus attained by means of philosophy or wisdom, and in studying the various means, employed in arriving at his proper happiness, man must make a progress in his scientific art. In this case, therefore, where man has already found the means of attaining his intellectual desire, What has he to advance farther, in promoting knowledge? Or what is he to gain, in being made fill more wise?—Suppose that, in his wisdom, he had made his animal enjoyment the object of his desire, Is there not an order of enjoyment still beyond that animal satisfaction, and of which he may make an object fill in his desire? If this is the case, then,
then, in attaining this ulterior desire, he would, from a wise animal, termed a man, become a wise man, in having himself increased his proper wisdom.

This wise person, therefore, may be properly termed a philosopher; as being not only wise, in properly adapting ends and means, but also in having formed the desire to be more wise, in studying wisdom, or the principles of his knowledge and means of his artificial happiness. Thus he loves wisdom, in studying that which makes him wise.

But, besides the wisdom of his intentions, man, speculating in his wisdom, and reviewing his own motives, may consider the benevolence and malevolence with which he is actuated and affected. Here man finds that he has naturally a love and inclination for his species; and also that he has naturally a desire to be loved and admired by those beings who are capable of love and admiration. Man, actuated with this desire, of being esteemed by others of his species, sacrifices his personal interest for the benefit of his neighbour: He thus enjoys, in his own opinion, the gratitude and good will of his species.

But if, instead of courting the love of another, in sacrificing his own interest or worldly concern, a man should take the pains to promote the interest of another, without the hope of a return, and, with this benevolent intention, should sacrifice his personal concern without the knowledge of any other but himself, What motive then would actuate that man to sacrifice his ease and pleasure? What hope could prompt him to neglect his worldly interest and his personal concern? — The strongest, in the eye of him who sees the interest of that part which in his constitution is not subject to decay, and who courts the approbation of that conscious principle which gives either misery or happiness. If man wisely loves himself, and
seeks his independent happiness; he will carefully promote the interest of mankind; and he will choose to do good, even to those whom otherwise he should hate. Here is the philosophy of self-love; for, if we are to love ourselves always, or without remorse, here is the only principle on which may be founded that esteem which makes the object lovely in our eyes; and, here is the principle on which perfect virtue must proceed.

The man who loves himself because he loves mankind, and who to his little personal concern prefers the consideration of a greater good, has, in studying his own nature, wisely arrived at the means of happiness; he then has learned the art of making himself happy upon the surest grounds, and in a superior degree compared with the effects of common wisdom. Here, therefore, we have philosophy again, in reasoning upon happiness as the end of wisdom, in like manner as we found it in reasoning upon wisdom as the means of attaining our desires.

19. After studying wisdom for its own sake, and finding benevolence to be his true interest, as well as his natural pleasure, What has man more to do in the promoting of his science? He has investigated wisdom and benevolence, in their efficient and final causes; he has only further to inquire after the cause, of those principles of action and affection which he has thus found to be generals, to be universals, in the system of intellect, in the constitution of his mind. This leads man necessarily to the First Cause, to the study of his Author, and to the knowledge of his proper end.

Here, science, or the generalisation of our knowledge, shows, that, as man the animal is wisely contrived for the purposes of life, man the intellectual person is naturally calculated to be wife, which is the end or purpose of his being; and that, as the happiness of man (to which wisdom necessarily leads) has been the end in view.
at his creation, or in the constitution of his mind, there is a principle of benevolence in the system, where man is made to take pleasure in the love of man. We may now comprise that system in a few words, in order to see it at one view.

20. The animal is guided by affection only, not by principle or theory, which he cannot form; but the affections of the animal are good, they are wisely calculated for the life and preservation either of the particular or of the race; no error therefore ever enters into the oeconomy of animal life, so far as this is guided by nature, who has given affections and aversions, all founded upon the principles of pleasure and pain.

Man, so far as he is an animal, is equally guided by nature as every other brute; but man, properly speaking, is not a brute, for he is enlightened with what is commonly called reason, that is to say, reasoning from principle: This is that which makes man guide himself, or walk by rule; for, this rule is properly of his own making. This rule, which man makes for his conduct, depends upon his wisdom; which again depends on nature, in having given man the faculty of science.

But man, in producing his capacities, must err, or be deficient; his theory therefore is infected with ignorance or error; and his conduct, guided by erroneous principle, is misled by folly. Hence, if man were not calculated for a superior state, a state to which he may arrive even by means of his error and his folly, he either had not been, like the brute, wisely intended for his end, or misery is the end for which he has been intended.

Thus we are led to inquire into the end or intention of folly, vice, and misery. As folly leads to vice, so vice necessarily leads to misery;
misery; but, in misery man repents, and then he sees his folly. Now, if man in reflection sees the folly of his conduct, he must also in thinking, see the error of his principle. But it is only in correcting erroneous principle that man may be truly wise and virtuous; as it is in being truly wise and virtuous, that he may be happy. Man is therefore made by nature, for a state superior to that of the animal; this state then commences with his wisdom, and is perfect in his happiness.

Here is bounded human knowledge, so far as we have no farther data on which to reason. He that stops short of this view of things, sees not to the end of intellect, or sees not all the way; he that pretends to see farther than just reasoning from sound principle will lead, erects fable on the history of human intellect; and, however piously, imposes on the credulity of mankind.

21. It being a subject of such pleasant speculation, to see the wisdom and benevolence of the system in which we live, a system in which life leads to knowledge, and knowledge to a sense of either happiness or misery; and it being a subject so interesting to a being who thinks upon himself, and looks towards futurity, that the prolixity of an author, who writes upon that subject will scarcely require apology, if his reasoning be just, or his arguments conclusive; if otherwise, no conciseness could atone for an attempt to introduce delusion, and no manner of entertainment could apologise for a mistake in questions of so great importance.

If ever an author is to suppose others considering a subject in the same light as he does himself, it is upon this occasion, where a person, thinking for himself, thinks for all mankind. Now that which has so often pleased a writer may occasionally please a reader; it is in this view that the following chapter is offered to the public. To those
those who understand the preceding theory, it may be perhaps superfluous; but, though not necessary, it may be agreeable.

C H A P. II.

View of Human Nature, as being the effect of Wisdom and Benevolence.

1. M A N exists, not only passively as a sensitive being, but also actively or actually in the operation of his thought. All other things, man only judges in his thought, or imagines by the operation of his mind. But, of his own existence, a person does not barely judge, so far as he has the most immediate knowledge of himself in his reflection, and, so far as imagination is reality, with regard to his actual existence. It is only in relation to external things that the distinction of imagination and reality takes place, in man perceiving what is real, and imagining what is false.

But, though a person imagines that which does not any otherwise, or in reality, exist, he cannot imagine that he is, when he is not; his imagination, in that case, constitutes a reality in his existence; and, he would equally exist, when, were it possible, he should imagine that he had no actual existence. This however is not the case with regard to the existence of external things, or bodies imagined as existing with colour, with magnitude and figure; this is only a judgment of the mind; and, this judgment may be either true or false, i. e. either real or supposed. My imagining these bodies, and my believing them to be real existences, draws to no conclusion in science, if it can be shown, that I have substituted an imagination of my own for a supposed reality, which does not subsist in nature, as a thing.
thing different from my thought. But, the most false imagination or supposition is equally a proof of my imagining or judging as would be the most true; for, when I form a judgement, whether true or false, I cannot doubt of having judged, if I reflect on what has happened in my thought; and, without thus reflecting and forming a judgement, I cannot doubt, any more than believe, of my existing.

The mind subsists in knowledge, in thought, and in the progress of reason or of intellect; thus man has an existence which may be termed absolute, when compared with all other things or external objects, which have only a casual existence in the operations of the human understanding. It has been one of the principle objects of this work, to illustrate that proposition; and it has required much reasoning, in order to investigate that subject, which is not to be rashly admitted as a truth. We may now take a short view of this part of the intellectual system.

Mankind naturally think that we learn to know the system of nature by perceiving the visible, tangible, bodies of this world; they suppose that we are thus made to understand the real extension of the universe, which we cannot see and feel; and they are thus led to believe, that there is, besides our mind which thinks, an infinity of other existences which do not think, but which subsist in magnitude and figure, and move in space or universal extension. If that be the case, then, upon the death of this living body, which is supposed to be immediately connected with my thinking principle, my mind or conscious principle may be considered as ceasing to subsist, or to return again to that state of insensibility and ignorance from whence it had proceeded. I have already endeavoured to show, that this would be an erroneous judgment*; and now we are only to take

* Sect. IV. of this Part.
a very cursory view of this subject—the supposed subsistence of the mind in the visible universe.

If the mind shall be considered as an unextended thing and without magnitude or figure, a question naturally occurs;—What is the connection of those two things, extension, without any active principle, and a thinking active substance without extension? Now, in order to resolve that question, let us endeavour to analyse our thoughts upon the subject.

There are, I believe, but two ways in which we may conceive those different things related. First, if extension really exists independent of our mind which thinks, then, our thinking principle must be contained within extension; for, extension is infinite or everywhere. But, however situated those two things, there can be nothing in that extension by which our thinking substance could be made to know it; and, it could not be by any extended or figured thing that our mind should be affected or informed. For, if mind be absolutely different from extension, which, being passive in its nature, can have no action; and if the mind, in acting, cannot be affected or refreshed by extension, (as mind does not move, but thinks), then, it must be by means of some other thing, perfectly different from extension or direction, magnitude or figure, that our knowing principle is informed. Therefore, however that supposition may be made, of our mind subsisting in space or extension, this can have no consequence in our reasoning, or serve no purpose in the progress of our intellect.

If, again, our mind subsists independent of extension, and with the power of forming thought, (which I suppose will not be denied!) then, though there should not be any such real existence as extension, this may virtually exist in our mind, in being conceived or formed as a thought. That our mind exists independent of extension,
tion, as having neither magnitude nor figure, is the principle upon
which we are now reasoning; and, that extended figured things ex-
ist virtually in our mind, being actually produced in our thought, is
a fact of which we are conscious,—a fact which lays the foundation
for a science the truths of which are never questioned. But it has
been shown, in section IV., of what high importance, may be that
conclusion, to our happiness, or to the reasoning of our science with
regard to the system in which we exist.

The question, that concerns us so much, is not, If there be per-
ceived a system of nature, in which there is manifested the greatest
power and the most perfect wisdom; the real existence of that sys-
tem is as evident to us as any other thing, although this evidence
does not depend upon the testimony of inert matter or extension.
The proper question, with regard to external things, and the nature
of our knowledge, is this; Is it by the information of an extended,
figured, universe, that we are made to know, independent of our
own imagination or conception, or, is it by the information of some
other thing, a thing as distinctly different from extension and direc-
tion, magnitude and figure, as action is from passion? If it be the
first, then, sensation, or the passion of our mind, would not be re-
quired, in order to acquire the knowledge of the material system;
but if it be the last, then, our original knowledge must be passion,
i.e., sensation, and this information must require an active cause,
which is the very opposite of that inert system of magnitude and
figure which we conceive. The question is thus brought, for de-
cision, within the reach of our conscious reason. The matter of fact
is this; We are first informed by sensation, the passion of our mind,
and the effect of an active intelligent cause; and then, we proceed,
upon that information, to conceive in thought, or to imagine an ex-
tended, figured, system.

Let us now sum up the argument, with regard to the subsistence
of our mind which thinks, and that of the universe which is supposed to be extended. The mind, or our conscious reasoning principle, does not subsist in an extended figured universe; but, there is such a universe in our knowledge or conception. Therefore, it follows of necessity, that the extended, figured, universe exists in our mind; and, this is a fact which we have learned by means of that active, that real, system of nature, in which we subsist, and by which we are informed in sensation, or the passion of our mind, not by the information of extended, figured, inactive things.

Having thus ascertained the nature of extended, figured, things, which are erroneously supposed as subsisting externally, it may perhaps be demanded, How we know, that there is really a system or design of nature; because, if we conceive a system of extension and direction, or a universe subsisting in magnitude and figure, without there being really or truly such a thing, it might be supposed, that, in perceiving or understanding a wise system of nature, we only formed to ourselves a certain imagination or conception which did not truly exist; and therefore, that the wise and benevolent intention of our Author, who has been pleased to call us into existence on purpose to make us happy, might be considered as no better than a dream, and not a rational conclusion, or the certainty of science.

Such a question as this could only be made from misunderstanding the theory which has been given of science or the human understanding, and from reasoning upon another system of philosophy which necessarily leads to that erroneous view of the subject. In order to see this, it must be considered, that, in acquiescing with the received systems of philosophy, where things imagined by the mind itself, and those of which we have actual information, are not properly discriminated; or, where the real information from without by sense, and the operation of the mind itself imagining and perceiving according to the information which it had received, are per-
feclly confounded, it were in vain to attempt the giving an actual subsistence to a system of power and wisdom, and to deny it to that inert system of extension which is considered as the foundation of our knowledge. This, however, is not the case with regard to the theory of mind, which has been given in this work, and to which I must refer those who are willing to investigate this interesting subject.

It has been shown, that there is a source of actual information, a source which is distinctly different from the faculties of our mind; and that this is not an inert system of extension and figure, but an active system of power and energy. It is by this active system that we are first led to know, simply, in sensation, the passions of our mind; and, secondly, by the changes in that information of sense, we are led, in perception, to imagine extension and direction, and then to figure and conceive things according to a certain order. This perceived order, then, forms the system of nature, or external things, to the knowledge of which we are led by a real information, and in the contemplation of which we must acknowledge the power and wisdom of our Author. But, besides that system of power and wisdom which we are made to know or to conceive, there is a system of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery, with which we are more immediately concerned. It is in this moral system, that the benevolence of our Author is as clearly manifested, to the philosopher, as is the power and wisdom of the Creator in the system of the universe, which we are made in science to conceive.

Such is the interesting information, which we have from nature, with regard to the cause of our existence, and to the means of our knowledge and enjoyment. But, there is still another subject which necessarily calls our attention, when arrived at this understanding of ourself. For, after understanding the progress of our being, we are naturally led to inquire after the farther intention of our Author,
or what we are to be. It is with respect, then, to this question, that we may compare those two systems of philosophy, which have now been considered as drawing to such different conclusions, with regard to the present state of things.

It is impossible to found a rational belief of a future state of existence, upon the system of extended material things, considered as really existing with magnitude and figure; and independent of our thought: Whereas, in properly understanding the nature of our thought, in which the system of the external universe is formed, we shall find every reason to believe, that our present knowledge or experience is only a preparation for a future state, or further progress of our intellectual existence. This is a subject which has been already examined at some length, and is only mentioned here.

Upon the whole, then, as it has been shown (Part I.) how we arrive at the knowledge of extension, without there being any such extended thing acting externally in order to give us information; and, as we now have found it unnecessary, if not absurd, to suppose that the mind subsists in an extended universe, it follows, that the extended figured universe actually subsists in our mind, thus led to know the power, the wisdom, and the benevolence, of the Author of nature, and the informer of our mind.

We may thus also understand the nature of the human intellect; for, instead of considering the understanding mind of man as an infinitely small part of the visible universe, which is erroneously supposed to subsist externally, we will consider the extended figured universe, as being a part of human knowledge; and, in comparing the knowledge of the brute animal, who looks not up to the heavens, \( i.e. \) who forms no such knowledge upon the information of sense, and that of man, who perceives a system which opens more and more to his understanding, we shall see the endless nature of the
the human intellect. Thus we shall understand the progress of the
scientific mind of man, who enlarges his knowledge, whether he
reasons upon the information of sense, the passion of his mind, or
whether he reflects upon that which has actually happened in his
thought.

Whatever be the nature of that external existence, of which we
can form no idea, and whatever be that active thing by which we
are informed through the sense, the real existence of our reasoning
mind, or intellectual substance, can never be the subject of dispute
or dubiety. Surely, I that write my thoughts, know that I think;
but, before knowing that I think, I must have known that I am;
and, before knowing that I am, I must have been. Whoever, there-
fore, knows, must be; although it does not hold conversely, that
whoever is, must know that he is. Knowing and being are two se-
veral things, which may be different. I am, because I know; but
I also know that I am ignorant; and, in knowing wherein I am
ignorant, I know myself better than I did before. When, therefore,
a person knows that he is ignorant, he does more than simply to
know; for, he must first have known, before he knows that in
which he is ignorant, or does not know.

2. It will thus appear, that the property of a conscious existence,
or a self-knowing being, is not simply to know, which every sen-
tive being must do in the exercise of his memory; it is not even to
reason, which a brute mind may do without consciousness, or know-
ing that he reasons; but, it is to know his proper ignorance, which
comprehends the knowing of his knowledge, or the understanding
in reflection that which before he had known simply, or instinctive-
ly, without the examination of his thoughts. Now, this is a species
of knowledge perhaps infinitely superior to that of a brute, when it
judges instinctively for the animal purpose of its being.

3. Man,
3. Man, therefore, in having ignorance, is only a secondary being, and not a knowing being, existing independent of any other power or cause. But, so far as man knows his ignorance, he is a self-knowing being; a being who has thus an existence also in himself, or in that reflex operation which, in the constitution of his existence, it is permitted him to make, for the progress of his knowledge or his being. It is by this progress, than man is distinguished from the brute intelligence, which is a being of inferior capacity for knowledge; a being that is limited to the instinctive operations of his nature; and one that seeks not to know truth, or understand the information which does not immediately affect his senses.

4. As man is thus discriminated, on the one hand, in relation to an inferior intelligence, which we name brute, so is he in relation to Supreme Intelligence, by whom he has been made to know himself, and to reflect upon his knowledge; for, being conscious that we are not ourselves the author of our knowledge, we are constrained, in seeking for the origin of our existence, to look up to a superior Cause. The intelligent being man exists only in this manner, by thinking on himself, and understanding his proper knowledge, which is not from himself.

But, supreme intelligence must be somewhere, or exist in some being, without any of those conditions which we find necessarily limiting the intelligence of man. This supreme knowledge, therefore, is perfectly different from human intellect, and is infinitely above what we can conceive: Although, from this, there arises not the least uncertainty with regard to the existence of that Supreme Intelligence; but, on the contrary, the greatest certainty, in thus procuring consistency to all our knowledge, or to our knowledge of that system of things, in which the rays of perfect wisdom are conspicuous, amidst the clouds of human ignorance and folly.

5. It
5. It is thus that the perfection of human nature consists in the knowing of ourself, in understanding the progress of our existence, and the limitation of our knowledge. But, if the happiness of man be necessarily connected with the perfection of his nature, as there is every reason to believe, it must behove us much to investigate our knowledge, and to perfect our nature. Now, this end is to be attained in comparing our intelligence, on the one hand, with the brute knowledge from whence we are sprung, and, on the other, with that idea of the Divine wisdom, which we form by abstracting every thing of imperfection in our own existence.

6. Man is born a brute; and, the brute mind is perfect, so far as concerns the end of his intention, which is to live and to preserve life, in avoiding what gives pain, and pursuing what gives pleasure. Such is the brute mind reasoning instinctively for the purposes of life, but not voluntarily, conscientiously, or scientifically, for the purpose of that intellect which we find in man. The human mind, again, is never perfect; for, the utmost perfection of man is to know his ignorance, in discovering an indefinite field for knowledge to which he has not yet attained.

The brute, therefore, in being perfect, is not in any degree comparable to the human intellect, but is infinitely inferior to that principle of reason which, in its proper imperfection, is made to improve itself, in aspiring at what is infinite or divine; and, the mind of man, however superior to brute reason, is only a being of subordinate intelligence. Now, in this intellectual being, there may be perceived many different degrees, according as he acquires principles of more or less extent, and according as he reasons justly on the principles which he may have acquired.

Thus man, the intelligent being, may be considered as beginning where the reason of the brute is perfected, and as proceeding,
through consciousness and science, to various degrees of understanding, wisdom, and enjoyment. He begins in understanding, but with little wisdom, which is only gradually acquired in science; and, with regard to enjoyment, he only attains it in proceeding according to the appointed order of nature, who has given man pleasure in science, and enjoyment in design; for, in every retrogradation, he loses the enjoyment of his nature, and falls into the path of misery which he would willingly avoid. Therefore, misery and enjoyment may be considered as the means of leading man to wisdom; and, in that case, folly must not be considered as any end in nature, but a mean; the proper end being wisdom and happiness, to which man is necessarily conducted in the absurdity of error, the folly of deviation, and misery of repentance.

If the true happiness of man consists in knowledge and in virtue, (as it may be made to appear;) and, if perfect wisdom and benevolence actuates the Supreme Being the Author of our existence, (as we find every reason to believe,) it must be evident, that the pursuit of happiness in the present state, is the best preparation or the most proper means for attaining happiness, in that future state to which the present is considered as a preparation. The system of human life will therefore appear to have been conceived in the most pure benevolence; because, to make the pleasure of enjoyment the very means by which continued happiness may be acquired, is to make happiness the end, to which even pain and misery contribute, in preserving life and teaching wisdom.

7. If man is naturally pleased with good, and displeased with evil, here must be the moral system as contrived by nature; and thus it would appear, that the system of nature is founded on benevolence. But, this may be made evident. Man, though he commits evil, is not pleased with the action as evil, but as good. When, for example, a person has taken a cruel revenge, he is not pleased with the pain,
pain, which an offending person has suffered in consequence of that which he had willed; but, he is instigated to act by his own suffering; and, he is pleased, in having allayed the pain of injury which he had felt, whether justly or erroneously, whether with reason or unreasonably; the pain of the miserable victim expiates the suffering person’s anger, which is a state of pain. If he had not been in anger, he had sympathetically suffered in knowing the pain of a person who was innocent or unoffending; and, it necessarily costs the pain of anger, in order to will the suffering of that person who has given him pain. Therefore, in the willing of evil, the angry person acts only from the principle of doing himself good. In like manner, when a covetous person has unjustly acquired what belonged to another whom he thus injures, he may have pleasure in the enjoyment of his vicious prize; but he has no pleasure purely in depriving another person of that which might have been to him a subject of enjoyment.

When therefore a man commits evil, it is only for the sake of attaining some end which he thinks good. Perhaps he is mistaken in his opinion, and the end is not so good as he had imagined; perhaps he is mistaken also in relation to the means, in thinking them less evil than they really are; nevertheless, good was the object of his intention; and, though evil had been employed in the attainment of that end, it was only as the means, and not for the sake of evil. He had felt pleasure only in the contemplation of the good; and, the intemperate or unwise consideration of that good, had made him blind to the evil of the means, and insensible to the displeasure naturally connected with the idea of the evil.

8. What more could perfect wisdom have contrived, in the system of absolute benevolence? And, what can human wisdom, in the contemplation of this order of things, suggest?
There are two ways in which moral evil may be conceived to have been avoided; either, first, in making man incapable of giving offence; or, secondly, in making him incapable of returning evil when offended. If there is no other way in which that end may be attained, and if it can be made to appear that, so far as is consistent with the wisdom of the system, this order of things has actually been observed, it may with reason be concluded, that, in the system of human nature, so far as we see, infinite wisdom and benevolence has been consulted.

1st, Had man been made absolutely incapable of evil, he had not been made for wisdom, in choosing ends and means; had man been made incapable of wisdom, he had not been made for virtue, in voluntarily suffering a present evil in the contemplation of a future good. In that case, man had been made to act instinctively, like the brute animal, who is not made to do evil voluntarily, but only occasionally in pursuing his natural good. Now, man is made superior to the brute, in choosing wisely to do either good or evil. But as man, born a brute, has to learn his wisdom, he cannot act always in a wise design; therefore, though naturally made benevolent, he must occasionally be foolish, in willing unnecessary evil for his good. Hence it must appear, that, so far as man has been made for wisdom and for virtue, his constitution is in wisdom and benevolence; and that he is not malevolent, but capable of evil, in learning to be wise.

2dly, Had man been made incapable of willing moral evil, he would necessarily have been incapable of returning an offence, which could not then have come to pass; but, as man is made, occasionally in his folly, to give offence, it is in necessity that he should also refer those offences in his folly; and, it has been shown, that in his wisdom he refers not, though, for the sake of virtue, he ordains evil. Hence, in every view which we have taken of the subject, divine
divine wisdom and benevolence appear conspicuous in the constitution of the human mind.

9. Thus the perfect wisdom and benevolence of the Divine will, or Author of our nature, are reconciled, in the explanation of that folly and malice which is occasionally found in man. At the same time, we thus learn the art of making ourselves happy, in cultivating science, and promoting virtue; and we may avoid the misery of an anxious discontentment, and the melancholy which disgusting views of nature entertain; for, every thing in nature being beautiful and right, we have but to see this wise and benevolent order of things in the system of man, to be pleased with our condition, and contented in our intellectual existence.

10. We find, upon certain occasions, that we are subject to pain and anguish; from this nature shrinks, that is, we necessarily avoid the cause of our uneasiness. Here is the law of nature, the wisdom of the system in which we have our existence. If therefore we are pleased to exist, we must in reason be content with this constitution of our sensitive nature, by which, amidst continual causes of destruction, the being of the animal is preserved. Now, without the preservation of this sensitive animal, the intellectual being man could not, in the present system, have been informed, or proceed in the course of reason and thought.

From the moment of parturition, the animal begins to suffer pain; and, by this means, is made to live in breathing. Were the pain of suffocation in the animal to cease, he would upon a thousand occasions forget to breath; and thus lose his life for his neglect. The pleasure, that he feels in breathing, could not of itself preserve the animal from destruction, no more than could the pain of suffocation have, of itself, conducted the alternate action of the proper muscles to fulfill this vital function; but, the brute mind of the infant animal
animal being infliged by pain to make its muscles act, and by pleasure directed in the acting of those muscles, an end is attained by these means. These means, therefore, are in perfect wisdom, so far as the end is thus effected; and they are in perfect benevolence, so far as there is no more pain employed than what is absolutely necessary for the purpose, which is then, by pleasure, conducted to the proper end of its intention.

It must not be here allledged, that the breathing of the animal might have been conducted in a similar manner to that by which the planetary bodies are made to approach alternately and recede from the sun or center of their orbits, that is, by a cause merely material. If the breathing of the animal shall be supposed as actuated and directed by no other than a material cause, it would not be the action and passion of the animal which brought about the purposes of life; and, in that case, the passions and actions of animal life could no more conduce to educate mind, and produce the intellect of man, than does the operation of the water-mill, which grinds his corn, and prepares his cloth. The action of the fire engine moves the pumps, the operation of the bellows excites fire in the forge, in like manner the playing of the breast supplies fresh air to the lungs, and thus maintains the vital qualities of the blood; but, here is no question with regard to the chemical affections of matter, or to the mechanical construction of bodies. An animal body is now supposed to exist perfect in all its parts; and, by this means, a mind is to be informed, so as to think and reason. Now, if this animal body, which is subject to perish, shall be preserved in the same system of the sensitive being, by which mind in the system of intellect is made to know, here is consummate wisdom, in the contrivance of a system in which nothing superfluous is found.

Without knowledge there is no mind; but, without sense, there is no knowledge. Consequently, sensation is that in which mind, proceeding
proceeding to intellect, must be considered as having its beginning; and, the feeling of pain and pleasure is that by which the animal is conducted through every operation of his life.

Pain is the only misery to which the animal life is properly subjected; and, there is no doubt of pain being one of the wise means, provided in the bounty of the divine will, for the constitution of animal life. But, it may be made a question, how far it shall appear, that, in the system of animal life, there is that just proportion of pain which benevolence might have directed, upon the supposition of perfect wisdom.

Now, to whom shall we apply for the decision of this question? —Not surely to the wretch who is racked upon the wheel; the measure of his pain is the termination of his life; and had the intensity of his pain been less, the quantity of his suffering had been proportionably increased. Is it to the imaginary ailings of the hypochondriac, whose thoughts are tinged with the colour of his bile, that we are to listen? —His disease springs from the eady circumstances of his life, and his misery flows from false apprehension in his mind. Send him to the woods, — air and exercise will cure the animal part; banish him the social board, — natural necessity will change his sentiments of danger; and now he will employ his art and ingenuity, in order to support that life which he had meditated to destroy.

There is indeed a plaint to which we hardly can refuse to listen. Here a person is consumed with the cruel cancer; there another is tormented with the growing stone. Why does kind nature, in this case, give more pain than what seems necessary to the end in view? —But, are all the ends of nature known to the imperfect science of mankind? —Without the various diseases to which the animal constitution is casually subjected, perhaps — But, why conjecture, where
we cannot reason? Nature is benevolent as well as wise; evil is
contrived with the best intention; and now the only question is,
how far the quantity of pain and misery is proportioned, or not, to
the end in view. We therefore can only reason from those cases
where we know the end proposed; and, in other cases, where we
do not see to the extent of the design, we are to judge according to
the opinion which we may form in those where our information is
more complete.

In these cases, if on the one hand we are to suppose infinite power
and perfect wisdom in nature, we might accuse the intention of ma-
levolence in willing evil where she might have ordered good; if, on
the other hand, we are to suppose perfect benevolence in the cause
of things, then nature might be accused of folly, in willing that
which she has not power or wisdom to perform. There is but a
third supposition left for us to make, that is, That the Author of our
existence is a Being possessed of infinite power, wisdom, and good-
ness; consequently, that all things are contrived in the best manner
for the best of purposes; but that, in the progress of our being from
the brutish state of ignorance to the perfection of our acquired in-
telligence, we often err in the judgments which we form upon appear-
ances. Now the question is,—Which of those three propositions is
the true one.

In the study of natural and moral philosophy we will find, that
the cause of things has acted with a power and wisdom infinitely
beyond what we can conceive, and with a benevolence that is per-
fected, so far as we cannot conceive more goodness in the intention.
It therefore only now remains to consider, how far it is true, that
we often err in our judgments concerning things above our reach;
and how far, supposing this true, it should be considered as wise
and right. I believe no person will insist upon proving the first
part
part of the proposition; or if they should, this very difference of opinion would prove the truth of the assertion. Let us then see how far this is right.

Man certainly errs; therefore, it is in the intention of nature that man should err. But, is this intention of nature right, that is, wise and good? Certainly it is, so far as man, in being a scientific person, learns from his errors to form judgements that are true. Had man known without a cause he had not been the creature, but a self-existing and supreme being. But man being created and subordinate, he must proceed, from the brutish state or of simple capacity in which he is created, towards that perfection of intellect for which he is intended; he begins by misunderstanding things, and reasoning with folly, he ends in seeing truth and in reasoning wisely. What he may arrive at, we do not know; but, in all this progress we see nothing but wisdom and benevolence. Life is blocked up in all its avenues by pain; no free exit is found for the sensitive being. Yet, notwithstanding this barrier, there are found minds intrepid enough to force that guard; and, to a Cherokeean victim, the fire itself gives not half the anger or the anguish, as do the stings of a national reflection. This warrior sings on his funeral pile; and, while the savage hand of cruelty exerts its utmost cunning to torment, he scorns to grace the triumph of his enemy with a groan.

Is it to the innocent, that the suffering of fear should be made less? or is it to the virtuous, that the pain of death should be diminished? and, is it to the vicious or the guilty, that the rigour of every sensual endurance should be doubled?—yes; in reasoning according to the common sense of man, who is so apt to be deceived with appearances, when reasoning superficially on subjects which require the deepest speculation, and the surest principles; but deeper reflection shows him he has reasoned wrong.

Man suffers, as an animal, by pain. It is there that he is subjected.
ted to the law of mere necessity; and, it is there alone. But, man
rises superior to the animal, in knowing that which is due to him-
self; here, in the freedom of election, necessity is overcome; and,
it is in this career that man despises pain, when it comes in compe-
tition with what he values more than life. Who is it then that has
estimated every passion, which in the system of animal life and hu-
man intellect may arise? and, who shall impeach the system, in
which he has acquired wisdom, with the want of just discernment in
proportioning the laws of pain and pleasure?

Man is made to judge; but it is only when he reasons from just
principles that he judges without error. Man is made to err, as the
animal is made for pain; because, by pain the animal is conducted,
as the man by means of error is instructed.

But, man, who is originally ignorant, and occasionally erroneous,
often accuses the Author of his being of injustice, without consider-
ing who is the author of his judging. Shall wisdom be found per-
fect in the reasoning person man, and imperfect in the author of his
life and reason? Man certainly acquires his wisdom, in observing
ends and means which are in nature; but, it is not always that he
understands the wisdom of those ends and means which he perceives.
Is it for man, who learns to reason from nature, to challenge nature,
or pretend to improve that system which he only begins to under-
stand? As well might the brute clay determine, for itself, the form
and the capacity, which, under the potter's hand, shall rise upon the
turning wheel.

11. Man has wisdom, but not absolutely; he has it only on a certain
condition; this is, That he shall not be exempted from folly. Man,
who is wise in some degree, may often accuse himself of folly; but
he must not accuse his nature, which is made for wisdom. Neither
is it every species of folly with which man may reproach himself.
Folly,
OF HUMAN NATURE.

Folly, properly, is not the want of wisdom; the animal, who has no wisdom, has not folly. Folly is the neglect of wisdom, in man transgressing that knowledge of truth, or principle, which makes him wise. Folly, therefore, is the property of man; but it is not proper to human nature, as a thing made perfect, in having attained the end of its creation. The folly of man's conduct is employed by nature to correct his morals or philosophy, in like manner as error, or absurdity in his reasoning, serves to promote his science. Error and folly are, in nature, only so far as they are in man, who is in nature, but immediately in nature or distinct from man, no error is by man detected, no species or degree of folly is ever found. Error and folly are the means appointed, in the wisdom of the system, for the education of that intellectual capacity and moral perfection which is to be found in man. Man errs through ignorance, or it is in the defect of knowledge that he errs; but he is foolish in design. By experience, man perfects knowledge, or corrects his error; and, he thus arrives at more perfect wisdom, by means of folly and repentance. So far as this end shall be attained, in perfecting the intellect of man, folly ceases in the system; so far, again, as the means are still required, to banish folly would be nothing but the want of wisdom.

Wouldst thou be wise, O man, without knowing folly?—wouldst thou enjoy, without suffering?—thou mightest as well desire to move without muscles, and to see without eyes. The difference is no less than infinite between human wisdom, which is only relative, and the wisdom of nature, which is absolute and perfect. Man, in his wisdom, sometimes employs means, without wishing for the end which is by nature or neceflity annexed to those means; here therefore is either error in his science, or folly in his design; as when, for instance, he proposes pleasure in the excess of sensual enjoyment. In like manner, he attempts to bring about an end without the necessary means; as when, for example, he would be happy without being virtuous. Nature, again, never seeks an end without
just means, nor ever employs means that are unnecessary. All
nature's means are ends, her ends are means; that is to say, by us,
who see not to the end, nor from the beginning, each event, in the
system of evolving things, is naturally referred to the catalogue
either of ends or means, according as we see its connection with
those which are a parte ante or a parte post.

12. In the election of man, there is necessity; for, the ends which
he pursues, the means which he employs, are all determined by na-
ture, in the system of which nevertheless man has a choice. Science
is thus necessary in man, to know the ends and means of which he
has to choose; therefore, in choosing contrary to his known prin-
ciple, he betrays his folly; and, from that folly, he suffers in repen-
tance. But science, in nature, would be superfluous. Nature has
not any thing to learn; consequently, cannot act contrary to rule or
principle, which we attribute with impropiety to the cause of things.
Man reasons in necessity, as he hears or feels; because, nature has
appointed those means in the progress of his being; but, Where is
the necessity, by which the system of nature has been bounded?—
This cannot be conceived as placed any other where than in the vo-
lation of the Mind which is Supreme,—which has knowledge abso-
olute or unconditional,—and which has no occasion, like man, to em-
ploy the means of reason, in order to know the whole of things, or
what in thought is right and fit.

Nature is that with which the intellect of man is more immedi-
ately concerned; for, it is that from whence he is properly inform-
ed, and made to know, first, in the passion and action natural to his
mind, and, secondly, in the order of changing things, whereby he is
regularly affected in his knowledge. In nature, we with reason
suppose power infinite, and wisdom perfect; so far we may judge
of nature from the effect, which, though known in the passion of
our mind, is necessarily attributed or referred to a thing external.

Will,
Will, again, is a thing of which we only can have immediate knowledge from within, that is from the reflection of our own mind. Now, so far as we distinguish nature as different from us, we cannot have such immediate information of will in nature, as we have of power and wisdom in the works of nature by which we are informed. Nor is will commonly ascribed to nature, but to God, the cause of nature, or to nature's mind. It is therefore in nature that we see justice, power, wisdom, as being infinite or perfect; benevolence again is said to be divine; nor is there in benevolence degree; for, between benevolence and malevolence there is no mean. Hence, if man is made after the image of God, the superintending mind, he must be benevolent. But, man judges of the divine Being, only from what he feels in himself. If therefore man finds himself naturally benevolent, he necessarily attributes benevolence to the Author of his being.

Malice we find in man; but, man is not naturally malevolent. Man has malice occasionally, as he has anger, cowardice, or thirst. Had nature made man malevolent, she had given him intellect with an intention that were evil; had the mind of man been led immediately in pleasure to commit crime, or been naturally happy in the suffering of another, human wisdom had been employed only in the purposes of malice; and, in that case, no principle of virtue had ever taken root, whether in the more interested love of the praises and approbation of another, or in the pure and disinterested value of our own esteem.

Had human nature been made malevolent, man might have accused his author of malevolence. If, on the contrary, man naturally is benevolent, then, so far as in philosophy we reason from effect to cause, we must conclude benevolence in the Supreme Mind. But, benevolence necessarily excludes the contrary, in a being who is perfect; although, to a being who is proceeding from brute ignorance
to science, from mere capacity towards perfection, it may be natural to find wisdom only in degree, and folly along with malice occasionally in his design.

13. In thus explaining appearances, we find, that there is not in nature any evil that is absolute; for, all evil ultimately terminates in good; while good is positively good, is in itself absolute, and does not terminate in evil. Pain of body, misery of mind, these make up the sum of evil. But, it is with the most benevolent intention that those evils are contrived; for, thus the animal may have the means for preserving life, and man may be led to enjoy happiness. Therefore, neither in the system of animal life, nor in that of intellect, is there any evil. But, in the animal system, we find death; now, in this ordination of things, is there to be acknowledged any evil?

Death, in the animal, is proper; this change of things makes room for life. The multiplication of animal life, beyond the measure of its proper end, would be the error of superfluity. Death, therefore, is as necessary in the idea of the animal world, as change of place is in that of the planetary system. Death is no absolute evil; although the pain, by which life is guarded, be wisely, in the system of sensitive beings, made a motive that is supremely cogent. The animal must die; and, sickness or disease is proper only to that part of man, which, after it has served its purpose in the system, is no longer useful to the person who has been educated by it. In the common language of mankind, we may say, That this part of the material system then dissolves; and that it thus returns into the circulation of matter proper for animal life, again to serve the purpose of intellect, in affecting or informing man. In the language of science, again, we say, That this part of our constitution, in which we are informed by sense, is to be changed; and surely we have reason to believe, that, upon this occasion, the benevolent author of our being will dispose of us in his infinite power and wisdom.

14. In
In the human constitution, pain and misery are necessarily interwoven with pleasure and happiness; this however might have been either with a benevolent or malevolent intention, according as the quantity of the one or other should be considered as prevailing, or according as the one or other of those opposite affections should be considered as the end in view or object of intention. Now, does pain and misery, upon the whole, predominate?—ask not the philosopher who is only one of the many; take the sense of mankind in the suffrage of the people.

Is not mankind in general, or all the tribes on earth, happy in themselves, happy both in their domestic and political economies, and happy in the circumstances or situations of their life, from the burning desire to the frozen ocean? say, Where is misery? Is it among the Esquimaux?—that nation would not quit their barren frozen rocks to cultivate the fertile lands of Egypt. Is not the chief source of pain, among men, founded in the unreasonable pursuit of pleasure? and, Is not the greatest misery of man situated in himself, produced by his folly, and arising from the agonies of a wounded conscience?—If man has reason and reflection to conduct his intellect, and if he is a voluntary agent in choosing what upon the whole shall please him most, it is not possible that pain and misery can predominate; although man, in his folly, may be often disappointed in his views of happiness.

Does happiness and pleasure naturally lead to pain and misery? or does it necessarily conduct an intellectual agent, who has wisdom, to that end? Here is a question not suited to the fallacious testimony of vulgar views; but calculated for the dispassionate inquiry of a philosophical investigation. In solving this question, we are carefully to distinguish, on the one hand, the natural progress of an innocent mind, learning in experience to correct error, in order that it may form general principles of wisdom for its conduct, or for leading
ing it to happiness; and, on the other hand, the folly of a corrupted mind, acting against principle, in preferring a little present enjoyment to much future happiness, or sacrificing peace of conscience and continued happiness to the fleeting pleasure of an animal enjoyment. But, even in this last case, man is either instructed in his folly to be wiser in a future choice, or he has not made a choice which he thinks on the whole is evil; and therefore, not misery, but happiness predominates.

15. Evil is not without good intention. The anger of man has been implanted for the purpose of returning evil. But, evil intention, in the first cause, would be a supposition of absurdity; for, why create evil, unless it be for good? That question cannot be retorted, viz. Why create good, unless it be for evil?—good is created for its own sake, which is an idea inapplicable to evil. The self-existing Being must be supposed happy in his nature; for, unhappiness is precisely that which a voluntary being would not choose. But, if the Author of our being be happy in himself, the contrivance of good is in perfect consistence with his nature; and, in that case, pain and misery cannot exist without good cause, that is, without having in view a benevolent intention, for which these had been calculated in wisdom. The use to be made of this truth is to support our spirits under affliction, as knowing that almighty power and wisdom is employed for our good, however a present suffering may appear to be evil, or however we may judge that to be evil in the particular, which in the general, or the end, is good.

We may be assured, that every painful sufferance is only a temporary evil; and that there is a certain measure of pain, which necessarily removes the sense itself in which the pain is felt. Therefore, every animal endurance either contributes to pleasure in serving life, or shall be by death removed. The misery of our mind, again, depends not on our animal constitution; the most vigorous and healthy
healthy are equally subject to this species of sufferance as the weak-
east and infirm. But, what has death to do with the suffering of the
intellectual part?—Is death an end of human existence? Then, here
is an end of intellectual misery. Is death the beginning of a new
existence? Then, what has man to fear in ending life! Is that intel-
lectual progress of our mind, which had its beginning in life, to be
continued after death? then, misery of mind may be employed, as
at present, in order to lead our intellect where it may find a state of
happiness. Misery of mind is, in this life, contrived for the most
benevolent purpose, and has ultimately in view nothing but the hap-
piness of man. But, shall he who is the author of our happiness, in
the present part of our existence, be considered as ordering a state of
unhappiness in that which is to come, unless it were for good? we
might just as well suppose the elements of fire and water to inter-
change their offices in nature, or that the body, which falls to the
ground to day, shall to-morrow move in a line directed from the
center to the zenith.

16. To affirm, that there is to be no misery in a future state,
would be an unreasonable supposition, and without a proper end or
purpose. As to animal pain, it requires no argument to be convi-
ced, that this exists not in a future state, where the animal is sup-
posed to be no more; and if, in the wisdom of the all-disposing
Power, there is to be misery in a future state, we must, in reasoning
from the present state, be assured that the intention of that suffering
will be in benevolence.

If, in this life, the guilt of crime had not been attended with a
misery, which in the conscience of a reflecting mind should have af-
flicted, no rule could have been formed in relation to that future
state of our existence. For, to have made beings, from animals ac-
tuated by the sense of pleasure and pain, to become voluntary agents,
knowing good and evil, without giving them in repentance a pain-
ful sense or miserable reflection in order to reform the motives of their conduct, had been a system deficient in wisdom, justice, and benevolence. In that case, there had not been a moral system, provided as an end for human intellect; there had not been a sense of happiness attained in the path of virtue. Therefore, we could not then have drawn an argument, as at present, from a system of perfect wisdom, justice, and benevolence; nor could the power of human reason have formed a conclusion with regard to a future existence, or a state of intellectual happiness, beyond the pleasure of the animal, which in death is at an end.

Here then, in reasoning with all the light of our present science, we must conclude, that man, without the intellectual enjoyment of a virtuous principle, and the flings of an offended conscience, had only been a brute, excited to reason from his appetite of pleasure, and his sense of pain; and that, to have given man science and wisdom, without a sense of intellectual beauty, and of natural benevolence, would, in a Being of absolute power, have been the malice of intention, or, in one capable of rational science, been an absurdity, such as we often find in man. But as, in human intellect, we find a progress of mind, or existence, beyond the animal state in which it had a beginning, we may conclude, that nature has not formed this amazing structure of human intellect in vain; nor that, in the end which Divine wisdom has intended for this being, there can be either malice or injustice.

We may also draw a practical inference; That, so far as man is a mere sensualist, he is not made for any other enjoyment, and therefore has nothing to expect from a future state. But let us suppose an intellectual or moral agent (which is the nature of man) to violate the principles of his rational constitution, in order to procure either pleasure or an unjust usurpation of power, that man, who is conscious of having violated the laws of God, and of having in folly forfeited
forfeited his right to true happiness, has not, in the prospect of a future state, that hope and consolation which a virtuous conduct must inspire. How much is such a vicious person to be pitied! We suppose him seeing the folly of his former conduct, and regretting that he has not an opportunity of reforming; he suffers the stings of conscience which pursues him to his grave; and he dies in misery, or with the dreadful apprehension of what may be his fate.

17. The animal man must die; the progress of his nature would not permit him to live long, if he had the power of preserving life to the utmost period at pleasure, as he has that of giving it an untimely end. But, as we have the power of voluntarily putting a period to life, it is surely not without good reason that the system of the animal is naturally preserved by pain, and life guarded in the human intellect with apprehension.

-Man, become superior to the prejudices of his animal life, and enlightened by the principles of philosophy, should consider death not as a natural evil, but as the period of that life which is intended for the education of his intellectual existence. But, this education of man is not a task, it is a pleasure; the improvement of the mind, which is its education, is no less attended with satisfaction and enjoyment, than is the nutrition and salutary operations of the animal. If there is thus pleasure or enjoyment in the education of man, that is, in the improvement of his mind, then, in the wise system of nature, there must be pain or misery in the want of that scientific progress which his soul desires. Hence that languor of diseased minds; that *tedium vitae* which corrodes the idle mind of unemployed intellect.

Man is thus led to knowledge by a natural desire, and by a pleasure which he finds in the satisfaction: He is also led to wisdom by the happiness he receives from having power; and he is deterred
from folly by the misery which the conscious want of wisdom must procure. As, therefore, wisdom and folly may be exercised in an indefinite number of different subjects, and in endless degrees, the life of man comes to be variously chequered with happiness and misery; although the general tendency of all is to procure wisdom, and the certain effect of wisdom is to promote his happiness. He, therefore, that would be happy, should learn to be wise. To merit the happiness of a man, a person must not only have that wisdom, which to an end in view provides the means; he ought also to be wise enough to seek an end, which, being accomplished, will procure him happiness. This is the happiness to which man may properly attain, as forming to himself an independent enjoyment, the privilege of his nature, which is that of a wise person, or a voluntary agent.

But how is this end to be attained? Whether is it to be found in the precarious suppositions of erroneous man, or in studying the laws of nature, in understanding that system which is absolutely wise, and that constitution in which all things have been devised in supreme benevolence, as well as executed with power which has no limit?

18. If man shall think it reasonable to follow his own imaginations, instead of considering for what purpose he is made, then, let him set his heart on riches. Let him, in the summit of his wisdom and the glory of his strength, go to the fertile countries of the east, where long continued industry hath accumulated wealth; there, like the Persian plunderer, let him ravage Indostan.—But, for what?—to have the happiness of scattering, in the north of Europe, what had been gathered in the south of Asia.—Is that a motive for a being who is proud of his wisdom? A much more grand and pious task it were, to return the Pyramids of Egypt to the bosom of the earth, from whence they had been taken.
Is power and conquest thy ambition?—look to the Hero who set out from Macedon; Is he satisfied and happy in the success of his conquest?—No; like the unfortunate who hates to think on himself, he stiles misery of mind in dissipation, and drowns his consciousness in the debauch of wine.

Would you renounce the very charter of humanity, and, with nothing but a brutal appetite, indulge in sensual pleasure, with all the avidity of erroneous science?—What would you, hence propose?—To increase the enjoyments of sense, by forcing every capacity for pleasure; and, to avert all disagreeable ideas, in avoiding serious reflection.—Deluded man! at the age of wisdom, you have arrived at the perfection of your folly. Can you increase the pleasure of eating food, by gorging your stomach, and paling your brute appetite? or, Can you augment the voluptuousness of sensual pleasure, in exhausting the vigour of animal inclination? Is there, on the one hand, any sensual pleasure, in the human constitution, which, inordinately pursued, ends not naturally in disgust, and leads not necessarily to disease? and, Is there, on the other hand, any animal satisfaction that virtue will corrupt, and that temperance will not strengthen?—If this is so, then, by pursuing pleasure in the folly of your science, you diminish happiness in the enjoyment of your nature; you have the perpetual misery of an anxious desire, because you have learned to desire that which is not in nature to bestow; and, you have the constant forfeit of a loathed pleasure, because you have not learned to abstain in order that you may enjoy.

Thus, with a view to discover that end which is to lead to happiness, we are to study the natural constitution of man; compare him with the brute animal, that we may know the duty of our being; and, in knowing that which makes us happy, act the part of noble minds, despising an inferior pleasure, and being the independent authors of their proper happiness. We shall find, for example, that,
in private life, friendship and benevolence form the source of social happiness; while again, in public stations, it is virtue and wisdom that may requite the pains of serving others with the approbation of a person's self, and the reflection of a pleased conscience. To see this with all the evidence of science, we must in the study of ourself remount to principle. But, being once convinced that it is our interest to be virtuous, it is impossible to be vicious from choice. That is to say, study, properly directed, must procure wisdom; and, wisdom necessarily conducts to happiness, or the enjoyment of our nature, in giving rules by which we learn to temperate the violence of animal passion, and to enflame the natural affections of the human species.

Man is by nature made to love his species; hence a source of happiness in the social intercourse of man. Next to the pleasing of himself, nothing is so agreeable to man as the pleasing of his neighbour; man is made happy with the approbation of his species, he is delighted with their love and admiration. But man, not wise enough, designs in folly; and, in aiming directly at the love and admiration of one part of mankind, he often forfeits the esteem and countenance of another; thus, instead of gaining, he loses that approbation of his species which he desires. It is in this manner that ingratitude, injustice, and oppression, are introduced into the system of nature, without being properly, or immediately, the operation of that system.

Nature has made man just, amiable, and benevolent; folly, again, has made him transgress the laws of nature, which are calculated for his happiness. But, folly itself is calculated for the good of man, who in repentance is made wise. Therefore, nature has contrived a system of virtue for the happiness of man; and, it is in seeing the order of this system, that man seeks intellectual happiness at the expense of every animal pleasure, and at the peril of his animal existence. What makes the zealous proselyte to every mystery, encounter hardships with unwearied patience? What makes the voluntary martyr
martyr to every faith, suffer the extremity of evil?—It is because they have the power of forming, to themselves, a system of thought which gives them happiness. What made Cato the philosopher so rigid in the cause of public virtue?—It was the love of system, or the enthusiasm of government. What makes virtue amiable in every eye capable of seeing truth?—It is the love of order and design, joined to the law of natural benevolence. Human nature, therefore, is the cause of virtue; and, virtue is naturally the cause of happiness.

19. Man is the only animal who has a system of knowledge, or of existence, perfectly independent of that information by which he first began to be, and by which he had been made to know. The intellectual system, in which man exists, is a thing distinctly different from the animal system, from whence it came; it is often pursued, in direct opposition to the animal system; and, therefore, it may subsist independent of the senses, by which the animal system had been formed. If this is the case, sense, ease, and pleasure, must form the perfect system or happiness of the animal; while knowledge, virtue, and philosophy, forms that of man. Hence it will appear, that the order of nature is, to form the philosopher from the animal man; and not, on the contrary, to form the animal from the man of science. This is the wise order of nature, who has made brute reason to precede that of science and philosophy; who has made philosophy subservient to happiness; and who has thus benevolently ordained happiness as the end, or ultimate, in the intention of the being man.

Man is a compound of animal life, and intellectual capacity. He has therefore to act both as an animal, and a man; and it happens, that the interests of those two parts sometimes interfere. In that case, man makes his election; whether to gratify the intellectual being, or the animal; whether to suffer as an animal, or as a man. Man is naturally an animal, that is, he is first a brute; and it is on-
ly in the scientific or artificial progress of his mind that he becomes a man. Hence, on all occasions, man makes his election, in proportion to the progress of his mind; and, he prefers his intellectual enjoyment to his animal pleasure, only in proportion as he knows the difference and has tasted of that enjoyment which he naturally had not, or of which, as an animal, he can have no idea.

Man, thus enjoying himself, or his own nature, and the beauty of that system in which he exists, then desires to increase his happiness, in making others happy; he forms an artificial system of morals, for those who cannot see the system of virtue; and he enforces this moral system by the cogent motive of sensual pain, for those who are too ignorant of the beauty of virtue to be affected by it, and too insensitive of intellectual misery to follow nature in her system of happiness. Hence is derived the artificial system of morals, contrived by the intellect of man for the benefit of his species, who are misled by folly, and corrupted by example. It is in this system, that we may distinguish private and public virtue; the one founded in the law of natural benevolence, which is instinctive, or implanted by the Author of our being; the other in the love of wisdom, justice, government, which is a scientific view, a generalisation of our particular pleasures, and a complication of various thoughts, in order to produce happiness in our reflection.

20. It thus appears, that the end and intention of man is to be happy in himself, to be pleased in his own reflection, and to enjoy in thought, that is, independently of any thing which happens in the material system: Not that he can produce to himself happiness, without being informed from an external cause; but because his intellectual happiness consists in his proper thought,—in his reflection upon that knowledge which he has formed by the faculties of his mind, while those faculties are conducted by an external agent, who is no otherwise known than in being the author of our knowledge.
Sect. VIII.

OF HUMAN NATURE.

Man is therefore made happy, upon all occasions, not in following blindly his own imaginations, which lead him into error and confusion; but, in pursuing truth, and obeying the laws of nature, which lead him, first, into the pursuit of pleasure, and the enjoyment of animal life, and, secondly, into conscious happiness, and the approbation of his own mind. This is the proper end of his natural constitution, and the benevolent intention of his Author.

Man is a voluntary agent, in having it in his option to pursue happiness; either, on the one hand, blindly and impatiently, in seeking that immediate pleasure which perishes in the enjoyment; or, on the other, by the patient application of his acquired talents, to find the regulated order of happiness, which he has often to attain through present sufferance and apparent misery. If man is ignorant, he is but a brute; and, in that case, he could have no other misery or enjoyment than what is proper to the animal. Such a being as this could not have it in his power to inform himself. Man, however, is not such a being. But, though man is not absolutely ignorant, as is the brute, he is so, more or less; and, in proportion as he is informed or uninformed, so is he susceptible, either in a greater or a less degree, of both misery and happiness.

Happiness consists, not in feeling pleasure, but in knowing the pleasure which we feel. Had happiness consisted in the feeling of pleasure, misery had been placed in the feeling of pain. Here, indeed, we may bring the argument to an issue. The question is not, If pain be misery. Certain degrees of pain become intolerable, consequently suffer not the mind to enjoy in thought where happiness is placed. But the question is, If misery be pain; and this must be answered in the negative. Here reference must be made to every person's feeling. Those who know no other misery but that which flows from pain, need not, will not read this book, which teaches to enjoy the knowledge of our knowledge. To those, again, who
know the nature of their happiness, it would be unnecessary to point out the nature of their misery. But, to such as may be considered as in a middle state, not ignorant of misery, nor yet having the science of their happiness, I would recommend the reflecting on those miserable moments in which they may have suffered, though they felt no pain.

It must not be here alledged, that pain is misery, and misery is pain; that is to say, that it is all one whether my flesh be cut, or my conscience prick me to the quick. We are here treating of happiness; and it is asserted, that it is not simple pain which constitutes unhappiness or misery. Pleasure must not be confounded with happiness, nor misery with pain. Pain is an accident to which animal life is properly subjected; misery is an accident to which human nature is made liable for the best of purposes. But, here is no question at present with regard to the final cause of misery, but to that which is efficient; and it is now required to shew, that the efficient cause of misery, i.e. human misery, is not pain. Now, this will appear by considering, that an action may be repented of which had actually procured pleasure. If, therefore, a free agent may repent what he had done on purpose to procure pleasure; and if, in repentance, there is misery to a knowing being, then, there is a misery, in the cause of which no degree of pain has entered; and, there is a misery which no pleasure can blot out of a reflecting mind.

Though knowledge be thus essential to a being who is to become happy in the perfection of his nature, misery is not the portion of ignorance; nor is happiness that of simple information. In every degree of information, man, who acts voluntarily from a conscious motive, acquires either happiness or misery, according as he makes a wise or foolish election of those motives which are in his choice; if he elects in wisdom, he enjoys in his reflection; if he elects in folly,
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folly, he suffers in repentance. In proportion, therefore, as man is capable of suffering, he is made capable to enjoy.

Such is the justice of the system; the benevolence is no less conspicuous. In proportion as man suffers in his folly, he has the means of being made more wise. But, in proportion as man is made wise, he has in himself the proper means of happiness. It is not in the power of man to conceive benevolence more perfect, or a constitution of things more worthy of our love and admiration.

21. The system of intellect, as well as that of matter, appears to be contrived in justice, wisdom, and benevolence; and the end or intention of this benevolent design is to form the happiness of beings whose constitution is knowledge, and who are made to enjoy the progress of their nature, which is by reflection. Man, therefore, enjoys the study of nature; and he arrives at the knowledge of those laws which exhibit wisdom in the contrivance, and justice in the execution. Man is made happy in obeying the laws of justice and benevolence, without knowing the beauty of those laws; but when, besides the instinctive obedience to nature's wisdom and benevolence, man acquires the knowledge of his nature, and admires the wisdom and benevolence of his Author, then, like the creator of system, he becomes the cause of happiness, in giving moral laws. It is then that man joins to his wisdom power; not in moving the brute matter of this earth, nor offending nature by giving pain, but in removing prejudice and error, and proclaiming the great law of God,—Let man be just and happy.

Thus it will appear, that though, in the natural state of the animal mind, man properly exists not, and has done nothing in the formation of his own capacities, no more than, in the animal oeconomy, he has distributed his nerves, and proportioned his muscles, yet, in the artificial state, where the wisdom of the individual is perfected in
in the progress of the species, man may be truly said to have made himself. Man makes himself, so far as he trains his species to give a voluntary obedience to those laws of justice and benevolence which nature had implanted in him for his good, laws which are known by man in his reflection on himself, and which are only understood in science, analysing knowledge, and knowing principles for judging wisely. It is thus that man says, in his wisdom,—this shall be a cunning and an artful people,—that an honest, sober, and industrious race,—here intrepidity and hardy courage shall prevail,—there gentleness, indolence, and timidity,—this nation shall be burlishly ignorant and superfluous,—that enlightened, learned, and rational. He makes man what he pleases, within the range of those capacities which are made in man by nature, but which are disposed at the will of man. Hence man the philosopher, man the citizen, is made by man; man the savage, man the animal, is made by nature; who also made man thus to make himself.

Hence a clear distinction of man, on the one hand, who is capable of making himself, in determining the character of man; and, on the other, of the animal on which man the scientific person is ingrafted; of a certain being, who is led immediately by the principle of sensation, and who knows no other good than the enjoyment which ultimately has a reference to that principle; and of another being, who is only led remotely in his conduct by that principle of sensation, as he is more immediately determined by an intellectual sense of happiness and misery; a being who is not only sensible to animal good and evil, but who also makes the distinction of those things in the abstract, by comparing animal good with that which is intellectual; and who thus, in his science, forms a system of morality for the general happiness of his species, as well as for the particular enjoyment of his own reflection. Therefore, in thus acting for the sake of others, in forming system for the conduct of a future race, and in receiving satisfaction or enjoyment in the contemplation
tion of this order in his intellect, man raises himself above his species, that is, above the generality of mankind, of which again the lowest degree, properly called man, may be considered as infinitely above the animal, who acts instinctively by reason for the simple purpose of his life.

22. Therefore, properly speaking, the nature of man is not that of an instinctive animal; at the same time, so long as he lives, man must continue, in some measure, under the necessity of instinctive action. Urged by famine, he becomes faint; hurt by fire or sword, he feels pain; therefore, when he is instigated by pain, or allured by pleasure, nature prompts the man to act, or to forbear; but, science, or what is commonly termed reason, often interferes with the instinctive sentiment of the animal, when conscious happiness is to be preferred to sensual satisfaction. It is here that wisdom characterizes man, in seeing causes, and foreseeing events, in which his happiness or misery may be concerned.

Man is made naturally benevolent; he loves to please his neighbour, and hates to see the misery of his fellow creature. This is the instinctive principle by which man is naturally actuated, when not excited to anger by offence; and this instinctive principle still operates on the man, when arrived at science, or directed by his intellect to overcome that motive. Is not the jailor tempted by his humanity to neglect his duty? Is not the virtuous parent prompted often to relax that discipline which is intended for the benefit of his child, and to indulge the fondness of affection, when he knows that the opposite is necessary for the morals of his pupil? Is not the sovereign sometimes enticed, from the love of mercy, to sacrifice justice, and thus to wrong the many, for the sake of human tenderness? Here is the frailty of man, still actuated by instinctive principle, in opposition to reason or his intellectual motive. Human
Human nature is founded on reflected knowledge, which in the order of science becomes infinite. In this course of science, therefore, man, who was an animal, begins a new career, in which surely there is something to be acquired, if nature has contrived in wisdom, and operates not in vain. What then has nature provided man to seek for in the course of his scientifical career?—wisdom. But, what is the end of wisdom?—happiness. The end of wisdom is not surely to procure animal pleasure; although man, in his folly, perverts the intention of nature, by pursuing animal pleasure beyond the very bounds of sense, on which it is founded. If animal pleasure is the proper end of wisdom, in that case, either the brute must be a wise personage, or he cannot be supposed to enjoy animal pleasure. Sensual desires require not wisdom in order to be satisfied; but, it requires wisdom to guard against the deceitful, though scientifical, idea of multiplying sensual pleasures in the unnecessary satisfaction of artificial desires.

Sensual pleasures in the hands of man, who in his imperfect science is actuated by folly, often change from good to evil. But man, in his wisdom, often foregoes the satisfaction of a sensual pleasure, for the enjoyment of one that is refined. Here, then, is a competition of things in the esteem of man; these are, sensual pleasures, on the one hand, and those that are intellectual, on the other. If, therefore, there are pleasures independent of sense, and situated in reflection; if there is happiness to be attained in the exercise of mental faculties, as animal pleasure is derived through the sense, then, here is the end of human nature, to enjoy in knowledge; here is the system of nature, to make man happy in himself, independent of those animal pleasures which he may nevertheless enjoy.

Hence may be observed a gradual progression of man, from the brute state in which he once had his being, to the enlightened understanding in which he is first supreme among the animals, and then
then superior to that sovereign animal, by creating system in his happiness. Man thus arrives at supreme intelligence, or aspires at attributes which are divine; attributes which are conceived in the progress of his science, and which, with the eye of intellect, are to be perceived as perfect in the Supreme Being, the cause of action and existence.

23. If happiness is thus the end, or in the purpose of human life, and if man thus by himself attains to this end, in wisely electing the course which nature, in giving him capacities, has intended that he should pursue, then, misery must be the departure from that right line of wisdom, and the perversion of his upright nature in the foolish pursuit of the phantom pleasure. In this case, man suffers for his folly; but, he is not punished for his fault, in feeling the vengeance of an offended Sovereign. For, in order to be punished with justice, man ought, in transgressing, to have willed evil; but, in wanting wisdom, man is not malevolent; and, in not choosing the right way to happiness, man foolishly desires immediate pleasure; this is his very constitution, and cannot be repented by the benevolent Author of his happiness.

Misery is the natural portion of man's folly; or, repentance necessarily follows the transgression of the wise intention, the just laws, of nature. But this, in the system of human nature, is the height of benevolence; in like manner as, with respect to animal life, pain is contrived in consummate wisdom, for the purpose of preserving life. Had animal action been directed by pleasure alone, or man's moral conduct by nothing but intellectual happiness, the end had either been neglected or precarious; but having, in the right line, either animal pleasure or intellectual happiness, and in every deviation, pain or misery, the end is attained in the wisdom of adapted means, and the means are chosen in the benevolence of the end to be attained.

It
It will thus appear, that it is unjust, or erroneous, to accuse the Author of human nature with malevolence, or to suppose the sovereign power as being angry, and avenging wrong, which has no place in nature. Man, in transgressing nature's laws, offends himself; and conscience, in avenging the injustice of man's conduct, may be said to punish the offence, in justifying the order of the system. In this constitution of man, the wisdom and benevolence of the system is conspicuous; for, while vice in the experience of folly is corrected, crime finds its punishment in an offended conscience. But, if the commission of crime gives misery, and if humanity gives happiness in reflection, What greater security can be contrived for the beneficence of voluntary agents? Or what more convincing evidence can be exhibited, for the actual existence of supreme wisdom and benevolence.

Let not nature therefore, in the ignorance of man, be accused of having created folly, and produced evil, on purpose to give misery to that being who often judges without wisdom. Nature has made the effects of folly to man disgusting; and has ordained, that his willing of evil should be followed with a conscious misery. Such is also the benevolence of this system of nature, that ignorance, in human intellect, is not attended with the sense of misery, no more than a dead body is sensible of pain or lesion; and, as the willing of no action gives the consciousnes of evil to a mind in the brute state, so, to the feeling of this being, no misery is provided in the stings of conscience, which is only formed in a scientific mind. To know, is the property of animal beings; but conscience, or reflection on his motives, is the prerogative of man. It is only in thus reflecting consciously or scientifically on his knowledge, that man comes to acquire wisdom, and then is made, either to suffer misery, in the repentance of his folly, or to enjoy happiness in the approbation of his virtue.
24. As, in natural things, the wisdom observed in the end attained directs the human intellect to become powerful in acquiring wisdom, so, in the moral system, man contrives laws of conditional event, after the example of nature; and, in his wisdom, he deters his species from the commission of crime and the intention of evil, by means of virtuous education to the youth, and exemplary punishment to the transgression of that which it is the general interest to observe.

Hence, the end of human virtue, as being in the system of nature, is to make man happy; and the effect of virtue, as being in the wisdom of man, is to secure happiness. But, in this virtue, there are various degrees; the man who in a prudent temperance avoids every personal danger, surely cannot compare with the virtuous citizen, who, when he thinks the state in danger, nobly sacrifices to his country’s safety every personal concern. Thus we shall acknowledge, that there is both simple and supreme virtue: The virtue in which there is for object a man’s personal concern, is simple in comparison with that in which virtue has for object public order and general felicity. It will therefore appear that there is, what may be considered as more than simple virtue, in the learning a people to be wise; in like manner, there is more than simple wisdom, in making the virtue of a people the object of our happiness.

But, if man may arrive at this perfection of his intellect, in which the pleasures of his animal nature are considered as subservient to the satisfaction of his thought, and his own enjoyment as involved in the happiness of others, he must become a very different person from him, who, in the error of his science, considers the pleasures of his sense as the sources of his happiness, and his personal gratifications as the bring of all his actions. The one is an animal become wise, in order only to corrupt the instinctive benevolence of
his nature; the other is a being become virtuous, in order to improve the man of nature, who is instinctively benevolent. The one is a person who is only partially wise, and who has thus learned to subdue the natural benevolence of man, in order to serve, either the brutal appetite of the animal, or the ill advised gratification of a pleasure which ends in disgust. The other is a person perfectly wise, in having learned the full enjoyment of every natural pleasure, and the preference of those joys which do not decay. Here then is philosophy, or a state of mind contrived by nature as the perfection of science in man, who thus loves wisdom for its own sake, in knowing that virtue is the perfection of his nature; and here is the summit of human art, training the ignorant to virtuous principle, in the habit of acquired morals, and teaching the learned to be wise, in knowing the principles of those virtuous habits in which they are made to consult their general happiness.

Here is a system of created beings, in which is displayed unquestionable marks of divine benevolence. Here is observed, in the human intellect, an order of things which appear to be conceived in wisdom, to be the work of unmeasurable power, and to be executed with a justice that is perfect. Who can behold this system of intellect, without feeling the deepest admiration of its beauty? Who can observe the benevolent intention of Omnipotence, without feeling a confidence in the laws of nature, wherein man exists? And who can feel the blessings of life, and happiness of a pleased conscience, without an effusion of gratitude, which contributes to make him still more happy?

Therefore, whether man studies the perfection of his own nature, in seeing the divine system of wisdom and benevolence in which his being is contrived; or whether he adores the Supreme Being, as the Author, both of that perfection which in his science he
he perceives, and of that enjoyment which he finds in the perfection of his nature, he is necessarily led to, wisdom, in his knowledge, and power; over nature, in his wisdom; and to happiness, in the ascendant of his intellectual enjoyment; over that which is merely sensual in his nature.

His is a life of existence, in which he is the subject of pleasure, which is the reward of the exercise of his mind. The power of his mind in directing the pleasures which he enjoys, is the result of his knowledge of himself, and the belief and experience of the power which he has, to control his own actions, and to act wisely, to know the principles of his nature, and to act accordingly. He is a wise man, knowing the principles of those universal rules in which they are made to conform their general happiness.

Here is a view of the principles, in which is his glory, which he can make use of to conform to the rules of wisdom, to regulate his actions, and to act wisely, to know the principles of his nature, and to act accordingly. He is a wise man, knowing the principles of those universal rules in which they are made to conform their general happiness.